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[RFC,v2,02/20] X.509: Parse Subject Alternative Name in certificates

Message ID 20250227030952.2319050-3-alistair@alistair23.me
State New
Headers show
Series lib: Rust implementation of SPDM | expand

Commit Message

Alistair Francis Feb. 27, 2025, 3:09 a.m. UTC
From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>

The upcoming support for PCI device authentication with CMA-SPDM
(PCIe r6.1 sec 6.31) requires validating the Subject Alternative Name
in X.509 certificates.

Store a pointer to the Subject Alternative Name upon parsing for
consumption by CMA-SPDM.

Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Reviewed-by: Wilfred Mallawa <wilfred.mallawa@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
---
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c | 9 +++++++++
 include/keys/x509-parser.h                | 2 ++
 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+)
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Patch

diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
index ee2fdab42334..ff1db59d4037 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
@@ -572,6 +572,15 @@  int x509_process_extension(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
 		return 0;
 	}
 
+	if (ctx->last_oid == OID_subjectAltName) {
+		if (ctx->cert->raw_san)
+			return -EBADMSG;
+
+		ctx->cert->raw_san = v;
+		ctx->cert->raw_san_size = vlen;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
 	if (ctx->last_oid == OID_keyUsage) {
 		/*
 		 * Get hold of the keyUsage bit string
diff --git a/include/keys/x509-parser.h b/include/keys/x509-parser.h
index 37436a5c7526..8e450befe3b9 100644
--- a/include/keys/x509-parser.h
+++ b/include/keys/x509-parser.h
@@ -36,6 +36,8 @@  struct x509_certificate {
 	unsigned	raw_subject_size;
 	unsigned	raw_skid_size;
 	const void	*raw_skid;		/* Raw subjectKeyId in ASN.1 */
+	const void	*raw_san;		/* Raw subjectAltName in ASN.1 */
+	unsigned	raw_san_size;
 	unsigned	index;
 	bool		seen;			/* Infinite recursion prevention */
 	bool		verified;