From patchwork Wed Jun 19 22:24:01 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Sean Christopherson X-Patchwork-Id: 11005483 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 41D9E13AF for ; Wed, 19 Jun 2019 22:24:22 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 325A3288B4 for ; Wed, 19 Jun 2019 22:24:22 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id 26B1A288B7; Wed, 19 Jun 2019 22:24:22 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-7.9 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI autolearn=unavailable version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9A584288B4 for ; Wed, 19 Jun 2019 22:24:21 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726322AbfFSWYU (ORCPT ); Wed, 19 Jun 2019 18:24:20 -0400 Received: from mga18.intel.com ([134.134.136.126]:40157 "EHLO mga18.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1730815AbfFSWYS (ORCPT ); Wed, 19 Jun 2019 18:24:18 -0400 X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from orsmga007.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.58]) by orsmga106.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 19 Jun 2019 15:24:13 -0700 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.63,394,1557212400"; d="scan'208";a="150743782" Received: from sjchrist-coffee.jf.intel.com ([10.54.74.36]) by orsmga007.jf.intel.com with ESMTP; 19 Jun 2019 15:24:13 -0700 From: Sean Christopherson To: Jarkko Sakkinen Cc: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org, Bill Roberts , Casey Schaufler , James Morris , Dave Hansen , Cedric Xing , Andy Lutomirski , Jethro Beekman , "Dr . Greg Wettstein" , Stephen Smalley Subject: [RFC PATCH v4 12/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Show line of sight to LSM support SGX2's EAUG Date: Wed, 19 Jun 2019 15:24:01 -0700 Message-Id: <20190619222401.14942-13-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.21.0 In-Reply-To: <20190619222401.14942-1-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> References: <20190619222401.14942-1-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: linux-sgx-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP Wire up a theoretical EAUG flag to show that the proposed LSM model is extensible to SGX2, i.e. that SGX can communicate to LSMs that an EAUG'd page is being mapped executable, as opposed to having to require userspace to state that an EAUG'd page *may* be mapped executable in the future. Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver/main.c | 10 +++++--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h | 2 ++ include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 2 +- include/linux/security.h | 4 ++-- security/security.c | 4 ++-- security/selinux/hooks.c | 4 +++- 7 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver/main.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver/main.c index 4379a2fb1f82..b478c0f45279 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver/main.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver/main.c @@ -99,7 +99,8 @@ static long sgx_compat_ioctl(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd, * page is considered to have no RWX permissions, i.e. is inaccessible. */ static unsigned long sgx_allowed_rwx(struct sgx_encl *encl, - struct vm_area_struct *vma) + struct vm_area_struct *vma, + bool *eaug) { unsigned long allowed_rwx = VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC; unsigned long idx, idx_start, idx_end; @@ -123,6 +124,8 @@ static unsigned long sgx_allowed_rwx(struct sgx_encl *encl, allowed_rwx = 0; else allowed_rwx &= page->vm_prot_bits; + if (page->vm_prot_bits & SGX_VM_EAUG) + *eaug = true; if (!allowed_rwx) break; } @@ -134,16 +137,17 @@ static int sgx_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma) { struct sgx_encl *encl = file->private_data; unsigned long allowed_rwx, prot; + bool eaug = false; int ret; - allowed_rwx = sgx_allowed_rwx(encl, vma); + allowed_rwx = sgx_allowed_rwx(encl, vma, &eaug); if (vma->vm_flags & (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC) & ~allowed_rwx) return -EACCES; prot = _calc_vm_trans(vma->vm_flags, VM_READ, PROT_READ) | _calc_vm_trans(vma->vm_flags, VM_WRITE, PROT_WRITE) | _calc_vm_trans(vma->vm_flags, VM_EXEC, PROT_EXEC); - ret = security_enclave_map(prot); + ret = security_enclave_map(prot, eaug); if (ret) return ret; diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c index 059d90dcaa27..2e64676a8144 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c @@ -389,10 +389,41 @@ static int sgx_vma_access(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr, } #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY +static bool is_eaug_range(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long start, + unsigned long end) +{ + unsigned long idx, idx_start, idx_end; + struct sgx_encl_page *page; + + /* Enclave is dead or inaccessible. */ + if (!encl) + return false; + + idx_start = PFN_DOWN(start); + idx_end = PFN_DOWN(end - 1); + + for (idx = idx_start; idx <= idx_end; ++idx) { + /* + * No need to take encl->lock, vm_prot_bits is set prior to + * insertion and never changes, and racing with adding pages is + * a userspace bug. + */ + rcu_read_lock(); + page = radix_tree_lookup(&encl->page_tree, idx); + rcu_read_unlock(); + + /* Non-existent page can only be PROT_NONE, bail early. */ + if (!page || page->vm_prot_bits & SGX_VM_EAUG) + return true; + } + + return false; +} static int sgx_vma_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned long prot) { - return security_enclave_map(prot); + return security_enclave_map(prot, + is_eaug_range(vma->vm_private_data, start, end)); } #endif diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h index 5ad018c8d74c..dae1a22dc87c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h @@ -41,6 +41,8 @@ enum sgx_encl_page_desc { #define SGX_ENCL_PAGE_VA_OFFSET(encl_page) \ ((encl_page)->desc & SGX_ENCL_PAGE_VA_OFFSET_MASK) +#define SGX_VM_EAUG BIT(3) + struct sgx_encl_page { unsigned long desc; unsigned long vm_prot_bits; diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h index 3bc92c65f287..d7da732cf56e 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h @@ -1819,7 +1819,7 @@ union security_list_options { #endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */ #ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_SGX - int (*enclave_map)(unsigned long prot); + int (*enclave_map)(unsigned long prot, bool eaug); int (*enclave_load)(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot, bool measured); #endif /* CONFIG_INTEL_SGX */ diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index 572ddfc53039..c55e14d776c8 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -1831,11 +1831,11 @@ static inline void security_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux) #ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_SGX #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY -int security_enclave_map(unsigned long prot); +int security_enclave_map(unsigned long prot, bool eaug); int security_enclave_load(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot, bool measured); #else -static inline int security_enclave_map(unsigned long prot) +static inline int security_enclave_map(unsigned long prot, bool eaug) { return 0; } diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 00f483beb1cc..f276f05341f2 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -2361,9 +2361,9 @@ void security_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux) #endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */ #ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_SGX -int security_enclave_map(unsigned long prot) +int security_enclave_map(unsigned long prot, bool eaug) { - return call_int_hook(enclave_map, 0, prot); + return call_int_hook(enclave_map, 0, prot, eaug); } int security_enclave_load(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot, bool measured) diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 8a431168e454..f349419d4c12 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -6733,7 +6733,7 @@ static inline int sgx_has_perm(u32 sid, u32 requested) SECCLASS_PROCESS2, requested, NULL); } -static int selinux_enclave_map(unsigned long prot) +static int selinux_enclave_map(unsigned long prot, bool eaug) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); u32 sid = cred_sid(cred); @@ -6743,6 +6743,8 @@ static int selinux_enclave_map(unsigned long prot) if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && (prot & PROT_WRITE)) return sgx_has_perm(sid, PROCESS2__SGX_MAPWX); + else if (eaug && (prot & PROT_EXEC)) + return sgx_has_perm(sid, PROCESS2__SGX_EXECDIRTY); return 0; }