| Message ID | 20240802-remove-cred-transfer-v1-1-b3fef1ef2ade@google.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | Superseded |
| Delegated to: | Paul Moore |
| Headers | show |
| Series | [RFC] security/KEYS: get rid of cred_alloc_blank and cred_transfer | expand |
On Fri Aug 2, 2024 at 4:10 PM EEST, Jann Horn wrote: > cred_alloc_blank and cred_transfer were only necessary so that keyctl can > allocate creds in the child and then asynchronously have the parent fill > them in and apply them. > > Get rid of them by letting the child synchronously wait for the task work > executing in the parent's context. This way, any errors that happen in the > task work can be plumbed back into the syscall return value in the child. > > Note that this requires using TWA_SIGNAL instead of TWA_RESUME, so the > parent might observe some spurious -EGAIN syscall returns or such; but the > parent likely anyway has to be ready to deal with the side effects of > receiving signals (since it'll probably get SIGCHLD when the child dies), > so that probably isn't an issue. > > Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> > --- > This is a quickly hacked up demo of the approach I proposed at > <https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAG48ez2bnvuX8i-D=5DxmfzEOKTWAf-DkgQq6aNC4WzSGoEGHg@mail.gmail.com/> > to get rid of the cred_transfer stuff. Diffstat looks like this: > > include/linux/cred.h | 1 - > include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 3 --- > include/linux/security.h | 12 ------------ > kernel/cred.c | 23 ----------------------- > security/apparmor/lsm.c | 19 ------------------- > security/keys/internal.h | 8 ++++++++ > security/keys/keyctl.c | 100 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------------------------------------------------------- > security/keys/process_keys.c | 86 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------------------------- > security/landlock/cred.c | 11 ++--------- > security/security.c | 35 ----------------------------------- > security/selinux/hooks.c | 12 ------------ > security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 32 -------------------------------- > 12 files changed, 82 insertions(+), 260 deletions(-) > > What do you think? Synchronously waiting for task work is a bit ugly, > but at least this condenses the uglyness in the keys subsystem instead > of making the rest of the security subsystem deal with this stuff. Why does synchronously waiting is ugly? Not sarcasm, I genuineily interested of breaking that down in smaller pieces. E.g. what disadvantages would be there from your point of view? Only trying to form a common picture, that's all. > > Another approach to simplify things further would be to try to move > the session keyring out of the creds entirely and just let the child > update it directly with appropriate locking, but I don't know enough > about the keys subsystem to know if that would maybe break stuff > that relies on override_creds() also overriding the keyrings, or > something like that. > --- > include/linux/cred.h | 1 - > include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 3 -- > include/linux/security.h | 12 ----- > kernel/cred.c | 23 ---------- > security/apparmor/lsm.c | 19 -------- > security/keys/internal.h | 8 ++++ > security/keys/keyctl.c | 100 +++++++++++------------------------------- > security/keys/process_keys.c | 86 +++++++++++++++++++----------------- > security/landlock/cred.c | 11 +---- > security/security.c | 35 --------------- > security/selinux/hooks.c | 12 ----- > security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 32 -------------- > 12 files changed, 82 insertions(+), 260 deletions(-) Given the large patch size: 1. If it is impossible to split some meaningful patches, i.e. patches that transform kernel tree from working state to another, I can cope with this. 2. Even for small chunks that can be split into their own logical pieces: please do that. Helps to review the main gist later on. > > diff --git a/include/linux/cred.h b/include/linux/cred.h > index 2976f534a7a3..54b5105d4cd5 100644 > --- a/include/linux/cred.h > +++ b/include/linux/cred.h > @@ -147,13 +147,12 @@ struct cred { > } __randomize_layout; > > extern void __put_cred(struct cred *); > extern void exit_creds(struct task_struct *); > extern int copy_creds(struct task_struct *, unsigned long); > extern const struct cred *get_task_cred(struct task_struct *); > -extern struct cred *cred_alloc_blank(void); > extern struct cred *prepare_creds(void); > extern struct cred *prepare_exec_creds(void); > extern int commit_creds(struct cred *); > extern void abort_creds(struct cred *); > extern const struct cred *override_creds(const struct cred *); > extern void revert_creds(const struct cred *); > diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h > index 855db460e08b..1d75075cb607 100644 > --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h > +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h > @@ -204,18 +204,15 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_receive, struct file *file) > LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_open, struct file *file) > LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_post_open, struct file *file, int mask) > LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_truncate, struct file *file) > LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_alloc, struct task_struct *task, > unsigned long clone_flags) > LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, task_free, struct task_struct *task) > -LSM_HOOK(int, 0, cred_alloc_blank, struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp) > LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, cred_free, struct cred *cred) > LSM_HOOK(int, 0, cred_prepare, struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, > gfp_t gfp) > -LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, cred_transfer, struct cred *new, > - const struct cred *old) > LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, cred_getsecid, const struct cred *c, u32 *secid) > LSM_HOOK(int, 0, kernel_act_as, struct cred *new, u32 secid) > LSM_HOOK(int, 0, kernel_create_files_as, struct cred *new, struct inode *inode) > LSM_HOOK(int, 0, kernel_module_request, char *kmod_name) > LSM_HOOK(int, 0, kernel_load_data, enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents) > LSM_HOOK(int, 0, kernel_post_load_data, char *buf, loff_t size, > diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h > index 1390f1efb4f0..a366c2a03f55 100644 > --- a/include/linux/security.h > +++ b/include/linux/security.h > @@ -421,16 +421,14 @@ int security_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk, > int security_file_receive(struct file *file); > int security_file_open(struct file *file); > int security_file_post_open(struct file *file, int mask); > int security_file_truncate(struct file *file); > int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long clone_flags); > void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task); > -int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp); > void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred); > int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp); > -void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old); > void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid); > int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid); > int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode); > int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name); > int security_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents); > int security_kernel_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size, > @@ -1117,32 +1115,22 @@ static inline int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, > return 0; > } > > static inline void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task) > { } > > -static inline int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp) > -{ > - return 0; > -} > - > static inline void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred) > { } > > static inline int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, > const struct cred *old, > gfp_t gfp) > { > return 0; > } > > -static inline void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, > - const struct cred *old) > -{ > -} > - > static inline void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid) > { > *secid = 0; > } > > static inline int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *cred, u32 secid) > diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c > index 075cfa7c896f..b2f6130cd6b7 100644 > --- a/kernel/cred.c > +++ b/kernel/cred.c > @@ -163,35 +163,12 @@ const struct cred *get_task_cred(struct task_struct *task) > > rcu_read_unlock(); > return cred; > } > EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_task_cred); > > -/* > - * Allocate blank credentials, such that the credentials can be filled in at a > - * later date without risk of ENOMEM. > - */ > -struct cred *cred_alloc_blank(void) > -{ > - struct cred *new; > - > - new = kmem_cache_zalloc(cred_jar, GFP_KERNEL); > - if (!new) > - return NULL; > - > - atomic_long_set(&new->usage, 1); > - if (security_cred_alloc_blank(new, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT) < 0) > - goto error; > - > - return new; > - > -error: > - abort_creds(new); > - return NULL; > -} > - > /** > * prepare_creds - Prepare a new set of credentials for modification > * > * Prepare a new set of task credentials for modification. A task's creds > * shouldn't generally be modified directly, therefore this function is used to > * prepare a new copy, which the caller then modifies and then commits by > diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c > index 808060f9effb..089d53978d9e 100644 > --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c > +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c > @@ -74,39 +74,22 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct aa_local_cache, aa_local_buffers); > static void apparmor_cred_free(struct cred *cred) > { > aa_put_label(cred_label(cred)); > set_cred_label(cred, NULL); > } > > -/* > - * allocate the apparmor part of blank credentials > - */ > -static int apparmor_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp) > -{ > - set_cred_label(cred, NULL); > - return 0; > -} > - > /* > * prepare new cred label for modification by prepare_cred block > */ > static int apparmor_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, > gfp_t gfp) > { > set_cred_label(new, aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(old))); > return 0; > } > > -/* > - * transfer the apparmor data to a blank set of creds > - */ > -static void apparmor_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) > -{ > - set_cred_label(new, aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(old))); > -} > - > static void apparmor_task_free(struct task_struct *task) > { > > aa_free_task_ctx(task_ctx(task)); > } > > @@ -1504,16 +1487,14 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { > apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, apparmor_sock_graft), > #ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK > LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, apparmor_inet_conn_request), > #endif > > - LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, apparmor_cred_alloc_blank), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, apparmor_cred_free), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, apparmor_cred_prepare), > - LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, apparmor_cred_transfer), > > LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_creds_for_exec, apparmor_bprm_creds_for_exec), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, apparmor_bprm_committing_creds), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds, apparmor_bprm_committed_creds), > > LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_free, apparmor_task_free), > diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h > index 2cffa6dc8255..2c5eadc04cf2 100644 > --- a/security/keys/internal.h > +++ b/security/keys/internal.h > @@ -157,12 +157,20 @@ extern struct key *request_key_and_link(struct key_type *type, > unsigned long flags); > > extern bool lookup_user_key_possessed(const struct key *key, > const struct key_match_data *match_data); > > extern long join_session_keyring(const char *name); > + > +struct keyctl_session_to_parent_context { > + struct callback_head work; > + struct completion done; > + struct key *new_session_keyring; > + const struct cred *child_cred; > + int result; > +}; > extern void key_change_session_keyring(struct callback_head *twork); > > extern struct work_struct key_gc_work; > extern unsigned key_gc_delay; > extern void keyring_gc(struct key *keyring, time64_t limit); > extern void keyring_restriction_gc(struct key *keyring, > diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c > index ab927a142f51..116ef2dfa5a1 100644 > --- a/security/keys/keyctl.c > +++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c > @@ -1616,104 +1616,56 @@ long keyctl_get_security(key_serial_t keyid, > * parent process. > * > * The keyring must exist and must grant the caller LINK permission, and the > * parent process must be single-threaded and must have the same effective > * ownership as this process and mustn't be SUID/SGID. > * > - * The keyring will be emplaced on the parent when it next resumes userspace. > + * The keyring will be emplaced on the parent via a pseudo-signal. > * > * If successful, 0 will be returned. > */ > long keyctl_session_to_parent(void) > { > - struct task_struct *me, *parent; > - const struct cred *mycred, *pcred; > - struct callback_head *newwork, *oldwork; > + struct keyctl_session_to_parent_context ctx; > + struct task_struct *parent; > key_ref_t keyring_r; > - struct cred *cred; > int ret; > > keyring_r = lookup_user_key(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, 0, KEY_NEED_LINK); > if (IS_ERR(keyring_r)) > return PTR_ERR(keyring_r); > > - ret = -ENOMEM; > - > - /* our parent is going to need a new cred struct, a new tgcred struct > - * and new security data, so we allocate them here to prevent ENOMEM in > - * our parent */ > - cred = cred_alloc_blank(); > - if (!cred) > - goto error_keyring; > - newwork = &cred->rcu; > + write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock); > + parent = get_task_struct(rcu_dereference_protected(current->real_parent, > + lockdep_is_held(&tasklist_lock))); > + write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock); > > - cred->session_keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_r); > - keyring_r = NULL; > - init_task_work(newwork, key_change_session_keyring); > + /* the parent mustn't be init and mustn't be a kernel thread */ > + if (is_global_init(parent) || (READ_ONCE(parent->flags) & PF_KTHREAD) != 0) > + goto put_task; > > - me = current; > - rcu_read_lock(); > - write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock); > + ctx.new_session_keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_r); > + ctx.child_cred = current_cred(); > + init_completion(&ctx.done); > + init_task_work(&ctx.work, key_change_session_keyring); > + ret = task_work_add(parent, &ctx.work, TWA_SIGNAL); > + if (ret) > + goto put_task; > > - ret = -EPERM; > - oldwork = NULL; > - parent = rcu_dereference_protected(me->real_parent, > - lockdep_is_held(&tasklist_lock)); > + ret = wait_for_completion_killable(&ctx.done); > > - /* the parent mustn't be init and mustn't be a kernel thread */ > - if (parent->pid <= 1 || !parent->mm) > - goto unlock; > - > - /* the parent must be single threaded */ > - if (!thread_group_empty(parent)) > - goto unlock; > - > - /* the parent and the child must have different session keyrings or > - * there's no point */ > - mycred = current_cred(); > - pcred = __task_cred(parent); > - if (mycred == pcred || > - mycred->session_keyring == pcred->session_keyring) { > - ret = 0; > - goto unlock; > + if (task_work_cancel(parent, &ctx.work)) { > + /* we got killed, task work has been cancelled */ > + } else { > + /* task work is running or has been executed */ > + wait_for_completion(&ctx.done); > + ret = ctx.result; > } > > - /* the parent must have the same effective ownership and mustn't be > - * SUID/SGID */ > - if (!uid_eq(pcred->uid, mycred->euid) || > - !uid_eq(pcred->euid, mycred->euid) || > - !uid_eq(pcred->suid, mycred->euid) || > - !gid_eq(pcred->gid, mycred->egid) || > - !gid_eq(pcred->egid, mycred->egid) || > - !gid_eq(pcred->sgid, mycred->egid)) > - goto unlock; > - > - /* the keyrings must have the same UID */ > - if ((pcred->session_keyring && > - !uid_eq(pcred->session_keyring->uid, mycred->euid)) || > - !uid_eq(mycred->session_keyring->uid, mycred->euid)) > - goto unlock; > - > - /* cancel an already pending keyring replacement */ > - oldwork = task_work_cancel_func(parent, key_change_session_keyring); > - > - /* the replacement session keyring is applied just prior to userspace > - * restarting */ > - ret = task_work_add(parent, newwork, TWA_RESUME); > - if (!ret) > - newwork = NULL; > -unlock: > - write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock); > - rcu_read_unlock(); > - if (oldwork) > - put_cred(container_of(oldwork, struct cred, rcu)); > - if (newwork) > - put_cred(cred); > - return ret; > - > -error_keyring: > +put_task: > + put_task_struct(parent); > key_ref_put(keyring_r); > return ret; > } > > /* > * Apply a restriction to a given keyring. > diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c > index b5d5333ab330..199c5dd34792 100644 > --- a/security/keys/process_keys.c > +++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c > @@ -902,59 +902,65 @@ long join_session_keyring(const char *name) > error: > abort_creds(new); > return ret; > } > > /* > - * Replace a process's session keyring on behalf of one of its children when > - * the target process is about to resume userspace execution. > + * Replace a process's session keyring on behalf of one of its children. > + * This function runs in task context, while the child is blocked in > + * keyctl_session_to_parent(). > */ > -void key_change_session_keyring(struct callback_head *twork) > +void key_change_session_keyring(struct callback_head *work) > { > - const struct cred *old = current_cred(); > - struct cred *new = container_of(twork, struct cred, rcu); > + struct keyctl_session_to_parent_context *ctx = > + container_of(work, struct keyctl_session_to_parent_context, work); > + const struct cred *pcred = current_cred(); > + const struct cred *ccred = ctx->child_cred; > + struct cred *new; > > - if (unlikely(current->flags & PF_EXITING)) { > - put_cred(new); > - return; > - } > + /* do checks */ > + ctx->result = -EPERM; > + if (unlikely(current->flags & PF_EXITING)) > + goto out; > > - /* If get_ucounts fails more bits are needed in the refcount */ > - if (unlikely(!get_ucounts(old->ucounts))) { > - WARN_ONCE(1, "In %s get_ucounts failed\n", __func__); > - put_cred(new); > - return; > - } > + /* we must be single threaded */ > + if (!thread_group_empty(current)) > + goto out; > + > + /* > + * the parent must have the same effective ownership and mustn't be > + * SUID/SGID > + */ > + if (!uid_eq(pcred->uid, ccred->euid) || > + !uid_eq(pcred->euid, ccred->euid) || > + !uid_eq(pcred->suid, ccred->euid) || > + !gid_eq(pcred->gid, ccred->egid) || > + !gid_eq(pcred->egid, ccred->egid) || > + !gid_eq(pcred->sgid, ccred->egid)) > + goto out; > + > + /* the keyrings must have the same UID */ > + if ((pcred->session_keyring && > + !uid_eq(pcred->session_keyring->uid, ccred->euid)) || > + !uid_eq(ctx->new_session_keyring->uid, ccred->euid)) > + goto out; > + > + > + /* okay, try to update creds */ > + ctx->result = -ENOMEM; > + new = prepare_creds(); > + if (!new) > + goto out; > > - new-> uid = old-> uid; > - new-> euid = old-> euid; > - new-> suid = old-> suid; > - new->fsuid = old->fsuid; > - new-> gid = old-> gid; > - new-> egid = old-> egid; > - new-> sgid = old-> sgid; > - new->fsgid = old->fsgid; > - new->user = get_uid(old->user); > - new->ucounts = old->ucounts; > - new->user_ns = get_user_ns(old->user_ns); > - new->group_info = get_group_info(old->group_info); > - > - new->securebits = old->securebits; > - new->cap_inheritable = old->cap_inheritable; > - new->cap_permitted = old->cap_permitted; > - new->cap_effective = old->cap_effective; > - new->cap_ambient = old->cap_ambient; > - new->cap_bset = old->cap_bset; > - > - new->jit_keyring = old->jit_keyring; > - new->thread_keyring = key_get(old->thread_keyring); > - new->process_keyring = key_get(old->process_keyring); > - > - security_transfer_creds(new, old); > + key_put(new->session_keyring); > + new->session_keyring = key_get(ctx->new_session_keyring); > > commit_creds(new); > + ctx->result = 0; > +out: > + complete_all(&ctx->done); > } > > /* > * Make sure that root's user and user-session keyrings exist. > */ > static int __init init_root_keyring(void) > diff --git a/security/landlock/cred.c b/security/landlock/cred.c > index db9fe7d906ba..786af18c4a1c 100644 > --- a/security/landlock/cred.c > +++ b/security/landlock/cred.c > @@ -11,41 +11,34 @@ > > #include "common.h" > #include "cred.h" > #include "ruleset.h" > #include "setup.h" > > -static void hook_cred_transfer(struct cred *const new, > - const struct cred *const old) > +static int hook_cred_prepare(struct cred *const new, > + const struct cred *const old, const gfp_t gfp) > { > struct landlock_ruleset *const old_dom = landlock_cred(old)->domain; > > if (old_dom) { > landlock_get_ruleset(old_dom); > landlock_cred(new)->domain = old_dom; > } > -} > - > -static int hook_cred_prepare(struct cred *const new, > - const struct cred *const old, const gfp_t gfp) > -{ > - hook_cred_transfer(new, old); > return 0; > } > > static void hook_cred_free(struct cred *const cred) > { > struct landlock_ruleset *const dom = landlock_cred(cred)->domain; > > if (dom) > landlock_put_ruleset_deferred(dom); > } > > static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { > LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, hook_cred_prepare), > - LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, hook_cred_transfer), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, hook_cred_free), > }; > > __init void landlock_add_cred_hooks(void) > { > security_add_hooks(landlock_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(landlock_hooks), > diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c > index 8cee5b6c6e6d..4fb81de5cf80 100644 > --- a/security/security.c > +++ b/security/security.c > @@ -3057,35 +3057,12 @@ void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task) > call_void_hook(task_free, task); > > kfree(task->security); > task->security = NULL; > } > > -/** > - * security_cred_alloc_blank() - Allocate the min memory to allow cred_transfer > - * @cred: credentials > - * @gfp: gfp flags > - * > - * Only allocate sufficient memory and attach to @cred such that > - * cred_transfer() will not get ENOMEM. > - * > - * Return: Returns 0 on success, negative values on failure. > - */ > -int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp) > -{ > - int rc = lsm_cred_alloc(cred, gfp); > - > - if (rc) > - return rc; > - > - rc = call_int_hook(cred_alloc_blank, cred, gfp); > - if (unlikely(rc)) > - security_cred_free(cred); > - return rc; > -} > - > /** > * security_cred_free() - Free the cred's LSM blob and associated resources > * @cred: credentials > * > * Deallocate and clear the cred->security field in a set of credentials. > */ > @@ -3124,24 +3101,12 @@ int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp) > rc = call_int_hook(cred_prepare, new, old, gfp); > if (unlikely(rc)) > security_cred_free(new); > return rc; > } > > -/** > - * security_transfer_creds() - Transfer creds > - * @new: target credentials > - * @old: original credentials > - * > - * Transfer data from original creds to new creds. > - */ > -void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) > -{ > - call_void_hook(cred_transfer, new, old); > -} > - > /** > * security_cred_getsecid() - Get the secid from a set of credentials > * @c: credentials > * @secid: secid value > * > * Retrieve the security identifier of the cred structure @c. In case of > diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c > index 55c78c318ccd..8a659475cc12 100644 > --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c > +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c > @@ -4007,23 +4007,12 @@ static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, > struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new); > > *tsec = *old_tsec; > return 0; > } > > -/* > - * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds > - */ > -static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) > -{ > - const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = selinux_cred(old); > - struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new); > - > - *tsec = *old_tsec; > -} > - > static void selinux_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid) > { > *secid = cred_sid(c); > } > > /* > @@ -7213,13 +7202,12 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { > LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_receive, selinux_file_receive), > > LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, selinux_file_open), > > LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_alloc, selinux_task_alloc), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, selinux_cred_prepare), > - LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, selinux_cred_transfer), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_getsecid, selinux_cred_getsecid), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, selinux_kernel_act_as), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, selinux_kernel_create_files_as), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request, selinux_kernel_module_request), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, selinux_kernel_load_data), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, selinux_kernel_read_file), > diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c > index 4164699cd4f6..4cc658deb08b 100644 > --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c > +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c > @@ -2050,27 +2050,12 @@ static int smack_file_open(struct file *file) > } > > /* > * Task hooks > */ > > -/** > - * smack_cred_alloc_blank - "allocate" blank task-level security credentials > - * @cred: the new credentials > - * @gfp: the atomicity of any memory allocations > - * > - * Prepare a blank set of credentials for modification. This must allocate all > - * the memory the LSM module might require such that cred_transfer() can > - * complete without error. > - */ > -static int smack_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp) > -{ > - init_task_smack(smack_cred(cred), NULL, NULL); > - return 0; > -} > - > > /** > * smack_cred_free - "free" task-level security credentials > * @cred: the credentials in question > * > */ > @@ -2113,27 +2098,12 @@ static int smack_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, > > rc = smk_copy_relabel(&new_tsp->smk_relabel, &old_tsp->smk_relabel, > gfp); > return rc; > } > > -/** > - * smack_cred_transfer - Transfer the old credentials to the new credentials > - * @new: the new credentials > - * @old: the original credentials > - * > - * Fill in a set of blank credentials from another set of credentials. > - */ > -static void smack_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) > -{ > - struct task_smack *old_tsp = smack_cred(old); > - struct task_smack *new_tsp = smack_cred(new); > - > - init_task_smack(new_tsp, old_tsp->smk_task, old_tsp->smk_task); > -} > - > /** > * smack_cred_getsecid - get the secid corresponding to a creds structure > * @cred: the object creds > * @secid: where to put the result > * > * Sets the secid to contain a u32 version of the smack label. > @@ -5107,16 +5077,14 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { > LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_set_fowner, smack_file_set_fowner), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_send_sigiotask, smack_file_send_sigiotask), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_receive, smack_file_receive), > > LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, smack_file_open), > > - LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, smack_cred_alloc_blank), Not going through everything but can we e.g. make a separe SMACK patch prepending? > LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, smack_cred_free), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, smack_cred_prepare), > - LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, smack_cred_transfer), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_getsecid, smack_cred_getsecid), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, smack_kernel_act_as), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, smack_kernel_create_files_as), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, smack_task_setpgid), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, smack_task_getpgid), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, smack_task_getsid), > > --- > base-commit: c0ecd6388360d930440cc5554026818895199923 > change-id: 20240802-remove-cred-transfer-493a3b696da2 BR, Jarkko
On Fri, Aug 2, 2024 at 8:09 PM Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@iki.fi> wrote: > On Fri Aug 2, 2024 at 4:10 PM EEST, Jann Horn wrote: > > cred_alloc_blank and cred_transfer were only necessary so that keyctl can > > allocate creds in the child and then asynchronously have the parent fill > > them in and apply them. > > > > Get rid of them by letting the child synchronously wait for the task work > > executing in the parent's context. This way, any errors that happen in the > > task work can be plumbed back into the syscall return value in the child. > > > > Note that this requires using TWA_SIGNAL instead of TWA_RESUME, so the > > parent might observe some spurious -EGAIN syscall returns or such; but the > > parent likely anyway has to be ready to deal with the side effects of > > receiving signals (since it'll probably get SIGCHLD when the child dies), > > so that probably isn't an issue. > > > > Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> > > --- > > This is a quickly hacked up demo of the approach I proposed at > > <https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAG48ez2bnvuX8i-D=5DxmfzEOKTWAf-DkgQq6aNC4WzSGoEGHg@mail.gmail.com/> > > to get rid of the cred_transfer stuff. Diffstat looks like this: > > > > include/linux/cred.h | 1 - > > include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 3 --- > > include/linux/security.h | 12 ------------ > > kernel/cred.c | 23 ----------------------- > > security/apparmor/lsm.c | 19 ------------------- > > security/keys/internal.h | 8 ++++++++ > > security/keys/keyctl.c | 100 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > security/keys/process_keys.c | 86 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------------------------- > > security/landlock/cred.c | 11 ++--------- > > security/security.c | 35 ----------------------------------- > > security/selinux/hooks.c | 12 ------------ > > security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 32 -------------------------------- > > 12 files changed, 82 insertions(+), 260 deletions(-) > > > > What do you think? Synchronously waiting for task work is a bit ugly, > > but at least this condenses the uglyness in the keys subsystem instead > > of making the rest of the security subsystem deal with this stuff. > > Why does synchronously waiting is ugly? Not sarcasm, I genuineily > interested of breaking that down in smaller pieces. > > E.g. what disadvantages would be there from your point of view? > > Only trying to form a common picture, that's all. Two things: 1. It means we have to send a pseudo-signal to the parent, to get the parent to bail out into signal handling context, which can lead to extra spurious -EGAIN in the parent. I think this is probably fine since _most_ parent processes will already expect to handle SIGCHLD signals... 2. If the parent is blocked on some other killable wait, we won't be able to make progress - so in particular, if the parent was using a killable wait to wait for the child to leave its syscall, userspace ẁould deadlock (in a way that could be resolved by SIGKILLing one of the processes). Actually, I think that might happen if the parent uses ptrace() with sufficiently bad timing? We could avoid the issue by doing an interruptible wait instead of a killable one, but then that might confuse userspace callers of the keyctl() if they get an -EINTR... I guess the way to do this cleanly is to use an interruptible wait and return -ERESTARTNOINTR if it gets interrupted? > > Another approach to simplify things further would be to try to move > > the session keyring out of the creds entirely and just let the child > > update it directly with appropriate locking, but I don't know enough > > about the keys subsystem to know if that would maybe break stuff > > that relies on override_creds() also overriding the keyrings, or > > something like that. > > --- > > include/linux/cred.h | 1 - > > include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 3 -- > > include/linux/security.h | 12 ----- > > kernel/cred.c | 23 ---------- > > security/apparmor/lsm.c | 19 -------- > > security/keys/internal.h | 8 ++++ > > security/keys/keyctl.c | 100 +++++++++++------------------------------- > > security/keys/process_keys.c | 86 +++++++++++++++++++----------------- > > security/landlock/cred.c | 11 +---- > > security/security.c | 35 --------------- > > security/selinux/hooks.c | 12 ----- > > security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 32 -------------- > > 12 files changed, 82 insertions(+), 260 deletions(-) > > Given the large patch size: > > 1. If it is impossible to split some meaningful patches, i.e. patches > that transform kernel tree from working state to another, I can > cope with this. > 2. Even for small chunks that can be split into their own logical > pieces: please do that. Helps to review the main gist later on. There are basically two parts to this, it could be split up nicely into these: 1. refactor code in security/keys/ 2. rip out all the code that is now unused (as you can see in the diffstat, basically everything outside security/keys/ is purely removals) [...] > Not going through everything but can we e.g. make a separe SMACK patch > prepending? I wouldn't want to split it up further: As long as the cred_transfer mechanism and LSM hook still exist, all the LSMs that currently have implementations of it should also still implement it. But I think if patch 2/2 is just ripping out unused infrastructure across the tree, that should be sufficiently reviewable? (Or we could split it up into ripping out one individual helper per patch, but IDK, that doesn't seem to me like it adds much reviewability.)
On Fri Aug 2, 2024 at 9:39 PM EEST, Jann Horn wrote: > > > What do you think? Synchronously waiting for task work is a bit ugly, > > > but at least this condenses the uglyness in the keys subsystem instead > > > of making the rest of the security subsystem deal with this stuff. > > > > Why does synchronously waiting is ugly? Not sarcasm, I genuineily > > interested of breaking that down in smaller pieces. > > > > E.g. what disadvantages would be there from your point of view? > > > > Only trying to form a common picture, that's all. > > Two things: > > 1. It means we have to send a pseudo-signal to the parent, to get the > parent to bail out into signal handling context, which can lead to > extra spurious -EGAIN in the parent. I think this is probably fine > since _most_ parent processes will already expect to handle SIGCHLD > signals... > > 2. If the parent is blocked on some other killable wait, we won't be > able to make progress - so in particular, if the parent was using a > killable wait to wait for the child to leave its syscall, userspace > ẁould deadlock (in a way that could be resolved by SIGKILLing one of > the processes). Actually, I think that might happen if the parent uses > ptrace() with sufficiently bad timing? We could avoid the issue by > doing an interruptible wait instead of a killable one, but then that > might confuse userspace callers of the keyctl() if they get an > -EINTR... > I guess the way to do this cleanly is to use an interruptible wait and > return -ERESTARTNOINTR if it gets interrupted? Or ERESTARTSYS if you want to select the behavior from caller using SA_RESTART, whether to restart or -EINTR. > > > Another approach to simplify things further would be to try to move > > > the session keyring out of the creds entirely and just let the child > > > update it directly with appropriate locking, but I don't know enough > > > about the keys subsystem to know if that would maybe break stuff > > > that relies on override_creds() also overriding the keyrings, or > > > something like that. > > > --- > > > include/linux/cred.h | 1 - > > > include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 3 -- > > > include/linux/security.h | 12 ----- > > > kernel/cred.c | 23 ---------- > > > security/apparmor/lsm.c | 19 -------- > > > security/keys/internal.h | 8 ++++ > > > security/keys/keyctl.c | 100 +++++++++++------------------------------- > > > security/keys/process_keys.c | 86 +++++++++++++++++++----------------- > > > security/landlock/cred.c | 11 +---- > > > security/security.c | 35 --------------- > > > security/selinux/hooks.c | 12 ----- > > > security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 32 -------------- > > > 12 files changed, 82 insertions(+), 260 deletions(-) > > > > Given the large patch size: > > > > 1. If it is impossible to split some meaningful patches, i.e. patches > > that transform kernel tree from working state to another, I can > > cope with this. > > 2. Even for small chunks that can be split into their own logical > > pieces: please do that. Helps to review the main gist later on. > > There are basically two parts to this, it could be split up nicely into these: > > 1. refactor code in security/keys/ > 2. rip out all the code that is now unused (as you can see in the > diffstat, basically everything outside security/keys/ is purely > removals) Yeah, I'd go for this simply because it allows better reviewer visibility. You can look at the soluton and cleanups separately. > > [...] > > Not going through everything but can we e.g. make a separe SMACK patch > > prepending? > > I wouldn't want to split it up further: As long as the cred_transfer > mechanism and LSM hook still exist, all the LSMs that currently have > implementations of it should also still implement it. > > But I think if patch 2/2 is just ripping out unused infrastructure > across the tree, that should be sufficiently reviewable? (Or we could > split it up into ripping out one individual helper per patch, but IDK, > that doesn't seem to me like it adds much reviewability.) I don't want to dictate this because might give wrong advice (given bandwidth to think it through). Pick a solution and we'll look at it :-) BR, Jarkko
diff --git a/include/linux/cred.h b/include/linux/cred.h index 2976f534a7a3..54b5105d4cd5 100644 --- a/include/linux/cred.h +++ b/include/linux/cred.h @@ -147,13 +147,12 @@ struct cred { } __randomize_layout; extern void __put_cred(struct cred *); extern void exit_creds(struct task_struct *); extern int copy_creds(struct task_struct *, unsigned long); extern const struct cred *get_task_cred(struct task_struct *); -extern struct cred *cred_alloc_blank(void); extern struct cred *prepare_creds(void); extern struct cred *prepare_exec_creds(void); extern int commit_creds(struct cred *); extern void abort_creds(struct cred *); extern const struct cred *override_creds(const struct cred *); extern void revert_creds(const struct cred *); diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h index 855db460e08b..1d75075cb607 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h @@ -204,18 +204,15 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_receive, struct file *file) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_open, struct file *file) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_post_open, struct file *file, int mask) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_truncate, struct file *file) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_alloc, struct task_struct *task, unsigned long clone_flags) LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, task_free, struct task_struct *task) -LSM_HOOK(int, 0, cred_alloc_blank, struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp) LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, cred_free, struct cred *cred) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, cred_prepare, struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp) -LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, cred_transfer, struct cred *new, - const struct cred *old) LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, cred_getsecid, const struct cred *c, u32 *secid) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, kernel_act_as, struct cred *new, u32 secid) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, kernel_create_files_as, struct cred *new, struct inode *inode) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, kernel_module_request, char *kmod_name) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, kernel_load_data, enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, kernel_post_load_data, char *buf, loff_t size, diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index 1390f1efb4f0..a366c2a03f55 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -421,16 +421,14 @@ int security_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk, int security_file_receive(struct file *file); int security_file_open(struct file *file); int security_file_post_open(struct file *file, int mask); int security_file_truncate(struct file *file); int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long clone_flags); void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task); -int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp); void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred); int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp); -void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old); void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid); int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid); int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode); int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name); int security_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents); int security_kernel_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size, @@ -1117,32 +1115,22 @@ static inline int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, return 0; } static inline void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task) { } -static inline int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp) -{ - return 0; -} - static inline void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred) { } static inline int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp) { return 0; } -static inline void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, - const struct cred *old) -{ -} - static inline void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid) { *secid = 0; } static inline int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *cred, u32 secid) diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c index 075cfa7c896f..b2f6130cd6b7 100644 --- a/kernel/cred.c +++ b/kernel/cred.c @@ -163,35 +163,12 @@ const struct cred *get_task_cred(struct task_struct *task) rcu_read_unlock(); return cred; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_task_cred); -/* - * Allocate blank credentials, such that the credentials can be filled in at a - * later date without risk of ENOMEM. - */ -struct cred *cred_alloc_blank(void) -{ - struct cred *new; - - new = kmem_cache_zalloc(cred_jar, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!new) - return NULL; - - atomic_long_set(&new->usage, 1); - if (security_cred_alloc_blank(new, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT) < 0) - goto error; - - return new; - -error: - abort_creds(new); - return NULL; -} - /** * prepare_creds - Prepare a new set of credentials for modification * * Prepare a new set of task credentials for modification. A task's creds * shouldn't generally be modified directly, therefore this function is used to * prepare a new copy, which the caller then modifies and then commits by diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c index 808060f9effb..089d53978d9e 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c @@ -74,39 +74,22 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct aa_local_cache, aa_local_buffers); static void apparmor_cred_free(struct cred *cred) { aa_put_label(cred_label(cred)); set_cred_label(cred, NULL); } -/* - * allocate the apparmor part of blank credentials - */ -static int apparmor_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp) -{ - set_cred_label(cred, NULL); - return 0; -} - /* * prepare new cred label for modification by prepare_cred block */ static int apparmor_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp) { set_cred_label(new, aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(old))); return 0; } -/* - * transfer the apparmor data to a blank set of creds - */ -static void apparmor_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) -{ - set_cred_label(new, aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(old))); -} - static void apparmor_task_free(struct task_struct *task) { aa_free_task_ctx(task_ctx(task)); } @@ -1504,16 +1487,14 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, apparmor_sock_graft), #ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, apparmor_inet_conn_request), #endif - LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, apparmor_cred_alloc_blank), LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, apparmor_cred_free), LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, apparmor_cred_prepare), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, apparmor_cred_transfer), LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_creds_for_exec, apparmor_bprm_creds_for_exec), LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, apparmor_bprm_committing_creds), LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds, apparmor_bprm_committed_creds), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_free, apparmor_task_free), diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h index 2cffa6dc8255..2c5eadc04cf2 100644 --- a/security/keys/internal.h +++ b/security/keys/internal.h @@ -157,12 +157,20 @@ extern struct key *request_key_and_link(struct key_type *type, unsigned long flags); extern bool lookup_user_key_possessed(const struct key *key, const struct key_match_data *match_data); extern long join_session_keyring(const char *name); + +struct keyctl_session_to_parent_context { + struct callback_head work; + struct completion done; + struct key *new_session_keyring; + const struct cred *child_cred; + int result; +}; extern void key_change_session_keyring(struct callback_head *twork); extern struct work_struct key_gc_work; extern unsigned key_gc_delay; extern void keyring_gc(struct key *keyring, time64_t limit); extern void keyring_restriction_gc(struct key *keyring, diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c index ab927a142f51..116ef2dfa5a1 100644 --- a/security/keys/keyctl.c +++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c @@ -1616,104 +1616,56 @@ long keyctl_get_security(key_serial_t keyid, * parent process. * * The keyring must exist and must grant the caller LINK permission, and the * parent process must be single-threaded and must have the same effective * ownership as this process and mustn't be SUID/SGID. * - * The keyring will be emplaced on the parent when it next resumes userspace. + * The keyring will be emplaced on the parent via a pseudo-signal. * * If successful, 0 will be returned. */ long keyctl_session_to_parent(void) { - struct task_struct *me, *parent; - const struct cred *mycred, *pcred; - struct callback_head *newwork, *oldwork; + struct keyctl_session_to_parent_context ctx; + struct task_struct *parent; key_ref_t keyring_r; - struct cred *cred; int ret; keyring_r = lookup_user_key(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, 0, KEY_NEED_LINK); if (IS_ERR(keyring_r)) return PTR_ERR(keyring_r); - ret = -ENOMEM; - - /* our parent is going to need a new cred struct, a new tgcred struct - * and new security data, so we allocate them here to prevent ENOMEM in - * our parent */ - cred = cred_alloc_blank(); - if (!cred) - goto error_keyring; - newwork = &cred->rcu; + write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock); + parent = get_task_struct(rcu_dereference_protected(current->real_parent, + lockdep_is_held(&tasklist_lock))); + write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock); - cred->session_keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_r); - keyring_r = NULL; - init_task_work(newwork, key_change_session_keyring); + /* the parent mustn't be init and mustn't be a kernel thread */ + if (is_global_init(parent) || (READ_ONCE(parent->flags) & PF_KTHREAD) != 0) + goto put_task; - me = current; - rcu_read_lock(); - write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock); + ctx.new_session_keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_r); + ctx.child_cred = current_cred(); + init_completion(&ctx.done); + init_task_work(&ctx.work, key_change_session_keyring); + ret = task_work_add(parent, &ctx.work, TWA_SIGNAL); + if (ret) + goto put_task; - ret = -EPERM; - oldwork = NULL; - parent = rcu_dereference_protected(me->real_parent, - lockdep_is_held(&tasklist_lock)); + ret = wait_for_completion_killable(&ctx.done); - /* the parent mustn't be init and mustn't be a kernel thread */ - if (parent->pid <= 1 || !parent->mm) - goto unlock; - - /* the parent must be single threaded */ - if (!thread_group_empty(parent)) - goto unlock; - - /* the parent and the child must have different session keyrings or - * there's no point */ - mycred = current_cred(); - pcred = __task_cred(parent); - if (mycred == pcred || - mycred->session_keyring == pcred->session_keyring) { - ret = 0; - goto unlock; + if (task_work_cancel(parent, &ctx.work)) { + /* we got killed, task work has been cancelled */ + } else { + /* task work is running or has been executed */ + wait_for_completion(&ctx.done); + ret = ctx.result; } - /* the parent must have the same effective ownership and mustn't be - * SUID/SGID */ - if (!uid_eq(pcred->uid, mycred->euid) || - !uid_eq(pcred->euid, mycred->euid) || - !uid_eq(pcred->suid, mycred->euid) || - !gid_eq(pcred->gid, mycred->egid) || - !gid_eq(pcred->egid, mycred->egid) || - !gid_eq(pcred->sgid, mycred->egid)) - goto unlock; - - /* the keyrings must have the same UID */ - if ((pcred->session_keyring && - !uid_eq(pcred->session_keyring->uid, mycred->euid)) || - !uid_eq(mycred->session_keyring->uid, mycred->euid)) - goto unlock; - - /* cancel an already pending keyring replacement */ - oldwork = task_work_cancel_func(parent, key_change_session_keyring); - - /* the replacement session keyring is applied just prior to userspace - * restarting */ - ret = task_work_add(parent, newwork, TWA_RESUME); - if (!ret) - newwork = NULL; -unlock: - write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock); - rcu_read_unlock(); - if (oldwork) - put_cred(container_of(oldwork, struct cred, rcu)); - if (newwork) - put_cred(cred); - return ret; - -error_keyring: +put_task: + put_task_struct(parent); key_ref_put(keyring_r); return ret; } /* * Apply a restriction to a given keyring. diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c index b5d5333ab330..199c5dd34792 100644 --- a/security/keys/process_keys.c +++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c @@ -902,59 +902,65 @@ long join_session_keyring(const char *name) error: abort_creds(new); return ret; } /* - * Replace a process's session keyring on behalf of one of its children when - * the target process is about to resume userspace execution. + * Replace a process's session keyring on behalf of one of its children. + * This function runs in task context, while the child is blocked in + * keyctl_session_to_parent(). */ -void key_change_session_keyring(struct callback_head *twork) +void key_change_session_keyring(struct callback_head *work) { - const struct cred *old = current_cred(); - struct cred *new = container_of(twork, struct cred, rcu); + struct keyctl_session_to_parent_context *ctx = + container_of(work, struct keyctl_session_to_parent_context, work); + const struct cred *pcred = current_cred(); + const struct cred *ccred = ctx->child_cred; + struct cred *new; - if (unlikely(current->flags & PF_EXITING)) { - put_cred(new); - return; - } + /* do checks */ + ctx->result = -EPERM; + if (unlikely(current->flags & PF_EXITING)) + goto out; - /* If get_ucounts fails more bits are needed in the refcount */ - if (unlikely(!get_ucounts(old->ucounts))) { - WARN_ONCE(1, "In %s get_ucounts failed\n", __func__); - put_cred(new); - return; - } + /* we must be single threaded */ + if (!thread_group_empty(current)) + goto out; + + /* + * the parent must have the same effective ownership and mustn't be + * SUID/SGID + */ + if (!uid_eq(pcred->uid, ccred->euid) || + !uid_eq(pcred->euid, ccred->euid) || + !uid_eq(pcred->suid, ccred->euid) || + !gid_eq(pcred->gid, ccred->egid) || + !gid_eq(pcred->egid, ccred->egid) || + !gid_eq(pcred->sgid, ccred->egid)) + goto out; + + /* the keyrings must have the same UID */ + if ((pcred->session_keyring && + !uid_eq(pcred->session_keyring->uid, ccred->euid)) || + !uid_eq(ctx->new_session_keyring->uid, ccred->euid)) + goto out; + + + /* okay, try to update creds */ + ctx->result = -ENOMEM; + new = prepare_creds(); + if (!new) + goto out; - new-> uid = old-> uid; - new-> euid = old-> euid; - new-> suid = old-> suid; - new->fsuid = old->fsuid; - new-> gid = old-> gid; - new-> egid = old-> egid; - new-> sgid = old-> sgid; - new->fsgid = old->fsgid; - new->user = get_uid(old->user); - new->ucounts = old->ucounts; - new->user_ns = get_user_ns(old->user_ns); - new->group_info = get_group_info(old->group_info); - - new->securebits = old->securebits; - new->cap_inheritable = old->cap_inheritable; - new->cap_permitted = old->cap_permitted; - new->cap_effective = old->cap_effective; - new->cap_ambient = old->cap_ambient; - new->cap_bset = old->cap_bset; - - new->jit_keyring = old->jit_keyring; - new->thread_keyring = key_get(old->thread_keyring); - new->process_keyring = key_get(old->process_keyring); - - security_transfer_creds(new, old); + key_put(new->session_keyring); + new->session_keyring = key_get(ctx->new_session_keyring); commit_creds(new); + ctx->result = 0; +out: + complete_all(&ctx->done); } /* * Make sure that root's user and user-session keyrings exist. */ static int __init init_root_keyring(void) diff --git a/security/landlock/cred.c b/security/landlock/cred.c index db9fe7d906ba..786af18c4a1c 100644 --- a/security/landlock/cred.c +++ b/security/landlock/cred.c @@ -11,41 +11,34 @@ #include "common.h" #include "cred.h" #include "ruleset.h" #include "setup.h" -static void hook_cred_transfer(struct cred *const new, - const struct cred *const old) +static int hook_cred_prepare(struct cred *const new, + const struct cred *const old, const gfp_t gfp) { struct landlock_ruleset *const old_dom = landlock_cred(old)->domain; if (old_dom) { landlock_get_ruleset(old_dom); landlock_cred(new)->domain = old_dom; } -} - -static int hook_cred_prepare(struct cred *const new, - const struct cred *const old, const gfp_t gfp) -{ - hook_cred_transfer(new, old); return 0; } static void hook_cred_free(struct cred *const cred) { struct landlock_ruleset *const dom = landlock_cred(cred)->domain; if (dom) landlock_put_ruleset_deferred(dom); } static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, hook_cred_prepare), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, hook_cred_transfer), LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, hook_cred_free), }; __init void landlock_add_cred_hooks(void) { security_add_hooks(landlock_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(landlock_hooks), diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 8cee5b6c6e6d..4fb81de5cf80 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -3057,35 +3057,12 @@ void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task) call_void_hook(task_free, task); kfree(task->security); task->security = NULL; } -/** - * security_cred_alloc_blank() - Allocate the min memory to allow cred_transfer - * @cred: credentials - * @gfp: gfp flags - * - * Only allocate sufficient memory and attach to @cred such that - * cred_transfer() will not get ENOMEM. - * - * Return: Returns 0 on success, negative values on failure. - */ -int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp) -{ - int rc = lsm_cred_alloc(cred, gfp); - - if (rc) - return rc; - - rc = call_int_hook(cred_alloc_blank, cred, gfp); - if (unlikely(rc)) - security_cred_free(cred); - return rc; -} - /** * security_cred_free() - Free the cred's LSM blob and associated resources * @cred: credentials * * Deallocate and clear the cred->security field in a set of credentials. */ @@ -3124,24 +3101,12 @@ int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp) rc = call_int_hook(cred_prepare, new, old, gfp); if (unlikely(rc)) security_cred_free(new); return rc; } -/** - * security_transfer_creds() - Transfer creds - * @new: target credentials - * @old: original credentials - * - * Transfer data from original creds to new creds. - */ -void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) -{ - call_void_hook(cred_transfer, new, old); -} - /** * security_cred_getsecid() - Get the secid from a set of credentials * @c: credentials * @secid: secid value * * Retrieve the security identifier of the cred structure @c. In case of diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 55c78c318ccd..8a659475cc12 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -4007,23 +4007,12 @@ static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new); *tsec = *old_tsec; return 0; } -/* - * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds - */ -static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) -{ - const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = selinux_cred(old); - struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new); - - *tsec = *old_tsec; -} - static void selinux_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid) { *secid = cred_sid(c); } /* @@ -7213,13 +7202,12 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_receive, selinux_file_receive), LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, selinux_file_open), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_alloc, selinux_task_alloc), LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, selinux_cred_prepare), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, selinux_cred_transfer), LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_getsecid, selinux_cred_getsecid), LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, selinux_kernel_act_as), LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, selinux_kernel_create_files_as), LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request, selinux_kernel_module_request), LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, selinux_kernel_load_data), LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, selinux_kernel_read_file), diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index 4164699cd4f6..4cc658deb08b 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -2050,27 +2050,12 @@ static int smack_file_open(struct file *file) } /* * Task hooks */ -/** - * smack_cred_alloc_blank - "allocate" blank task-level security credentials - * @cred: the new credentials - * @gfp: the atomicity of any memory allocations - * - * Prepare a blank set of credentials for modification. This must allocate all - * the memory the LSM module might require such that cred_transfer() can - * complete without error. - */ -static int smack_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp) -{ - init_task_smack(smack_cred(cred), NULL, NULL); - return 0; -} - /** * smack_cred_free - "free" task-level security credentials * @cred: the credentials in question * */ @@ -2113,27 +2098,12 @@ static int smack_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, rc = smk_copy_relabel(&new_tsp->smk_relabel, &old_tsp->smk_relabel, gfp); return rc; } -/** - * smack_cred_transfer - Transfer the old credentials to the new credentials - * @new: the new credentials - * @old: the original credentials - * - * Fill in a set of blank credentials from another set of credentials. - */ -static void smack_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) -{ - struct task_smack *old_tsp = smack_cred(old); - struct task_smack *new_tsp = smack_cred(new); - - init_task_smack(new_tsp, old_tsp->smk_task, old_tsp->smk_task); -} - /** * smack_cred_getsecid - get the secid corresponding to a creds structure * @cred: the object creds * @secid: where to put the result * * Sets the secid to contain a u32 version of the smack label. @@ -5107,16 +5077,14 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_set_fowner, smack_file_set_fowner), LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_send_sigiotask, smack_file_send_sigiotask), LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_receive, smack_file_receive), LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, smack_file_open), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, smack_cred_alloc_blank), LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, smack_cred_free), LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, smack_cred_prepare), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, smack_cred_transfer), LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_getsecid, smack_cred_getsecid), LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, smack_kernel_act_as), LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, smack_kernel_create_files_as), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, smack_task_setpgid), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, smack_task_getpgid), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, smack_task_getsid),
cred_alloc_blank and cred_transfer were only necessary so that keyctl can allocate creds in the child and then asynchronously have the parent fill them in and apply them. Get rid of them by letting the child synchronously wait for the task work executing in the parent's context. This way, any errors that happen in the task work can be plumbed back into the syscall return value in the child. Note that this requires using TWA_SIGNAL instead of TWA_RESUME, so the parent might observe some spurious -EGAIN syscall returns or such; but the parent likely anyway has to be ready to deal with the side effects of receiving signals (since it'll probably get SIGCHLD when the child dies), so that probably isn't an issue. Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> --- This is a quickly hacked up demo of the approach I proposed at <https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAG48ez2bnvuX8i-D=5DxmfzEOKTWAf-DkgQq6aNC4WzSGoEGHg@mail.gmail.com/> to get rid of the cred_transfer stuff. Diffstat looks like this: include/linux/cred.h | 1 - include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 3 --- include/linux/security.h | 12 ------------ kernel/cred.c | 23 ----------------------- security/apparmor/lsm.c | 19 ------------------- security/keys/internal.h | 8 ++++++++ security/keys/keyctl.c | 100 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------------------------------------------------------- security/keys/process_keys.c | 86 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------------------------- security/landlock/cred.c | 11 ++--------- security/security.c | 35 ----------------------------------- security/selinux/hooks.c | 12 ------------ security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 32 -------------------------------- 12 files changed, 82 insertions(+), 260 deletions(-) What do you think? Synchronously waiting for task work is a bit ugly, but at least this condenses the uglyness in the keys subsystem instead of making the rest of the security subsystem deal with this stuff. Another approach to simplify things further would be to try to move the session keyring out of the creds entirely and just let the child update it directly with appropriate locking, but I don't know enough about the keys subsystem to know if that would maybe break stuff that relies on override_creds() also overriding the keyrings, or something like that. --- include/linux/cred.h | 1 - include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 3 -- include/linux/security.h | 12 ----- kernel/cred.c | 23 ---------- security/apparmor/lsm.c | 19 -------- security/keys/internal.h | 8 ++++ security/keys/keyctl.c | 100 +++++++++++------------------------------- security/keys/process_keys.c | 86 +++++++++++++++++++----------------- security/landlock/cred.c | 11 +---- security/security.c | 35 --------------- security/selinux/hooks.c | 12 ----- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 32 -------------- 12 files changed, 82 insertions(+), 260 deletions(-) --- base-commit: c0ecd6388360d930440cc5554026818895199923 change-id: 20240802-remove-cred-transfer-493a3b696da2