From patchwork Mon Nov 13 01:17:03 2023 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Xiubo Li X-Patchwork-Id: 13453440 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (lindbergh.monkeyblade.net [23.128.96.19]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id CE81D5666 for ; Mon, 13 Nov 2023 01:19:25 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=redhat.com header.i=@redhat.com header.b="jF/b18IJ" Received: from us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com (us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com [170.10.129.124]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 5E872107 for ; Sun, 12 Nov 2023 17:19:24 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=redhat.com; s=mimecast20190719; t=1699838363; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=5UtU4zCp5YIi9PXxcMfEmKiCFi7KtUnPZJrinBbzOBU=; b=jF/b18IJp0fFywCv/18tZGshO8TMSfY4h33dYvtbdSdrTjBrRRzUkjEMux1HKQ4K+keFNB MjTEy+rpk9U9rtpuoNChPNouaRMXq8crYEHlXDqaVQZxxybd91/PBGOmyWZxAS5L3keego s8V56VGn7aSKp1OYFfUWg5xb2pwbxgY= Received: from mimecast-mx02.redhat.com (mimecast-mx02.redhat.com [66.187.233.88]) by relay.mimecast.com with ESMTP with STARTTLS (version=TLSv1.3, cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) id us-mta-311-GrHyu1xFNrOS3SL7bDTLTQ-1; Sun, 12 Nov 2023 20:19:20 -0500 X-MC-Unique: GrHyu1xFNrOS3SL7bDTLTQ-1 Received: from smtp.corp.redhat.com (int-mx08.intmail.prod.int.rdu2.redhat.com [10.11.54.8]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (2048 bits) server-digest SHA256) (No client certificate requested) by mimecast-mx02.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A74F3811E7E; Mon, 13 Nov 2023 01:19:19 +0000 (UTC) Received: from li-a71a4dcc-35d1-11b2-a85c-951838863c8d.ibm.com.com (unknown [10.72.112.63]) by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id DD876C15881; Mon, 13 Nov 2023 01:19:16 +0000 (UTC) From: xiubli@redhat.com To: ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org Cc: idryomov@gmail.com, jlayton@kernel.org, vshankar@redhat.com, mchangir@redhat.com, Xiubo Li Subject: [PATCH v2 2/5] ceph: add ceph_mds_check_access() helper support Date: Mon, 13 Nov 2023 09:17:03 +0800 Message-ID: <20231113011706.542551-3-xiubli@redhat.com> In-Reply-To: <20231113011706.542551-1-xiubli@redhat.com> References: <20231113011706.542551-1-xiubli@redhat.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 3.4.1 on 10.11.54.8 From: Xiubo Li This will help check the mds auth access in client side. Always insert the server path in front of the target path when matching the paths. URL: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/61333 Signed-off-by: Xiubo Li --- fs/ceph/mds_client.c | 157 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ fs/ceph/mds_client.h | 3 + 2 files changed, 160 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/ceph/mds_client.c b/fs/ceph/mds_client.c index 3fb0b0104f6b..81040052eb4d 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/mds_client.c +++ b/fs/ceph/mds_client.c @@ -5604,6 +5604,163 @@ void send_flush_mdlog(struct ceph_mds_session *s) mutex_unlock(&s->s_mutex); } +static int ceph_mds_auth_match(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc, + struct ceph_mds_cap_auth *auth, + char *tpath) +{ + const struct cred *cred = get_current_cred(); + uint32_t caller_uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, cred->fsuid); + uint32_t caller_gid = from_kgid(&init_user_ns, cred->fsgid); + struct ceph_client *cl = mdsc->fsc->client; + const char *path = mdsc->fsc->mount_options->server_path; + bool gid_matched = false; + uint32_t gid, tlen, len; + int i, j; + + doutc(cl, "match.uid %lld\n", auth->match.uid); + if (auth->match.uid != MDS_AUTH_UID_ANY) { + if (auth->match.uid != caller_uid) + return 0; + if (auth->match.num_gids) { + for (i = 0; i < auth->match.num_gids; i++) { + if (caller_gid == auth->match.gids[i]) + gid_matched = true; + } + if (!gid_matched && cred->group_info->ngroups) { + for (i = 0; i < cred->group_info->ngroups; i++) { + gid = from_kgid(&init_user_ns, cred->group_info->gid[i]); + for (j = 0; j < auth->match.num_gids; j++) { + if (gid == auth->match.gids[j]) { + gid_matched = true; + break; + } + } + if (gid_matched) + break; + } + } + if (!gid_matched) + return 0; + } + } + + /* path match */ + if (auth->match.path) { + if (!tpath) + return 0; + + tlen = strlen(tpath); + len = strlen(auth->match.path); + if (len) { + char *_tpath = tpath; + bool free_tpath = false; + int m, n; + + doutc(cl, "server path %s, tpath %s, match.path %s\n", + path, tpath, auth->match.path); + if (path && (m = strlen(path)) != 1) { + /* mount path + '/' + tpath + an extra space */ + n = m + 1 + tlen + 1; + _tpath = kmalloc(n, GFP_NOFS); + if (!_tpath) + return -ENOMEM; + /* remove the leading '/' */ + snprintf(_tpath, n, "%s/%s", path + 1, tpath); + free_tpath = true; + tlen = strlen(_tpath); + } + + /* Remove the tailing '/' */ + while (tlen && _tpath[tlen - 1] == '/') { + _tpath[tlen - 1] = '\0'; + tlen -= 1; + } + doutc(cl, "_tpath %s\n", _tpath); + + /* In case first == _tpath && tlen == len: + * path=/foo --> /foo target_path=/foo --> match + * path=/foo/ --> /foo target_path=/foo --> match + * + * In case first == _tpath && tlen > len: + * path=/foo/ --> /foo target_path=/foo/ --> match + * path=/foo --> /foo target_path=/foo/ --> match + * path=/foo/ --> /foo target_path=/foo/d --> match + * path=/foo --> /foo target_path=/food --> mismatch + * + * All the other cases --> mismatch + */ + char *first = strstr(_tpath, auth->match.path); + if (first != _tpath) { + if (free_tpath) + kfree(_tpath); + return 0; + } + + if (tlen > len && _tpath[len] != '/') { + if (free_tpath) + kfree(_tpath); + return 0; + } + } + } + + doutc(cl, "matched\n"); + return 1; +} + +int ceph_mds_check_access(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc, char *tpath, int mask) +{ + const struct cred *cred = get_current_cred(); + uint32_t caller_uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, cred->fsuid); + uint32_t caller_gid = from_kgid(&init_user_ns, cred->fsgid); + struct ceph_mds_cap_auth *rw_perms_s = NULL; + struct ceph_client *cl = mdsc->fsc->client; + bool root_squash_perms = true; + int i, err; + + doutc(cl, "tpath '%s', mask %d, caller_uid %d, caller_gid %d\n", + tpath, mask, caller_uid, caller_gid); + + for (i = 0; i < mdsc->s_cap_auths_num; i++) { + struct ceph_mds_cap_auth *s = &mdsc->s_cap_auths[i]; + + err = ceph_mds_auth_match(mdsc, s, tpath); + if (err < 0) { + return err; + } else if (err > 0) { + // always follow the last auth caps' permision + root_squash_perms = true; + rw_perms_s = NULL; + if ((mask & MAY_WRITE) && s->writeable && + s->match.root_squash && (!caller_uid || !caller_gid)) + root_squash_perms = false; + + if (((mask & MAY_WRITE) && !s->writeable) || + ((mask & MAY_READ) && !s->readable)) + rw_perms_s = s; + } + } + + doutc(cl, "root_squash_perms %d, rw_perms_s %p\n", root_squash_perms, + rw_perms_s); + if (root_squash_perms && rw_perms_s == NULL) { + doutc(cl, "access allowed\n"); + return 0; + } + + if (!root_squash_perms) { + doutc(cl, "root_squash is enabled and user(%d %d) isn't allowed to write", + caller_uid, caller_gid); + } + if (rw_perms_s) { + doutc(cl, "mds auth caps readable/writeable %d/%d while request r/w %d/%d", + rw_perms_s->readable, rw_perms_s->writeable, !!(mask & MAY_READ), + !!(mask & MAY_WRITE)); + } + doutc(cl, "access denied\n"); + return -EACCES; +} + /* * called before mount is ro, and before dentries are torn down. * (hmm, does this still race with new lookups?) diff --git a/fs/ceph/mds_client.h b/fs/ceph/mds_client.h index 71f4d1ff663f..8be57267c253 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/mds_client.h +++ b/fs/ceph/mds_client.h @@ -602,6 +602,9 @@ extern void ceph_reclaim_caps_nr(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc, int nr); extern int ceph_iterate_session_caps(struct ceph_mds_session *session, int (*cb)(struct inode *, int mds, void *), void *arg); +extern int ceph_mds_check_access(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc, char *tpath, + int mask); + extern void ceph_mdsc_pre_umount(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc); static inline void ceph_mdsc_free_path(char *path, int len)