| Message ID | 20241024104012.1815022-1-linux@jordanrome.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | Superseded |
| Headers | show |
| Series | [v1] security: add trace event for cap_capable | expand |
On Thu, 24 Oct 2024 03:40:12 -0700 Jordan Rome <linux@jordanrome.com> wrote: > +TRACE_EVENT(capable, > + > + TP_PROTO(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *targ_ns, > + struct user_namespace *capable_ns, int cap, unsigned int opts, int ret), > + > + TP_ARGS(cred, targ_ns, capable_ns, cap, opts, ret), > + > + TP_STRUCT__entry( > + __field(const struct cred *, cred) > + __field(struct user_namespace *, targ_ns) > + __field(struct user_namespace *, capable_ns) > + __field(int, cap) > + __field(unsigned int, opts) > + __field(int, ret) > + ), > + > + TP_fast_assign( > + __entry->cred = cred; > + __entry->targ_ns = targ_ns; > + __entry->capable_ns = capable_ns; > + __entry->cap = cap; > + __entry->opts = opts; > + __entry->ret = ret; > + ), > + > + TP_printk("cap %d, opts %u, ret %d", > + __entry->cap, __entry->opts, __entry->ret) > +); > + You record cred, targ_ns and capable_ns but don't use it in TP_printk? It's fine to print pointers there. Is there a reason you do not? -- Steve
On Thu, Oct 24, 2024 at 9:19 AM Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> wrote: > > On Thu, 24 Oct 2024 03:40:12 -0700 > Jordan Rome <linux@jordanrome.com> wrote: > > > +TRACE_EVENT(capable, > > + > > + TP_PROTO(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *targ_ns, > > + struct user_namespace *capable_ns, int cap, unsigned int opts, int ret), > > + > > + TP_ARGS(cred, targ_ns, capable_ns, cap, opts, ret), > > + > > + TP_STRUCT__entry( > > + __field(const struct cred *, cred) > > + __field(struct user_namespace *, targ_ns) > > + __field(struct user_namespace *, capable_ns) > > + __field(int, cap) > > + __field(unsigned int, opts) > > + __field(int, ret) > > + ), > > + > > + TP_fast_assign( > > + __entry->cred = cred; > > + __entry->targ_ns = targ_ns; > > + __entry->capable_ns = capable_ns; > > + __entry->cap = cap; > > + __entry->opts = opts; > > + __entry->ret = ret; > > + ), > > + > > + TP_printk("cap %d, opts %u, ret %d", > > + __entry->cap, __entry->opts, __entry->ret) > > +); > > + > > You record cred, targ_ns and capable_ns but don't use it in TP_printk? > > It's fine to print pointers there. Is there a reason you do not? > > -- Steve I wasn't sure if printing the pointers was useful. I'm fine to add them in.
On Thu, Oct 24, 2024 at 6:19 AM Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> wrote: > > On Thu, 24 Oct 2024 03:40:12 -0700 > Jordan Rome <linux@jordanrome.com> wrote: > > > +TRACE_EVENT(capable, > > + > > + TP_PROTO(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *targ_ns, > > + struct user_namespace *capable_ns, int cap, unsigned int opts, int ret), > > + > > + TP_ARGS(cred, targ_ns, capable_ns, cap, opts, ret), > > + > > + TP_STRUCT__entry( > > + __field(const struct cred *, cred) > > + __field(struct user_namespace *, targ_ns) > > + __field(struct user_namespace *, capable_ns) > > + __field(int, cap) > > + __field(unsigned int, opts) > > + __field(int, ret) > > + ), > > + > > + TP_fast_assign( > > + __entry->cred = cred; > > + __entry->targ_ns = targ_ns; > > + __entry->capable_ns = capable_ns; > > + __entry->cap = cap; > > + __entry->opts = opts; > > + __entry->ret = ret; > > + ), > > + > > + TP_printk("cap %d, opts %u, ret %d", > > + __entry->cap, __entry->opts, __entry->ret) > > +); > > + > > You record cred, targ_ns and capable_ns but don't use it in TP_printk? > > It's fine to print pointers there. Is there a reason you do not? Are those pointers really useful for anything? Maybe it's better to print ns->ns.inum instead? At least that's something that is usable from user space side, no? > > -- Steve
On Thu, Oct 24, 2024 at 3:40 AM Jordan Rome <linux@jordanrome.com> wrote: > > In cases where we want a stable way to observe/trace > cap_capable (e.g. protection from inlining and API updates) > add a tracepoint that passes: > - The credentials used > - The user namespace which needs the capability > - The user namespace that actually has the capability (if one exists) > - The capability to check for > - Bitmask of options defined in include/linux/security.h > - The return value of the check > > Signed-off-by: Jordan Rome <linux@jordanrome.com> > --- > MAINTAINERS | 1 + > include/trace/events/capability.h | 58 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > security/commoncap.c | 21 +++++++---- > 3 files changed, 74 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) > create mode 100644 include/trace/events/capability.h > > diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS > index cc40a9d9b8cd..210e9076c858 100644 > --- a/MAINTAINERS > +++ b/MAINTAINERS > @@ -4994,6 +4994,7 @@ M: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> > L: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org > S: Supported > F: include/linux/capability.h > +F: include/trace/events/capability.h > F: include/uapi/linux/capability.h > F: kernel/capability.c > F: security/commoncap.c > diff --git a/include/trace/events/capability.h b/include/trace/events/capability.h > new file mode 100644 > index 000000000000..092b8e77063a > --- /dev/null > +++ b/include/trace/events/capability.h > @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ > +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ > +#undef TRACE_SYSTEM > +#define TRACE_SYSTEM capability > + > +#if !defined(_TRACE_CAPABILITY_H) || defined(TRACE_HEADER_MULTI_READ) > +#define _TRACE_CAPABILITY_H > + > +#include <linux/cred.h> > +#include <linux/tracepoint.h> > +#include <linux/user_namespace.h> > + > +/** > + * capable - called after it's determined if a task has a particular > + * effective capability > + * > + * @cred: The credentials used > + * @targ_ns: The user namespace which needs the capability > + * @capable_ns: The user namespace that actually has the capability > + * if ret is 0 otherwise this will be NULL > + * @cap: The capability to check for > + * @opts: Bitmask of options defined in include/linux/security.h > + * @ret: The return value of the check: 0 if it does, -ve if it does not > + * > + * Allows to trace calls to cap_capable in commoncap.c > + */ > +TRACE_EVENT(capable, > + > + TP_PROTO(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *targ_ns, > + struct user_namespace *capable_ns, int cap, unsigned int opts, int ret), > + > + TP_ARGS(cred, targ_ns, capable_ns, cap, opts, ret), > + > + TP_STRUCT__entry( > + __field(const struct cred *, cred) > + __field(struct user_namespace *, targ_ns) > + __field(struct user_namespace *, capable_ns) > + __field(int, cap) > + __field(unsigned int, opts) > + __field(int, ret) > + ), > + > + TP_fast_assign( > + __entry->cred = cred; > + __entry->targ_ns = targ_ns; > + __entry->capable_ns = capable_ns; > + __entry->cap = cap; > + __entry->opts = opts; > + __entry->ret = ret; > + ), > + > + TP_printk("cap %d, opts %u, ret %d", > + __entry->cap, __entry->opts, __entry->ret) > +); > + > +#endif /* _TRACE_CAPABILITY_H */ > + > +/* This part must be outside protection */ > +#include <trace/define_trace.h> > diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c > index 162d96b3a676..675d40fbaa77 100644 > --- a/security/commoncap.c > +++ b/security/commoncap.c > @@ -27,6 +27,9 @@ > #include <linux/mnt_idmapping.h> > #include <uapi/linux/lsm.h> > > +#define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS > +#include <trace/events/capability.h> > + > /* > * If a non-root user executes a setuid-root binary in > * !secure(SECURE_NOROOT) mode, then we raise capabilities. > @@ -68,6 +71,7 @@ int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *targ_ns, > int cap, unsigned int opts) > { > struct user_namespace *ns = targ_ns; > + int ret = 0; > > /* See if cred has the capability in the target user namespace > * by examining the target user namespace and all of the target > @@ -75,22 +79,26 @@ int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *targ_ns, > */ > for (;;) { > /* Do we have the necessary capabilities? */ > - if (ns == cred->user_ns) > - return cap_raised(cred->cap_effective, cap) ? 0 : -EPERM; > + if (ns == cred->user_ns) { > + ret = cap_raised(cred->cap_effective, cap) ? 0 : -EPERM; > + break; > + } > > /* > * If we're already at a lower level than we're looking for, > * we're done searching. > */ > - if (ns->level <= cred->user_ns->level) > - return -EPERM; > + if (ns->level <= cred->user_ns->level) { I'd do ns = NULL; here > + ret = -EPERM; > + break; > + } > > /* > * The owner of the user namespace in the parent of the > * user namespace has all caps. > */ > if ((ns->parent == cred->user_ns) && uid_eq(ns->owner, cred->euid)) and this needs `ns = ns->parent;` (because that's the namespace that grants capability, is that right?) > - return 0; > + break; > > /* > * If you have a capability in a parent user ns, then you have > @@ -99,7 +107,8 @@ int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *targ_ns, > ns = ns->parent; > } > > - /* We never get here */ > + trace_capable(cred, targ_ns, ret == 0 ? ns : NULL, cap, opts, ret); with the above changes just pass ns directly, no need for `ret == 0` check (and it seems it's wrong for one of the case due to ns->parent use) > + return ret; > } > > /** > -- > 2.43.5 >
On Oct 24, 2024 Jordan Rome <linux@jordanrome.com> wrote: > > In cases where we want a stable way to observe/trace > cap_capable (e.g. protection from inlining and API updates) > add a tracepoint that passes: > - The credentials used > - The user namespace which needs the capability > - The user namespace that actually has the capability (if one exists) > - The capability to check for > - Bitmask of options defined in include/linux/security.h > - The return value of the check > > Signed-off-by: Jordan Rome <linux@jordanrome.com> > --- > MAINTAINERS | 1 + > include/trace/events/capability.h | 58 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > security/commoncap.c | 21 +++++++---- > 3 files changed, 74 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) > create mode 100644 include/trace/events/capability.h ... > diff --git a/include/trace/events/capability.h b/include/trace/events/capability.h > new file mode 100644 > index 000000000000..092b8e77063a > --- /dev/null > +++ b/include/trace/events/capability.h > @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ > +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ > +#undef TRACE_SYSTEM > +#define TRACE_SYSTEM capability > + > +#if !defined(_TRACE_CAPABILITY_H) || defined(TRACE_HEADER_MULTI_READ) > +#define _TRACE_CAPABILITY_H > + > +#include <linux/cred.h> > +#include <linux/tracepoint.h> > +#include <linux/user_namespace.h> > + > +/** > + * capable - called after it's determined if a task has a particular > + * effective capability > + * > + * @cred: The credentials used > + * @targ_ns: The user namespace which needs the capability > + * @capable_ns: The user namespace that actually has the capability > + * if ret is 0 otherwise this will be NULL > + * @cap: The capability to check for > + * @opts: Bitmask of options defined in include/linux/security.h > + * @ret: The return value of the check: 0 if it does, -ve if it does not > + * > + * Allows to trace calls to cap_capable in commoncap.c > + */ > +TRACE_EVENT(capable, This should either be named "cap_capable" if you are only interested in the CAP_XXX capability checks or "capable" if you are interested in all of the checks that are performed when capable() is called from within the kernel. Presently safesetid, apparmor, and selinux all enforce access controls when capable() is called, with the potential for additional checks in future kernel releases. > + TP_PROTO(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *targ_ns, > + struct user_namespace *capable_ns, int cap, unsigned int opts, int ret), > + > + TP_ARGS(cred, targ_ns, capable_ns, cap, opts, ret), > + > + TP_STRUCT__entry( > + __field(const struct cred *, cred) > + __field(struct user_namespace *, targ_ns) > + __field(struct user_namespace *, capable_ns) > + __field(int, cap) > + __field(unsigned int, opts) > + __field(int, ret) > + ), > + > + TP_fast_assign( > + __entry->cred = cred; > + __entry->targ_ns = targ_ns; > + __entry->capable_ns = capable_ns; > + __entry->cap = cap; > + __entry->opts = opts; > + __entry->ret = ret; > + ), > + > + TP_printk("cap %d, opts %u, ret %d", > + __entry->cap, __entry->opts, __entry->ret) > +); > + > +#endif /* _TRACE_CAPABILITY_H */ > + > +/* This part must be outside protection */ > +#include <trace/define_trace.h> -- paul-moore.com
On Thu, Oct 24, 2024 at 03:40:12AM -0700, Jordan Rome wrote: > In cases where we want a stable way to observe/trace > cap_capable (e.g. protection from inlining and API updates) > add a tracepoint that passes: > - The credentials used > - The user namespace which needs the capability "the user namespace which needs the capability" is not quite the right way to put this. It's the user namespace against which the capability is needed. It's an object, not a subject. Or maybe "the user namespace of the resource being accessed". > - The user namespace that actually has the capability (if one exists) How about "the user namespace in which the task has the capability targeted at the resource"? (It's not the user namespace itself that has the capability) > - The capability to check for > - Bitmask of options defined in include/linux/security.h > - The return value of the check > > Signed-off-by: Jordan Rome <linux@jordanrome.com> > --- > MAINTAINERS | 1 + > include/trace/events/capability.h | 58 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > security/commoncap.c | 21 +++++++---- > 3 files changed, 74 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) > create mode 100644 include/trace/events/capability.h > > diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS > index cc40a9d9b8cd..210e9076c858 100644 > --- a/MAINTAINERS > +++ b/MAINTAINERS > @@ -4994,6 +4994,7 @@ M: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> > L: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org > S: Supported > F: include/linux/capability.h > +F: include/trace/events/capability.h > F: include/uapi/linux/capability.h > F: kernel/capability.c > F: security/commoncap.c > diff --git a/include/trace/events/capability.h b/include/trace/events/capability.h > new file mode 100644 > index 000000000000..092b8e77063a > --- /dev/null > +++ b/include/trace/events/capability.h > @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ > +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ > +#undef TRACE_SYSTEM > +#define TRACE_SYSTEM capability > + > +#if !defined(_TRACE_CAPABILITY_H) || defined(TRACE_HEADER_MULTI_READ) > +#define _TRACE_CAPABILITY_H > + > +#include <linux/cred.h> > +#include <linux/tracepoint.h> > +#include <linux/user_namespace.h> > + > +/** > + * capable - called after it's determined if a task has a particular > + * effective capability > + * > + * @cred: The credentials used > + * @targ_ns: The user namespace which needs the capability (same here) > + * @capable_ns: The user namespace that actually has the capability > + * if ret is 0 otherwise this will be NULL > + * @cap: The capability to check for > + * @opts: Bitmask of options defined in include/linux/security.h > + * @ret: The return value of the check: 0 if it does, -ve if it does not > + * > + * Allows to trace calls to cap_capable in commoncap.c > + */ > +TRACE_EVENT(capable, > + > + TP_PROTO(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *targ_ns, > + struct user_namespace *capable_ns, int cap, unsigned int opts, int ret), > + > + TP_ARGS(cred, targ_ns, capable_ns, cap, opts, ret), > + > + TP_STRUCT__entry( > + __field(const struct cred *, cred) > + __field(struct user_namespace *, targ_ns) > + __field(struct user_namespace *, capable_ns) > + __field(int, cap) > + __field(unsigned int, opts) > + __field(int, ret) > + ), > + > + TP_fast_assign( > + __entry->cred = cred; > + __entry->targ_ns = targ_ns; > + __entry->capable_ns = capable_ns; > + __entry->cap = cap; > + __entry->opts = opts; > + __entry->ret = ret; > + ), > + > + TP_printk("cap %d, opts %u, ret %d", > + __entry->cap, __entry->opts, __entry->ret) > +); > + > +#endif /* _TRACE_CAPABILITY_H */ > + > +/* This part must be outside protection */ > +#include <trace/define_trace.h> > diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c > index 162d96b3a676..675d40fbaa77 100644 > --- a/security/commoncap.c > +++ b/security/commoncap.c > @@ -27,6 +27,9 @@ > #include <linux/mnt_idmapping.h> > #include <uapi/linux/lsm.h> > > +#define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS > +#include <trace/events/capability.h> > + > /* > * If a non-root user executes a setuid-root binary in > * !secure(SECURE_NOROOT) mode, then we raise capabilities. > @@ -68,6 +71,7 @@ int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *targ_ns, > int cap, unsigned int opts) > { > struct user_namespace *ns = targ_ns; > + int ret = 0; > > /* See if cred has the capability in the target user namespace > * by examining the target user namespace and all of the target > @@ -75,22 +79,26 @@ int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *targ_ns, > */ > for (;;) { > /* Do we have the necessary capabilities? */ > - if (ns == cred->user_ns) > - return cap_raised(cred->cap_effective, cap) ? 0 : -EPERM; > + if (ns == cred->user_ns) { > + ret = cap_raised(cred->cap_effective, cap) ? 0 : -EPERM; > + break; > + } > > /* > * If we're already at a lower level than we're looking for, > * we're done searching. > */ > - if (ns->level <= cred->user_ns->level) > - return -EPERM; > + if (ns->level <= cred->user_ns->level) { > + ret = -EPERM; > + break; > + } > > /* > * The owner of the user namespace in the parent of the > * user namespace has all caps. > */ > if ((ns->parent == cred->user_ns) && uid_eq(ns->owner, cred->euid)) > - return 0; > + break; > > /* > * If you have a capability in a parent user ns, then you have > @@ -99,7 +107,8 @@ int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *targ_ns, > ns = ns->parent; > } > > - /* We never get here */ With this change, I become less comfortable with us assuming that it is the case that we'll never just drop off the end of the while loop. I'd be more comfortable if you set ret = -EPERM at the top, and set it to 0 in the last break. > + trace_capable(cred, targ_ns, ret == 0 ? ns : NULL, cap, opts, ret); > + return ret; > } > > /** > -- > 2.43.5 >
On Thu, 24 Oct 2024 10:48:55 -0700 Andrii Nakryiko <andrii.nakryiko@gmail.com> wrote: > > You record cred, targ_ns and capable_ns but don't use it in TP_printk? > > > > It's fine to print pointers there. Is there a reason you do not? > > Are those pointers really useful for anything? Maybe it's better to > print ns->ns.inum instead? At least that's something that is usable > from user space side, no? Pointers are actually useful from user space. It allows you to add eprobes to get data from the structure. Yes, you can do this from BPF but sometimes a shell script is nicer to use. $ gdb vmlinux (gdb) print &(((struct user_namespace *)0)->ns.inum) $2 = (unsigned int *) 0xe8 # cd /sys/kernel/tracing # echo 'e:cap capability/capable num=+0e8($capable-ns)' > dynamic_events # echo 1 > events/eprobes/cap/enable # cat trace Thus pointers give a nice way of getting info dynamically, and having the pointer printed out in the TP_printk also helps to know you can do this. I realize that eprobes is not documented well (or at all) which needs to be fixed. -- Steve
On Thu, Oct 24, 2024 at 4:28 PM <sergeh@kernel.org> wrote: > > On Thu, Oct 24, 2024 at 03:40:12AM -0700, Jordan Rome wrote: > > In cases where we want a stable way to observe/trace > > cap_capable (e.g. protection from inlining and API updates) > > add a tracepoint that passes: > > - The credentials used > > - The user namespace which needs the capability > > "the user namespace which needs the capability" is not quite the > right way to put this. It's the user namespace against which the > capability is needed. It's an object, not a subject. Or maybe > "the user namespace of the resource being accessed". > I like "The user namespace of the resource being accessed" > > - The user namespace that actually has the capability (if one exists) > > How about "the user namespace in which the task has the > capability targeted at the resource"? (It's not the user > namespace itself that has the capability) > This phrasing seems a little confusing. How about: "The user namespace that has the capability to access the targeted resource" ? > > - The capability to check for > > - Bitmask of options defined in include/linux/security.h > > - The return value of the check > > > > Signed-off-by: Jordan Rome <linux@jordanrome.com> > > --- > > MAINTAINERS | 1 + > > include/trace/events/capability.h | 58 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > > security/commoncap.c | 21 +++++++---- > > 3 files changed, 74 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) > > create mode 100644 include/trace/events/capability.h > > > > diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS > > index cc40a9d9b8cd..210e9076c858 100644 > > --- a/MAINTAINERS > > +++ b/MAINTAINERS > > @@ -4994,6 +4994,7 @@ M: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> > > L: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org > > S: Supported > > F: include/linux/capability.h > > +F: include/trace/events/capability.h > > F: include/uapi/linux/capability.h > > F: kernel/capability.c > > F: security/commoncap.c > > diff --git a/include/trace/events/capability.h b/include/trace/events/capability.h > > new file mode 100644 > > index 000000000000..092b8e77063a > > --- /dev/null > > +++ b/include/trace/events/capability.h > > @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ > > +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ > > +#undef TRACE_SYSTEM > > +#define TRACE_SYSTEM capability > > + > > +#if !defined(_TRACE_CAPABILITY_H) || defined(TRACE_HEADER_MULTI_READ) > > +#define _TRACE_CAPABILITY_H > > + > > +#include <linux/cred.h> > > +#include <linux/tracepoint.h> > > +#include <linux/user_namespace.h> > > + > > +/** > > + * capable - called after it's determined if a task has a particular > > + * effective capability > > + * > > + * @cred: The credentials used > > + * @targ_ns: The user namespace which needs the capability > > (same here) > > > + * @capable_ns: The user namespace that actually has the capability > > + * if ret is 0 otherwise this will be NULL > > + * @cap: The capability to check for > > + * @opts: Bitmask of options defined in include/linux/security.h > > + * @ret: The return value of the check: 0 if it does, -ve if it does not > > + * > > + * Allows to trace calls to cap_capable in commoncap.c > > + */ > > +TRACE_EVENT(capable, > > + > > + TP_PROTO(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *targ_ns, > > + struct user_namespace *capable_ns, int cap, unsigned int opts, int ret), > > + > > + TP_ARGS(cred, targ_ns, capable_ns, cap, opts, ret), > > + > > + TP_STRUCT__entry( > > + __field(const struct cred *, cred) > > + __field(struct user_namespace *, targ_ns) > > + __field(struct user_namespace *, capable_ns) > > + __field(int, cap) > > + __field(unsigned int, opts) > > + __field(int, ret) > > + ), > > + > > + TP_fast_assign( > > + __entry->cred = cred; > > + __entry->targ_ns = targ_ns; > > + __entry->capable_ns = capable_ns; > > + __entry->cap = cap; > > + __entry->opts = opts; > > + __entry->ret = ret; > > + ), > > + > > + TP_printk("cap %d, opts %u, ret %d", > > + __entry->cap, __entry->opts, __entry->ret) > > +); > > + > > +#endif /* _TRACE_CAPABILITY_H */ > > + > > +/* This part must be outside protection */ > > +#include <trace/define_trace.h> > > diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c > > index 162d96b3a676..675d40fbaa77 100644 > > --- a/security/commoncap.c > > +++ b/security/commoncap.c > > @@ -27,6 +27,9 @@ > > #include <linux/mnt_idmapping.h> > > #include <uapi/linux/lsm.h> > > > > +#define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS > > +#include <trace/events/capability.h> > > + > > /* > > * If a non-root user executes a setuid-root binary in > > * !secure(SECURE_NOROOT) mode, then we raise capabilities. > > @@ -68,6 +71,7 @@ int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *targ_ns, > > int cap, unsigned int opts) > > { > > struct user_namespace *ns = targ_ns; > > + int ret = 0; > > > > /* See if cred has the capability in the target user namespace > > * by examining the target user namespace and all of the target > > @@ -75,22 +79,26 @@ int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *targ_ns, > > */ > > for (;;) { > > /* Do we have the necessary capabilities? */ > > - if (ns == cred->user_ns) > > - return cap_raised(cred->cap_effective, cap) ? 0 : -EPERM; > > + if (ns == cred->user_ns) { > > + ret = cap_raised(cred->cap_effective, cap) ? 0 : -EPERM; > > + break; > > + } > > > > /* > > * If we're already at a lower level than we're looking for, > > * we're done searching. > > */ > > - if (ns->level <= cred->user_ns->level) > > - return -EPERM; > > + if (ns->level <= cred->user_ns->level) { > > + ret = -EPERM; > > + break; > > + } > > > > /* > > * The owner of the user namespace in the parent of the > > * user namespace has all caps. > > */ > > if ((ns->parent == cred->user_ns) && uid_eq(ns->owner, cred->euid)) > > - return 0; > > + break; > > > > /* > > * If you have a capability in a parent user ns, then you have > > @@ -99,7 +107,8 @@ int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *targ_ns, > > ns = ns->parent; > > } > > > > - /* We never get here */ > > With this change, I become less comfortable with us assuming that it is > the case that we'll never just drop off the end of the while loop. I'd > be more comfortable if you set ret = -EPERM at the top, and set it to 0 > in the last break. > Sure. I can make this change. > > + trace_capable(cred, targ_ns, ret == 0 ? ns : NULL, cap, opts, ret); > > + return ret; > > } > > > > /** > > -- > > 2.43.5 > >
On Thu, Oct 24, 2024 at 09:15:56PM -0400, Jordan Rome wrote: > On Thu, Oct 24, 2024 at 4:28 PM <sergeh@kernel.org> wrote: > > > > On Thu, Oct 24, 2024 at 03:40:12AM -0700, Jordan Rome wrote: > > > In cases where we want a stable way to observe/trace > > > cap_capable (e.g. protection from inlining and API updates) > > > add a tracepoint that passes: > > > - The credentials used > > > - The user namespace which needs the capability > > > > "the user namespace which needs the capability" is not quite the > > right way to put this. It's the user namespace against which the > > capability is needed. It's an object, not a subject. Or maybe > > "the user namespace of the resource being accessed". > > > > I like "The user namespace of the resource being accessed" > > > > - The user namespace that actually has the capability (if one exists) > > > > How about "the user namespace in which the task has the > > capability targeted at the resource"? (It's not the user > > namespace itself that has the capability) > > > > This phrasing seems a little confusing. How about: > "The user namespace that has the capability to access the targeted resource" ? The problem again is that it's not the user namespace that has the capability. The cred has the capability in that user namespace. "The user namespace in which the credential has the capability to access the targeted resource"? Or maybe s/has/provides/. > > > - The capability to check for > > > - Bitmask of options defined in include/linux/security.h > > > - The return value of the check > > > > > > Signed-off-by: Jordan Rome <linux@jordanrome.com> > > > --- > > > MAINTAINERS | 1 + > > > include/trace/events/capability.h | 58 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > > > security/commoncap.c | 21 +++++++---- > > > 3 files changed, 74 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) > > > create mode 100644 include/trace/events/capability.h > > > > > > diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS > > > index cc40a9d9b8cd..210e9076c858 100644 > > > --- a/MAINTAINERS > > > +++ b/MAINTAINERS > > > @@ -4994,6 +4994,7 @@ M: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> > > > L: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org > > > S: Supported > > > F: include/linux/capability.h > > > +F: include/trace/events/capability.h > > > F: include/uapi/linux/capability.h > > > F: kernel/capability.c > > > F: security/commoncap.c > > > diff --git a/include/trace/events/capability.h b/include/trace/events/capability.h > > > new file mode 100644 > > > index 000000000000..092b8e77063a > > > --- /dev/null > > > +++ b/include/trace/events/capability.h > > > @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ > > > +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ > > > +#undef TRACE_SYSTEM > > > +#define TRACE_SYSTEM capability > > > + > > > +#if !defined(_TRACE_CAPABILITY_H) || defined(TRACE_HEADER_MULTI_READ) > > > +#define _TRACE_CAPABILITY_H > > > + > > > +#include <linux/cred.h> > > > +#include <linux/tracepoint.h> > > > +#include <linux/user_namespace.h> > > > + > > > +/** > > > + * capable - called after it's determined if a task has a particular > > > + * effective capability > > > + * > > > + * @cred: The credentials used > > > + * @targ_ns: The user namespace which needs the capability > > > > (same here) > > > > > + * @capable_ns: The user namespace that actually has the capability > > > + * if ret is 0 otherwise this will be NULL > > > + * @cap: The capability to check for > > > + * @opts: Bitmask of options defined in include/linux/security.h > > > + * @ret: The return value of the check: 0 if it does, -ve if it does not > > > + * > > > + * Allows to trace calls to cap_capable in commoncap.c > > > + */ > > > +TRACE_EVENT(capable, > > > + > > > + TP_PROTO(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *targ_ns, > > > + struct user_namespace *capable_ns, int cap, unsigned int opts, int ret), > > > + > > > + TP_ARGS(cred, targ_ns, capable_ns, cap, opts, ret), > > > + > > > + TP_STRUCT__entry( > > > + __field(const struct cred *, cred) > > > + __field(struct user_namespace *, targ_ns) > > > + __field(struct user_namespace *, capable_ns) > > > + __field(int, cap) > > > + __field(unsigned int, opts) > > > + __field(int, ret) > > > + ), > > > + > > > + TP_fast_assign( > > > + __entry->cred = cred; > > > + __entry->targ_ns = targ_ns; > > > + __entry->capable_ns = capable_ns; > > > + __entry->cap = cap; > > > + __entry->opts = opts; > > > + __entry->ret = ret; > > > + ), > > > + > > > + TP_printk("cap %d, opts %u, ret %d", > > > + __entry->cap, __entry->opts, __entry->ret) > > > +); > > > + > > > +#endif /* _TRACE_CAPABILITY_H */ > > > + > > > +/* This part must be outside protection */ > > > +#include <trace/define_trace.h> > > > diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c > > > index 162d96b3a676..675d40fbaa77 100644 > > > --- a/security/commoncap.c > > > +++ b/security/commoncap.c > > > @@ -27,6 +27,9 @@ > > > #include <linux/mnt_idmapping.h> > > > #include <uapi/linux/lsm.h> > > > > > > +#define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS > > > +#include <trace/events/capability.h> > > > + > > > /* > > > * If a non-root user executes a setuid-root binary in > > > * !secure(SECURE_NOROOT) mode, then we raise capabilities. > > > @@ -68,6 +71,7 @@ int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *targ_ns, > > > int cap, unsigned int opts) > > > { > > > struct user_namespace *ns = targ_ns; > > > + int ret = 0; > > > > > > /* See if cred has the capability in the target user namespace > > > * by examining the target user namespace and all of the target > > > @@ -75,22 +79,26 @@ int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *targ_ns, > > > */ > > > for (;;) { > > > /* Do we have the necessary capabilities? */ > > > - if (ns == cred->user_ns) > > > - return cap_raised(cred->cap_effective, cap) ? 0 : -EPERM; > > > + if (ns == cred->user_ns) { > > > + ret = cap_raised(cred->cap_effective, cap) ? 0 : -EPERM; > > > + break; > > > + } > > > > > > /* > > > * If we're already at a lower level than we're looking for, > > > * we're done searching. > > > */ > > > - if (ns->level <= cred->user_ns->level) > > > - return -EPERM; > > > + if (ns->level <= cred->user_ns->level) { > > > + ret = -EPERM; > > > + break; > > > + } > > > > > > /* > > > * The owner of the user namespace in the parent of the > > > * user namespace has all caps. > > > */ > > > if ((ns->parent == cred->user_ns) && uid_eq(ns->owner, cred->euid)) > > > - return 0; > > > + break; > > > > > > /* > > > * If you have a capability in a parent user ns, then you have > > > @@ -99,7 +107,8 @@ int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *targ_ns, > > > ns = ns->parent; > > > } > > > > > > - /* We never get here */ > > > > With this change, I become less comfortable with us assuming that it is > > the case that we'll never just drop off the end of the while loop. I'd > > be more comfortable if you set ret = -EPERM at the top, and set it to 0 > > in the last break. > > > > Sure. I can make this change. > > > > + trace_capable(cred, targ_ns, ret == 0 ? ns : NULL, cap, opts, ret); > > > + return ret; > > > } > > > > > > /** > > > -- > > > 2.43.5 > > >
On Fri, Oct 25, 2024 at 7:18 AM <sergeh@kernel.org> wrote: > > On Thu, Oct 24, 2024 at 09:15:56PM -0400, Jordan Rome wrote: > > On Thu, Oct 24, 2024 at 4:28 PM <sergeh@kernel.org> wrote: > > > > > > On Thu, Oct 24, 2024 at 03:40:12AM -0700, Jordan Rome wrote: > > > > In cases where we want a stable way to observe/trace > > > > cap_capable (e.g. protection from inlining and API updates) > > > > add a tracepoint that passes: > > > > - The credentials used > > > > - The user namespace which needs the capability > > > > > > "the user namespace which needs the capability" is not quite the > > > right way to put this. It's the user namespace against which the > > > capability is needed. It's an object, not a subject. Or maybe > > > "the user namespace of the resource being accessed". > > > > > > > I like "The user namespace of the resource being accessed" > > > > > > - The user namespace that actually has the capability (if one exists) > > > > > > How about "the user namespace in which the task has the > > > capability targeted at the resource"? (It's not the user > > > namespace itself that has the capability) > > > > > > > This phrasing seems a little confusing. How about: > > "The user namespace that has the capability to access the targeted resource" ? > > The problem again is that it's not the user namespace that has the > capability. The cred has the capability in that user namespace. > > "The user namespace in which the credential has the capability to access > the targeted resource"? > > Or maybe s/has/provides/. > This sounds good to me with "provides" > > > > - The capability to check for > > > > - Bitmask of options defined in include/linux/security.h > > > > - The return value of the check > > > > > > > > Signed-off-by: Jordan Rome <linux@jordanrome.com> > > > > --- > > > > MAINTAINERS | 1 + > > > > include/trace/events/capability.h | 58 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > > > > security/commoncap.c | 21 +++++++---- > > > > 3 files changed, 74 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) > > > > create mode 100644 include/trace/events/capability.h > > > > > > > > diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS > > > > index cc40a9d9b8cd..210e9076c858 100644 > > > > --- a/MAINTAINERS > > > > +++ b/MAINTAINERS > > > > @@ -4994,6 +4994,7 @@ M: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> > > > > L: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org > > > > S: Supported > > > > F: include/linux/capability.h > > > > +F: include/trace/events/capability.h > > > > F: include/uapi/linux/capability.h > > > > F: kernel/capability.c > > > > F: security/commoncap.c > > > > diff --git a/include/trace/events/capability.h b/include/trace/events/capability.h > > > > new file mode 100644 > > > > index 000000000000..092b8e77063a > > > > --- /dev/null > > > > +++ b/include/trace/events/capability.h > > > > @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ > > > > +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ > > > > +#undef TRACE_SYSTEM > > > > +#define TRACE_SYSTEM capability > > > > + > > > > +#if !defined(_TRACE_CAPABILITY_H) || defined(TRACE_HEADER_MULTI_READ) > > > > +#define _TRACE_CAPABILITY_H > > > > + > > > > +#include <linux/cred.h> > > > > +#include <linux/tracepoint.h> > > > > +#include <linux/user_namespace.h> > > > > + > > > > +/** > > > > + * capable - called after it's determined if a task has a particular > > > > + * effective capability > > > > + * > > > > + * @cred: The credentials used > > > > + * @targ_ns: The user namespace which needs the capability > > > > > > (same here) > > > > > > > + * @capable_ns: The user namespace that actually has the capability > > > > + * if ret is 0 otherwise this will be NULL > > > > + * @cap: The capability to check for > > > > + * @opts: Bitmask of options defined in include/linux/security.h > > > > + * @ret: The return value of the check: 0 if it does, -ve if it does not > > > > + * > > > > + * Allows to trace calls to cap_capable in commoncap.c > > > > + */ > > > > +TRACE_EVENT(capable, > > > > + > > > > + TP_PROTO(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *targ_ns, > > > > + struct user_namespace *capable_ns, int cap, unsigned int opts, int ret), > > > > + > > > > + TP_ARGS(cred, targ_ns, capable_ns, cap, opts, ret), > > > > + > > > > + TP_STRUCT__entry( > > > > + __field(const struct cred *, cred) > > > > + __field(struct user_namespace *, targ_ns) > > > > + __field(struct user_namespace *, capable_ns) > > > > + __field(int, cap) > > > > + __field(unsigned int, opts) > > > > + __field(int, ret) > > > > + ), > > > > + > > > > + TP_fast_assign( > > > > + __entry->cred = cred; > > > > + __entry->targ_ns = targ_ns; > > > > + __entry->capable_ns = capable_ns; > > > > + __entry->cap = cap; > > > > + __entry->opts = opts; > > > > + __entry->ret = ret; > > > > + ), > > > > + > > > > + TP_printk("cap %d, opts %u, ret %d", > > > > + __entry->cap, __entry->opts, __entry->ret) > > > > +); > > > > + > > > > +#endif /* _TRACE_CAPABILITY_H */ > > > > + > > > > +/* This part must be outside protection */ > > > > +#include <trace/define_trace.h> > > > > diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c > > > > index 162d96b3a676..675d40fbaa77 100644 > > > > --- a/security/commoncap.c > > > > +++ b/security/commoncap.c > > > > @@ -27,6 +27,9 @@ > > > > #include <linux/mnt_idmapping.h> > > > > #include <uapi/linux/lsm.h> > > > > > > > > +#define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS > > > > +#include <trace/events/capability.h> > > > > + > > > > /* > > > > * If a non-root user executes a setuid-root binary in > > > > * !secure(SECURE_NOROOT) mode, then we raise capabilities. > > > > @@ -68,6 +71,7 @@ int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *targ_ns, > > > > int cap, unsigned int opts) > > > > { > > > > struct user_namespace *ns = targ_ns; > > > > + int ret = 0; > > > > > > > > /* See if cred has the capability in the target user namespace > > > > * by examining the target user namespace and all of the target > > > > @@ -75,22 +79,26 @@ int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *targ_ns, > > > > */ > > > > for (;;) { > > > > /* Do we have the necessary capabilities? */ > > > > - if (ns == cred->user_ns) > > > > - return cap_raised(cred->cap_effective, cap) ? 0 : -EPERM; > > > > + if (ns == cred->user_ns) { > > > > + ret = cap_raised(cred->cap_effective, cap) ? 0 : -EPERM; > > > > + break; > > > > + } > > > > > > > > /* > > > > * If we're already at a lower level than we're looking for, > > > > * we're done searching. > > > > */ > > > > - if (ns->level <= cred->user_ns->level) > > > > - return -EPERM; > > > > + if (ns->level <= cred->user_ns->level) { > > > > + ret = -EPERM; > > > > + break; > > > > + } > > > > > > > > /* > > > > * The owner of the user namespace in the parent of the > > > > * user namespace has all caps. > > > > */ > > > > if ((ns->parent == cred->user_ns) && uid_eq(ns->owner, cred->euid)) > > > > - return 0; > > > > + break; > > > > > > > > /* > > > > * If you have a capability in a parent user ns, then you have > > > > @@ -99,7 +107,8 @@ int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *targ_ns, > > > > ns = ns->parent; > > > > } > > > > > > > > - /* We never get here */ > > > > > > With this change, I become less comfortable with us assuming that it is > > > the case that we'll never just drop off the end of the while loop. I'd > > > be more comfortable if you set ret = -EPERM at the top, and set it to 0 > > > in the last break. > > > > > > > Sure. I can make this change. > > > > > > + trace_capable(cred, targ_ns, ret == 0 ? ns : NULL, cap, opts, ret); > > > > + return ret; > > > > } > > > > > > > > /** > > > > -- > > > > 2.43.5 > > > >
diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index cc40a9d9b8cd..210e9076c858 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -4994,6 +4994,7 @@ M: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> L: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org S: Supported F: include/linux/capability.h +F: include/trace/events/capability.h F: include/uapi/linux/capability.h F: kernel/capability.c F: security/commoncap.c diff --git a/include/trace/events/capability.h b/include/trace/events/capability.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..092b8e77063a --- /dev/null +++ b/include/trace/events/capability.h @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#undef TRACE_SYSTEM +#define TRACE_SYSTEM capability + +#if !defined(_TRACE_CAPABILITY_H) || defined(TRACE_HEADER_MULTI_READ) +#define _TRACE_CAPABILITY_H + +#include <linux/cred.h> +#include <linux/tracepoint.h> +#include <linux/user_namespace.h> + +/** + * capable - called after it's determined if a task has a particular + * effective capability + * + * @cred: The credentials used + * @targ_ns: The user namespace which needs the capability + * @capable_ns: The user namespace that actually has the capability + * if ret is 0 otherwise this will be NULL + * @cap: The capability to check for + * @opts: Bitmask of options defined in include/linux/security.h + * @ret: The return value of the check: 0 if it does, -ve if it does not + * + * Allows to trace calls to cap_capable in commoncap.c + */ +TRACE_EVENT(capable, + + TP_PROTO(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *targ_ns, + struct user_namespace *capable_ns, int cap, unsigned int opts, int ret), + + TP_ARGS(cred, targ_ns, capable_ns, cap, opts, ret), + + TP_STRUCT__entry( + __field(const struct cred *, cred) + __field(struct user_namespace *, targ_ns) + __field(struct user_namespace *, capable_ns) + __field(int, cap) + __field(unsigned int, opts) + __field(int, ret) + ), + + TP_fast_assign( + __entry->cred = cred; + __entry->targ_ns = targ_ns; + __entry->capable_ns = capable_ns; + __entry->cap = cap; + __entry->opts = opts; + __entry->ret = ret; + ), + + TP_printk("cap %d, opts %u, ret %d", + __entry->cap, __entry->opts, __entry->ret) +); + +#endif /* _TRACE_CAPABILITY_H */ + +/* This part must be outside protection */ +#include <trace/define_trace.h> diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c index 162d96b3a676..675d40fbaa77 100644 --- a/security/commoncap.c +++ b/security/commoncap.c @@ -27,6 +27,9 @@ #include <linux/mnt_idmapping.h> #include <uapi/linux/lsm.h> +#define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS +#include <trace/events/capability.h> + /* * If a non-root user executes a setuid-root binary in * !secure(SECURE_NOROOT) mode, then we raise capabilities. @@ -68,6 +71,7 @@ int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *targ_ns, int cap, unsigned int opts) { struct user_namespace *ns = targ_ns; + int ret = 0; /* See if cred has the capability in the target user namespace * by examining the target user namespace and all of the target @@ -75,22 +79,26 @@ int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *targ_ns, */ for (;;) { /* Do we have the necessary capabilities? */ - if (ns == cred->user_ns) - return cap_raised(cred->cap_effective, cap) ? 0 : -EPERM; + if (ns == cred->user_ns) { + ret = cap_raised(cred->cap_effective, cap) ? 0 : -EPERM; + break; + } /* * If we're already at a lower level than we're looking for, * we're done searching. */ - if (ns->level <= cred->user_ns->level) - return -EPERM; + if (ns->level <= cred->user_ns->level) { + ret = -EPERM; + break; + } /* * The owner of the user namespace in the parent of the * user namespace has all caps. */ if ((ns->parent == cred->user_ns) && uid_eq(ns->owner, cred->euid)) - return 0; + break; /* * If you have a capability in a parent user ns, then you have @@ -99,7 +107,8 @@ int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *targ_ns, ns = ns->parent; } - /* We never get here */ + trace_capable(cred, targ_ns, ret == 0 ? ns : NULL, cap, opts, ret); + return ret; } /**
In cases where we want a stable way to observe/trace cap_capable (e.g. protection from inlining and API updates) add a tracepoint that passes: - The credentials used - The user namespace which needs the capability - The user namespace that actually has the capability (if one exists) - The capability to check for - Bitmask of options defined in include/linux/security.h - The return value of the check Signed-off-by: Jordan Rome <linux@jordanrome.com> --- MAINTAINERS | 1 + include/trace/events/capability.h | 58 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/commoncap.c | 21 +++++++---- 3 files changed, 74 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) create mode 100644 include/trace/events/capability.h -- 2.43.5