From patchwork Tue Sep 28 19:10:04 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Borislav Petkov X-Patchwork-Id: 12523649 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B0466C43219 for ; Tue, 28 Sep 2021 19:10:41 +0000 (UTC) Received: from gabe.freedesktop.org (gabe.freedesktop.org [131.252.210.177]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 7032C6135E for ; Tue, 28 Sep 2021 19:10:41 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.4.1 mail.kernel.org 7032C6135E Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=alien8.de Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=lists.freedesktop.org Received: from gabe.freedesktop.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by gabe.freedesktop.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C349F6E946; Tue, 28 Sep 2021 19:10:24 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.skyhub.de (mail.skyhub.de [IPv6:2a01:4f8:190:11c2::b:1457]) by gabe.freedesktop.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 9D1C06E946; Tue, 28 Sep 2021 19:10:22 +0000 (UTC) Received: from zn.tnic (p200300ec2f13b20078349fd04295260b.dip0.t-ipconnect.de [IPv6:2003:ec:2f13:b200:7834:9fd0:4295:260b]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.skyhub.de (SuperMail on ZX Spectrum 128k) with ESMTPSA id D3CBA1EC0752; Tue, 28 Sep 2021 21:10:20 +0200 (CEST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=alien8.de; s=dkim; t=1632856221; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version:content-type: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=tI5EKQyiJ5raj9g6K0LwQyKzz9oZ1IWFygzYqGLLXlI=; b=jtxYO/r269DfmnwCak/7lSzy7BxpGJEwUtOgQ1mfz1IJsyIbDJZwKE1zPG7z0Qr+qwkov1 699yIvchf1BPahMru19zZ+k+cLw1QtutQLg0TfBisiMooan1gV7VAIrqrF6Adoj3KyA2OU Wz9Rnc6x8btJ/HpB/iZkiCjypBwqRNY= From: Borislav Petkov To: LKML Cc: Andi Kleen , Andy Lutomirski , Ard Biesheuvel , Baoquan He , Benjamin Herrenschmidt , Christian Borntraeger , Daniel Vetter , Dave Young , David Airlie , Heiko Carstens , Joerg Roedel , "Kirill A. Shutemov" , "Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan" , Maarten Lankhorst , Maxime Ripard , Michael Ellerman , Paul Mackerras , Tom Lendacky , Thomas Zimmermann , Vasily Gorbik , VMware Graphics , Will Deacon , Christoph Hellwig , x86@kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org, amd-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org, dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org Subject: [PATCH 3/8] x86/sev: Add an x86 version of cc_platform_has() Date: Tue, 28 Sep 2021 21:10:04 +0200 Message-Id: <20210928191009.32551-4-bp@alien8.de> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.29.2 In-Reply-To: <20210928191009.32551-1-bp@alien8.de> References: <20210928191009.32551-1-bp@alien8.de> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-BeenThere: dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Direct Rendering Infrastructure - Development List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Errors-To: dri-devel-bounces@lists.freedesktop.org Sender: "dri-devel" From: Tom Lendacky Introduce an x86 version of the cc_platform_has() function. This will be used to replace vendor specific calls like sme_active(), sev_active(), etc. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/Makefile | 6 +++ arch/x86/kernel/cc_platform.c | 69 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 1 + 5 files changed, 78 insertions(+) create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cc_platform.c diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig index ab83c22d274e..9f190ec4f953 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig @@ -1518,6 +1518,7 @@ config AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT select ARCH_HAS_FORCE_DMA_UNENCRYPTED select INSTRUCTION_DECODER select ARCH_HAS_RESTRICTED_VIRTIO_MEMORY_ACCESS + select ARCH_HAS_CC_PLATFORM help Say yes to enable support for the encryption of system memory. This requires an AMD processor that supports Secure Memory diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h index 9c80c68d75b5..3fb9f5ebefa4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__ #include +#include #include diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile index 8f4e8fa6ed75..2ff3e600f426 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile @@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ CFLAGS_REMOVE_ftrace.o = -pg CFLAGS_REMOVE_early_printk.o = -pg CFLAGS_REMOVE_head64.o = -pg CFLAGS_REMOVE_sev.o = -pg +CFLAGS_REMOVE_cc_platform.o = -pg endif KASAN_SANITIZE_head$(BITS).o := n @@ -29,6 +30,7 @@ KASAN_SANITIZE_dumpstack_$(BITS).o := n KASAN_SANITIZE_stacktrace.o := n KASAN_SANITIZE_paravirt.o := n KASAN_SANITIZE_sev.o := n +KASAN_SANITIZE_cc_platform.o := n # With some compiler versions the generated code results in boot hangs, caused # by several compilation units. To be safe, disable all instrumentation. @@ -47,6 +49,7 @@ endif KCOV_INSTRUMENT := n CFLAGS_head$(BITS).o += -fno-stack-protector +CFLAGS_cc_platform.o += -fno-stack-protector CFLAGS_irq.o := -I $(srctree)/$(src)/../include/asm/trace @@ -147,6 +150,9 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_FRAME_POINTER) += unwind_frame.o obj-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_GUESS) += unwind_guess.o obj-$(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT) += sev.o + +obj-$(CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_CC_PLATFORM) += cc_platform.o + ### # 64 bit specific files ifeq ($(CONFIG_X86_64),y) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cc_platform.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cc_platform.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..03bb2f343ddb --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cc_platform.c @@ -0,0 +1,69 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* + * Confidential Computing Platform Capability checks + * + * Copyright (C) 2021 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. + * + * Author: Tom Lendacky + */ + +#include +#include +#include + +#include + +static bool __maybe_unused intel_cc_platform_has(enum cc_attr attr) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_GUEST + return false; +#else + return false; +#endif +} + +/* + * SME and SEV are very similar but they are not the same, so there are + * times that the kernel will need to distinguish between SME and SEV. The + * cc_platform_has() function is used for this. When a distinction isn't + * needed, the CC_ATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT attribute can be used. + * + * The trampoline code is a good example for this requirement. Before + * paging is activated, SME will access all memory as decrypted, but SEV + * will access all memory as encrypted. So, when APs are being brought + * up under SME the trampoline area cannot be encrypted, whereas under SEV + * the trampoline area must be encrypted. + */ +static bool amd_cc_platform_has(enum cc_attr attr) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT + switch (attr) { + case CC_ATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT: + return sme_me_mask; + + case CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT: + return sme_me_mask && !(sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED); + + case CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT: + return sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED; + + case CC_ATTR_GUEST_STATE_ENCRYPT: + return sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_ENABLED; + + default: + return false; + } +#else + return false; +#endif +} + + +bool cc_platform_has(enum cc_attr attr) +{ + if (sme_me_mask) + return amd_cc_platform_has(attr); + + return false; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(cc_platform_has); diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c index ff08dc463634..e29b1418d00c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include