| Message ID | 171175868956.1988170.10162640337320302727.stgit@frogsfrogsfrogs (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | Superseded |
| Headers | show |
| Series | [01/29] xfs: use unsigned ints for non-negative quantities in xfs_attr_remote.c | expand |
On 2024-03-29 17:42:19, Darrick J. Wong wrote: > From: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> > > Teach online repair to check for unused fsverity metadata and purge it > on reconstruction. > > Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> > --- > fs/xfs/scrub/attr.c | 139 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > fs/xfs/scrub/attr.h | 6 ++ > fs/xfs/scrub/attr_repair.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++ > fs/xfs/scrub/trace.c | 1 > fs/xfs/scrub/trace.h | 31 ++++++++++ > 5 files changed, 226 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > > > diff --git a/fs/xfs/scrub/attr.c b/fs/xfs/scrub/attr.c > index 2e8a2b2e82fbd..be121625c14f0 100644 > --- a/fs/xfs/scrub/attr.c > +++ b/fs/xfs/scrub/attr.c > @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ > #include "xfs_attr_leaf.h" > #include "xfs_attr_sf.h" > #include "xfs_parent.h" > +#include "xfs_verity.h" > #include "scrub/scrub.h" > #include "scrub/common.h" > #include "scrub/dabtree.h" > @@ -25,6 +26,8 @@ > #include "scrub/listxattr.h" > #include "scrub/repair.h" > > +#include <linux/fsverity.h> > + > /* Free the buffers linked from the xattr buffer. */ > static void > xchk_xattr_buf_cleanup( > @@ -126,6 +129,53 @@ xchk_setup_xattr_buf( > return 0; > } > > +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_VERITY > +/* > + * Obtain merkle tree geometry information for a verity file so that we can > + * perform sanity checks of the fsverity xattrs. > + */ > +STATIC int > +xchk_xattr_setup_verity( > + struct xfs_scrub *sc) > +{ > + struct xchk_xattr_buf *ab; > + int error; > + > + /* > + * Drop the ILOCK and the transaction because loading the fsverity > + * metadata will call into the xattr code. S_VERITY is enabled with > + * IOLOCK_EXCL held, so it should not change here. > + */ > + xchk_iunlock(sc, XFS_ILOCK_EXCL); > + xchk_trans_cancel(sc); > + > + error = xchk_setup_xattr_buf(sc, 0); > + if (error) > + return error; > + > + ab = sc->buf; > + error = fsverity_merkle_tree_geometry(VFS_I(sc->ip), > + &ab->merkle_blocksize, &ab->merkle_tree_size); > + if (error == -ENODATA || error == -EFSCORRUPTED) { > + /* fsverity metadata corrupt, cannot complete checks */ > + xchk_set_incomplete(sc); > + ab->merkle_blocksize = 0; > + error = 0; > + } > + if (error) > + return error; > + > + error = xchk_trans_alloc(sc, 0); > + if (error) > + return error; > + > + xchk_ilock(sc, XFS_ILOCK_EXCL); > + return 0; > +} > +#else > +# define xchk_xattr_setup_verity(...) (0) > +#endif /* CONFIG_FS_VERITY */ > + > /* Set us up to scrub an inode's extended attributes. */ > int > xchk_setup_xattr( > @@ -150,9 +200,89 @@ xchk_setup_xattr( > return error; > } > > - return xchk_setup_inode_contents(sc, 0); > + error = xchk_setup_inode_contents(sc, 0); > + if (error) > + return error; > + > + if (IS_VERITY(VFS_I(sc->ip))) { > + error = xchk_xattr_setup_verity(sc); > + if (error) > + return error; > + } > + > + return error; > } > > +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_VERITY > +/* Check the merkle tree xattrs. */ > +STATIC void > +xchk_xattr_verity( > + struct xfs_scrub *sc, > + xfs_dablk_t blkno, > + const unsigned char *name, > + unsigned int namelen, > + unsigned int valuelen) > +{ > + struct xchk_xattr_buf *ab = sc->buf; > + > + /* Non-verity filesystems should never have verity xattrs. */ > + if (!xfs_has_verity(sc->mp)) { > + xchk_fblock_set_corrupt(sc, XFS_ATTR_FORK, blkno); > + return; > + } > + > + /* > + * Any verity metadata on a non-verity file are leftovers from a > + * previous attempt to enable verity. > + */ > + if (!IS_VERITY(VFS_I(sc->ip))) { > + xchk_ino_set_preen(sc, sc->ip->i_ino); > + return; > + } > + > + /* Zero blocksize occurs if we couldn't load the merkle tree data. */ > + if (ab->merkle_blocksize == 0) > + return; > + > + switch (namelen) { > + case sizeof(struct xfs_merkle_key): > + /* Oversized blocks are not allowed */ > + if (valuelen > ab->merkle_blocksize) { > + xchk_fblock_set_corrupt(sc, XFS_ATTR_FORK, blkno); > + return; > + } > + break; > + case XFS_VERITY_DESCRIPTOR_NAME_LEN: > + /* Has to match the descriptor xattr name */ > + if (memcmp(name, XFS_VERITY_DESCRIPTOR_NAME, namelen)) > + xchk_fblock_set_corrupt(sc, XFS_ATTR_FORK, blkno); > + return; > + default: > + xchk_fblock_set_corrupt(sc, XFS_ATTR_FORK, blkno); > + return; > + } > + > + /* > + * Merkle tree blocks beyond the end of the tree are leftovers from > + * a previous failed attempt to enable verity. > + */ > + if (xfs_merkle_key_from_disk(name, namelen) >= ab->merkle_tree_size) > + xchk_ino_set_preen(sc, sc->ip->i_ino); The other case which probably can be detected is if we start removing the tree and it gets interrupted (starting blocks missing). This can be checked by iterating over the xattrs names up to ->merkle_tree_size. But I'm not sure if online repair can store state over xattrs validation. Also, only pair of valid descriptor and valid tree is something of use, but I'm not sure if all of this is in scope of online repair. Otherwise, looks good to me: Reviewed-by: Andrey Albershteyn <aalbersh@redhat.com>
On Tue, Apr 02, 2024 at 05:42:04PM +0200, Andrey Albershteyn wrote: > On 2024-03-29 17:42:19, Darrick J. Wong wrote: > > From: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> > > > > Teach online repair to check for unused fsverity metadata and purge it > > on reconstruction. > > > > Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> > > --- > > fs/xfs/scrub/attr.c | 139 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > > fs/xfs/scrub/attr.h | 6 ++ > > fs/xfs/scrub/attr_repair.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++ > > fs/xfs/scrub/trace.c | 1 > > fs/xfs/scrub/trace.h | 31 ++++++++++ > > 5 files changed, 226 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > > > > > > diff --git a/fs/xfs/scrub/attr.c b/fs/xfs/scrub/attr.c > > index 2e8a2b2e82fbd..be121625c14f0 100644 > > --- a/fs/xfs/scrub/attr.c > > +++ b/fs/xfs/scrub/attr.c > > @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ > > #include "xfs_attr_leaf.h" > > #include "xfs_attr_sf.h" > > #include "xfs_parent.h" > > +#include "xfs_verity.h" > > #include "scrub/scrub.h" > > #include "scrub/common.h" > > #include "scrub/dabtree.h" > > @@ -25,6 +26,8 @@ > > #include "scrub/listxattr.h" > > #include "scrub/repair.h" > > > > +#include <linux/fsverity.h> > > + > > /* Free the buffers linked from the xattr buffer. */ > > static void > > xchk_xattr_buf_cleanup( > > @@ -126,6 +129,53 @@ xchk_setup_xattr_buf( > > return 0; > > } > > > > +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_VERITY > > +/* > > + * Obtain merkle tree geometry information for a verity file so that we can > > + * perform sanity checks of the fsverity xattrs. > > + */ > > +STATIC int > > +xchk_xattr_setup_verity( > > + struct xfs_scrub *sc) > > +{ > > + struct xchk_xattr_buf *ab; > > + int error; > > + > > + /* > > + * Drop the ILOCK and the transaction because loading the fsverity > > + * metadata will call into the xattr code. S_VERITY is enabled with > > + * IOLOCK_EXCL held, so it should not change here. > > + */ > > + xchk_iunlock(sc, XFS_ILOCK_EXCL); > > + xchk_trans_cancel(sc); > > + > > + error = xchk_setup_xattr_buf(sc, 0); > > + if (error) > > + return error; > > + > > + ab = sc->buf; > > + error = fsverity_merkle_tree_geometry(VFS_I(sc->ip), > > + &ab->merkle_blocksize, &ab->merkle_tree_size); > > + if (error == -ENODATA || error == -EFSCORRUPTED) { > > + /* fsverity metadata corrupt, cannot complete checks */ > > + xchk_set_incomplete(sc); > > + ab->merkle_blocksize = 0; > > + error = 0; > > + } > > + if (error) > > + return error; > > + > > + error = xchk_trans_alloc(sc, 0); > > + if (error) > > + return error; > > + > > + xchk_ilock(sc, XFS_ILOCK_EXCL); > > + return 0; > > +} > > +#else > > +# define xchk_xattr_setup_verity(...) (0) > > +#endif /* CONFIG_FS_VERITY */ > > + > > /* Set us up to scrub an inode's extended attributes. */ > > int > > xchk_setup_xattr( > > @@ -150,9 +200,89 @@ xchk_setup_xattr( > > return error; > > } > > > > - return xchk_setup_inode_contents(sc, 0); > > + error = xchk_setup_inode_contents(sc, 0); > > + if (error) > > + return error; > > + > > + if (IS_VERITY(VFS_I(sc->ip))) { > > + error = xchk_xattr_setup_verity(sc); > > + if (error) > > + return error; > > + } > > + > > + return error; > > } > > > > +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_VERITY > > +/* Check the merkle tree xattrs. */ > > +STATIC void > > +xchk_xattr_verity( > > + struct xfs_scrub *sc, > > + xfs_dablk_t blkno, > > + const unsigned char *name, > > + unsigned int namelen, > > + unsigned int valuelen) > > +{ > > + struct xchk_xattr_buf *ab = sc->buf; > > + > > + /* Non-verity filesystems should never have verity xattrs. */ > > + if (!xfs_has_verity(sc->mp)) { > > + xchk_fblock_set_corrupt(sc, XFS_ATTR_FORK, blkno); > > + return; > > + } > > + > > + /* > > + * Any verity metadata on a non-verity file are leftovers from a > > + * previous attempt to enable verity. > > + */ > > + if (!IS_VERITY(VFS_I(sc->ip))) { > > + xchk_ino_set_preen(sc, sc->ip->i_ino); > > + return; > > + } > > + > > + /* Zero blocksize occurs if we couldn't load the merkle tree data. */ > > + if (ab->merkle_blocksize == 0) > > + return; > > + > > + switch (namelen) { > > + case sizeof(struct xfs_merkle_key): > > + /* Oversized blocks are not allowed */ > > + if (valuelen > ab->merkle_blocksize) { > > + xchk_fblock_set_corrupt(sc, XFS_ATTR_FORK, blkno); > > + return; > > + } > > + break; > > + case XFS_VERITY_DESCRIPTOR_NAME_LEN: > > + /* Has to match the descriptor xattr name */ > > + if (memcmp(name, XFS_VERITY_DESCRIPTOR_NAME, namelen)) > > + xchk_fblock_set_corrupt(sc, XFS_ATTR_FORK, blkno); > > + return; > > + default: > > + xchk_fblock_set_corrupt(sc, XFS_ATTR_FORK, blkno); > > + return; > > + } > > + > > + /* > > + * Merkle tree blocks beyond the end of the tree are leftovers from > > + * a previous failed attempt to enable verity. > > + */ > > + if (xfs_merkle_key_from_disk(name, namelen) >= ab->merkle_tree_size) > > + xchk_ino_set_preen(sc, sc->ip->i_ino); > > The other case which probably can be detected is if we start > removing the tree and it gets interrupted (starting blocks missing). > This can be checked by iterating over the xattrs names up to > ->merkle_tree_size. But I'm not sure if online repair can store > state over xattrs validation. It can; you'd just have to amend the xchk_xattr_buf to store whatever extra data you want. That said, if IS_VERITY() isn't true, then we'll flag the xattr structure for any XFS_ATTR_VERITY attrs: /* * Any verity metadata on a non-verity file are leftovers from a * previous attempt to enable verity. */ if (!IS_VERITY(VFS_I(sc->ip))) { xchk_ino_set_preen(sc, sc->ip->i_ino); return; } And attr_repair.c will not salvage the attrs when it reconstructs the attr structure. > Also, only pair of valid descriptor and valid tree is something of > use, but I'm not sure if all of this is in scope of online repair. Not here -- the xfsprogs verity patchset amends xfs_scrub phase 6 to look for verity files so that it can open them and read the contents to see if any IO errors occur. That will catch missing/inconsistent bits in the fsverity metadata. > Otherwise, looks good to me: > Reviewed-by: Andrey Albershteyn <aalbersh@redhat.com> Thanks! --D > -- > - Andrey > >
diff --git a/fs/xfs/scrub/attr.c b/fs/xfs/scrub/attr.c index 2e8a2b2e82fbd..be121625c14f0 100644 --- a/fs/xfs/scrub/attr.c +++ b/fs/xfs/scrub/attr.c @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ #include "xfs_attr_leaf.h" #include "xfs_attr_sf.h" #include "xfs_parent.h" +#include "xfs_verity.h" #include "scrub/scrub.h" #include "scrub/common.h" #include "scrub/dabtree.h" @@ -25,6 +26,8 @@ #include "scrub/listxattr.h" #include "scrub/repair.h" +#include <linux/fsverity.h> + /* Free the buffers linked from the xattr buffer. */ static void xchk_xattr_buf_cleanup( @@ -126,6 +129,53 @@ xchk_setup_xattr_buf( return 0; } +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_VERITY +/* + * Obtain merkle tree geometry information for a verity file so that we can + * perform sanity checks of the fsverity xattrs. + */ +STATIC int +xchk_xattr_setup_verity( + struct xfs_scrub *sc) +{ + struct xchk_xattr_buf *ab; + int error; + + /* + * Drop the ILOCK and the transaction because loading the fsverity + * metadata will call into the xattr code. S_VERITY is enabled with + * IOLOCK_EXCL held, so it should not change here. + */ + xchk_iunlock(sc, XFS_ILOCK_EXCL); + xchk_trans_cancel(sc); + + error = xchk_setup_xattr_buf(sc, 0); + if (error) + return error; + + ab = sc->buf; + error = fsverity_merkle_tree_geometry(VFS_I(sc->ip), + &ab->merkle_blocksize, &ab->merkle_tree_size); + if (error == -ENODATA || error == -EFSCORRUPTED) { + /* fsverity metadata corrupt, cannot complete checks */ + xchk_set_incomplete(sc); + ab->merkle_blocksize = 0; + error = 0; + } + if (error) + return error; + + error = xchk_trans_alloc(sc, 0); + if (error) + return error; + + xchk_ilock(sc, XFS_ILOCK_EXCL); + return 0; +} +#else +# define xchk_xattr_setup_verity(...) (0) +#endif /* CONFIG_FS_VERITY */ + /* Set us up to scrub an inode's extended attributes. */ int xchk_setup_xattr( @@ -150,9 +200,89 @@ xchk_setup_xattr( return error; } - return xchk_setup_inode_contents(sc, 0); + error = xchk_setup_inode_contents(sc, 0); + if (error) + return error; + + if (IS_VERITY(VFS_I(sc->ip))) { + error = xchk_xattr_setup_verity(sc); + if (error) + return error; + } + + return error; } +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_VERITY +/* Check the merkle tree xattrs. */ +STATIC void +xchk_xattr_verity( + struct xfs_scrub *sc, + xfs_dablk_t blkno, + const unsigned char *name, + unsigned int namelen, + unsigned int valuelen) +{ + struct xchk_xattr_buf *ab = sc->buf; + + /* Non-verity filesystems should never have verity xattrs. */ + if (!xfs_has_verity(sc->mp)) { + xchk_fblock_set_corrupt(sc, XFS_ATTR_FORK, blkno); + return; + } + + /* + * Any verity metadata on a non-verity file are leftovers from a + * previous attempt to enable verity. + */ + if (!IS_VERITY(VFS_I(sc->ip))) { + xchk_ino_set_preen(sc, sc->ip->i_ino); + return; + } + + /* Zero blocksize occurs if we couldn't load the merkle tree data. */ + if (ab->merkle_blocksize == 0) + return; + + switch (namelen) { + case sizeof(struct xfs_merkle_key): + /* Oversized blocks are not allowed */ + if (valuelen > ab->merkle_blocksize) { + xchk_fblock_set_corrupt(sc, XFS_ATTR_FORK, blkno); + return; + } + break; + case XFS_VERITY_DESCRIPTOR_NAME_LEN: + /* Has to match the descriptor xattr name */ + if (memcmp(name, XFS_VERITY_DESCRIPTOR_NAME, namelen)) + xchk_fblock_set_corrupt(sc, XFS_ATTR_FORK, blkno); + return; + default: + xchk_fblock_set_corrupt(sc, XFS_ATTR_FORK, blkno); + return; + } + + /* + * Merkle tree blocks beyond the end of the tree are leftovers from + * a previous failed attempt to enable verity. + */ + if (xfs_merkle_key_from_disk(name, namelen) >= ab->merkle_tree_size) + xchk_ino_set_preen(sc, sc->ip->i_ino); +} +#else +static void +xchk_xattr_verity( + struct xfs_scrub *sc, + xfs_dablk_t blkno, + const unsigned char *name, + unsigned int namelen, + unsigned int valuelen) +{ + /* Should never see verity xattrs when verity is not enabled. */ + xchk_fblock_set_corrupt(sc, XFS_ATTR_FORK, blkno); +} +#endif /* CONFIG_FS_VERITY */ + /* Extended Attributes */ /* @@ -211,6 +341,13 @@ xchk_xattr_actor( return -ECANCELED; } + /* Check verity xattr geometry */ + if (attr_flags & XFS_ATTR_VERITY) { + xchk_xattr_verity(sc, args.blkno, name, namelen, valuelen); + if (sc->sm->sm_flags & XFS_SCRUB_OFLAG_CORRUPT) + return -ECANCELED; + } + /* * Local and shortform xattr values are stored in the attr leaf block, * so we don't need to retrieve the value from a remote block to detect diff --git a/fs/xfs/scrub/attr.h b/fs/xfs/scrub/attr.h index 7db58af56646b..40b8c12384f55 100644 --- a/fs/xfs/scrub/attr.h +++ b/fs/xfs/scrub/attr.h @@ -22,6 +22,12 @@ struct xchk_xattr_buf { /* Memory buffer used to extract xattr values. */ void *value; size_t value_sz; + +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_VERITY + /* Geometry of the merkle tree attached to this verity file. */ + u64 merkle_tree_size; + unsigned int merkle_blocksize; +#endif }; bool xchk_xattr_set_map(struct xfs_scrub *sc, unsigned long *map, diff --git a/fs/xfs/scrub/attr_repair.c b/fs/xfs/scrub/attr_repair.c index 7c5e52ceae82e..040138610ae94 100644 --- a/fs/xfs/scrub/attr_repair.c +++ b/fs/xfs/scrub/attr_repair.c @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ #include "xfs_exchrange.h" #include "xfs_acl.h" #include "xfs_parent.h" +#include "xfs_verity.h" #include "scrub/xfs_scrub.h" #include "scrub/scrub.h" #include "scrub/common.h" @@ -159,6 +160,44 @@ xrep_setup_xattr( return xrep_tempfile_create(sc, S_IFREG); } +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_VERITY +static int +xrep_xattr_want_salvage_verity( + struct xrep_xattr *rx, + const void *name, + int namelen, + int valuelen) +{ + struct xchk_xattr_buf *ab = rx->sc->buf; + + if (!xfs_has_verity(rx->sc->mp)) + return false; + if (!IS_VERITY(VFS_I(rx->sc->ip))) + return false; + + switch (namelen) { + case sizeof(struct xfs_merkle_key): + /* Oversized blocks are not allowed */ + if (valuelen > ab->merkle_blocksize) + return false; + break; + case XFS_VERITY_DESCRIPTOR_NAME_LEN: + /* Has to match the descriptor xattr name */ + return !memcmp(name, XFS_VERITY_DESCRIPTOR_NAME, namelen); + default: + return false; + } + + /* + * Merkle tree blocks beyond the end of the tree are leftovers from + * a previous failed attempt to enable verity. + */ + return xfs_merkle_key_from_disk(name, namelen) < ab->merkle_tree_size; +} +#else +# define xrep_xattr_want_salvage_verity(...) (false) +#endif /* CONFIG_FS_VERITY */ + /* * Decide if we want to salvage this attribute. We don't bother with * incomplete or oversized keys or values. The @value parameter can be null @@ -183,6 +222,9 @@ xrep_xattr_want_salvage( return false; if (attr_flags & XFS_ATTR_PARENT) return xfs_parent_valuecheck(rx->sc->mp, value, valuelen); + if (attr_flags & XFS_ATTR_VERITY) + return xrep_xattr_want_salvage_verity(rx, name, namelen, + valuelen); return true; } @@ -216,6 +258,11 @@ xrep_xattr_salvage_key( trace_xrep_xattr_salvage_pptr(rx->sc->ip, flags, name, key.namelen, value, valuelen); + } else if (flags & XFS_ATTR_VERITY) { + key.namelen = namelen; + + trace_xrep_xattr_salvage_verity(rx->sc->ip, flags, name, + key.namelen, value, valuelen); } else { while (i < namelen && name[i] != 0) i++; @@ -667,6 +714,9 @@ xrep_xattr_insert_rec( trace_xrep_xattr_insert_pptr(rx->sc->tempip, key->flags, ab->name, key->namelen, ab->value, key->valuelen); + else if (key->flags & XFS_ATTR_VERITY) + trace_xrep_xattr_insert_verity(rx->sc->ip, key->flags, ab->name, + key->namelen, ab->value, key->valuelen); else trace_xrep_xattr_insert_rec(rx->sc->tempip, key->flags, ab->name, key->namelen, key->valuelen); diff --git a/fs/xfs/scrub/trace.c b/fs/xfs/scrub/trace.c index 6d8acb2f63d8a..69c234f2a4b32 100644 --- a/fs/xfs/scrub/trace.c +++ b/fs/xfs/scrub/trace.c @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ #include "xfs_parent.h" #include "xfs_imeta.h" #include "xfs_rtgroup.h" +#include "xfs_verity.h" #include "scrub/scrub.h" #include "scrub/xfile.h" #include "scrub/xfarray.h" diff --git a/fs/xfs/scrub/trace.h b/fs/xfs/scrub/trace.h index 6fd91c13f25ff..787f409799a06 100644 --- a/fs/xfs/scrub/trace.h +++ b/fs/xfs/scrub/trace.h @@ -3069,6 +3069,37 @@ DEFINE_EVENT(xrep_pptr_salvage_class, name, \ DEFINE_XREP_PPTR_SALVAGE_EVENT(xrep_xattr_salvage_pptr); DEFINE_XREP_PPTR_SALVAGE_EVENT(xrep_xattr_insert_pptr); +DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(xrep_verity_salvage_class, + TP_PROTO(struct xfs_inode *ip, unsigned int flags, const void *name, + unsigned int namelen, const void *value, unsigned int valuelen), + TP_ARGS(ip, flags, name, namelen, value, valuelen), + TP_STRUCT__entry( + __field(dev_t, dev) + __field(xfs_ino_t, ino) + __field(unsigned long long, merkle_off) + ), + TP_fast_assign( + __entry->dev = ip->i_mount->m_super->s_dev; + __entry->ino = ip->i_ino; + if (namelen == sizeof(struct xfs_merkle_key)) + __entry->merkle_off = xfs_merkle_key_from_disk(name, + namelen); + else + __entry->merkle_off = -1ULL; + ), + TP_printk("dev %d:%d ino 0x%llx merkle_off 0x%llx", + MAJOR(__entry->dev), MINOR(__entry->dev), + __entry->ino, + __entry->merkle_off) +) +#define DEFINE_XREP_VERITY_SALVAGE_EVENT(name) \ +DEFINE_EVENT(xrep_verity_salvage_class, name, \ + TP_PROTO(struct xfs_inode *ip, unsigned int flags, const void *name, \ + unsigned int namelen, const void *value, unsigned int valuelen), \ + TP_ARGS(ip, flags, name, namelen, value, valuelen)) +DEFINE_XREP_VERITY_SALVAGE_EVENT(xrep_xattr_salvage_verity); +DEFINE_XREP_VERITY_SALVAGE_EVENT(xrep_xattr_insert_verity); + TRACE_EVENT(xrep_xattr_class, TP_PROTO(struct xfs_inode *ip, struct xfs_inode *arg_ip), TP_ARGS(ip, arg_ip),