From patchwork Fri Dec 13 13:50:05 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: David Howells X-Patchwork-Id: 13907077 Received: from us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com (us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com [170.10.133.124]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4DD7F1E102E for ; Fri, 13 Dec 2024 13:51:04 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=170.10.133.124 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1734097866; cv=none; b=XXS5+c+ghYDMnSmU7qJqtS2Q9v1SJ0sqlEy96VNpBC+c1CVREgVG8o7qZevvPHAdA5KuuTr/LS5UDgq6zylNTJnDy3PbzDlIhTUFIIENZk2RVaJL3vWcHetE820oBcCdUT7yLvG6wXtx19delKDNf2+IbKNDknM9f8qPGr9w2ts= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1734097866; c=relaxed/simple; bh=lvd/F1J57A1QaB/fJW9dMRjyyIjagIy4YdSoparsG/s=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=AIAbJaG3umkNQf1fzQj0uONddKBfSl+x5E5gPmHZhein2hFkUeB+yPTHxUGh7dklY9EZyOq4FLqs4zhsGB4rpD4HZpyGfYrBU7Ks81uvxSbXsdH7R8FYTZ2bp2cTv8GN1HN62COozskO2gOf/3uceHQkanHDLyrp5VuUkFqvA0M= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=redhat.com; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=redhat.com; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=redhat.com header.i=@redhat.com header.b=JcRstcy+; arc=none smtp.client-ip=170.10.133.124 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=redhat.com Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=redhat.com Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=redhat.com header.i=@redhat.com header.b="JcRstcy+" DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=redhat.com; s=mimecast20190719; t=1734097863; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=PgqF6qS7NlWWtrfijPJ59f4qec6LLBa+L5U7UdJSTDg=; b=JcRstcy+VCNxqmVKzfis+b1DzdeNB1Gi5Es4W1U0wCY5NQXUpHEnVUumgKNG8BMRrKr5bw 2xniJS12sRPyqh/rev13K+4+gGYslCE66AYlg1Fo6Z5Y20wwaGurmPcyLP33EV3VTP1kKh RY3o6ttNu9Fqm4NXfXd5l0q4FNwL5fY= Received: from mx-prod-mc-03.mail-002.prod.us-west-2.aws.redhat.com (ec2-54-186-198-63.us-west-2.compute.amazonaws.com [54.186.198.63]) by relay.mimecast.com with ESMTP with STARTTLS (version=TLSv1.3, cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) id us-mta-144-5qCQLS_NOjiuU8cdRRSGCw-1; Fri, 13 Dec 2024 08:50:58 -0500 X-MC-Unique: 5qCQLS_NOjiuU8cdRRSGCw-1 X-Mimecast-MFC-AGG-ID: 5qCQLS_NOjiuU8cdRRSGCw Received: from mx-prod-int-04.mail-002.prod.us-west-2.aws.redhat.com (mx-prod-int-04.mail-002.prod.us-west-2.aws.redhat.com [10.30.177.40]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (2048 bits) server-digest SHA256) (No client certificate requested) by mx-prod-mc-03.mail-002.prod.us-west-2.aws.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 8DA8F1955F54; Fri, 13 Dec 2024 13:50:55 +0000 (UTC) Received: from warthog.procyon.org.uk.com (unknown [10.42.28.48]) by mx-prod-int-04.mail-002.prod.us-west-2.aws.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 51D89195605A; Fri, 13 Dec 2024 13:50:50 +0000 (UTC) From: David Howells To: Christian Brauner Cc: David Howells , Max Kellermann , Ilya Dryomov , Xiubo Li , Trond Myklebust , Jeff Layton , Matthew Wilcox , netfs@lists.linux.dev, linux-afs@lists.infradead.org, linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org, linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org, ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org, v9fs@lists.linux.dev, linux-erofs@lists.ozlabs.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH 05/10] cachefiles: Parse the "secctx" immediately Date: Fri, 13 Dec 2024 13:50:05 +0000 Message-ID: <20241213135013.2964079-6-dhowells@redhat.com> In-Reply-To: <20241213135013.2964079-1-dhowells@redhat.com> References: <20241213135013.2964079-1-dhowells@redhat.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 3.0 on 10.30.177.40 From: Max Kellermann Instead of storing an opaque string, call security_secctx_to_secid() right in the "secctx" command handler and store only the numeric "secid". This eliminates an unnecessary string allocation and allows the daemon to receive errors when writing the "secctx" command instead of postponing the error to the "bind" command handler. For example, if the kernel was built without `CONFIG_SECURITY`, "bind" will return `EOPNOTSUPP`, but the daemon doesn't know why. With this patch, the "secctx" will instead return `EOPNOTSUPP` which is the right context for this error. This patch adds a boolean flag `have_secid` because I'm not sure if we can safely assume that zero is the special secid value for "not set". This appears to be true for SELinux, Smack and AppArmor, but since this attribute is not documented, I'm unable to derive a stable guarantee for that. Signed-off-by: Max Kellermann Signed-off-by: David Howells Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241209141554.638708-1-max.kellermann@ionos.com/ --- fs/cachefiles/daemon.c | 14 +++++++------- fs/cachefiles/internal.h | 3 ++- fs/cachefiles/security.c | 6 +++--- 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/cachefiles/daemon.c b/fs/cachefiles/daemon.c index 89b11336a836..1806bff8e59b 100644 --- a/fs/cachefiles/daemon.c +++ b/fs/cachefiles/daemon.c @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -576,7 +577,7 @@ static int cachefiles_daemon_dir(struct cachefiles_cache *cache, char *args) */ static int cachefiles_daemon_secctx(struct cachefiles_cache *cache, char *args) { - char *secctx; + int err; _enter(",%s", args); @@ -585,16 +586,16 @@ static int cachefiles_daemon_secctx(struct cachefiles_cache *cache, char *args) return -EINVAL; } - if (cache->secctx) { + if (cache->have_secid) { pr_err("Second security context specified\n"); return -EINVAL; } - secctx = kstrdup(args, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!secctx) - return -ENOMEM; + err = security_secctx_to_secid(args, strlen(args), &cache->secid); + if (err) + return err; - cache->secctx = secctx; + cache->have_secid = true; return 0; } @@ -820,7 +821,6 @@ static void cachefiles_daemon_unbind(struct cachefiles_cache *cache) put_cred(cache->cache_cred); kfree(cache->rootdirname); - kfree(cache->secctx); kfree(cache->tag); _leave(""); diff --git a/fs/cachefiles/internal.h b/fs/cachefiles/internal.h index 7b99bd98de75..38c236e38cef 100644 --- a/fs/cachefiles/internal.h +++ b/fs/cachefiles/internal.h @@ -122,7 +122,6 @@ struct cachefiles_cache { #define CACHEFILES_STATE_CHANGED 3 /* T if state changed (poll trigger) */ #define CACHEFILES_ONDEMAND_MODE 4 /* T if in on-demand read mode */ char *rootdirname; /* name of cache root directory */ - char *secctx; /* LSM security context */ char *tag; /* cache binding tag */ refcount_t unbind_pincount;/* refcount to do daemon unbind */ struct xarray reqs; /* xarray of pending on-demand requests */ @@ -130,6 +129,8 @@ struct cachefiles_cache { struct xarray ondemand_ids; /* xarray for ondemand_id allocation */ u32 ondemand_id_next; u32 msg_id_next; + u32 secid; /* LSM security id */ + bool have_secid; /* whether "secid" was set */ }; static inline bool cachefiles_in_ondemand_mode(struct cachefiles_cache *cache) diff --git a/fs/cachefiles/security.c b/fs/cachefiles/security.c index fe777164f1d8..fc6611886b3b 100644 --- a/fs/cachefiles/security.c +++ b/fs/cachefiles/security.c @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ int cachefiles_get_security_ID(struct cachefiles_cache *cache) struct cred *new; int ret; - _enter("{%s}", cache->secctx); + _enter("{%u}", cache->have_secid ? cache->secid : 0); new = prepare_kernel_cred(current); if (!new) { @@ -26,8 +26,8 @@ int cachefiles_get_security_ID(struct cachefiles_cache *cache) goto error; } - if (cache->secctx) { - ret = set_security_override_from_ctx(new, cache->secctx); + if (cache->have_secid) { + ret = set_security_override(new, cache->secid); if (ret < 0) { put_cred(new); pr_err("Security denies permission to nominate security context: error %d\n",