| Message ID | 20190910121324.GA6867@pure.paranoia.local (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
| Series | RFC: Cryptographic attestation for email-based patch workflows | expand |
On 10.09.2019 08:13, Konstantin Ryabitsev wrote: ># Proposed approach > >I recommend that we provide a way to include cryptographic signature >information natively using git-format-patch, using roughly the following >process: > >- generate a signify-compatible cryptographic signature of the verbatim > patch content, perhaps slightly normalized for things like LF vs. CRLF > line endings (see minisign/libsodium for crypto details) >- include both the signature and the public key in the area below '---', > using "Minisig:" and "Minikey:" taglines I like where you're heading with this suggestion however there are some issues. It is not clear what bytes the signature was calculated over. Does it include the "From:" line of the email? How about the "Signed-off-by"? If there is no binding of the identity of the submitter to the key pair then you'll have problems with the TOFU policy you describe further down (explained later). Also, since we're trying to move to a Git that supports signatures from multiple different signing tools and to also support multi-sig sign-offs (e.g. first the author, then the reviewer, then the merger) these taglines need to be more compex. At the very least either there needs to be a signature type tagline or the type of the signature needs to be baked into the key and signture values (see Secure Scuttlebutt encoding of keys/sigs). Also, if we want to do chained multisign there should be some framing of what is signed by each signature. If you're looking for something email like, we could borrow from mime email attachment encoding to provide framing. >For example: > >---8<--- >From b41a2a0f817caddc9a76f43c3c9ed7d8edd6b2de Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 >From: Konstantin Ryabitsev <konstantin@linuxfoundation.org> >Date: Tue, 10 Sep 2019 06:15:36 -0400 >Subject: [PATCH] Second commit > >Change the greeting. > >Signed-off-by: Konstantin Ryabitsev <konstantin@linuxfoundation.org> >--- > foo.c | 2 +- > 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) > > Minisig: RWT9fcUvSnHPLiqWgXEnn98sgk8nl4FteDRkD+9lVK+He//eLOxNZ5QjCROoKJgPGpL4uzoHicN+f6gB54qmtO1cQtfvjS+++QU= > Minikey: RWT9fcUvSnHPLqqyfLbkGBMEscBWciFFp2iBj2XnZPzW69OVIoYwZ25q > >diff --git a/foo.c b/foo.c >index d40a2b9..dcfad55 100644 >--- a/foo.c >+++ b/foo.c >@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ > #include <stdio.h> > int main() > { >- printf("Hello, World!"); >+ printf("Hello, Signed World!"); > } >--ᐞ >2.21.0 >---8<--- I would instead have at the very least the signature tool in the value: Key: minisign|RWT9fcUvSnHPLqqyfLbkGBMEscBWciFFp2iBj2XnZPzW69OVIoYwZ25q Sig: minisign|RWT9fcUvSnHPLiqWgXEnn98sgk8nl4FteDRkD+9lVK+He//eLOxNZ5QjCROoKJgPGpL4uzoHicN+f6gB54qmtO1cQtfvjS+++QU= But this doesn't solve multi-sig. >When git-am encounters a signed patch, it should: > >1. check if the email in From: matches existing entries in git's TOFU > (trust on first use) database, which is a simple key-value store > like: > > konstantin@linuxfoundation.org: RWT9fcUvSnHPLqqyfLbkGBMEscBWciFFp2iBj2XnZPzW69OVIoYwZ25q > >2. if no matches, add a new entry to the TOFU tracking database and > consider the key automatically trusted (perhaps configurable) >3. if there are existing matches: > > a. compare the keys to make sure they haven't changed > b. if keys changed, emit a warning and let developer decide if they > trust the key change > c. if keys did not change, validate the signature > d. if validation failed, alert the developer and error out > >4. if the TOFU db exists at all, git-am should check if the email > address in From: matches any existing records and alert if the patch > carries no signature (in case it's been removed by a malicious > attacker). > >All of these operations should be sufficiently fast, since both ECC >crypto and key-value lookups are fast operations that don't require a >lot of resources. TOFU has the problem of not providing cryptographic provenance over keys while maintaining provenance on the binding between other identity attributes and those keys (e.g. author string). In step 3 above there's no way to know for sure that the submitter is actually who they claim to be. Reviewers have no way of knowing that the new key used with the patch is a legitimate key update. The only option with this design is to do some out-of-band key verification (i.e. call the submitter and have them read the key to you over the phone). Out-of-band key validation hasn't scaled for GPG and it won't scale here either. Instead of TOFU, a more secure design would require key enrollment, key rotation, key recovery, and key revocation to all be separate, cryptographically verified updates to the attribute-to-key database in the repo. Your instinct for storing the attribute+key data in the repo itself (i.e. in-band) is correct because it makes Git repos self-verifiable in that cloning is all you need to do to get all of the data necessary for verifying all of the digital signatures. Key enrollment should be a separate patch submission that adds the author and public key to the database file. The patch must be signed using the key that is being added to the database. This provides the provenance anchor for the key and also binds the attribute to the key. The record in the data should also contain some data that enables secure key recovery/rotation. A simple hashed secret passphrase and nonce works. In the future, key recovery/rotation can be done by the owner by submitting a new patch that updates the database record with a new key and recovery data, signed with the new key and also including the nonce and secret passphrase used to generate the previous key recovery hash. Key revocation is a patch that removes the record from the database that is signed by the key that is being removed or a new key plus the recovery secret passphrase and nonce. So back to the original proposal, I like the simplicity but with a few tweaks, it could be an air tight digital signature scheme for emailed patches. If air tight provenance is not what you're aiming for, then why are you even using cryptography? That's my 2p on this. I like where you're head is at Kontantin. Cheers! Dave
On Fri, Sep 27, 2019 at 08:24:37AM -0700, dwh@linuxprogrammer.org wrote: >>- generate a signify-compatible cryptographic signature of the >>verbatim >> patch content, perhaps slightly normalized for things like LF vs. CRLF >> line endings (see minisign/libsodium for crypto details) >>- include both the signature and the public key in the area below '---', >> using "Minisig:" and "Minikey:" taglines > >I like where you're heading with this suggestion however there are some >issues. It is not clear what bytes the signature was calculated over. Just the actual patch. >Does it include the "From:" line of the email? How about the >"Signed-off-by"? If there is no binding of the identity of the submitter >to the key pair then you'll have problems with the TOFU policy you >describe further down (explained later). Ok, I'll argue my point on this later. :) >Also, since we're trying to >move to a Git that supports signatures from multiple different signing >tools and to also support multi-sig sign-offs (e.g. first the author, >then the reviewer, then the merger) these taglines need to be more >compex. At the very least either there needs to be a signature type >tagline or the type of the signature needs to be baked into the key and >signture values (see Secure Scuttlebutt encoding of keys/sigs). Also, if >we want to do chained multisign there should be some framing of what is >signed by each signature. If you're looking for something email like, we >could borrow from mime email attachment encoding to provide framing. No, we definitely don't want to go down the MIME path (it's routinely mangled by archivers, so we're much more likely to lose anything that comes in via MIME attachments). >I would instead have at the very least the signature tool in the value: > > Key: minisign|RWT9fcUvSnHPLqqyfLbkGBMEscBWciFFp2iBj2XnZPzW69OVIoYwZ25q > Sig: minisign|RWT9fcUvSnHPLiqWgXEnn98sgk8nl4FteDRkD+9lVK+He//eLOxNZ5QjCROoKJgPGpL4uzoHicN+f6gB54qmtO1cQtfvjS+++QU= I don't think it's worth it to abstract this out. The main benefits of minisigs are: - it's an emerging standard (www.kernel.org should soon offer minisig signatures on tarball downloads) - it's short enough to include both the key and the signature into a few bytes of information -- attempting to do the same with PGP would balloon the message into kilobytes, even if ECC keys/subkeys are used >But this doesn't solve multi-sig. It doesn't attempt to, but it can be achieved in a number of clever ways. For example, the reviewer can sign the minisig signature on the original patch. E.g.: Reviewed-by: Alter Ego <mricon@kernel.org> Reviewed-minisig: {minisig signature of RWT9fcUvS...fvjS+++QU=} Reviewed-minikey: {reviewer pubkey} This would give you a chain of attestation to the original patch. For series, this would be more complicated, since Reviewed-by: is usually posted for the cover letter. Perhaps series cover letters could include a signature of all individual patch signatures. That said, this is not something I'm trying to solve -- my goal is to provide tamper-evident attestation of patches sent to mailing lists, and I expound on that further down. >TOFU has the problem of not providing cryptographic provenance over >keys >while maintaining provenance on the binding between other identity >attributes and those keys (e.g. author string). In step 3 above there's >no way to know for sure that the submitter is actually who they claim to >be. Correct, but the same is true for any other key distribution mechanism. Even with PGP, most people I work with use the TOFU approach -- if a key is in their keyring, it's considered automatically trusted. My goal is not really to come up with a tamper-proof solution, but to offer a chain of cryptographic attestation. Developers can then *choose* to incorporate tamper-proof features of it into their workflows via tool support. >Reviewers have no way of knowing that the new key used with the >patch is a legitimate key update. The only option with this design is to >do some out-of-band key verification (i.e. call the submitter and have >them read the key to you over the phone). Out-of-band key validation >hasn't scaled for GPG and it won't scale here either. Yes, because delegated trust is *hard*. :) We either must rely on delegated trust via certification authorities -- with all the potential for abuse there -- or we must make trust decisions on our own, which doesn't scale well. As far as I can tell, there is no easy solution to this problem. TOFU just formalizes everyone's current coping mechanism. >Instead of TOFU, a more secure design would require key enrollment, key >rotation, key recovery, and key revocation to all be separate, >cryptographically verified updates to the attribute-to-key database in >the repo. Right, as long as it's understood that this delegates trust to people with write access to this repository (and infrastructure admins). This also has important drawbacks in the case of the Linux kernel, for example: - there are thousands of people committing patches to the Linux kernel, and it's not the same thousands of people with each mainline release, so keeping key information for all of them in the repository would be next to impossible - while torvalds/linux.git is considered "canonical" for Linux, most developers would be working off of other trees (netdev, arm, etc), so it would make little sense for them to put their key information into the mainline repository >Your instinct for storing the attribute+key data in the repo >itself (i.e. in-band) is correct because it makes Git repos >self-verifiable in that cloning is all you need to do to get all of the >data necessary for verifying all of the digital signatures. Right, this is an important problem to solve, but it's not the one I'm trying to address. :) I'm specifically interested in cryptographic attestation of patches sent to mailing lists -- *before* code even makes it into git. Since there is no way to translate signatures on patches into git commit signatures, I'm not even attempting to solve that problem. >Key enrollment should be a separate patch submission that adds the >author and public key to the database file. The patch must be signed >using the key that is being added to the database. This provides the >provenance anchor for the key and also binds the attribute to the key. I like it, but this won't scale for Linux kernel due to the reasons I've described above -- thousands of developers who come and go, plus multiple "canonical" linux.git trees, depending on the component you're working on. >So back to the original proposal, I like the simplicity but with a few >tweaks, it could be an air tight digital signature scheme for emailed >patches. If air tight provenance is not what you're aiming for, then why >are you even using cryptography? My primary goal is to remove one of the last bits where we explicitly trust infrastructure in the Linux Kernel development -- vger.kernel.org and lore.kernel.org. If either of these systems are compromised, an attacker would be able to modify patches on the fly in order to insert malicious code without leaving a trace (e.g. intercept a patch as it is sent to the actual maintainer, but not when sent to others or to the archiver). Adding basic cryptographic signatures to the process will hopefully make this attack vector less likely and will at least offer a mechanism to perform post-mortem forensic examinations -- without introducing a central certification authority. -K
diff --git a/foo.c b/foo.c index d40a2b9..dcfad55 100644 --- a/foo.c +++ b/foo.c @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ #include <stdio.h> int main() { - printf("Hello, World!"); + printf("Hello, Signed World!"); }