diff mbox series

[v8] security: add trace event for cap_capable

Message ID 20241128224849.3774367-1-linux@jordanrome.com (mailing list archive)
State New
Headers show
Series [v8] security: add trace event for cap_capable | expand

Commit Message

Jordan Rome Nov. 28, 2024, 10:48 p.m. UTC
In cases where we want a stable way to observe/trace
cap_capable (e.g. protection from inlining and API updates)
add a tracepoint that passes:
- The credentials used
- The user namespace of the resource being accessed
- The user namespace in which the credential provides the
capability to access the targeted resource
- The capability to check for
- The return value of the check

Signed-off-by: Jordan Rome <linux@jordanrome.com>
---
 MAINTAINERS                       |  1 +
 include/trace/events/capability.h | 57 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/commoncap.c              | 57 +++++++++++++++++++++----------
 3 files changed, 97 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 include/trace/events/capability.h

--
2.43.5

Comments

Paul Moore Nov. 30, 2024, 2:57 a.m. UTC | #1
On Thu, Nov 28, 2024 at 5:49 PM Jordan Rome <linux@jordanrome.com> wrote:
>
> In cases where we want a stable way to observe/trace
> cap_capable (e.g. protection from inlining and API updates)
> add a tracepoint that passes:
> - The credentials used
> - The user namespace of the resource being accessed
> - The user namespace in which the credential provides the
> capability to access the targeted resource
> - The capability to check for
> - The return value of the check
>
> Signed-off-by: Jordan Rome <linux@jordanrome.com>
> ---
>  MAINTAINERS                       |  1 +
>  include/trace/events/capability.h | 57 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  security/commoncap.c              | 57 +++++++++++++++++++++----------
>  3 files changed, 97 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
>  create mode 100644 include/trace/events/capability.h

I'm personally not a fan of the helper based approach here, it adds
unnecessary complexity in my opinion, but I understand that was an
edict handed to you.  Otherwise, and within the other constraints, I
think this looks okay.

Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Serge E. Hallyn Nov. 30, 2024, 8:07 p.m. UTC | #2
On Fri, Nov 29, 2024 at 09:57:54PM -0500, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Thu, Nov 28, 2024 at 5:49 PM Jordan Rome <linux@jordanrome.com> wrote:
> >
> > In cases where we want a stable way to observe/trace
> > cap_capable (e.g. protection from inlining and API updates)
> > add a tracepoint that passes:
> > - The credentials used
> > - The user namespace of the resource being accessed
> > - The user namespace in which the credential provides the
> > capability to access the targeted resource
> > - The capability to check for
> > - The return value of the check
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Jordan Rome <linux@jordanrome.com>
> > ---
> >  MAINTAINERS                       |  1 +
> >  include/trace/events/capability.h | 57 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> >  security/commoncap.c              | 57 +++++++++++++++++++++----------
> >  3 files changed, 97 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
> >  create mode 100644 include/trace/events/capability.h
> 
> I'm personally not a fan of the helper based approach here, it adds
> unnecessary complexity in my opinion, but I understand that was an
> edict handed to you.  Otherwise, and within the other constraints, I
> think this looks okay.
> 
> Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>

Thanks, I'll add it to the caps-next tree so it can get some
testing until the next merge window.

> 
> -- 
> paul-moore.com
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
index f870842fad9c..b90df58f6030 100644
--- a/MAINTAINERS
+++ b/MAINTAINERS
@@ -5103,6 +5103,7 @@  M:	Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
 L:	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
 S:	Supported
 F:	include/linux/capability.h
+F:	include/trace/events/capability.h
 F:	include/uapi/linux/capability.h
 F:	kernel/capability.c
 F:	security/commoncap.c
diff --git a/include/trace/events/capability.h b/include/trace/events/capability.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..17340257946c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/trace/events/capability.h
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ 
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#undef TRACE_SYSTEM
+#define TRACE_SYSTEM capability
+
+#if !defined(_TRACE_CAPABILITY_H) || defined(TRACE_HEADER_MULTI_READ)
+#define _TRACE_CAPABILITY_H
+
+#include <linux/cred.h>
+#include <linux/tracepoint.h>
+#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
+
+/**
+ * cap_capable - called after it's determined if a task has a particular
+ * effective capability
+ *
+ * @cred: The credentials used
+ * @target_ns: The user namespace of the resource being accessed
+ * @capable_ns: The user namespace in which the credential provides the
+ *              capability to access the targeted resource.
+ *              This will be NULL if ret is not 0.
+ * @cap: The capability to check for
+ * @ret: The return value of the check: 0 if it does, -ve if it does not
+ *
+ * Allows to trace calls to cap_capable in commoncap.c
+ */
+TRACE_EVENT(cap_capable,
+
+	TP_PROTO(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *target_ns,
+		const struct user_namespace *capable_ns, int cap, int ret),
+
+	TP_ARGS(cred, target_ns, capable_ns, cap, ret),
+
+	TP_STRUCT__entry(
+		__field(const struct cred *, cred)
+		__field(struct user_namespace *, target_ns)
+		__field(const struct user_namespace *, capable_ns)
+		__field(int, cap)
+		__field(int, ret)
+	),
+
+	TP_fast_assign(
+		__entry->cred       = cred;
+		__entry->target_ns    = target_ns;
+		__entry->capable_ns = ret == 0 ? capable_ns : NULL;
+		__entry->cap        = cap;
+		__entry->ret        = ret;
+	),
+
+	TP_printk("cred %p, target_ns %p, capable_ns %p, cap %d, ret %d",
+		__entry->cred, __entry->target_ns, __entry->capable_ns, __entry->cap,
+		__entry->ret)
+);
+
+#endif /* _TRACE_CAPABILITY_H */
+
+/* This part must be outside protection */
+#include <trace/define_trace.h>
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index cefad323a0b1..6b40f12bda18 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -27,6 +27,9 @@ 
 #include <linux/mnt_idmapping.h>
 #include <uapi/linux/lsm.h>

+#define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
+#include <trace/events/capability.h>
+
 /*
  * If a non-root user executes a setuid-root binary in
  * !secure(SECURE_NOROOT) mode, then we raise capabilities.
@@ -50,24 +53,17 @@  static void warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(const char *fname)
 }

 /**
- * cap_capable - Determine whether a task has a particular effective capability
- * @cred: The credentials to use
- * @targ_ns:  The user namespace in which we need the capability
- * @cap: The capability to check for
- * @opts: Bitmask of options defined in include/linux/security.h
+ * cap_capable_helper - Determine whether a task has a particular effective
+ * capability.
  *
- * Determine whether the nominated task has the specified capability amongst
- * its effective set, returning 0 if it does, -ve if it does not.
- *
- * NOTE WELL: cap_has_capability() cannot be used like the kernel's capable()
- * and has_capability() functions.  That is, it has the reverse semantics:
- * cap_has_capability() returns 0 when a task has a capability, but the
- * kernel's capable() and has_capability() returns 1 for this case.
+ * See cap_capable for more details.
  */
-int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *targ_ns,
-		int cap, unsigned int opts)
+static inline int cap_capable_helper(const struct cred *cred,
+				     struct user_namespace *target_ns,
+				     const struct user_namespace *cred_ns,
+				     int cap)
 {
-	struct user_namespace *ns = targ_ns;
+	struct user_namespace *ns = target_ns;

 	/* See if cred has the capability in the target user namespace
 	 * by examining the target user namespace and all of the target
@@ -75,21 +71,21 @@  int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *targ_ns,
 	 */
 	for (;;) {
 		/* Do we have the necessary capabilities? */
-		if (ns == cred->user_ns)
+		if (likely(ns == cred_ns))
 			return cap_raised(cred->cap_effective, cap) ? 0 : -EPERM;

 		/*
 		 * If we're already at a lower level than we're looking for,
 		 * we're done searching.
 		 */
-		if (ns->level <= cred->user_ns->level)
+		if (ns->level <= cred_ns->level)
 			return -EPERM;

 		/*
 		 * The owner of the user namespace in the parent of the
 		 * user namespace has all caps.
 		 */
-		if ((ns->parent == cred->user_ns) && uid_eq(ns->owner, cred->euid))
+		if ((ns->parent == cred_ns) && uid_eq(ns->owner, cred->euid))
 			return 0;

 		/*
@@ -102,6 +98,31 @@  int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *targ_ns,
 	/* We never get here */
 }

+/**
+ * cap_capable - Determine whether a task has a particular effective capability
+ * @cred: The credentials to use
+ * @target_ns:  The user namespace of the resource being accessed
+ * @cap: The capability to check for
+ * @opts: Bitmask of options defined in include/linux/security.h (unused)
+ *
+ * Determine whether the nominated task has the specified capability amongst
+ * its effective set, returning 0 if it does, -ve if it does not.
+ *
+ * NOTE WELL: cap_has_capability() cannot be used like the kernel's capable()
+ * and has_capability() functions.  That is, it has the reverse semantics:
+ * cap_has_capability() returns 0 when a task has a capability, but the
+ * kernel's capable() and has_capability() returns 1 for this case.
+ */
+int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *target_ns,
+		int cap, unsigned int opts)
+{
+	const struct user_namespace *cred_ns = cred->user_ns;
+	int ret = cap_capable_helper(cred, target_ns, cred_ns, cap);
+
+	trace_cap_capable(cred, target_ns, cred_ns, cap, ret);
+	return ret;
+}
+
 /**
  * cap_settime - Determine whether the current process may set the system clock
  * @ts: The time to set