From patchwork Tue Nov 25 06:16:58 2014 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Sujith Manoharan X-Patchwork-Id: 5372571 Return-Path: X-Original-To: patchwork-ath10k@patchwork.kernel.org Delivered-To: patchwork-parsemail@patchwork1.web.kernel.org Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.19.201]) by patchwork1.web.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6A8809F319 for ; Tue, 25 Nov 2014 06:16:14 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.kernel.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 85C6C2017E for ; Tue, 25 Nov 2014 06:16:13 +0000 (UTC) Received: from bombadil.infradead.org (bombadil.infradead.org [198.137.202.9]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 78DBE201C7 for ; Tue, 25 Nov 2014 06:16:12 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost ([127.0.0.1] helo=bombadil.infradead.org) by bombadil.infradead.org with esmtp (Exim 4.80.1 #2 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1Xt9Q0-0005hw-9Y; Tue, 25 Nov 2014 06:16:08 +0000 Received: from casper.infradead.org ([2001:770:15f::2]) by bombadil.infradead.org with esmtps (Exim 4.80.1 #2 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1Xt9Py-0005hB-1b for ath10k@bombadil.infradead.org; Tue, 25 Nov 2014 06:16:06 +0000 Received: from s72.web-hosting.com ([198.187.29.22]) by casper.infradead.org with esmtps (Exim 4.80.1 #2 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1Xt9Ps-0000lP-K1 for ath10k@lists.infradead.org; Tue, 25 Nov 2014 06:16:04 +0000 Received: from [117.199.140.142] (port=10473 helo=sujith-pixel.qualcomm.com) by server72.web-hosting.com with esmtpsa (UNKNOWN:AES128-SHA256:128) (Exim 4.82) (envelope-from ) id 1Xt9P7-003iJs-6N; Tue, 25 Nov 2014 01:15:13 -0500 From: Sujith Manoharan To: ath10k@lists.infradead.org Subject: [PATCH v2 1/3] ath10k: Fix shared WEP Date: Tue, 25 Nov 2014 11:46:58 +0530 Message-Id: <1416896220-29691-1-git-send-email-sujith@msujith.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.1.3 X-AntiAbuse: This header was added to track abuse, please include it with any abuse report X-AntiAbuse: Primary Hostname - server72.web-hosting.com X-AntiAbuse: Original Domain - lists.infradead.org X-AntiAbuse: Originator/Caller UID/GID - [47 12] / [47 12] X-AntiAbuse: Sender Address Domain - msujith.org X-Get-Message-Sender-Via: server72.web-hosting.com: authenticated_id: sujith@msujith.org X-Source: X-Source-Args: X-Source-Dir: X-CRM114-Version: 20100106-BlameMichelson ( TRE 0.8.0 (BSD) ) MR-646709E3 X-CRM114-CacheID: sfid-20141125_061600_766806_15C10EA4 X-CRM114-Status: GOOD ( 16.05 ) X-Spam-Score: -1.1 (-) Cc: linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org X-BeenThere: ath10k@lists.infradead.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.18-1 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: "ath10k" Errors-To: ath10k-bounces+patchwork-ath10k=patchwork.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.8 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW, RCVD_IN_SORBS_WEB, T_RP_MATCHES_RCVD, UNPARSEABLE_RELAY autolearn=unavailable version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on mail.kernel.org X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP From: Sujith Manoharan When static keys are used in shared WEP, when a station is associated, message 3 is sent with an encrypted payload. But, for subsequent authentications that are triggered without a deauth, the auth frame is decrypted by the HW. To handle this, check if the WEP keys have already been set for the peer and if so, mark the frame as decrypted. This scenario can happen when a station changes its default TX key and initiates a new authentication sequence. Signed-off-by: Sujith Manoharan --- drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/mac.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/mac.h | 4 ++++ drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/wmi.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 65 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/mac.c b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/mac.c index 1245ac8..fb95d4d 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/mac.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/mac.c @@ -179,6 +179,31 @@ static int ath10k_clear_peer_keys(struct ath10k_vif *arvif, return first_errno; } +bool ath10k_mac_is_peer_wep_key_set(struct ath10k *ar, const u8 *addr, + u8 keyidx) +{ + struct ath10k_peer *peer; + int i; + + lockdep_assert_held(&ar->data_lock); + + /* We don't know which vdev this peer belongs to, + * since WMI doesn't give us that information. + * + * FIXME: multi-bss needs to be handled. + */ + peer = ath10k_peer_find(ar, 0, addr); + if (!peer) + return false; + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(peer->keys); i++) { + if (peer->keys[i] && peer->keys[i]->keyidx == keyidx) + return true; + } + + return false; +} + static int ath10k_clear_vdev_key(struct ath10k_vif *arvif, struct ieee80211_key_conf *key) { diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/mac.h b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/mac.h index 4e3c989..6829611 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/mac.h +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/mac.h @@ -21,6 +21,8 @@ #include #include "core.h" +#define WEP_KEYID_SHIFT 6 + struct ath10k_generic_iter { struct ath10k *ar; int ret; @@ -41,6 +43,8 @@ void ath10k_mgmt_over_wmi_tx_work(struct work_struct *work); void ath10k_halt(struct ath10k *ar); void ath10k_mac_vif_beacon_free(struct ath10k_vif *arvif); void ath10k_drain_tx(struct ath10k *ar); +bool ath10k_mac_is_peer_wep_key_set(struct ath10k *ar, const u8 *addr, + u8 keyidx); static inline struct ath10k_vif *ath10k_vif_to_arvif(struct ieee80211_vif *vif) { diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/wmi.c b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/wmi.c index c300a53..c7e4b9f 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/wmi.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/wmi.c @@ -1113,6 +1113,40 @@ static inline u8 get_rate_idx(u32 rate, enum ieee80211_band band) return rate_idx; } +/* If keys are configured, HW decrypts all frames + * with protected bit set. Mark such frames as decrypted. + */ +static void ath10k_wmi_handle_wep_reauth(struct ath10k *ar, + struct sk_buff *skb, + struct ieee80211_rx_status *status) +{ + struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data; + unsigned int hdrlen; + bool peer_key; + u8 *addr, keyidx; + + if (!ieee80211_is_auth(hdr->frame_control) || + !ieee80211_has_protected(hdr->frame_control)) + return; + + hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control); + if (skb->len < (hdrlen + IEEE80211_WEP_IV_LEN)) + return; + + keyidx = skb->data[hdrlen + (IEEE80211_WEP_IV_LEN - 1)] >> WEP_KEYID_SHIFT; + addr = ieee80211_get_SA(hdr); + + spin_lock_bh(&ar->data_lock); + peer_key = ath10k_mac_is_peer_wep_key_set(ar, addr, keyidx); + spin_unlock_bh(&ar->data_lock); + + if (peer_key) { + ath10k_dbg(ar, ATH10K_DBG_MAC, + "mac wep key present for peer %pM\n", addr); + status->flag |= RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED; + } +} + static int ath10k_wmi_event_mgmt_rx(struct ath10k *ar, struct sk_buff *skb) { struct wmi_mgmt_rx_event_v1 *ev_v1; @@ -1200,6 +1234,8 @@ static int ath10k_wmi_event_mgmt_rx(struct ath10k *ar, struct sk_buff *skb) hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data; fc = le16_to_cpu(hdr->frame_control); + ath10k_wmi_handle_wep_reauth(ar, skb, status); + /* FW delivers WEP Shared Auth frame with Protected Bit set and * encrypted payload. However in case of PMF it delivers decrypted * frames with Protected Bit set. */