| Message ID | 1378311199-1695-1-git-send-email-dros@netapp.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
On Wed, 2013-09-04 at 12:13 -0400, Weston Andros Adamson wrote: > Commit 97431204ea005ec8070ac94bc3251e836daa7ca7 introduced a regression > that causes SECINFO_NO_NAME to fail without sending an RPC if: > > 1) the nfs_client's rpc_client is using krb5i/p (now tried by default) > 2) the current user doesn't have valid kerberos credentials > > This situation is quite common - as of now a sec=sys mount would use > krb5i for the nfs_client's rpc_client and a user would hardly be faulted > for not having run kinit. > > The solution is to use the machine cred when trying to use an integrity > protected auth flavor for SECINFO_NO_NAME. > > Older servers may not support using the machine cred or an integrity > protected auth flavor for SECINFO_NO_NAME in every circumstance, so we fall > back to using the user's cred and the filesystem's auth flavor in this case. > > We run into another problem when running against linux nfs servers - > they return NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC when using integrity auth flavor (unless the > mount is also that flavor) even though that is not a valid error for > SECINFO*. Even though it's against spec, handle WRONGSEC errors on > SECINFO_NO_NAME by falling back to using the user cred and the > filesystem's auth flavor. > > Signed-off-by: Weston Andros Adamson <dros@netapp.com> > --- > > This patch goes along with yesterday's SECINFO patch > > fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- > 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c > index ab1461e..74b37f5 100644 > --- a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c > +++ b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c > @@ -7291,7 +7291,8 @@ out: > */ > static int > _nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(struct nfs_server *server, struct nfs_fh *fhandle, > - struct nfs_fsinfo *info, struct nfs4_secinfo_flavors *flavors) > + struct nfs_fsinfo *info, > + struct nfs4_secinfo_flavors *flavors, bool use_integrity) > { > struct nfs41_secinfo_no_name_args args = { > .style = SECINFO_STYLE_CURRENT_FH, > @@ -7304,8 +7305,23 @@ _nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(struct nfs_server *server, struct nfs_fh *fhandle, > .rpc_argp = &args, > .rpc_resp = &res, > }; > - return nfs4_call_sync(server->nfs_client->cl_rpcclient, server, &msg, > - &args.seq_args, &res.seq_res, 0); > + struct rpc_clnt *clnt = server->client; > + int status; > + > + if (use_integrity) { > + clnt = server->nfs_client->cl_rpcclient; > + msg.rpc_cred = nfs4_get_clid_cred(server->nfs_client); > + } > + > + dprintk("--> %s\n", __func__); > + status = nfs4_call_sync(clnt, server, &msg, &args.seq_args, > + &res.seq_res, 0); > + dprintk("<-- %s status=%d\n", __func__, status); > + > + if (msg.rpc_cred) > + put_rpccred(msg.rpc_cred); > + > + return status; > } > > static int > @@ -7315,7 +7331,24 @@ nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(struct nfs_server *server, struct nfs_fh *fhandle, > struct nfs4_exception exception = { }; > int err; > do { > - err = _nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(server, fhandle, info, flavors); > + /* first try using integrity protection */ > + err = -NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC; > + > + /* try to use integrity protection with machine cred */ > + if (_nfs4_is_integrity_protected(server->nfs_client)) > + err = _nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(server, fhandle, info, > + flavors, true); > + > + /* > + * if unable to use integrity protection, or SECINFO with > + * integrity protection returns NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC (which is > + * disallowed by spec, but exists in deployed servers) use > + * the current filesystem's rpc_client and the user cred. > + */ > + if (err == -NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC) > + err = _nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(server, fhandle, info, > + flavors, false); As I said yesterday, RFC5661 forbids SECINFO_NO_NAME from returning NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC, so this is 100% equivalent to if (!_nfs4_is_integrity_protected()) err = .... > + > switch (err) { > case 0: > case -NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC: -- Trond Myklebust Linux NFS client maintainer NetApp Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com www.netapp.com
On Sep 4, 2013, at 12:24 PM, "Myklebust, Trond" <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com> wrote: > On Wed, 2013-09-04 at 12:13 -0400, Weston Andros Adamson wrote: >> Commit 97431204ea005ec8070ac94bc3251e836daa7ca7 introduced a regression >> that causes SECINFO_NO_NAME to fail without sending an RPC if: >> >> 1) the nfs_client's rpc_client is using krb5i/p (now tried by default) >> 2) the current user doesn't have valid kerberos credentials >> >> This situation is quite common - as of now a sec=sys mount would use >> krb5i for the nfs_client's rpc_client and a user would hardly be faulted >> for not having run kinit. >> >> The solution is to use the machine cred when trying to use an integrity >> protected auth flavor for SECINFO_NO_NAME. >> >> Older servers may not support using the machine cred or an integrity >> protected auth flavor for SECINFO_NO_NAME in every circumstance, so we fall >> back to using the user's cred and the filesystem's auth flavor in this case. >> >> We run into another problem when running against linux nfs servers - >> they return NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC when using integrity auth flavor (unless the >> mount is also that flavor) even though that is not a valid error for >> SECINFO*. Even though it's against spec, handle WRONGSEC errors on >> SECINFO_NO_NAME by falling back to using the user cred and the >> filesystem's auth flavor. >> >> Signed-off-by: Weston Andros Adamson <dros@netapp.com> >> --- >> >> This patch goes along with yesterday's SECINFO patch >> >> fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- >> 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) >> >> diff --git a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c >> index ab1461e..74b37f5 100644 >> --- a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c >> +++ b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c >> @@ -7291,7 +7291,8 @@ out: >> */ >> static int >> _nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(struct nfs_server *server, struct nfs_fh *fhandle, >> - struct nfs_fsinfo *info, struct nfs4_secinfo_flavors *flavors) >> + struct nfs_fsinfo *info, >> + struct nfs4_secinfo_flavors *flavors, bool use_integrity) >> { >> struct nfs41_secinfo_no_name_args args = { >> .style = SECINFO_STYLE_CURRENT_FH, >> @@ -7304,8 +7305,23 @@ _nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(struct nfs_server *server, struct nfs_fh *fhandle, >> .rpc_argp = &args, >> .rpc_resp = &res, >> }; >> - return nfs4_call_sync(server->nfs_client->cl_rpcclient, server, &msg, >> - &args.seq_args, &res.seq_res, 0); >> + struct rpc_clnt *clnt = server->client; >> + int status; >> + >> + if (use_integrity) { >> + clnt = server->nfs_client->cl_rpcclient; >> + msg.rpc_cred = nfs4_get_clid_cred(server->nfs_client); >> + } >> + >> + dprintk("--> %s\n", __func__); >> + status = nfs4_call_sync(clnt, server, &msg, &args.seq_args, >> + &res.seq_res, 0); >> + dprintk("<-- %s status=%d\n", __func__, status); >> + >> + if (msg.rpc_cred) >> + put_rpccred(msg.rpc_cred); >> + >> + return status; >> } >> >> static int >> @@ -7315,7 +7331,24 @@ nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(struct nfs_server *server, struct nfs_fh *fhandle, >> struct nfs4_exception exception = { }; >> int err; >> do { >> - err = _nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(server, fhandle, info, flavors); >> + /* first try using integrity protection */ >> + err = -NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC; >> + >> + /* try to use integrity protection with machine cred */ >> + if (_nfs4_is_integrity_protected(server->nfs_client)) >> + err = _nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(server, fhandle, info, >> + flavors, true); >> + >> + /* >> + * if unable to use integrity protection, or SECINFO with >> + * integrity protection returns NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC (which is >> + * disallowed by spec, but exists in deployed servers) use >> + * the current filesystem's rpc_client and the user cred. >> + */ >> + if (err == -NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC) >> + err = _nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(server, fhandle, info, >> + flavors, false); > > As I said yesterday, RFC5661 forbids SECINFO_NO_NAME from returning > NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC, so this is 100% equivalent to > > if (!_nfs4_is_integrity_protected()) > err = …. Right, but I thought we were doing this to support server implementations like linux that *do* return NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC on SECINFO_NO_NAME even though it's forbidden. I know we normally don't work around server bugs, but this seems pretty simple. If we don't do this, then SECINFO_NO_NAME will always fail against current linux severs no matter what the mount options - unless krb5i/p is unusable (not configured, time skew, no machine cred, etc). -dros > >> + >> switch (err) { >> case 0: >> case -NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC: > > -- > Trond Myklebust > Linux NFS client maintainer > > NetApp > Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com > www.netapp.com -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-nfs" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
On Wed, 2013-09-04 at 16:48 +0000, Adamson, Dros wrote: > On Sep 4, 2013, at 12:24 PM, "Myklebust, Trond" <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com> wrote: > > > On Wed, 2013-09-04 at 12:13 -0400, Weston Andros Adamson wrote: > >> Commit 97431204ea005ec8070ac94bc3251e836daa7ca7 introduced a regression > >> that causes SECINFO_NO_NAME to fail without sending an RPC if: > >> > >> 1) the nfs_client's rpc_client is using krb5i/p (now tried by default) > >> 2) the current user doesn't have valid kerberos credentials > >> > >> This situation is quite common - as of now a sec=sys mount would use > >> krb5i for the nfs_client's rpc_client and a user would hardly be faulted > >> for not having run kinit. > >> > >> The solution is to use the machine cred when trying to use an integrity > >> protected auth flavor for SECINFO_NO_NAME. > >> > >> Older servers may not support using the machine cred or an integrity > >> protected auth flavor for SECINFO_NO_NAME in every circumstance, so we fall > >> back to using the user's cred and the filesystem's auth flavor in this case. > >> > >> We run into another problem when running against linux nfs servers - > >> they return NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC when using integrity auth flavor (unless the > >> mount is also that flavor) even though that is not a valid error for > >> SECINFO*. Even though it's against spec, handle WRONGSEC errors on > >> SECINFO_NO_NAME by falling back to using the user cred and the > >> filesystem's auth flavor. > >> > >> Signed-off-by: Weston Andros Adamson <dros@netapp.com> > >> --- > >> > >> This patch goes along with yesterday's SECINFO patch > >> > >> fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- > >> 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) > >> > >> diff --git a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c > >> index ab1461e..74b37f5 100644 > >> --- a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c > >> +++ b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c > >> @@ -7291,7 +7291,8 @@ out: > >> */ > >> static int > >> _nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(struct nfs_server *server, struct nfs_fh *fhandle, > >> - struct nfs_fsinfo *info, struct nfs4_secinfo_flavors *flavors) > >> + struct nfs_fsinfo *info, > >> + struct nfs4_secinfo_flavors *flavors, bool use_integrity) > >> { > >> struct nfs41_secinfo_no_name_args args = { > >> .style = SECINFO_STYLE_CURRENT_FH, > >> @@ -7304,8 +7305,23 @@ _nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(struct nfs_server *server, struct nfs_fh *fhandle, > >> .rpc_argp = &args, > >> .rpc_resp = &res, > >> }; > >> - return nfs4_call_sync(server->nfs_client->cl_rpcclient, server, &msg, > >> - &args.seq_args, &res.seq_res, 0); > >> + struct rpc_clnt *clnt = server->client; > >> + int status; > >> + > >> + if (use_integrity) { > >> + clnt = server->nfs_client->cl_rpcclient; > >> + msg.rpc_cred = nfs4_get_clid_cred(server->nfs_client); > >> + } > >> + > >> + dprintk("--> %s\n", __func__); > >> + status = nfs4_call_sync(clnt, server, &msg, &args.seq_args, > >> + &res.seq_res, 0); > >> + dprintk("<-- %s status=%d\n", __func__, status); > >> + > >> + if (msg.rpc_cred) > >> + put_rpccred(msg.rpc_cred); > >> + > >> + return status; > >> } > >> > >> static int > >> @@ -7315,7 +7331,24 @@ nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(struct nfs_server *server, struct nfs_fh *fhandle, > >> struct nfs4_exception exception = { }; > >> int err; > >> do { > >> - err = _nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(server, fhandle, info, flavors); > >> + /* first try using integrity protection */ > >> + err = -NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC; > >> + > >> + /* try to use integrity protection with machine cred */ > >> + if (_nfs4_is_integrity_protected(server->nfs_client)) > >> + err = _nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(server, fhandle, info, > >> + flavors, true); > >> + > >> + /* > >> + * if unable to use integrity protection, or SECINFO with > >> + * integrity protection returns NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC (which is > >> + * disallowed by spec, but exists in deployed servers) use > >> + * the current filesystem's rpc_client and the user cred. > >> + */ > >> + if (err == -NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC) > >> + err = _nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(server, fhandle, info, > >> + flavors, false); > > > > As I said yesterday, RFC5661 forbids SECINFO_NO_NAME from returning > > NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC, so this is 100% equivalent to > > > > if (!_nfs4_is_integrity_protected()) > > err = …. > > Right, but I thought we were doing this to support server implementations like linux that *do* return NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC on SECINFO_NO_NAME even though it's forbidden. I know we normally don't work around server bugs, but this seems pretty simple. > > If we don't do this, then SECINFO_NO_NAME will always fail against current linux severs no matter what the mount options - unless krb5i/p is unusable (not configured, time skew, no machine cred, etc). Bruce, you're it: what's the deal here? -- Trond Myklebust Linux NFS client maintainer NetApp Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com www.netapp.com
On Thu, Sep 05, 2013 at 12:45:09AM +0000, Myklebust, Trond wrote: > On Wed, 2013-09-04 at 16:48 +0000, Adamson, Dros wrote: > > On Sep 4, 2013, at 12:24 PM, "Myklebust, Trond" <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com> wrote: > > > > > On Wed, 2013-09-04 at 12:13 -0400, Weston Andros Adamson wrote: > > >> Commit 97431204ea005ec8070ac94bc3251e836daa7ca7 introduced a regression > > >> that causes SECINFO_NO_NAME to fail without sending an RPC if: > > >> > > >> 1) the nfs_client's rpc_client is using krb5i/p (now tried by default) > > >> 2) the current user doesn't have valid kerberos credentials > > >> > > >> This situation is quite common - as of now a sec=sys mount would use > > >> krb5i for the nfs_client's rpc_client and a user would hardly be faulted > > >> for not having run kinit. > > >> > > >> The solution is to use the machine cred when trying to use an integrity > > >> protected auth flavor for SECINFO_NO_NAME. > > >> > > >> Older servers may not support using the machine cred or an integrity > > >> protected auth flavor for SECINFO_NO_NAME in every circumstance, so we fall > > >> back to using the user's cred and the filesystem's auth flavor in this case. > > >> > > >> We run into another problem when running against linux nfs servers - > > >> they return NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC when using integrity auth flavor (unless the > > >> mount is also that flavor) even though that is not a valid error for > > >> SECINFO*. Even though it's against spec, handle WRONGSEC errors on > > >> SECINFO_NO_NAME by falling back to using the user cred and the > > >> filesystem's auth flavor. > > >> > > >> Signed-off-by: Weston Andros Adamson <dros@netapp.com> > > >> --- > > >> > > >> This patch goes along with yesterday's SECINFO patch > > >> > > >> fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- > > >> 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) > > >> > > >> diff --git a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c > > >> index ab1461e..74b37f5 100644 > > >> --- a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c > > >> +++ b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c > > >> @@ -7291,7 +7291,8 @@ out: > > >> */ > > >> static int > > >> _nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(struct nfs_server *server, struct nfs_fh *fhandle, > > >> - struct nfs_fsinfo *info, struct nfs4_secinfo_flavors *flavors) > > >> + struct nfs_fsinfo *info, > > >> + struct nfs4_secinfo_flavors *flavors, bool use_integrity) > > >> { > > >> struct nfs41_secinfo_no_name_args args = { > > >> .style = SECINFO_STYLE_CURRENT_FH, > > >> @@ -7304,8 +7305,23 @@ _nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(struct nfs_server *server, struct nfs_fh *fhandle, > > >> .rpc_argp = &args, > > >> .rpc_resp = &res, > > >> }; > > >> - return nfs4_call_sync(server->nfs_client->cl_rpcclient, server, &msg, > > >> - &args.seq_args, &res.seq_res, 0); > > >> + struct rpc_clnt *clnt = server->client; > > >> + int status; > > >> + > > >> + if (use_integrity) { > > >> + clnt = server->nfs_client->cl_rpcclient; > > >> + msg.rpc_cred = nfs4_get_clid_cred(server->nfs_client); > > >> + } > > >> + > > >> + dprintk("--> %s\n", __func__); > > >> + status = nfs4_call_sync(clnt, server, &msg, &args.seq_args, > > >> + &res.seq_res, 0); > > >> + dprintk("<-- %s status=%d\n", __func__, status); > > >> + > > >> + if (msg.rpc_cred) > > >> + put_rpccred(msg.rpc_cred); > > >> + > > >> + return status; > > >> } > > >> > > >> static int > > >> @@ -7315,7 +7331,24 @@ nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(struct nfs_server *server, struct nfs_fh *fhandle, > > >> struct nfs4_exception exception = { }; > > >> int err; > > >> do { > > >> - err = _nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(server, fhandle, info, flavors); > > >> + /* first try using integrity protection */ > > >> + err = -NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC; > > >> + > > >> + /* try to use integrity protection with machine cred */ > > >> + if (_nfs4_is_integrity_protected(server->nfs_client)) > > >> + err = _nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(server, fhandle, info, > > >> + flavors, true); > > >> + > > >> + /* > > >> + * if unable to use integrity protection, or SECINFO with > > >> + * integrity protection returns NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC (which is > > >> + * disallowed by spec, but exists in deployed servers) use > > >> + * the current filesystem's rpc_client and the user cred. > > >> + */ > > >> + if (err == -NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC) > > >> + err = _nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(server, fhandle, info, > > >> + flavors, false); > > > > > > As I said yesterday, RFC5661 forbids SECINFO_NO_NAME from returning > > > NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC, so this is 100% equivalent to > > > > > > if (!_nfs4_is_integrity_protected()) > > > err = …. > > > > Right, but I thought we were doing this to support server implementations like linux that *do* return NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC on SECINFO_NO_NAME even though it's forbidden. I know we normally don't work around server bugs, but this seems pretty simple. > > > > If we don't do this, then SECINFO_NO_NAME will always fail against current linux severs no matter what the mount options - unless krb5i/p is unusable (not configured, time skew, no machine cred, etc). > > Bruce, you're it: what's the deal here? Dros, in what cases exactly do you see SECINFO_NO_NAME returning WRONGSEC? From a quick skim of the code it looks like it shouldn't happen in the CURRENT_FH case, which is the one the client uses. But I probably overlooked something.... --b. -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-nfs" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
On Sep 5, 2013, at 10:07 AM, Dr James Bruce Fields <bfields@fieldses.org> wrote: > On Thu, Sep 05, 2013 at 12:45:09AM +0000, Myklebust, Trond wrote: >> On Wed, 2013-09-04 at 16:48 +0000, Adamson, Dros wrote: >>> On Sep 4, 2013, at 12:24 PM, "Myklebust, Trond" <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com> wrote: >>> >>>> On Wed, 2013-09-04 at 12:13 -0400, Weston Andros Adamson wrote: >>>>> Commit 97431204ea005ec8070ac94bc3251e836daa7ca7 introduced a regression >>>>> that causes SECINFO_NO_NAME to fail without sending an RPC if: >>>>> >>>>> 1) the nfs_client's rpc_client is using krb5i/p (now tried by default) >>>>> 2) the current user doesn't have valid kerberos credentials >>>>> >>>>> This situation is quite common - as of now a sec=sys mount would use >>>>> krb5i for the nfs_client's rpc_client and a user would hardly be faulted >>>>> for not having run kinit. >>>>> >>>>> The solution is to use the machine cred when trying to use an integrity >>>>> protected auth flavor for SECINFO_NO_NAME. >>>>> >>>>> Older servers may not support using the machine cred or an integrity >>>>> protected auth flavor for SECINFO_NO_NAME in every circumstance, so we fall >>>>> back to using the user's cred and the filesystem's auth flavor in this case. >>>>> >>>>> We run into another problem when running against linux nfs servers - >>>>> they return NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC when using integrity auth flavor (unless the >>>>> mount is also that flavor) even though that is not a valid error for >>>>> SECINFO*. Even though it's against spec, handle WRONGSEC errors on >>>>> SECINFO_NO_NAME by falling back to using the user cred and the >>>>> filesystem's auth flavor. >>>>> >>>>> Signed-off-by: Weston Andros Adamson <dros@netapp.com> >>>>> --- >>>>> >>>>> This patch goes along with yesterday's SECINFO patch >>>>> >>>>> fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- >>>>> 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) >>>>> >>>>> diff --git a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c >>>>> index ab1461e..74b37f5 100644 >>>>> --- a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c >>>>> +++ b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c >>>>> @@ -7291,7 +7291,8 @@ out: >>>>> */ >>>>> static int >>>>> _nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(struct nfs_server *server, struct nfs_fh *fhandle, >>>>> - struct nfs_fsinfo *info, struct nfs4_secinfo_flavors *flavors) >>>>> + struct nfs_fsinfo *info, >>>>> + struct nfs4_secinfo_flavors *flavors, bool use_integrity) >>>>> { >>>>> struct nfs41_secinfo_no_name_args args = { >>>>> .style = SECINFO_STYLE_CURRENT_FH, >>>>> @@ -7304,8 +7305,23 @@ _nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(struct nfs_server *server, struct nfs_fh *fhandle, >>>>> .rpc_argp = &args, >>>>> .rpc_resp = &res, >>>>> }; >>>>> - return nfs4_call_sync(server->nfs_client->cl_rpcclient, server, &msg, >>>>> - &args.seq_args, &res.seq_res, 0); >>>>> + struct rpc_clnt *clnt = server->client; >>>>> + int status; >>>>> + >>>>> + if (use_integrity) { >>>>> + clnt = server->nfs_client->cl_rpcclient; >>>>> + msg.rpc_cred = nfs4_get_clid_cred(server->nfs_client); >>>>> + } >>>>> + >>>>> + dprintk("--> %s\n", __func__); >>>>> + status = nfs4_call_sync(clnt, server, &msg, &args.seq_args, >>>>> + &res.seq_res, 0); >>>>> + dprintk("<-- %s status=%d\n", __func__, status); >>>>> + >>>>> + if (msg.rpc_cred) >>>>> + put_rpccred(msg.rpc_cred); >>>>> + >>>>> + return status; >>>>> } >>>>> >>>>> static int >>>>> @@ -7315,7 +7331,24 @@ nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(struct nfs_server *server, struct nfs_fh *fhandle, >>>>> struct nfs4_exception exception = { }; >>>>> int err; >>>>> do { >>>>> - err = _nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(server, fhandle, info, flavors); >>>>> + /* first try using integrity protection */ >>>>> + err = -NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC; >>>>> + >>>>> + /* try to use integrity protection with machine cred */ >>>>> + if (_nfs4_is_integrity_protected(server->nfs_client)) >>>>> + err = _nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(server, fhandle, info, >>>>> + flavors, true); >>>>> + >>>>> + /* >>>>> + * if unable to use integrity protection, or SECINFO with >>>>> + * integrity protection returns NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC (which is >>>>> + * disallowed by spec, but exists in deployed servers) use >>>>> + * the current filesystem's rpc_client and the user cred. >>>>> + */ >>>>> + if (err == -NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC) >>>>> + err = _nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(server, fhandle, info, >>>>> + flavors, false); >>>> >>>> As I said yesterday, RFC5661 forbids SECINFO_NO_NAME from returning >>>> NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC, so this is 100% equivalent to >>>> >>>> if (!_nfs4_is_integrity_protected()) >>>> err = …. >>> >>> Right, but I thought we were doing this to support server implementations like linux that *do* return NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC on SECINFO_NO_NAME even though it's forbidden. I know we normally don't work around server bugs, but this seems pretty simple. >>> >>> If we don't do this, then SECINFO_NO_NAME will always fail against current linux severs no matter what the mount options - unless krb5i/p is unusable (not configured, time skew, no machine cred, etc). >> >> Bruce, you're it: what's the deal here? > > Dros, in what cases exactly do you see SECINFO_NO_NAME returning > WRONGSEC? > > From a quick skim of the code it looks like it shouldn't happen in the > CURRENT_FH case, which is the one the client uses. But I probably > overlooked something.... > > --b. SECINFO_NO_NAME will fail with NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC in check_nfsd_access when the rpc auth flavor is different from the export's auth flavor - in the same way as SECINFO. -dros -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-nfs" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
On Thu, Sep 05, 2013 at 03:17:37PM +0000, Adamson, Dros wrote: > > On Sep 5, 2013, at 10:07 AM, Dr James Bruce Fields <bfields@fieldses.org> wrote: > > > On Thu, Sep 05, 2013 at 12:45:09AM +0000, Myklebust, Trond wrote: > >> On Wed, 2013-09-04 at 16:48 +0000, Adamson, Dros wrote: > >>> On Sep 4, 2013, at 12:24 PM, "Myklebust, Trond" <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com> wrote: > >>> > >>>> On Wed, 2013-09-04 at 12:13 -0400, Weston Andros Adamson wrote: > >>>>> Commit 97431204ea005ec8070ac94bc3251e836daa7ca7 introduced a regression > >>>>> that causes SECINFO_NO_NAME to fail without sending an RPC if: > >>>>> > >>>>> 1) the nfs_client's rpc_client is using krb5i/p (now tried by default) > >>>>> 2) the current user doesn't have valid kerberos credentials > >>>>> > >>>>> This situation is quite common - as of now a sec=sys mount would use > >>>>> krb5i for the nfs_client's rpc_client and a user would hardly be faulted > >>>>> for not having run kinit. > >>>>> > >>>>> The solution is to use the machine cred when trying to use an integrity > >>>>> protected auth flavor for SECINFO_NO_NAME. > >>>>> > >>>>> Older servers may not support using the machine cred or an integrity > >>>>> protected auth flavor for SECINFO_NO_NAME in every circumstance, so we fall > >>>>> back to using the user's cred and the filesystem's auth flavor in this case. > >>>>> > >>>>> We run into another problem when running against linux nfs servers - > >>>>> they return NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC when using integrity auth flavor (unless the > >>>>> mount is also that flavor) even though that is not a valid error for > >>>>> SECINFO*. Even though it's against spec, handle WRONGSEC errors on > >>>>> SECINFO_NO_NAME by falling back to using the user cred and the > >>>>> filesystem's auth flavor. > >>>>> > >>>>> Signed-off-by: Weston Andros Adamson <dros@netapp.com> > >>>>> --- > >>>>> > >>>>> This patch goes along with yesterday's SECINFO patch > >>>>> > >>>>> fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- > >>>>> 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) > >>>>> > >>>>> diff --git a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c > >>>>> index ab1461e..74b37f5 100644 > >>>>> --- a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c > >>>>> +++ b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c > >>>>> @@ -7291,7 +7291,8 @@ out: > >>>>> */ > >>>>> static int > >>>>> _nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(struct nfs_server *server, struct nfs_fh *fhandle, > >>>>> - struct nfs_fsinfo *info, struct nfs4_secinfo_flavors *flavors) > >>>>> + struct nfs_fsinfo *info, > >>>>> + struct nfs4_secinfo_flavors *flavors, bool use_integrity) > >>>>> { > >>>>> struct nfs41_secinfo_no_name_args args = { > >>>>> .style = SECINFO_STYLE_CURRENT_FH, > >>>>> @@ -7304,8 +7305,23 @@ _nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(struct nfs_server *server, struct nfs_fh *fhandle, > >>>>> .rpc_argp = &args, > >>>>> .rpc_resp = &res, > >>>>> }; > >>>>> - return nfs4_call_sync(server->nfs_client->cl_rpcclient, server, &msg, > >>>>> - &args.seq_args, &res.seq_res, 0); > >>>>> + struct rpc_clnt *clnt = server->client; > >>>>> + int status; > >>>>> + > >>>>> + if (use_integrity) { > >>>>> + clnt = server->nfs_client->cl_rpcclient; > >>>>> + msg.rpc_cred = nfs4_get_clid_cred(server->nfs_client); > >>>>> + } > >>>>> + > >>>>> + dprintk("--> %s\n", __func__); > >>>>> + status = nfs4_call_sync(clnt, server, &msg, &args.seq_args, > >>>>> + &res.seq_res, 0); > >>>>> + dprintk("<-- %s status=%d\n", __func__, status); > >>>>> + > >>>>> + if (msg.rpc_cred) > >>>>> + put_rpccred(msg.rpc_cred); > >>>>> + > >>>>> + return status; > >>>>> } > >>>>> > >>>>> static int > >>>>> @@ -7315,7 +7331,24 @@ nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(struct nfs_server *server, struct nfs_fh *fhandle, > >>>>> struct nfs4_exception exception = { }; > >>>>> int err; > >>>>> do { > >>>>> - err = _nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(server, fhandle, info, flavors); > >>>>> + /* first try using integrity protection */ > >>>>> + err = -NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC; > >>>>> + > >>>>> + /* try to use integrity protection with machine cred */ > >>>>> + if (_nfs4_is_integrity_protected(server->nfs_client)) > >>>>> + err = _nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(server, fhandle, info, > >>>>> + flavors, true); > >>>>> + > >>>>> + /* > >>>>> + * if unable to use integrity protection, or SECINFO with > >>>>> + * integrity protection returns NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC (which is > >>>>> + * disallowed by spec, but exists in deployed servers) use > >>>>> + * the current filesystem's rpc_client and the user cred. > >>>>> + */ > >>>>> + if (err == -NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC) > >>>>> + err = _nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(server, fhandle, info, > >>>>> + flavors, false); > >>>> > >>>> As I said yesterday, RFC5661 forbids SECINFO_NO_NAME from returning > >>>> NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC, so this is 100% equivalent to > >>>> > >>>> if (!_nfs4_is_integrity_protected()) > >>>> err = …. > >>> > >>> Right, but I thought we were doing this to support server implementations like linux that *do* return NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC on SECINFO_NO_NAME even though it's forbidden. I know we normally don't work around server bugs, but this seems pretty simple. > >>> > >>> If we don't do this, then SECINFO_NO_NAME will always fail against current linux severs no matter what the mount options - unless krb5i/p is unusable (not configured, time skew, no machine cred, etc). > >> > >> Bruce, you're it: what's the deal here? > > > > Dros, in what cases exactly do you see SECINFO_NO_NAME returning > > WRONGSEC? > > > > From a quick skim of the code it looks like it shouldn't happen in the > > CURRENT_FH case, which is the one the client uses. But I probably > > overlooked something.... > > > > --b. > > SECINFO_NO_NAME will fail with NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC in check_nfsd_access when the rpc auth flavor is different from the export's auth flavor - in the same way as SECINFO. Huh. There's no check_nfsd_access call in secinfo_no_name in the CURRENT_FH case. And any checks on the putfh op should be turned off by the OP_HANDLES_WRONGSEC flag on secinfo_no_name. But I haven't actually tried it, and presumably you have (any hints on reproducing?), so I'll take a look.... --b. -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-nfs" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
On Sep 5, 2013, at 11:31 AM, Dr James Bruce Fields <bfields@fieldses.org> wrote: > On Thu, Sep 05, 2013 at 03:17:37PM +0000, Adamson, Dros wrote: >> >> On Sep 5, 2013, at 10:07 AM, Dr James Bruce Fields <bfields@fieldses.org> wrote: >> >>> On Thu, Sep 05, 2013 at 12:45:09AM +0000, Myklebust, Trond wrote: >>>> On Wed, 2013-09-04 at 16:48 +0000, Adamson, Dros wrote: >>>>> On Sep 4, 2013, at 12:24 PM, "Myklebust, Trond" <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> On Wed, 2013-09-04 at 12:13 -0400, Weston Andros Adamson wrote: >>>>>>> Commit 97431204ea005ec8070ac94bc3251e836daa7ca7 introduced a regression >>>>>>> that causes SECINFO_NO_NAME to fail without sending an RPC if: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> 1) the nfs_client's rpc_client is using krb5i/p (now tried by default) >>>>>>> 2) the current user doesn't have valid kerberos credentials >>>>>>> >>>>>>> This situation is quite common - as of now a sec=sys mount would use >>>>>>> krb5i for the nfs_client's rpc_client and a user would hardly be faulted >>>>>>> for not having run kinit. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The solution is to use the machine cred when trying to use an integrity >>>>>>> protected auth flavor for SECINFO_NO_NAME. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Older servers may not support using the machine cred or an integrity >>>>>>> protected auth flavor for SECINFO_NO_NAME in every circumstance, so we fall >>>>>>> back to using the user's cred and the filesystem's auth flavor in this case. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> We run into another problem when running against linux nfs servers - >>>>>>> they return NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC when using integrity auth flavor (unless the >>>>>>> mount is also that flavor) even though that is not a valid error for >>>>>>> SECINFO*. Even though it's against spec, handle WRONGSEC errors on >>>>>>> SECINFO_NO_NAME by falling back to using the user cred and the >>>>>>> filesystem's auth flavor. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Signed-off-by: Weston Andros Adamson <dros@netapp.com> >>>>>>> --- >>>>>>> >>>>>>> This patch goes along with yesterday's SECINFO patch >>>>>>> >>>>>>> fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- >>>>>>> 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) >>>>>>> >>>>>>> diff --git a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c >>>>>>> index ab1461e..74b37f5 100644 >>>>>>> --- a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c >>>>>>> +++ b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c >>>>>>> @@ -7291,7 +7291,8 @@ out: >>>>>>> */ >>>>>>> static int >>>>>>> _nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(struct nfs_server *server, struct nfs_fh *fhandle, >>>>>>> - struct nfs_fsinfo *info, struct nfs4_secinfo_flavors *flavors) >>>>>>> + struct nfs_fsinfo *info, >>>>>>> + struct nfs4_secinfo_flavors *flavors, bool use_integrity) >>>>>>> { >>>>>>> struct nfs41_secinfo_no_name_args args = { >>>>>>> .style = SECINFO_STYLE_CURRENT_FH, >>>>>>> @@ -7304,8 +7305,23 @@ _nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(struct nfs_server *server, struct nfs_fh *fhandle, >>>>>>> .rpc_argp = &args, >>>>>>> .rpc_resp = &res, >>>>>>> }; >>>>>>> - return nfs4_call_sync(server->nfs_client->cl_rpcclient, server, &msg, >>>>>>> - &args.seq_args, &res.seq_res, 0); >>>>>>> + struct rpc_clnt *clnt = server->client; >>>>>>> + int status; >>>>>>> + >>>>>>> + if (use_integrity) { >>>>>>> + clnt = server->nfs_client->cl_rpcclient; >>>>>>> + msg.rpc_cred = nfs4_get_clid_cred(server->nfs_client); >>>>>>> + } >>>>>>> + >>>>>>> + dprintk("--> %s\n", __func__); >>>>>>> + status = nfs4_call_sync(clnt, server, &msg, &args.seq_args, >>>>>>> + &res.seq_res, 0); >>>>>>> + dprintk("<-- %s status=%d\n", __func__, status); >>>>>>> + >>>>>>> + if (msg.rpc_cred) >>>>>>> + put_rpccred(msg.rpc_cred); >>>>>>> + >>>>>>> + return status; >>>>>>> } >>>>>>> >>>>>>> static int >>>>>>> @@ -7315,7 +7331,24 @@ nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(struct nfs_server *server, struct nfs_fh *fhandle, >>>>>>> struct nfs4_exception exception = { }; >>>>>>> int err; >>>>>>> do { >>>>>>> - err = _nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(server, fhandle, info, flavors); >>>>>>> + /* first try using integrity protection */ >>>>>>> + err = -NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC; >>>>>>> + >>>>>>> + /* try to use integrity protection with machine cred */ >>>>>>> + if (_nfs4_is_integrity_protected(server->nfs_client)) >>>>>>> + err = _nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(server, fhandle, info, >>>>>>> + flavors, true); >>>>>>> + >>>>>>> + /* >>>>>>> + * if unable to use integrity protection, or SECINFO with >>>>>>> + * integrity protection returns NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC (which is >>>>>>> + * disallowed by spec, but exists in deployed servers) use >>>>>>> + * the current filesystem's rpc_client and the user cred. >>>>>>> + */ >>>>>>> + if (err == -NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC) >>>>>>> + err = _nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(server, fhandle, info, >>>>>>> + flavors, false); >>>>>> >>>>>> As I said yesterday, RFC5661 forbids SECINFO_NO_NAME from returning >>>>>> NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC, so this is 100% equivalent to >>>>>> >>>>>> if (!_nfs4_is_integrity_protected()) >>>>>> err = …. >>>>> >>>>> Right, but I thought we were doing this to support server implementations like linux that *do* return NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC on SECINFO_NO_NAME even though it's forbidden. I know we normally don't work around server bugs, but this seems pretty simple. >>>>> >>>>> If we don't do this, then SECINFO_NO_NAME will always fail against current linux severs no matter what the mount options - unless krb5i/p is unusable (not configured, time skew, no machine cred, etc). >>>> >>>> Bruce, you're it: what's the deal here? >>> >>> Dros, in what cases exactly do you see SECINFO_NO_NAME returning >>> WRONGSEC? >>> >>> From a quick skim of the code it looks like it shouldn't happen in the >>> CURRENT_FH case, which is the one the client uses. But I probably >>> overlooked something.... >>> >>> --b. >> >> SECINFO_NO_NAME will fail with NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC in check_nfsd_access when the rpc auth flavor is different from the export's auth flavor - in the same way as SECINFO. > > Huh. There's no check_nfsd_access call in secinfo_no_name in the > CURRENT_FH case. And any checks on the putfh op should be turned off by > the OP_HANDLES_WRONGSEC flag on secinfo_no_name. > > But I haven't actually tried it, and presumably you have (any hints on > reproducing?), so I'll take a look.... > > --b. You may be right here - I'm pretty sure I saw SECINFO_NO_NAME fail like this, but I'm not 100%. I'll try to reproduce and report back. -dros -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-nfs" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
On Thu, Sep 05, 2013 at 05:05:09PM +0000, Adamson, Dros wrote: > > On Sep 5, 2013, at 11:31 AM, Dr James Bruce Fields <bfields@fieldses.org> wrote: > > > On Thu, Sep 05, 2013 at 03:17:37PM +0000, Adamson, Dros wrote: > >> > >> On Sep 5, 2013, at 10:07 AM, Dr James Bruce Fields <bfields@fieldses.org> wrote: > >> > >>> On Thu, Sep 05, 2013 at 12:45:09AM +0000, Myklebust, Trond wrote: > >>>> On Wed, 2013-09-04 at 16:48 +0000, Adamson, Dros wrote: > >>>>> On Sep 4, 2013, at 12:24 PM, "Myklebust, Trond" <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com> wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>>> On Wed, 2013-09-04 at 12:13 -0400, Weston Andros Adamson wrote: > >>>>>>> Commit 97431204ea005ec8070ac94bc3251e836daa7ca7 introduced a regression > >>>>>>> that causes SECINFO_NO_NAME to fail without sending an RPC if: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> 1) the nfs_client's rpc_client is using krb5i/p (now tried by default) > >>>>>>> 2) the current user doesn't have valid kerberos credentials > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> This situation is quite common - as of now a sec=sys mount would use > >>>>>>> krb5i for the nfs_client's rpc_client and a user would hardly be faulted > >>>>>>> for not having run kinit. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> The solution is to use the machine cred when trying to use an integrity > >>>>>>> protected auth flavor for SECINFO_NO_NAME. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Older servers may not support using the machine cred or an integrity > >>>>>>> protected auth flavor for SECINFO_NO_NAME in every circumstance, so we fall > >>>>>>> back to using the user's cred and the filesystem's auth flavor in this case. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> We run into another problem when running against linux nfs servers - > >>>>>>> they return NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC when using integrity auth flavor (unless the > >>>>>>> mount is also that flavor) even though that is not a valid error for > >>>>>>> SECINFO*. Even though it's against spec, handle WRONGSEC errors on > >>>>>>> SECINFO_NO_NAME by falling back to using the user cred and the > >>>>>>> filesystem's auth flavor. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Signed-off-by: Weston Andros Adamson <dros@netapp.com> > >>>>>>> --- > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> This patch goes along with yesterday's SECINFO patch > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- > >>>>>>> 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> diff --git a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c > >>>>>>> index ab1461e..74b37f5 100644 > >>>>>>> --- a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c > >>>>>>> +++ b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c > >>>>>>> @@ -7291,7 +7291,8 @@ out: > >>>>>>> */ > >>>>>>> static int > >>>>>>> _nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(struct nfs_server *server, struct nfs_fh *fhandle, > >>>>>>> - struct nfs_fsinfo *info, struct nfs4_secinfo_flavors *flavors) > >>>>>>> + struct nfs_fsinfo *info, > >>>>>>> + struct nfs4_secinfo_flavors *flavors, bool use_integrity) > >>>>>>> { > >>>>>>> struct nfs41_secinfo_no_name_args args = { > >>>>>>> .style = SECINFO_STYLE_CURRENT_FH, > >>>>>>> @@ -7304,8 +7305,23 @@ _nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(struct nfs_server *server, struct nfs_fh *fhandle, > >>>>>>> .rpc_argp = &args, > >>>>>>> .rpc_resp = &res, > >>>>>>> }; > >>>>>>> - return nfs4_call_sync(server->nfs_client->cl_rpcclient, server, &msg, > >>>>>>> - &args.seq_args, &res.seq_res, 0); > >>>>>>> + struct rpc_clnt *clnt = server->client; > >>>>>>> + int status; > >>>>>>> + > >>>>>>> + if (use_integrity) { > >>>>>>> + clnt = server->nfs_client->cl_rpcclient; > >>>>>>> + msg.rpc_cred = nfs4_get_clid_cred(server->nfs_client); > >>>>>>> + } > >>>>>>> + > >>>>>>> + dprintk("--> %s\n", __func__); > >>>>>>> + status = nfs4_call_sync(clnt, server, &msg, &args.seq_args, > >>>>>>> + &res.seq_res, 0); > >>>>>>> + dprintk("<-- %s status=%d\n", __func__, status); > >>>>>>> + > >>>>>>> + if (msg.rpc_cred) > >>>>>>> + put_rpccred(msg.rpc_cred); > >>>>>>> + > >>>>>>> + return status; > >>>>>>> } > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> static int > >>>>>>> @@ -7315,7 +7331,24 @@ nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(struct nfs_server *server, struct nfs_fh *fhandle, > >>>>>>> struct nfs4_exception exception = { }; > >>>>>>> int err; > >>>>>>> do { > >>>>>>> - err = _nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(server, fhandle, info, flavors); > >>>>>>> + /* first try using integrity protection */ > >>>>>>> + err = -NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC; > >>>>>>> + > >>>>>>> + /* try to use integrity protection with machine cred */ > >>>>>>> + if (_nfs4_is_integrity_protected(server->nfs_client)) > >>>>>>> + err = _nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(server, fhandle, info, > >>>>>>> + flavors, true); > >>>>>>> + > >>>>>>> + /* > >>>>>>> + * if unable to use integrity protection, or SECINFO with > >>>>>>> + * integrity protection returns NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC (which is > >>>>>>> + * disallowed by spec, but exists in deployed servers) use > >>>>>>> + * the current filesystem's rpc_client and the user cred. > >>>>>>> + */ > >>>>>>> + if (err == -NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC) > >>>>>>> + err = _nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(server, fhandle, info, > >>>>>>> + flavors, false); > >>>>>> > >>>>>> As I said yesterday, RFC5661 forbids SECINFO_NO_NAME from returning > >>>>>> NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC, so this is 100% equivalent to > >>>>>> > >>>>>> if (!_nfs4_is_integrity_protected()) > >>>>>> err = …. > >>>>> > >>>>> Right, but I thought we were doing this to support server implementations like linux that *do* return NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC on SECINFO_NO_NAME even though it's forbidden. I know we normally don't work around server bugs, but this seems pretty simple. > >>>>> > >>>>> If we don't do this, then SECINFO_NO_NAME will always fail against current linux severs no matter what the mount options - unless krb5i/p is unusable (not configured, time skew, no machine cred, etc). > >>>> > >>>> Bruce, you're it: what's the deal here? > >>> > >>> Dros, in what cases exactly do you see SECINFO_NO_NAME returning > >>> WRONGSEC? > >>> > >>> From a quick skim of the code it looks like it shouldn't happen in the > >>> CURRENT_FH case, which is the one the client uses. But I probably > >>> overlooked something.... > >>> > >>> --b. > >> > >> SECINFO_NO_NAME will fail with NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC in check_nfsd_access when the rpc auth flavor is different from the export's auth flavor - in the same way as SECINFO. > > > > Huh. There's no check_nfsd_access call in secinfo_no_name in the > > CURRENT_FH case. And any checks on the putfh op should be turned off by > > the OP_HANDLES_WRONGSEC flag on secinfo_no_name. > > > > But I haven't actually tried it, and presumably you have (any hints on > > reproducing?), so I'll take a look.... > > > > --b. > > You may be right here - I'm pretty sure I saw SECINFO_NO_NAME fail like this, but I'm not 100%. I'll try to reproduce and report back. OK, thanks.--b. -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-nfs" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
On Wed, 2013-09-04 at 12:13 -0400, Weston Andros Adamson wrote: > Commit 97431204ea005ec8070ac94bc3251e836daa7ca7 introduced a regression > that causes SECINFO_NO_NAME to fail without sending an RPC if: > > 1) the nfs_client's rpc_client is using krb5i/p (now tried by default) > 2) the current user doesn't have valid kerberos credentials > > This situation is quite common - as of now a sec=sys mount would use > krb5i for the nfs_client's rpc_client and a user would hardly be faulted > for not having run kinit. > > The solution is to use the machine cred when trying to use an integrity > protected auth flavor for SECINFO_NO_NAME. > > Older servers may not support using the machine cred or an integrity > protected auth flavor for SECINFO_NO_NAME in every circumstance, so we fall > back to using the user's cred and the filesystem's auth flavor in this case. > > We run into another problem when running against linux nfs servers - > they return NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC when using integrity auth flavor (unless the > mount is also that flavor) even though that is not a valid error for > SECINFO*. Even though it's against spec, handle WRONGSEC errors on > SECINFO_NO_NAME by falling back to using the user cred and the > filesystem's auth flavor. > > Signed-off-by: Weston Andros Adamson <dros@netapp.com> > --- > > This patch goes along with yesterday's SECINFO patch > > fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- > 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c > index ab1461e..74b37f5 100644 > --- a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c > +++ b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c > @@ -7291,7 +7291,8 @@ out: > */ > static int > _nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(struct nfs_server *server, struct nfs_fh *fhandle, > - struct nfs_fsinfo *info, struct nfs4_secinfo_flavors *flavors) > + struct nfs_fsinfo *info, > + struct nfs4_secinfo_flavors *flavors, bool use_integrity) > { > struct nfs41_secinfo_no_name_args args = { > .style = SECINFO_STYLE_CURRENT_FH, > @@ -7304,8 +7305,23 @@ _nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(struct nfs_server *server, struct nfs_fh *fhandle, > .rpc_argp = &args, > .rpc_resp = &res, > }; > - return nfs4_call_sync(server->nfs_client->cl_rpcclient, server, &msg, > - &args.seq_args, &res.seq_res, 0); > + struct rpc_clnt *clnt = server->client; > + int status; > + > + if (use_integrity) { > + clnt = server->nfs_client->cl_rpcclient; > + msg.rpc_cred = nfs4_get_clid_cred(server->nfs_client); > + } > + > + dprintk("--> %s\n", __func__); > + status = nfs4_call_sync(clnt, server, &msg, &args.seq_args, > + &res.seq_res, 0); > + dprintk("<-- %s status=%d\n", __func__, status); > + > + if (msg.rpc_cred) > + put_rpccred(msg.rpc_cred); > + > + return status; > } I have a question: if we use the machine credential, don't we risk a NFS4ERR_ACCESS due to the directory permission settings? I don't see anything in the spec about what permissions you do need for a SECINFO_NO_NAME, but since NFS4ERR_ACCESS is listed as a valid return code, I'm assuming that the server may enforce lookup permissions... -- Trond Myklebust Linux NFS client maintainer NetApp Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com www.netapp.com
On Sep 5, 2013, at 1:25 PM, "Myklebust, Trond" <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com> wrote: > On Wed, 2013-09-04 at 12:13 -0400, Weston Andros Adamson wrote: >> Commit 97431204ea005ec8070ac94bc3251e836daa7ca7 introduced a regression >> that causes SECINFO_NO_NAME to fail without sending an RPC if: >> >> 1) the nfs_client's rpc_client is using krb5i/p (now tried by default) >> 2) the current user doesn't have valid kerberos credentials >> >> This situation is quite common - as of now a sec=sys mount would use >> krb5i for the nfs_client's rpc_client and a user would hardly be faulted >> for not having run kinit. >> >> The solution is to use the machine cred when trying to use an integrity >> protected auth flavor for SECINFO_NO_NAME. >> >> Older servers may not support using the machine cred or an integrity >> protected auth flavor for SECINFO_NO_NAME in every circumstance, so we fall >> back to using the user's cred and the filesystem's auth flavor in this case. >> >> We run into another problem when running against linux nfs servers - >> they return NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC when using integrity auth flavor (unless the >> mount is also that flavor) even though that is not a valid error for >> SECINFO*. Even though it's against spec, handle WRONGSEC errors on >> SECINFO_NO_NAME by falling back to using the user cred and the >> filesystem's auth flavor. >> >> Signed-off-by: Weston Andros Adamson <dros@netapp.com> >> --- >> >> This patch goes along with yesterday's SECINFO patch >> >> fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- >> 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) >> >> diff --git a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c >> index ab1461e..74b37f5 100644 >> --- a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c >> +++ b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c >> @@ -7291,7 +7291,8 @@ out: >> */ >> static int >> _nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(struct nfs_server *server, struct nfs_fh *fhandle, >> - struct nfs_fsinfo *info, struct nfs4_secinfo_flavors *flavors) >> + struct nfs_fsinfo *info, >> + struct nfs4_secinfo_flavors *flavors, bool use_integrity) >> { >> struct nfs41_secinfo_no_name_args args = { >> .style = SECINFO_STYLE_CURRENT_FH, >> @@ -7304,8 +7305,23 @@ _nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(struct nfs_server *server, struct nfs_fh *fhandle, >> .rpc_argp = &args, >> .rpc_resp = &res, >> }; >> - return nfs4_call_sync(server->nfs_client->cl_rpcclient, server, &msg, >> - &args.seq_args, &res.seq_res, 0); >> + struct rpc_clnt *clnt = server->client; >> + int status; >> + >> + if (use_integrity) { >> + clnt = server->nfs_client->cl_rpcclient; >> + msg.rpc_cred = nfs4_get_clid_cred(server->nfs_client); >> + } >> + >> + dprintk("--> %s\n", __func__); >> + status = nfs4_call_sync(clnt, server, &msg, &args.seq_args, >> + &res.seq_res, 0); >> + dprintk("<-- %s status=%d\n", __func__, status); >> + >> + if (msg.rpc_cred) >> + put_rpccred(msg.rpc_cred); >> + >> + return status; >> } > > I have a question: if we use the machine credential, don't we risk a > NFS4ERR_ACCESS due to the directory permission settings? > > I don't see anything in the spec about what permissions you do need for > a SECINFO_NO_NAME, but since NFS4ERR_ACCESS is listed as a valid return > code, I'm assuming that the server may enforce lookup permissions… > This is a good question. Looking into it… -dros > -- > Trond Myklebust > Linux NFS client maintainer > > NetApp > Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com > www.netapp.com -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-nfs" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
On Thu, Sep 05, 2013 at 05:25:48PM +0000, Myklebust, Trond wrote: > On Wed, 2013-09-04 at 12:13 -0400, Weston Andros Adamson wrote: > > Commit 97431204ea005ec8070ac94bc3251e836daa7ca7 introduced a regression > > that causes SECINFO_NO_NAME to fail without sending an RPC if: > > > > 1) the nfs_client's rpc_client is using krb5i/p (now tried by default) > > 2) the current user doesn't have valid kerberos credentials > > > > This situation is quite common - as of now a sec=sys mount would use > > krb5i for the nfs_client's rpc_client and a user would hardly be faulted > > for not having run kinit. > > > > The solution is to use the machine cred when trying to use an integrity > > protected auth flavor for SECINFO_NO_NAME. > > > > Older servers may not support using the machine cred or an integrity > > protected auth flavor for SECINFO_NO_NAME in every circumstance, so we fall > > back to using the user's cred and the filesystem's auth flavor in this case. > > > > We run into another problem when running against linux nfs servers - > > they return NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC when using integrity auth flavor (unless the > > mount is also that flavor) even though that is not a valid error for > > SECINFO*. Even though it's against spec, handle WRONGSEC errors on > > SECINFO_NO_NAME by falling back to using the user cred and the > > filesystem's auth flavor. > > > > Signed-off-by: Weston Andros Adamson <dros@netapp.com> > > --- > > > > This patch goes along with yesterday's SECINFO patch > > > > fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- > > 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) > > > > diff --git a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c > > index ab1461e..74b37f5 100644 > > --- a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c > > +++ b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c > > @@ -7291,7 +7291,8 @@ out: > > */ > > static int > > _nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(struct nfs_server *server, struct nfs_fh *fhandle, > > - struct nfs_fsinfo *info, struct nfs4_secinfo_flavors *flavors) > > + struct nfs_fsinfo *info, > > + struct nfs4_secinfo_flavors *flavors, bool use_integrity) > > { > > struct nfs41_secinfo_no_name_args args = { > > .style = SECINFO_STYLE_CURRENT_FH, > > @@ -7304,8 +7305,23 @@ _nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(struct nfs_server *server, struct nfs_fh *fhandle, > > .rpc_argp = &args, > > .rpc_resp = &res, > > }; > > - return nfs4_call_sync(server->nfs_client->cl_rpcclient, server, &msg, > > - &args.seq_args, &res.seq_res, 0); > > + struct rpc_clnt *clnt = server->client; > > + int status; > > + > > + if (use_integrity) { > > + clnt = server->nfs_client->cl_rpcclient; > > + msg.rpc_cred = nfs4_get_clid_cred(server->nfs_client); > > + } > > + > > + dprintk("--> %s\n", __func__); > > + status = nfs4_call_sync(clnt, server, &msg, &args.seq_args, > > + &res.seq_res, 0); > > + dprintk("<-- %s status=%d\n", __func__, status); > > + > > + if (msg.rpc_cred) > > + put_rpccred(msg.rpc_cred); > > + > > + return status; > > } > > I have a question: if we use the machine credential, don't we risk a > NFS4ERR_ACCESS due to the directory permission settings? > > I don't see anything in the spec about what permissions you do need for > a SECINFO_NO_NAME, but since NFS4ERR_ACCESS is listed as a valid return > code, I'm assuming that the server may enforce lookup permissions... It needs to in the STYLE4_PARENT case, but it would seem very strange in the CURRENT_FH case where there's no real "lookup". (If anyone's allowed SECINFO_NO_NAME with CURRENT_FH, would that give away too much information? I'm not sure. I don't think many administrators would be surprised by the fact that anyone could discover the set of exported filesystems and their security flavors. People are used to that being visible through showmount, for example. Maybe there's some scenario where somebody would care just about the ability to probe whether a given filehandle is valid or not, e.g. to see whether a given file had been deleted or not. But you can already get that information by sending a bare PUTFH and checking the error. We could close that minor information leak by checking the export flavor as soon as we've parsed enough of the filehandle to identify the export, before trying to find the actual file. And SECINFO_NO_NAME with CURRENT_FH could similarly be allowed to succeed as soon as we've identified the export (we don't need any more as long as security flavors are set only per-export). I'm not sure anyone cares.) --b. -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-nfs" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
diff --git a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c index ab1461e..74b37f5 100644 --- a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c +++ b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c @@ -7291,7 +7291,8 @@ out: */ static int _nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(struct nfs_server *server, struct nfs_fh *fhandle, - struct nfs_fsinfo *info, struct nfs4_secinfo_flavors *flavors) + struct nfs_fsinfo *info, + struct nfs4_secinfo_flavors *flavors, bool use_integrity) { struct nfs41_secinfo_no_name_args args = { .style = SECINFO_STYLE_CURRENT_FH, @@ -7304,8 +7305,23 @@ _nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(struct nfs_server *server, struct nfs_fh *fhandle, .rpc_argp = &args, .rpc_resp = &res, }; - return nfs4_call_sync(server->nfs_client->cl_rpcclient, server, &msg, - &args.seq_args, &res.seq_res, 0); + struct rpc_clnt *clnt = server->client; + int status; + + if (use_integrity) { + clnt = server->nfs_client->cl_rpcclient; + msg.rpc_cred = nfs4_get_clid_cred(server->nfs_client); + } + + dprintk("--> %s\n", __func__); + status = nfs4_call_sync(clnt, server, &msg, &args.seq_args, + &res.seq_res, 0); + dprintk("<-- %s status=%d\n", __func__, status); + + if (msg.rpc_cred) + put_rpccred(msg.rpc_cred); + + return status; } static int @@ -7315,7 +7331,24 @@ nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(struct nfs_server *server, struct nfs_fh *fhandle, struct nfs4_exception exception = { }; int err; do { - err = _nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(server, fhandle, info, flavors); + /* first try using integrity protection */ + err = -NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC; + + /* try to use integrity protection with machine cred */ + if (_nfs4_is_integrity_protected(server->nfs_client)) + err = _nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(server, fhandle, info, + flavors, true); + + /* + * if unable to use integrity protection, or SECINFO with + * integrity protection returns NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC (which is + * disallowed by spec, but exists in deployed servers) use + * the current filesystem's rpc_client and the user cred. + */ + if (err == -NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC) + err = _nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(server, fhandle, info, + flavors, false); + switch (err) { case 0: case -NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC:
Commit 97431204ea005ec8070ac94bc3251e836daa7ca7 introduced a regression that causes SECINFO_NO_NAME to fail without sending an RPC if: 1) the nfs_client's rpc_client is using krb5i/p (now tried by default) 2) the current user doesn't have valid kerberos credentials This situation is quite common - as of now a sec=sys mount would use krb5i for the nfs_client's rpc_client and a user would hardly be faulted for not having run kinit. The solution is to use the machine cred when trying to use an integrity protected auth flavor for SECINFO_NO_NAME. Older servers may not support using the machine cred or an integrity protected auth flavor for SECINFO_NO_NAME in every circumstance, so we fall back to using the user's cred and the filesystem's auth flavor in this case. We run into another problem when running against linux nfs servers - they return NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC when using integrity auth flavor (unless the mount is also that flavor) even though that is not a valid error for SECINFO*. Even though it's against spec, handle WRONGSEC errors on SECINFO_NO_NAME by falling back to using the user cred and the filesystem's auth flavor. Signed-off-by: Weston Andros Adamson <dros@netapp.com> --- This patch goes along with yesterday's SECINFO patch fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)