[for_v22,v2,8/8] x86/sgx: Pass userspace source address directly to EADD

Message ID	20190813011252.4121-9-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com (mailing list archive)
State	New, archived
Headers	show Return-Path: <linux-sgx-owner@kernel.org> From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Cc: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Subject: [PATCH for_v22 v2 8/8] x86/sgx: Pass userspace source address directly to EADD Date: Mon, 12 Aug 2019 18:12:52 -0700 Message-Id: <20190813011252.4121-9-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> In-Reply-To: <20190813011252.4121-1-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> References: <20190813011252.4121-1-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: linux-sgx-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk
Series	x86/sgx: Remove EADD worker and page copy \| expand [for_v22,v2,0/8] x86/sgx: Remove EADD worker and page copy [for_v22,v2,1/8] selftests/x86/sgx: Align enclave binary on 4k boundary [for_v22,v2,2/8] x86/sgx: Require EADD source to be page aligned [for_v22,v2,3/8] x86/sgx: Validate generic SECINFO immediately after copying from user [for_v22,v2,4/8] x86/sgx: Set SGX_ENCL_PAGE_TCS when allocating encl_page [for_v22,v2,5/8] x86/sgx: Move encl_page insertion into tree out of alloc flow [for_v22,v2,6/8] x86/sgx: Allocate encl_page prior to taking encl->lock [for_v22,v2,7/8] x86/sgx: Remove the EADD page worker [for_v22,v2,8/8] x86/sgx: Pass userspace source address directly to EADD

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver/ioctl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver/ioctl.c index 840376cf352f..a55a138826d5 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver/ioctl.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver/ioctl.c @@ -302,71 +302,46 @@ static int sgx_validate_secinfo(struct sgx_secinfo *secinfo) return 0; } -static bool sgx_validate_offset(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long offset) -{ - if (offset & (PAGE_SIZE - 1)) - return false; - - if (offset >= encl->size) - return false; - - return true; -} - -static int sgx_validate_tcs(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_tcs *tcs) -{ - int i; - - if (tcs->flags & SGX_TCS_RESERVED_MASK) - return -EINVAL; - - if (tcs->flags & SGX_TCS_DBGOPTIN) - return -EINVAL; - - if (!sgx_validate_offset(encl, tcs->ssa_offset)) - return -EINVAL; - - if (!sgx_validate_offset(encl, tcs->fs_offset)) - return -EINVAL; - - if (!sgx_validate_offset(encl, tcs->gs_offset)) - return -EINVAL; - - if ((tcs->fs_limit & 0xFFF) != 0xFFF) - return -EINVAL; - - if ((tcs->gs_limit & 0xFFF) != 0xFFF) - return -EINVAL; - - for (i = 0; i < SGX_TCS_RESERVED_SIZE; i++) - if (tcs->reserved[i]) - return -EINVAL; - - return 0; -} - static int __sgx_encl_add_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page, struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page, - void *data, - struct sgx_secinfo *secinfo, - unsigned long mrmask) + struct sgx_secinfo *secinfo, unsigned long src, + unsigned long prot, unsigned long mrmask) { struct sgx_pageinfo pginfo; + struct vm_area_struct *vma; int ret; int i; pginfo.secs = (unsigned long)sgx_epc_addr(encl->secs.epc_page); pginfo.addr = SGX_ENCL_PAGE_ADDR(encl_page); pginfo.metadata = (unsigned long)secinfo; - pginfo.contents = (unsigned long)data; + pginfo.contents = src; + down_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem); + + /* Query vma's VM_MAYEXEC as an indirect path_noexec() check. */ + if (encl_page->vm_prot_bits & VM_EXEC) { + vma = find_vma(current->mm, src); + if (!vma) { + up_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem); + return -EFAULT; + } + + if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYEXEC)) { + up_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem); + return -EACCES; + } + } + + __uaccess_begin(); ret = __eadd(&pginfo, sgx_epc_addr(epc_page)); - if (ret) { - if (encls_failed(ret)) - ENCLS_WARN(ret, "EADD"); + __uaccess_end(); + + up_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem); + + if (ret) return -EFAULT; - } for_each_set_bit(i, &mrmask, 16) { ret = __eextend(sgx_epc_addr(encl->secs.epc_page), @@ -386,9 +361,9 @@ static int __sgx_encl_add_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, return 0; } -static int sgx_encl_add_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long addr, - void *data, struct sgx_secinfo *secinfo, - unsigned int mrmask, unsigned long prot) +static int sgx_encl_add_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, + struct sgx_enclave_add_page *addp, + struct sgx_secinfo *secinfo, unsigned long prot) { u64 page_type = secinfo->flags & SGX_SECINFO_PAGE_TYPE_MASK; struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page; @@ -396,13 +371,7 @@ static int sgx_encl_add_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long addr, struct sgx_va_page *va_page; int ret; - if (page_type == SGX_SECINFO_TCS) { - ret = sgx_validate_tcs(encl, data); - if (ret) - return ret; - } - - encl_page = sgx_encl_page_alloc(encl, addr, prot, page_type); + encl_page = sgx_encl_page_alloc(encl, addp->addr, prot, page_type); if (IS_ERR(encl_page)) return PTR_ERR(encl_page); @@ -425,8 +394,8 @@ static int sgx_encl_add_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long addr, if (ret) goto err_out_shrink; - ret = __sgx_encl_add_page(encl, encl_page, epc_page, data, secinfo, - mrmask); + ret = __sgx_encl_add_page(encl, encl_page, epc_page, secinfo, + addp->src, prot, addp->mrmask); if (ret) goto err_out; @@ -447,36 +416,6 @@ static int sgx_encl_add_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long addr, return ret; } -static int sgx_encl_page_import_user(void *dst, unsigned long src, - unsigned long prot) -{ - struct vm_area_struct *vma; - int ret = 0; - - down_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem); - - /* Query vma's VM_MAYEXEC as an indirect path_noexec() check. */ - if (prot & PROT_EXEC) { - vma = find_vma(current->mm, src); - if (!vma) { - ret = -EFAULT; - goto out; - } - - if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYEXEC)) { - ret = -EACCES; - goto out; - } - } - - if (copy_from_user(dst, (void __user *)src, PAGE_SIZE)) - ret = -EFAULT; - -out: - up_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem); - return ret; -} - /** * sgx_ioc_enclave_add_page - handler for %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGE * @@ -498,10 +437,7 @@ static long sgx_ioc_enclave_add_page(struct file *filep, void __user *arg) struct sgx_encl *encl = filep->private_data; struct sgx_enclave_add_page addp; struct sgx_secinfo secinfo; - struct page *data_page; unsigned long prot; - void *data; - int ret; if (!(encl->flags & SGX_ENCL_CREATED)) return -EINVAL; @@ -523,12 +459,6 @@ static long sgx_ioc_enclave_add_page(struct file *filep, void __user *arg) if (sgx_validate_secinfo(&secinfo)) return -EINVAL; - data_page = alloc_page(GFP_HIGHUSER); - if (!data_page) - return -ENOMEM; - - data = kmap(data_page); - prot = _calc_vm_trans(secinfo.flags, SGX_SECINFO_R, PROT_READ) | _calc_vm_trans(secinfo.flags, SGX_SECINFO_W, PROT_WRITE) | _calc_vm_trans(secinfo.flags, SGX_SECINFO_X, PROT_EXEC); @@ -537,19 +467,7 @@ static long sgx_ioc_enclave_add_page(struct file *filep, void __user *arg) if ((secinfo.flags & SGX_SECINFO_PAGE_TYPE_MASK) == SGX_SECINFO_TCS) prot |= PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE; - ret = sgx_encl_page_import_user(data, addp.src, prot); - if (ret) - goto out; - - ret = sgx_encl_add_page(encl, addp.addr, data, &secinfo, addp.mrmask, - prot); - if (ret) - goto out; - -out: - kunmap(data_page); - __free_page(data_page); - return ret; + return sgx_encl_add_page(encl, &addp, &secinfo, prot); } static int __sgx_get_key_hash(struct crypto_shash *tfm, const void *modulus,

[for_v22,v2,8/8] x86/sgx: Pass userspace source address directly to EADD

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