From patchwork Thu Feb 29 00:54:48 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Fan Wu X-Patchwork-Id: 13576190 X-Patchwork-Delegate: paul@paul-moore.com Received: from linux.microsoft.com (linux.microsoft.com [13.77.154.182]) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 494CC21350; Thu, 29 Feb 2024 00:55:22 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=13.77.154.182 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1709168125; cv=none; b=oW+lfvtVkLxWaZgHuYzSePFWBTAZVbnnSAAlR8sbGswMD0cop3DK1vhharE6LaWpYVDczZ3l6vEgsFh9EqnHUgcOg+b0HI4AHY05TP08SaM0equ1VXg27JaLo2LAg18rOOAYyTKVRFOsQhDsGlYfoN4ssoAlcYQckGtUFfiU+Eg= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1709168125; c=relaxed/simple; bh=mMmBldoDd3t7SLJM7aR3/z14hu5UfLUqK1gdag5vqbs=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-Id:In-Reply-To:References; b=sVudmnMxH2FnSz2xrubtgxMqoUi0b02mSWIIcQkKo+IJs5sY87yQn+tBMHvC9tPui8+YLvRjyUAy4OhFfKeotUzcIOoCr9/0vg0ktUK2hESHw89aKadnrMyY4GRuLXvIu5UWJygvw0uTd+Q0K9HggnmdGVkYYnIheZDi/QeRALo= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.microsoft.com; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=linux.microsoft.com; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linux.microsoft.com header.i=@linux.microsoft.com header.b=mjP+teMu; arc=none smtp.client-ip=13.77.154.182 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.microsoft.com Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=linux.microsoft.com Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linux.microsoft.com header.i=@linux.microsoft.com header.b="mjP+teMu" Received: by linux.microsoft.com (Postfix, from userid 1052) id B6D5A20B74CB; Wed, 28 Feb 2024 16:55:18 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 linux.microsoft.com B6D5A20B74CB DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linux.microsoft.com; s=default; t=1709168118; bh=JWOCt9coMApPWLNblAg4NISXFGN6/T4kJBRM0vG62O0=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=mjP+teMukPMm+zHpBOwsNhzloDD4ztoavnBd0pD58QbsMFkIjj7QxnX2QsQEKy/vz On39c3DoftushisWDd1JMdGsMbBNB/1va01dLpfU8cmwg/jUOuHZnZOUu9YbSM1luw COT/75Ny4pWhKlbEZyePiejFKpLKat2vWO4Yk210= From: Fan Wu To: corbet@lwn.net, zohar@linux.ibm.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, tytso@mit.edu, ebiggers@kernel.org, axboe@kernel.dk, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@kernel.org, eparis@redhat.com, paul@paul-moore.com Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-block@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@lists.linux.dev, audit@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Fan Wu , Deven Bowers Subject: [RFC PATCH v13 06/20] ipe: introduce 'boot_verified' as a trust provider Date: Wed, 28 Feb 2024 16:54:48 -0800 Message-Id: <1709168102-7677-7-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.8.3.1 In-Reply-To: <1709168102-7677-1-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> References: <1709168102-7677-1-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: audit@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: IPE is designed to provide system level trust guarantees, this usually implies that trust starts from bootup with a hardware root of trust, which validates the bootloader. After this, the bootloader verifies the kernel and the initramfs. As there's no currently supported integrity method for initramfs, and it's typically already verified by the bootloader. This patch introduces a new IPE property `boot_verified` which allows author of IPE policy to indicate trust for files from initramfs. The implementation of this feature utilizes the newly added `initramfs_populated` hook. This hook marks the superblock of the rootfs after the initramfs has been unpacked into it. Before mounting the real rootfs on top of the initramfs, initramfs script will recursively remove all files and directories on the initramfs. This is typically implemented by using switch_root(8) (https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/switch_root.8.html). Therefore the initramfs will be empty and not accessible after the real rootfs takes over. It is advised to switch to a different policy that doesn't rely on the `boot_verified` property after this point. This ensures that the trust policies remain relevant and effective throughout the system's operation. Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers Signed-off-by: Fan Wu --- v2: +No Changes v3: + Remove useless caching system + Move ipe_load_properties to this match + Minor changes from checkpatch --strict warnings v4: + Remove comments from headers that was missed previously. + Grammatical corrections. v5: + No significant changes v6: + No changes v7: + Reword and refactor patch 04/12 to [09/16], based on changes in the underlying system. + Add common audit function for boolean values + Use common audit function as implementation. v8: + No changes v9: + No changes v10: + Replace struct file with struct super_block v11: + Fix code style issues v12: + Switch to use unpack_initramfs hook and security blob v13: + Update the hook name + Rename the security blob field to initramfs + Remove the dependency on CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD --- security/ipe/eval.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- security/ipe/eval.h | 5 +++++ security/ipe/hooks.c | 6 ++++++ security/ipe/hooks.h | 2 ++ security/ipe/ipe.c | 8 ++++++++ security/ipe/ipe.h | 1 + security/ipe/policy.h | 2 ++ security/ipe/policy_parser.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 8 files changed, 94 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/ipe/eval.c b/security/ipe/eval.c index 4f425afffcad..bef204decbbf 100644 --- a/security/ipe/eval.c +++ b/security/ipe/eval.c @@ -16,6 +16,18 @@ struct ipe_policy __rcu *ipe_active_policy; +#define FILE_SUPERBLOCK(f) ((f)->f_path.mnt->mnt_sb) + +/** + * build_ipe_sb_ctx - Build initramfs field of an evaluation context. + * @ctx: Supplies a pointer to the context to be populated. + * @file: Supplies the file struct of the file triggered IPE event. + */ +static void build_ipe_sb_ctx(struct ipe_eval_ctx *ctx, const struct file *const file) +{ + ctx->initramfs = ipe_sb(FILE_SUPERBLOCK(file))->initramfs; +} + /** * build_eval_ctx - Build an evaluation context. * @ctx: Supplies a pointer to the context to be populated. @@ -28,6 +40,22 @@ void build_eval_ctx(struct ipe_eval_ctx *ctx, { ctx->file = file; ctx->op = op; + + if (file) + build_ipe_sb_ctx(ctx, file); +} + +/** + * evaluate_boot_verified - Evaluate @ctx for the boot verified property. + * @ctx: Supplies a pointer to the context being evaluated. + * + * Return: + * * true - The current @ctx match the @p + * * false - The current @ctx doesn't match the @p + */ +static bool evaluate_boot_verified(const struct ipe_eval_ctx *const ctx) +{ + return ctx->initramfs; } /** @@ -42,7 +70,14 @@ void build_eval_ctx(struct ipe_eval_ctx *ctx, static bool evaluate_property(const struct ipe_eval_ctx *const ctx, struct ipe_prop *p) { - return false; + switch (p->type) { + case IPE_PROP_BOOT_VERIFIED_FALSE: + return !evaluate_boot_verified(ctx); + case IPE_PROP_BOOT_VERIFIED_TRUE: + return evaluate_boot_verified(ctx); + default: + return false; + } } /** diff --git a/security/ipe/eval.h b/security/ipe/eval.h index cfdf3c8dfe8a..884821494525 100644 --- a/security/ipe/eval.h +++ b/security/ipe/eval.h @@ -15,10 +15,15 @@ extern struct ipe_policy __rcu *ipe_active_policy; +struct ipe_superblock { + bool initramfs; +}; + struct ipe_eval_ctx { enum ipe_op_type op; const struct file *file; + bool initramfs; }; void build_eval_ctx(struct ipe_eval_ctx *ctx, const struct file *file, enum ipe_op_type op); diff --git a/security/ipe/hooks.c b/security/ipe/hooks.c index 3aec88c074e1..23cf070438fa 100644 --- a/security/ipe/hooks.c +++ b/security/ipe/hooks.c @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ */ #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -181,3 +182,8 @@ int ipe_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents) build_eval_ctx(&ctx, NULL, op); return ipe_evaluate_event(&ctx); } + +void ipe_unpack_initramfs(void) +{ + ipe_sb(current->fs->root.mnt->mnt_sb)->initramfs = true; +} diff --git a/security/ipe/hooks.h b/security/ipe/hooks.h index 23205452f758..21f49cdc2fcd 100644 --- a/security/ipe/hooks.h +++ b/security/ipe/hooks.h @@ -22,4 +22,6 @@ int ipe_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id, int ipe_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents); +void ipe_unpack_initramfs(void); + #endif /* _IPE_HOOKS_H */ diff --git a/security/ipe/ipe.c b/security/ipe/ipe.c index 22bd95116087..3bf7c1331d5e 100644 --- a/security/ipe/ipe.c +++ b/security/ipe/ipe.c @@ -5,9 +5,11 @@ #include #include "ipe.h" +#include "eval.h" #include "hooks.h" static struct lsm_blob_sizes ipe_blobs __ro_after_init = { + .lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct ipe_superblock), }; static const struct lsm_id ipe_lsmid = { @@ -15,12 +17,18 @@ static const struct lsm_id ipe_lsmid = { .id = LSM_ID_IPE, }; +struct ipe_superblock *ipe_sb(const struct super_block *sb) +{ + return sb->s_security + ipe_blobs.lbs_superblock; +} + static struct security_hook_list ipe_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_check_security, ipe_bprm_check_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, ipe_mmap_file), LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, ipe_file_mprotect), LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, ipe_kernel_read_file), LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, ipe_kernel_load_data), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(initramfs_populated, ipe_unpack_initramfs), }; /** diff --git a/security/ipe/ipe.h b/security/ipe/ipe.h index a1c68d0fc2e0..fb8f0ad168b3 100644 --- a/security/ipe/ipe.h +++ b/security/ipe/ipe.h @@ -12,5 +12,6 @@ #define pr_fmt(fmt) "IPE: " fmt #include +struct ipe_superblock *ipe_sb(const struct super_block *sb); #endif /* _IPE_H */ diff --git a/security/ipe/policy.h b/security/ipe/policy.h index fb906f41522b..fb48024bb63e 100644 --- a/security/ipe/policy.h +++ b/security/ipe/policy.h @@ -30,6 +30,8 @@ enum ipe_action_type { #define IPE_ACTION_INVALID __IPE_ACTION_MAX enum ipe_prop_type { + IPE_PROP_BOOT_VERIFIED_FALSE, + IPE_PROP_BOOT_VERIFIED_TRUE, __IPE_PROP_MAX }; diff --git a/security/ipe/policy_parser.c b/security/ipe/policy_parser.c index 612839b405f4..3fc8fea55b95 100644 --- a/security/ipe/policy_parser.c +++ b/security/ipe/policy_parser.c @@ -265,6 +265,12 @@ static enum ipe_action_type parse_action(char *t) return match_token(t, action_tokens, args); } +static const match_table_t property_tokens = { + {IPE_PROP_BOOT_VERIFIED_FALSE, "boot_verified=FALSE"}, + {IPE_PROP_BOOT_VERIFIED_TRUE, "boot_verified=TRUE"}, + {IPE_PROP_INVALID, NULL} +}; + /** * parse_property - Parse the property type given a token string. * @t: Supplies the token string to be parsed. @@ -277,7 +283,34 @@ static enum ipe_action_type parse_action(char *t) */ static int parse_property(char *t, struct ipe_rule *r) { - return -EBADMSG; + substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS]; + struct ipe_prop *p = NULL; + int rc = 0; + int token; + + p = kzalloc(sizeof(*p), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!p) + return -ENOMEM; + + token = match_token(t, property_tokens, args); + + switch (token) { + case IPE_PROP_BOOT_VERIFIED_FALSE: + case IPE_PROP_BOOT_VERIFIED_TRUE: + p->type = token; + break; + default: + rc = -EBADMSG; + break; + } + if (rc) + goto err; + list_add_tail(&p->next, &r->props); + + return rc; +err: + kfree(p); + return rc; } /**