| Message ID | 20230412110930.176835-68-xiubli@redhat.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
| Series | ceph+fscrypt: full support | expand |
On Wed, Apr 12, 2023 at 1:15 PM <xiubli@redhat.com> wrote: > > From: Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com> > > The sync_filesystem() will flush all the dirty buffer and submit the > osd reqs to the osdc and then is blocked to wait for all the reqs to > finish. But the when the reqs' replies come, the reqs will be removed > from osdc just before the req->r_callback()s are called. Which means > the sync_filesystem() will be woke up by leaving the req->r_callback()s > are still running. > > This will be buggy when the waiter require the req->r_callback()s to > release some resources before continuing. So we need to make sure the > req->r_callback()s are called before removing the reqs from the osdc. > > WARNING: CPU: 4 PID: 168846 at fs/crypto/keyring.c:242 fscrypt_destroy_keyring+0x7e/0xd0 > CPU: 4 PID: 168846 Comm: umount Tainted: G S 6.1.0-rc5-ceph-g72ead199864c #1 > Hardware name: Supermicro SYS-5018R-WR/X10SRW-F, BIOS 2.0 12/17/2015 > RIP: 0010:fscrypt_destroy_keyring+0x7e/0xd0 > RSP: 0018:ffffc9000b277e28 EFLAGS: 00010202 > RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: ffff88810d52ac00 RCX: ffff88810b56aa00 > RDX: 0000000080000000 RSI: ffffffff822f3a09 RDI: ffff888108f59000 > RBP: ffff8881d394fb88 R08: 0000000000000028 R09: 0000000000000000 > R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 11ff4fe6834fcd91 R12: ffff8881d394fc40 > R13: ffff888108f59000 R14: ffff8881d394f800 R15: 0000000000000000 > FS: 00007fd83f6f1080(0000) GS:ffff88885fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 > CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 > CR2: 00007f918d417000 CR3: 000000017f89a005 CR4: 00000000003706e0 > DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 > DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 > Call Trace: > <TASK> > generic_shutdown_super+0x47/0x120 > kill_anon_super+0x14/0x30 > ceph_kill_sb+0x36/0x90 [ceph] > deactivate_locked_super+0x29/0x60 > cleanup_mnt+0xb8/0x140 > task_work_run+0x67/0xb0 > exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x23d/0x240 > syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x25/0x60 > do_syscall_64+0x40/0x80 > entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd > RIP: 0033:0x7fd83dc39e9b > > URL: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/58126 > Tested-by: Luís Henriques <lhenriques@suse.de> > Tested-by: Venky Shankar <vshankar@redhat.com> > Reviewed-by: Luís Henriques <lhenriques@suse.de> > Signed-off-by: Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com> > --- > net/ceph/osd_client.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- > 1 file changed, 35 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/net/ceph/osd_client.c b/net/ceph/osd_client.c > index 78b622178a3d..db3d93d3e692 100644 > --- a/net/ceph/osd_client.c > +++ b/net/ceph/osd_client.c > @@ -2507,7 +2507,7 @@ static void submit_request(struct ceph_osd_request *req, bool wrlocked) > __submit_request(req, wrlocked); > } > > -static void finish_request(struct ceph_osd_request *req) > +static void __finish_request(struct ceph_osd_request *req) > { > struct ceph_osd_client *osdc = req->r_osdc; > > @@ -2516,12 +2516,6 @@ static void finish_request(struct ceph_osd_request *req) > > req->r_end_latency = ktime_get(); > > - if (req->r_osd) { > - ceph_init_sparse_read(&req->r_osd->o_sparse_read); > - unlink_request(req->r_osd, req); > - } > - atomic_dec(&osdc->num_requests); > - > /* > * If an OSD has failed or returned and a request has been sent > * twice, it's possible to get a reply and end up here while the > @@ -2532,13 +2526,46 @@ static void finish_request(struct ceph_osd_request *req) > ceph_msg_revoke_incoming(req->r_reply); > } > > +static void __remove_request(struct ceph_osd_request *req) > +{ > + struct ceph_osd_client *osdc = req->r_osdc; > + > + dout("%s req %p tid %llu\n", __func__, req, req->r_tid); > + > + if (req->r_osd) { > + ceph_init_sparse_read(&req->r_osd->o_sparse_read); > + unlink_request(req->r_osd, req); > + } > + atomic_dec(&osdc->num_requests); > +} > + > +static void finish_request(struct ceph_osd_request *req) > +{ > + __finish_request(req); > + __remove_request(req); > +} > + > static void __complete_request(struct ceph_osd_request *req) > { > + struct ceph_osd_client *osdc = req->r_osdc; > + struct ceph_osd *osd = req->r_osd; > + > dout("%s req %p tid %llu cb %ps result %d\n", __func__, req, > req->r_tid, req->r_callback, req->r_result); > > if (req->r_callback) > req->r_callback(req); > + > + down_read(&osdc->lock); > + if (osd) { > + mutex_lock(&osd->lock); > + __remove_request(req); > + mutex_unlock(&osd->lock); > + } else { > + atomic_dec(&osdc->num_requests); > + } > + up_read(&osdc->lock); Hi Xiubo, I think it was highlighted before that this patch is wrong so I'm surprised to see it in this series, broken out and with a different subject. On top of changing long-standing behavior which is purposefully consistent with Objecter behavior in userspace, it also seems to introduce a race condition with ceph_osdc_cancel_request() which can lead, among other things, to a use-after-free on req. Consider what would happen if the request is cancelled while the callback is running: since it would still be linked at that point, cancel_request() would be allowed to go through and eventually put the messenger's reference. Thanks, Ilya
On 4/17/23 03:49, Ilya Dryomov wrote: > On Wed, Apr 12, 2023 at 1:15 PM <xiubli@redhat.com> wrote: >> From: Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com> >> >> The sync_filesystem() will flush all the dirty buffer and submit the >> osd reqs to the osdc and then is blocked to wait for all the reqs to >> finish. But the when the reqs' replies come, the reqs will be removed >> from osdc just before the req->r_callback()s are called. Which means >> the sync_filesystem() will be woke up by leaving the req->r_callback()s >> are still running. >> >> This will be buggy when the waiter require the req->r_callback()s to >> release some resources before continuing. So we need to make sure the >> req->r_callback()s are called before removing the reqs from the osdc. >> >> WARNING: CPU: 4 PID: 168846 at fs/crypto/keyring.c:242 fscrypt_destroy_keyring+0x7e/0xd0 >> CPU: 4 PID: 168846 Comm: umount Tainted: G S 6.1.0-rc5-ceph-g72ead199864c #1 >> Hardware name: Supermicro SYS-5018R-WR/X10SRW-F, BIOS 2.0 12/17/2015 >> RIP: 0010:fscrypt_destroy_keyring+0x7e/0xd0 >> RSP: 0018:ffffc9000b277e28 EFLAGS: 00010202 >> RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: ffff88810d52ac00 RCX: ffff88810b56aa00 >> RDX: 0000000080000000 RSI: ffffffff822f3a09 RDI: ffff888108f59000 >> RBP: ffff8881d394fb88 R08: 0000000000000028 R09: 0000000000000000 >> R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 11ff4fe6834fcd91 R12: ffff8881d394fc40 >> R13: ffff888108f59000 R14: ffff8881d394f800 R15: 0000000000000000 >> FS: 00007fd83f6f1080(0000) GS:ffff88885fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 >> CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 >> CR2: 00007f918d417000 CR3: 000000017f89a005 CR4: 00000000003706e0 >> DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 >> DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 >> Call Trace: >> <TASK> >> generic_shutdown_super+0x47/0x120 >> kill_anon_super+0x14/0x30 >> ceph_kill_sb+0x36/0x90 [ceph] >> deactivate_locked_super+0x29/0x60 >> cleanup_mnt+0xb8/0x140 >> task_work_run+0x67/0xb0 >> exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x23d/0x240 >> syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x25/0x60 >> do_syscall_64+0x40/0x80 >> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd >> RIP: 0033:0x7fd83dc39e9b >> >> URL: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/58126 >> Tested-by: Luís Henriques <lhenriques@suse.de> >> Tested-by: Venky Shankar <vshankar@redhat.com> >> Reviewed-by: Luís Henriques <lhenriques@suse.de> >> Signed-off-by: Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com> >> --- >> net/ceph/osd_client.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- >> 1 file changed, 35 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) >> >> diff --git a/net/ceph/osd_client.c b/net/ceph/osd_client.c >> index 78b622178a3d..db3d93d3e692 100644 >> --- a/net/ceph/osd_client.c >> +++ b/net/ceph/osd_client.c >> @@ -2507,7 +2507,7 @@ static void submit_request(struct ceph_osd_request *req, bool wrlocked) >> __submit_request(req, wrlocked); >> } >> >> -static void finish_request(struct ceph_osd_request *req) >> +static void __finish_request(struct ceph_osd_request *req) >> { >> struct ceph_osd_client *osdc = req->r_osdc; >> >> @@ -2516,12 +2516,6 @@ static void finish_request(struct ceph_osd_request *req) >> >> req->r_end_latency = ktime_get(); >> >> - if (req->r_osd) { >> - ceph_init_sparse_read(&req->r_osd->o_sparse_read); >> - unlink_request(req->r_osd, req); >> - } >> - atomic_dec(&osdc->num_requests); >> - >> /* >> * If an OSD has failed or returned and a request has been sent >> * twice, it's possible to get a reply and end up here while the >> @@ -2532,13 +2526,46 @@ static void finish_request(struct ceph_osd_request *req) >> ceph_msg_revoke_incoming(req->r_reply); >> } >> >> +static void __remove_request(struct ceph_osd_request *req) >> +{ >> + struct ceph_osd_client *osdc = req->r_osdc; >> + >> + dout("%s req %p tid %llu\n", __func__, req, req->r_tid); >> + >> + if (req->r_osd) { >> + ceph_init_sparse_read(&req->r_osd->o_sparse_read); >> + unlink_request(req->r_osd, req); >> + } >> + atomic_dec(&osdc->num_requests); >> +} >> + >> +static void finish_request(struct ceph_osd_request *req) >> +{ >> + __finish_request(req); >> + __remove_request(req); >> +} >> + >> static void __complete_request(struct ceph_osd_request *req) >> { >> + struct ceph_osd_client *osdc = req->r_osdc; >> + struct ceph_osd *osd = req->r_osd; >> + >> dout("%s req %p tid %llu cb %ps result %d\n", __func__, req, >> req->r_tid, req->r_callback, req->r_result); >> >> if (req->r_callback) >> req->r_callback(req); >> + >> + down_read(&osdc->lock); >> + if (osd) { >> + mutex_lock(&osd->lock); >> + __remove_request(req); >> + mutex_unlock(&osd->lock); >> + } else { >> + atomic_dec(&osdc->num_requests); >> + } >> + up_read(&osdc->lock); > Hi Xiubo, > > I think it was highlighted before that this patch is wrong so I'm > surprised to see it in this series, broken out and with a different > subject. > > On top of changing long-standing behavior which is purposefully > consistent with Objecter behavior in userspace, it also seems to > introduce a race condition with ceph_osdc_cancel_request() which can > lead, among other things, to a use-after-free on req. Consider what > would happen if the request is cancelled while the callback is running: > since it would still be linked at that point, cancel_request() would be > allowed to go through and eventually put the messenger's reference. Okay, I may miss or misunderstand it in another thread. Since the bug has been fixed by the following [68/71] patch, let's remove this. Thanks - Xiubo > Thanks, > > Ilya >
diff --git a/net/ceph/osd_client.c b/net/ceph/osd_client.c index 78b622178a3d..db3d93d3e692 100644 --- a/net/ceph/osd_client.c +++ b/net/ceph/osd_client.c @@ -2507,7 +2507,7 @@ static void submit_request(struct ceph_osd_request *req, bool wrlocked) __submit_request(req, wrlocked); } -static void finish_request(struct ceph_osd_request *req) +static void __finish_request(struct ceph_osd_request *req) { struct ceph_osd_client *osdc = req->r_osdc; @@ -2516,12 +2516,6 @@ static void finish_request(struct ceph_osd_request *req) req->r_end_latency = ktime_get(); - if (req->r_osd) { - ceph_init_sparse_read(&req->r_osd->o_sparse_read); - unlink_request(req->r_osd, req); - } - atomic_dec(&osdc->num_requests); - /* * If an OSD has failed or returned and a request has been sent * twice, it's possible to get a reply and end up here while the @@ -2532,13 +2526,46 @@ static void finish_request(struct ceph_osd_request *req) ceph_msg_revoke_incoming(req->r_reply); } +static void __remove_request(struct ceph_osd_request *req) +{ + struct ceph_osd_client *osdc = req->r_osdc; + + dout("%s req %p tid %llu\n", __func__, req, req->r_tid); + + if (req->r_osd) { + ceph_init_sparse_read(&req->r_osd->o_sparse_read); + unlink_request(req->r_osd, req); + } + atomic_dec(&osdc->num_requests); +} + +static void finish_request(struct ceph_osd_request *req) +{ + __finish_request(req); + __remove_request(req); +} + static void __complete_request(struct ceph_osd_request *req) { + struct ceph_osd_client *osdc = req->r_osdc; + struct ceph_osd *osd = req->r_osd; + dout("%s req %p tid %llu cb %ps result %d\n", __func__, req, req->r_tid, req->r_callback, req->r_result); if (req->r_callback) req->r_callback(req); + + down_read(&osdc->lock); + if (osd) { + mutex_lock(&osd->lock); + __remove_request(req); + mutex_unlock(&osd->lock); + } else { + atomic_dec(&osdc->num_requests); + } + up_read(&osdc->lock); + complete_all(&req->r_completion); ceph_osdc_put_request(req); } @@ -3873,7 +3900,7 @@ static void handle_reply(struct ceph_osd *osd, struct ceph_msg *msg) WARN_ON(!(m.flags & CEPH_OSD_FLAG_ONDISK)); req->r_version = m.user_version; req->r_result = m.result ?: data_len; - finish_request(req); + __finish_request(req); mutex_unlock(&osd->lock); up_read(&osdc->lock);