From patchwork Thu Jan 23 12:59:53 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Christophe Leroy X-Patchwork-Id: 11349873 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E3226138C for ; Fri, 24 Jan 2020 08:52:42 +0000 (UTC) Received: from gabe.freedesktop.org (gabe.freedesktop.org [131.252.210.177]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id C166420709 for ; Fri, 24 Jan 2020 08:52:42 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=fail reason="signature verification failed" (1024-bit key) header.d=c-s.fr header.i=@c-s.fr header.b="cpigVkHf" DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org C166420709 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=c-s.fr Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=dri-devel-bounces@lists.freedesktop.org Received: from gabe.freedesktop.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by gabe.freedesktop.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 963D16FF80; Fri, 24 Jan 2020 08:52:35 +0000 (UTC) X-Original-To: dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org Delivered-To: dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org Received: from pegase1.c-s.fr (pegase1.c-s.fr [93.17.236.30]) by gabe.freedesktop.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 0EFDD6FC83 for ; Thu, 23 Jan 2020 12:59:56 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost (mailhub1-int [192.168.12.234]) by localhost (Postfix) with ESMTP id 483Mn46sR5z9vB4Z; Thu, 23 Jan 2020 13:59:52 +0100 (CET) Authentication-Results: localhost; dkim=pass reason="1024-bit key; insecure key" header.d=c-s.fr header.i=@c-s.fr header.b=cpigVkHf; dkim-adsp=pass; dkim-atps=neutral X-Virus-Scanned: Debian amavisd-new at c-s.fr Received: from pegase1.c-s.fr ([192.168.12.234]) by localhost (pegase1.c-s.fr [192.168.12.234]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id ye82euo1eSlt; Thu, 23 Jan 2020 13:59:52 +0100 (CET) Received: from messagerie.si.c-s.fr (messagerie.si.c-s.fr [192.168.25.192]) by pegase1.c-s.fr (Postfix) with ESMTP id 483Mn45Rmtz9vB4X; Thu, 23 Jan 2020 13:59:52 +0100 (CET) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=c-s.fr; s=mail; t=1579784392; bh=y3mCq62z8QvBHB/lDe1I9sTNmtZcrMNh5y5Vki0onEE=; h=In-Reply-To:References:From:Subject:To:Cc:Date:From; b=cpigVkHfJgSSTDA00DxU2scK4Rca1sAxhbjcOWb8jiWHowf2s1qShrxF+apnrpyXN L93hAuZNOjAXZqV1WnCT8GVRnd8hPVboEyKyK1neBsuGJrcG6uagLhkUCI3C/6/2si +I2qMd4mFfI3MY/I7H1HrpG47DrkCldDbPruXlkQ= Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by messagerie.si.c-s.fr (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0B6F18B82C; Thu, 23 Jan 2020 13:59:54 +0100 (CET) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at c-s.fr Received: from messagerie.si.c-s.fr ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (messagerie.si.c-s.fr [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10023) with ESMTP id yFkjLN7K3l7s; Thu, 23 Jan 2020 13:59:53 +0100 (CET) Received: from po14934vm.idsi0.si.c-s.fr (unknown [192.168.4.90]) by messagerie.si.c-s.fr (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6F9738B826; Thu, 23 Jan 2020 13:59:53 +0100 (CET) Received: by po14934vm.idsi0.si.c-s.fr (Postfix, from userid 0) id 3DE38651C0; Thu, 23 Jan 2020 12:59:53 +0000 (UTC) Message-Id: In-Reply-To: References: From: Christophe Leroy Subject: [PATCH v3 2/7] uaccess: Tell user_access_begin() if it's for a write or not To: Benjamin Herrenschmidt , Paul Mackerras , Michael Ellerman , Linus Torvalds , Alexander Viro , Andrew Morton , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , "H. Peter Anvin" , Jani Nikula Date: Thu, 23 Jan 2020 12:59:53 +0000 (UTC) X-Mailman-Approved-At: Fri, 24 Jan 2020 08:52:34 +0000 X-BeenThere: dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Direct Rendering Infrastructure - Development List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org MIME-Version: 1.0 Errors-To: dri-devel-bounces@lists.freedesktop.org Sender: "dri-devel" On 32 bits powerPC (book3s/32), only write accesses to user are protected and there is no point spending time on unlocking for reads. On 64 bits powerpc (book3s/64 at least), access can be granted read only, write only or read/write. Add an argument to user_access_begin() to tell when it's for write and return an opaque key that will be used by user_access_end() to know what was done by user_access_begin(). Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy Reported-by: kbuild test robot --- v3: new --- arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h | 5 +++-- drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gem/i915_gem_execbuffer.c | 15 ++++++++++----- fs/readdir.c | 16 ++++++++++------ include/linux/uaccess.h | 4 ++-- kernel/compat.c | 16 ++++++++++------ kernel/exit.c | 17 +++++++++++------ lib/strncpy_from_user.c | 6 ++++-- lib/strnlen_user.c | 6 ++++-- lib/usercopy.c | 8 +++++--- 9 files changed, 59 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h index 61d93f062a36..05eccdc0366a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h @@ -709,7 +709,8 @@ extern struct movsl_mask { * checking before using them, but you have to surround them with the * user_access_begin/end() pair. */ -static __must_check __always_inline bool user_access_begin(const void __user *ptr, size_t len) +static __must_check __always_inline unsigned long +user_access_begin(const void __user *ptr, size_t len, bool write) { if (unlikely(!access_ok(ptr,len))) return 0; @@ -717,7 +718,7 @@ static __must_check __always_inline bool user_access_begin(const void __user *pt return 1; } #define user_access_begin(a,b) user_access_begin(a,b) -#define user_access_end() __uaccess_end() +#define user_access_end(x) __uaccess_end() #define user_access_save() smap_save() #define user_access_restore(x) smap_restore(x) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gem/i915_gem_execbuffer.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gem/i915_gem_execbuffer.c index bc3a67226163..509bfb6116ac 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gem/i915_gem_execbuffer.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gem/i915_gem_execbuffer.c @@ -1615,6 +1615,7 @@ static int eb_copy_relocations(const struct i915_execbuffer *eb) const unsigned int count = eb->buffer_count; unsigned int i; int err; + unsigned long key; for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { const unsigned int nreloc = eb->exec[i].relocation_count; @@ -1662,14 +1663,15 @@ static int eb_copy_relocations(const struct i915_execbuffer *eb) * happened we would make the mistake of assuming that the * relocations were valid. */ - if (!user_access_begin(urelocs, size)) + key = user_access_begin(urelocs, size, true); + if (!key) goto end; for (copied = 0; copied < nreloc; copied++) unsafe_put_user(-1, &urelocs[copied].presumed_offset, end_user); - user_access_end(); + user_access_end(key); eb->exec[i].relocs_ptr = (uintptr_t)relocs; } @@ -1677,7 +1679,7 @@ static int eb_copy_relocations(const struct i915_execbuffer *eb) return 0; end_user: - user_access_end(); + user_access_end(key); end: kvfree(relocs); err = -EFAULT; @@ -2906,6 +2908,7 @@ i915_gem_execbuffer2_ioctl(struct drm_device *dev, void *data, struct drm_i915_gem_exec_object2 __user *user_exec_list = u64_to_user_ptr(args->buffers_ptr); unsigned int i; + unsigned long key; /* Copy the new buffer offsets back to the user's exec list. */ /* @@ -2915,7 +2918,9 @@ i915_gem_execbuffer2_ioctl(struct drm_device *dev, void *data, * And this range already got effectively checked earlier * when we did the "copy_from_user()" above. */ - if (!user_access_begin(user_exec_list, count * sizeof(*user_exec_list))) + key = user_access_begin(user_exec_list, + count * sizeof(*user_exec_list), true); + if (!key) goto end; for (i = 0; i < args->buffer_count; i++) { @@ -2929,7 +2934,7 @@ i915_gem_execbuffer2_ioctl(struct drm_device *dev, void *data, end_user); } end_user: - user_access_end(); + user_access_end(key); end:; } diff --git a/fs/readdir.c b/fs/readdir.c index 4b466cbb0f3a..47b9ef97e16e 100644 --- a/fs/readdir.c +++ b/fs/readdir.c @@ -221,6 +221,7 @@ static int filldir(struct dir_context *ctx, const char *name, int namlen, int reclen = ALIGN(offsetof(struct linux_dirent, d_name) + namlen + 2, sizeof(long)); int prev_reclen; + unsigned long key; buf->error = verify_dirent_name(name, namlen); if (unlikely(buf->error)) @@ -238,7 +239,8 @@ static int filldir(struct dir_context *ctx, const char *name, int namlen, return -EINTR; dirent = buf->current_dir; prev = (void __user *)dirent - prev_reclen; - if (!user_access_begin(prev, reclen + prev_reclen)) + key = user_access_begin(prev, reclen + prev_reclen, true); + if (!key) goto efault; /* This might be 'dirent->d_off', but if so it will get overwritten */ @@ -247,14 +249,14 @@ static int filldir(struct dir_context *ctx, const char *name, int namlen, unsafe_put_user(reclen, &dirent->d_reclen, efault_end); unsafe_put_user(d_type, (char __user *) dirent + reclen - 1, efault_end); unsafe_copy_dirent_name(dirent->d_name, name, namlen, efault_end); - user_access_end(); + user_access_end(key); buf->current_dir = (void __user *)dirent + reclen; buf->prev_reclen = reclen; buf->count -= reclen; return 0; efault_end: - user_access_end(); + user_access_end(key); efault: buf->error = -EFAULT; return -EFAULT; @@ -311,6 +313,7 @@ static int filldir64(struct dir_context *ctx, const char *name, int namlen, int reclen = ALIGN(offsetof(struct linux_dirent64, d_name) + namlen + 1, sizeof(u64)); int prev_reclen; + unsigned long key; buf->error = verify_dirent_name(name, namlen); if (unlikely(buf->error)) @@ -323,7 +326,8 @@ static int filldir64(struct dir_context *ctx, const char *name, int namlen, return -EINTR; dirent = buf->current_dir; prev = (void __user *)dirent - prev_reclen; - if (!user_access_begin(prev, reclen + prev_reclen)) + key = user_access_begin(prev, reclen + prev_reclen, true); + if (!key) goto efault; /* This might be 'dirent->d_off', but if so it will get overwritten */ @@ -332,7 +336,7 @@ static int filldir64(struct dir_context *ctx, const char *name, int namlen, unsafe_put_user(reclen, &dirent->d_reclen, efault_end); unsafe_put_user(d_type, &dirent->d_type, efault_end); unsafe_copy_dirent_name(dirent->d_name, name, namlen, efault_end); - user_access_end(); + user_access_end(key); buf->prev_reclen = reclen; dirent = (void __user *)dirent + reclen; @@ -341,7 +345,7 @@ static int filldir64(struct dir_context *ctx, const char *name, int namlen, return 0; efault_end: - user_access_end(); + user_access_end(key); efault: buf->error = -EFAULT; return -EFAULT; diff --git a/include/linux/uaccess.h b/include/linux/uaccess.h index 67f016010aad..394f5029a727 100644 --- a/include/linux/uaccess.h +++ b/include/linux/uaccess.h @@ -369,8 +369,8 @@ extern long strnlen_unsafe_user(const void __user *unsafe_addr, long count); probe_kernel_read(&retval, addr, sizeof(retval)) #ifndef user_access_begin -#define user_access_begin(ptr,len) access_ok(ptr, len) -#define user_access_end() do { } while (0) +#define user_access_begin(ptr, len, write) access_ok(ptr, len) +#define user_access_end(x) do { } while (0) #define unsafe_op_wrap(op, err) do { if (unlikely(op)) goto err; } while (0) #define unsafe_get_user(x,p,e) unsafe_op_wrap(__get_user(x,p),e) #define unsafe_put_user(x,p,e) unsafe_op_wrap(__put_user(x,p),e) diff --git a/kernel/compat.c b/kernel/compat.c index 95005f849c68..4bcbe1cd761b 100644 --- a/kernel/compat.c +++ b/kernel/compat.c @@ -258,12 +258,14 @@ long compat_get_bitmap(unsigned long *mask, const compat_ulong_t __user *umask, unsigned long bitmap_size) { unsigned long nr_compat_longs; + unsigned long key; /* align bitmap up to nearest compat_long_t boundary */ bitmap_size = ALIGN(bitmap_size, BITS_PER_COMPAT_LONG); nr_compat_longs = BITS_TO_COMPAT_LONGS(bitmap_size); - if (!user_access_begin(umask, bitmap_size / 8)) + key = user_access_begin(umask, bitmap_size / 8, false); + if (!key) return -EFAULT; while (nr_compat_longs > 1) { @@ -275,11 +277,11 @@ long compat_get_bitmap(unsigned long *mask, const compat_ulong_t __user *umask, } if (nr_compat_longs) unsafe_get_user(*mask, umask++, Efault); - user_access_end(); + user_access_end(key); return 0; Efault: - user_access_end(); + user_access_end(key); return -EFAULT; } @@ -287,12 +289,14 @@ long compat_put_bitmap(compat_ulong_t __user *umask, unsigned long *mask, unsigned long bitmap_size) { unsigned long nr_compat_longs; + unsigned long key; /* align bitmap up to nearest compat_long_t boundary */ bitmap_size = ALIGN(bitmap_size, BITS_PER_COMPAT_LONG); nr_compat_longs = BITS_TO_COMPAT_LONGS(bitmap_size); - if (!user_access_begin(umask, bitmap_size / 8)) + key = user_access_begin(umask, bitmap_size / 8, true); + if (!key) return -EFAULT; while (nr_compat_longs > 1) { @@ -303,10 +307,10 @@ long compat_put_bitmap(compat_ulong_t __user *umask, unsigned long *mask, } if (nr_compat_longs) unsafe_put_user((compat_ulong_t)*mask, umask++, Efault); - user_access_end(); + user_access_end(key); return 0; Efault: - user_access_end(); + user_access_end(key); return -EFAULT; } diff --git a/kernel/exit.c b/kernel/exit.c index 2833ffb0c211..1cb9c8a879d2 100644 --- a/kernel/exit.c +++ b/kernel/exit.c @@ -1553,6 +1553,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(waitid, int, which, pid_t, upid, struct siginfo __user *, struct waitid_info info = {.status = 0}; long err = kernel_waitid(which, upid, &info, options, ru ? &r : NULL); int signo = 0; + unsigned long key; if (err > 0) { signo = SIGCHLD; @@ -1563,7 +1564,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(waitid, int, which, pid_t, upid, struct siginfo __user *, if (!infop) return err; - if (!user_access_begin(infop, sizeof(*infop))) + key = user_access_begin(infop, sizeof(*infop), true); + if (!key) return -EFAULT; unsafe_put_user(signo, &infop->si_signo, Efault); @@ -1572,10 +1574,10 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(waitid, int, which, pid_t, upid, struct siginfo __user *, unsafe_put_user(info.pid, &infop->si_pid, Efault); unsafe_put_user(info.uid, &infop->si_uid, Efault); unsafe_put_user(info.status, &infop->si_status, Efault); - user_access_end(); + user_access_end(key); return err; Efault: - user_access_end(); + user_access_end(key); return -EFAULT; } @@ -1673,6 +1675,8 @@ COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE5(waitid, struct waitid_info info = {.status = 0}; long err = kernel_waitid(which, pid, &info, options, uru ? &ru : NULL); int signo = 0; + unsigned long key; + if (err > 0) { signo = SIGCHLD; err = 0; @@ -1690,7 +1694,8 @@ COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE5(waitid, if (!infop) return err; - if (!user_access_begin(infop, sizeof(*infop))) + key = user_access_begin(infop, sizeof(*infop), true); + if (!key) return -EFAULT; unsafe_put_user(signo, &infop->si_signo, Efault); @@ -1699,10 +1704,10 @@ COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE5(waitid, unsafe_put_user(info.pid, &infop->si_pid, Efault); unsafe_put_user(info.uid, &infop->si_uid, Efault); unsafe_put_user(info.status, &infop->si_status, Efault); - user_access_end(); + user_access_end(key); return err; Efault: - user_access_end(); + user_access_end(key); return -EFAULT; } #endif diff --git a/lib/strncpy_from_user.c b/lib/strncpy_from_user.c index dccb95af6003..7184fb766439 100644 --- a/lib/strncpy_from_user.c +++ b/lib/strncpy_from_user.c @@ -113,12 +113,14 @@ long strncpy_from_user(char *dst, const char __user *src, long count) if (likely(src_addr < max_addr)) { unsigned long max = max_addr - src_addr; long retval; + unsigned long key; kasan_check_write(dst, count); check_object_size(dst, count, false); - if (user_access_begin(src, max)) { + key = user_access_begin(src, max, false); + if (key) { retval = do_strncpy_from_user(dst, src, count, max); - user_access_end(); + user_access_end(key); return retval; } } diff --git a/lib/strnlen_user.c b/lib/strnlen_user.c index 6c0005d5dd5c..819e355b8608 100644 --- a/lib/strnlen_user.c +++ b/lib/strnlen_user.c @@ -108,10 +108,12 @@ long strnlen_user(const char __user *str, long count) if (likely(src_addr < max_addr)) { unsigned long max = max_addr - src_addr; long retval; + unsigned long key; - if (user_access_begin(str, max)) { + key = user_access_begin(str, max, false); + if (key) { retval = do_strnlen_user(str, count, max); - user_access_end(); + user_access_end(key); return retval; } } diff --git a/lib/usercopy.c b/lib/usercopy.c index cbb4d9ec00f2..9e03ca88ad32 100644 --- a/lib/usercopy.c +++ b/lib/usercopy.c @@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ int check_zeroed_user(const void __user *from, size_t size) { unsigned long val; uintptr_t align = (uintptr_t) from % sizeof(unsigned long); + unsigned long key; if (unlikely(size == 0)) return 1; @@ -58,7 +59,8 @@ int check_zeroed_user(const void __user *from, size_t size) from -= align; size += align; - if (!user_access_begin(from, size)) + key = user_access_begin(from, size, false); + if (!key) return -EFAULT; unsafe_get_user(val, (unsigned long __user *) from, err_fault); @@ -79,10 +81,10 @@ int check_zeroed_user(const void __user *from, size_t size) val &= aligned_byte_mask(size); done: - user_access_end(); + user_access_end(key); return (val == 0); err_fault: - user_access_end(); + user_access_end(key); return -EFAULT; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(check_zeroed_user);