| Message ID | CAH2r5msFoAqT4-ec1SbeVfnTD5=OeXawyx4GgvqdZ1CcZ+4VEg@mail.gmail.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
On Sun, 25 Nov 2012 00:10:32 -0600 Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com> wrote: > Incorporating Jeff's feedback > > commit e6104c75c0e3158d39356591955f2aff7f3558c3 > Author: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com> > Date: Sun Nov 25 00:07:44 2012 -0600 > > [CIFS] default authentication needs to be at least ntlmv2 security > for cifs mounts > > We had planned to upgrade to ntlmv2 security a few releases ago, > and have been warning users in dmesg on mount about the impending > upgrade, but had to make a change (to use nltmssp with ntlmv2) due > to testing issues with some non-Windows, non-Samba servers. > > The approach in this patch is simpler than earlier patches, > and changes the default authentication mechanism to ntlmv2 > password hashes (encapsulated in ntlmssp) from ntlm (ntlm is > too weak for current use and ntlmv2 has been broadly > supported for many, many years). > > Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com> > > diff --git a/fs/cifs/cifsglob.h b/fs/cifs/cifsglob.h > index f5af252..2cd5ea2 100644 > --- a/fs/cifs/cifsglob.h > +++ b/fs/cifs/cifsglob.h > @@ -1362,7 +1362,7 @@ require use of the stronger protocol */ > #define CIFSSEC_MUST_SEAL 0x40040 /* not supported yet */ > #define CIFSSEC_MUST_NTLMSSP 0x80080 /* raw ntlmssp with ntlmv2 */ > > -#define CIFSSEC_DEF (CIFSSEC_MAY_SIGN | CIFSSEC_MAY_NTLM | > CIFSSEC_MAY_NTLMV2 | CIFSSEC_MAY_NTLMSSP) > +#define CIFSSEC_DEF (CIFSSEC_MAY_SIGN | CIFSSEC_MAY_NTLMSSP) > #define CIFSSEC_MAX (CIFSSEC_MUST_SIGN | CIFSSEC_MUST_NTLMV2) > #define CIFSSEC_AUTH_MASK (CIFSSEC_MAY_NTLM | CIFSSEC_MAY_NTLMV2 | > CIFSSEC_MAY_LANMAN | CIFSSEC_MAY_PLNTXT | CIFSSEC_MAY_KRB5 | > CIFSSEC_MAY_NTLMSSP) > /* > diff --git a/fs/cifs/connect.c b/fs/cifs/connect.c > index 5c670b9..32fb50e 100644 > --- a/fs/cifs/connect.c > +++ b/fs/cifs/connect.c > @@ -2397,8 +2397,6 @@ cifs_set_cifscreds(struct smb_vol *vol > __attribute__((unused)), > } > #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */ > > -static bool warned_on_ntlm; /* globals init to false automatically */ > - > static struct cifs_ses * > cifs_get_smb_ses(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, struct smb_vol *volume_info) > { > @@ -2475,14 +2473,6 @@ cifs_get_smb_ses(struct TCP_Server_Info > *server, struct smb_vol *volume_info) > ses->cred_uid = volume_info->cred_uid; > ses->linux_uid = volume_info->linux_uid; > > - /* ntlmv2 is much stronger than ntlm security, and has been broadly > - supported for many years, time to update default security mechanism */ > - if ((volume_info->secFlg == 0) && warned_on_ntlm == false) { > - warned_on_ntlm = true; > - cERROR(1, "default security mechanism requested. The default " > - "security mechanism will be upgraded from ntlm to " > - "ntlmv2 in kernel release 3.3"); > - } > ses->overrideSecFlg = volume_info->secFlg; > > mutex_lock(&ses->session_mutex); > I'd still like to see a more comprehensive overhaul of the auth code, but this will at least get rid of the warning for now... Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-cifs" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
diff --git a/fs/cifs/cifsglob.h b/fs/cifs/cifsglob.h index f5af252..2cd5ea2 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/cifsglob.h +++ b/fs/cifs/cifsglob.h @@ -1362,7 +1362,7 @@ require use of the stronger protocol */ #define CIFSSEC_MUST_SEAL 0x40040 /* not supported yet */ #define CIFSSEC_MUST_NTLMSSP 0x80080 /* raw ntlmssp with ntlmv2 */ -#define CIFSSEC_DEF (CIFSSEC_MAY_SIGN | CIFSSEC_MAY_NTLM | CIFSSEC_MAY_NTLMV2 | CIFSSEC_MAY_NTLMSSP) +#define CIFSSEC_DEF (CIFSSEC_MAY_SIGN | CIFSSEC_MAY_NTLMSSP) #define CIFSSEC_MAX (CIFSSEC_MUST_SIGN | CIFSSEC_MUST_NTLMV2) #define CIFSSEC_AUTH_MASK (CIFSSEC_MAY_NTLM | CIFSSEC_MAY_NTLMV2 | CIFSSEC_MAY_LANMAN | CIFSSEC_MAY_PLNTXT | CIFSSEC_MAY_KRB5 | CIFSSEC_MAY_NTLMSSP) /* diff --git a/fs/cifs/connect.c b/fs/cifs/connect.c index 5c670b9..32fb50e 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/connect.c +++ b/fs/cifs/connect.c @@ -2397,8 +2397,6 @@ cifs_set_cifscreds(struct smb_vol *vol __attribute__((unused)), } #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */ -static bool warned_on_ntlm; /* globals init to false automatically */ - static struct cifs_ses * cifs_get_smb_ses(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, struct smb_vol *volume_info)
Incorporating Jeff's feedback commit e6104c75c0e3158d39356591955f2aff7f3558c3 Author: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com> Date: Sun Nov 25 00:07:44 2012 -0600 [CIFS] default authentication needs to be at least ntlmv2 security for cifs mounts We had planned to upgrade to ntlmv2 security a few releases ago, and have been warning users in dmesg on mount about the impending upgrade, but had to make a change (to use nltmssp with ntlmv2) due to testing issues with some non-Windows, non-Samba servers. The approach in this patch is simpler than earlier patches, and changes the default authentication mechanism to ntlmv2 password hashes (encapsulated in ntlmssp) from ntlm (ntlm is too weak for current use and ntlmv2 has been broadly supported for many, many years). Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com> { @@ -2475,14 +2473,6 @@ cifs_get_smb_ses(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, struct smb_vol *volume_info) ses->cred_uid = volume_info->cred_uid; ses->linux_uid = volume_info->linux_uid; - /* ntlmv2 is much stronger than ntlm security, and has been broadly - supported for many years, time to update default security mechanism */ - if ((volume_info->secFlg == 0) && warned_on_ntlm == false) { - warned_on_ntlm = true; - cERROR(1, "default security mechanism requested. The default " - "security mechanism will be upgraded from ntlm to " - "ntlmv2 in kernel release 3.3"); - } ses->overrideSecFlg = volume_info->secFlg; mutex_lock(&ses->session_mutex);