| Message ID | 20200716135303.276442-14-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
| Series | Intel SGX foundations | expand |
On Thursday, 2020-07-16 at 16:52:52 +03, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > Add an ioctl, which performs ENCLS[EADD] that adds new visible page to an > enclave, and optionally ENCLS[EEXTEND] operations that hash the page to the > enclave measurement. By visible we mean a page that can be mapped to the > address range of an enclave. > > Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com> > Tested-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com> > Tested-by: Haitao Huang <haitao.huang@linux.intel.com> > Tested-by: Chunyang Hui <sanqian.hcy@antfin.com> > Tested-by: Jordan Hand <jorhand@linux.microsoft.com> > Tested-by: Nathaniel McCallum <npmccallum@redhat.com> > Tested-by: Seth Moore <sethmo@google.com> Tested-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> > Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> > Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> > Co-developed-by: Suresh Siddha <suresh.b.siddha@intel.com> > Signed-off-by: Suresh Siddha <suresh.b.siddha@intel.com> > Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> > --- > arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h | 30 ++++ > arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c | 291 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > 2 files changed, 321 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h > index 3787d278e84b..c8f199b3fb6f 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h > +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h > @@ -8,10 +8,21 @@ > #include <linux/types.h> > #include <linux/ioctl.h> > > +/** > + * enum sgx_epage_flags - page control flags > + * %SGX_PAGE_MEASURE: Measure the page contents with a sequence of > + * ENCLS[EEXTEND] operations. > + */ > +enum sgx_page_flags { > + SGX_PAGE_MEASURE = 0x01, > +}; > + > #define SGX_MAGIC 0xA4 > > #define SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_CREATE \ > _IOW(SGX_MAGIC, 0x00, struct sgx_enclave_create) > +#define SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES \ > + _IOWR(SGX_MAGIC, 0x01, struct sgx_enclave_add_pages) > > /** > * struct sgx_enclave_create - parameter structure for the > @@ -22,4 +33,23 @@ struct sgx_enclave_create { > __u64 src; > }; > > +/** > + * struct sgx_enclave_add_pages - parameter structure for the > + * %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGE ioctl > + * @src: start address for the page data > + * @offset: starting page offset > + * @length: length of the data (multiple of the page size) > + * @secinfo: address for the SECINFO data > + * @flags: page control flags > + * @count: number of bytes added (multiple of the page size) > + */ > +struct sgx_enclave_add_pages { > + __u64 src; > + __u64 offset; > + __u64 length; > + __u64 secinfo; > + __u64 flags; > + __u64 count; > +}; > + > #endif /* _UAPI_ASM_X86_SGX_H */ > diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c > index 7981c411b05a..c63a51362d14 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c > +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c > @@ -197,6 +197,294 @@ static long sgx_ioc_enclave_create(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg) > return ret; > } > > +static struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_page_alloc(struct sgx_encl *encl, > + unsigned long offset, > + u64 secinfo_flags) > +{ > + struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page; > + unsigned long prot; > + > + encl_page = kzalloc(sizeof(*encl_page), GFP_KERNEL); > + if (!encl_page) > + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); > + > + encl_page->desc = encl->base + offset; > + encl_page->encl = encl; > + > + prot = _calc_vm_trans(secinfo_flags, SGX_SECINFO_R, PROT_READ) | > + _calc_vm_trans(secinfo_flags, SGX_SECINFO_W, PROT_WRITE) | > + _calc_vm_trans(secinfo_flags, SGX_SECINFO_X, PROT_EXEC); > + > + /* > + * TCS pages must always RW set for CPU access while the SECINFO > + * permissions are *always* zero - the CPU ignores the user provided > + * values and silently overwrites them with zero permissions. > + */ > + if ((secinfo_flags & SGX_SECINFO_PAGE_TYPE_MASK) == SGX_SECINFO_TCS) > + prot |= PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE; > + > + /* Calculate maximum of the VM flags for the page. */ > + encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits = calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, 0); > + > + return encl_page; > +} > + > +static int sgx_validate_secinfo(struct sgx_secinfo *secinfo) > +{ > + u64 perm = secinfo->flags & SGX_SECINFO_PERMISSION_MASK; > + u64 pt = secinfo->flags & SGX_SECINFO_PAGE_TYPE_MASK; > + > + if (pt != SGX_SECINFO_REG && pt != SGX_SECINFO_TCS) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + if ((perm & SGX_SECINFO_W) && !(perm & SGX_SECINFO_R)) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + /* > + * CPU will silently overwrite the permissions as zero, which means > + * that we need to validate it ourselves. > + */ > + if (pt == SGX_SECINFO_TCS && perm) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + if (secinfo->flags & SGX_SECINFO_RESERVED_MASK) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + if (memchr_inv(secinfo->reserved, 0, sizeof(secinfo->reserved))) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + return 0; > +} > + > +static int __sgx_encl_add_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, > + struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page, > + struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page, > + struct sgx_secinfo *secinfo, unsigned long src) > +{ > + struct sgx_pageinfo pginfo; > + struct vm_area_struct *vma; > + struct page *src_page; > + int ret; > + > + /* Query vma's VM_MAYEXEC as an indirect path_noexec() check. */ > + if (encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits & VM_EXEC) { > + vma = find_vma(current->mm, src); > + if (!vma) > + return -EFAULT; > + > + if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYEXEC)) > + return -EACCES; > + } > + > + ret = get_user_pages(src, 1, 0, &src_page, NULL); > + if (ret < 1) > + return ret; > + > + pginfo.secs = (unsigned long)sgx_get_epc_addr(encl->secs.epc_page); > + pginfo.addr = SGX_ENCL_PAGE_ADDR(encl_page); > + pginfo.metadata = (unsigned long)secinfo; > + pginfo.contents = (unsigned long)kmap_atomic(src_page); > + > + ret = __eadd(&pginfo, sgx_get_epc_addr(epc_page)); > + > + kunmap_atomic((void *)pginfo.contents); > + put_page(src_page); > + > + return ret ? -EIO : 0; > +} > + > +/* > + * If the caller requires measurement of the page as a proof for the content, > + * use EEXTEND to add a measurement for 256 bytes of the page. Repeat this > + * operation until the entire page is measured." > + */ > +static int __sgx_encl_extend(struct sgx_encl *encl, > + struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page) > +{ > + int ret; > + int i; > + > + for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) { > + ret = __eextend(sgx_get_epc_addr(encl->secs.epc_page), > + sgx_get_epc_addr(epc_page) + (i * 0x100)); > + if (ret) { > + if (encls_failed(ret)) > + ENCLS_WARN(ret, "EEXTEND"); > + return -EIO; > + } > + } > + > + return 0; > +} > + > +static int sgx_encl_add_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long src, > + unsigned long offset, unsigned long length, > + struct sgx_secinfo *secinfo, unsigned long flags) > +{ > + struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page; > + struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page; > + int ret; > + > + encl_page = sgx_encl_page_alloc(encl, offset, secinfo->flags); > + if (IS_ERR(encl_page)) > + return PTR_ERR(encl_page); > + > + epc_page = __sgx_alloc_epc_page(); > + if (IS_ERR(epc_page)) { > + kfree(encl_page); > + return PTR_ERR(epc_page); > + } > + > + mmap_read_lock(current->mm); > + mutex_lock(&encl->lock); > + > + /* > + * Insert prior to EADD in case of OOM. EADD modifies MRENCLAVE, i.e. > + * can't be gracefully unwound, while failure on EADD/EXTEND is limited > + * to userspace errors (or kernel/hardware bugs). > + */ > + ret = xa_insert(&encl->page_array, PFN_DOWN(encl_page->desc), > + encl_page, GFP_KERNEL); > + if (ret) > + goto err_out_unlock; > + > + ret = __sgx_encl_add_page(encl, encl_page, epc_page, secinfo, > + src); > + if (ret) > + goto err_out; > + > + /* > + * Complete the "add" before doing the "extend" so that the "add" > + * isn't in a half-baked state in the extremely unlikely scenario the > + * the enclave will be destroyed in response to EEXTEND failure. > + */ > + encl_page->encl = encl; > + encl_page->epc_page = epc_page; > + encl->secs_child_cnt++; > + > + if (flags & SGX_PAGE_MEASURE) { > + ret = __sgx_encl_extend(encl, epc_page); > + if (ret) > + goto err_out; > + } > + > + mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); > + mmap_read_unlock(current->mm); > + return ret; > + > +err_out: > + xa_erase(&encl->page_array, PFN_DOWN(encl_page->desc)); > + > +err_out_unlock: > + mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); > + mmap_read_unlock(current->mm); > + > + sgx_free_epc_page(epc_page); > + kfree(encl_page); > + > + /* > + * Destroy enclave on ENCLS failure as this means that EPC has been > + * invalidated. > + */ > + if (ret == -EIO) { > + mutex_lock(&encl->lock); > + sgx_encl_destroy(encl); > + mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); > + } > + > + return ret; > +} > + > +/** > + * sgx_ioc_enclave_add_pages() - The handler for %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES > + * @encl: pointer to an enclave instance (via ioctl() file pointer) > + * @arg: a user pointer to a struct sgx_enclave_add_pages instance > + * > + * Add one or more pages to an uninitialized enclave, and optionally extend the > + * measurement with the contents of the page. The SECINFO and measurement mask > + * are applied to all pages. > + * > + * A SECINFO for a TCS is required to always contain zero permissions because > + * CPU silently zeros them. Allowing anything else would cause a mismatch in > + * the measurement. > + * > + * mmap()'s protection bits are capped by the page permissions. For each page > + * address, the maximum protection bits are computed with the following > + * heuristics: > + * > + * 1. A regular page: PROT_R, PROT_W and PROT_X match the SECINFO permissions. > + * 2. A TCS page: PROT_R | PROT_W. > + * > + * mmap() is not allowed to surpass the minimum of the maximum protection bits > + * within the given address range. > + * > + * If ENCLS opcode fails, that effectively means that EPC has been invalidated. > + * When this happens the enclave is destroyed and -EIO is returned to the > + * caller. > + * > + * Return: > + * 0 on success, > + * -EACCES if an executable source page is located in a noexec partition, > + * -EIO if either ENCLS[EADD] or ENCLS[EEXTEND] fails > + * -errno otherwise > + */ > +static long sgx_ioc_enclave_add_pages(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg) > +{ > + struct sgx_enclave_add_pages addp; > + struct sgx_secinfo secinfo; > + unsigned long c; > + int ret; > + > + if ((atomic_read(&encl->flags) & SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED) || > + !(atomic_read(&encl->flags) & SGX_ENCL_CREATED)) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + if (copy_from_user(&addp, arg, sizeof(addp))) > + return -EFAULT; > + > + if (!IS_ALIGNED(addp.offset, PAGE_SIZE) || > + !IS_ALIGNED(addp.src, PAGE_SIZE)) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + if (!(access_ok(addp.src, PAGE_SIZE))) > + return -EFAULT; > + > + if (addp.length & (PAGE_SIZE - 1)) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + if (addp.offset + addp.length - PAGE_SIZE >= encl->size) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + if (copy_from_user(&secinfo, (void __user *)addp.secinfo, > + sizeof(secinfo))) > + return -EFAULT; > + > + if (sgx_validate_secinfo(&secinfo)) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + for (c = 0 ; c < addp.length; c += PAGE_SIZE) { > + if (signal_pending(current)) { > + ret = -EINTR; > + break; > + } > + > + if (need_resched()) > + cond_resched(); > + > + ret = sgx_encl_add_page(encl, addp.src + c, addp.offset + c, > + addp.length - c, &secinfo, addp.flags); > + if (ret) > + break; > + } > + > + addp.count = c; > + > + if (copy_to_user(arg, &addp, sizeof(addp))) > + return -EFAULT; > + > + return ret; > +} > + > long sgx_ioctl(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) > { > struct sgx_encl *encl = filep->private_data; > @@ -215,6 +503,9 @@ long sgx_ioctl(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) > case SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_CREATE: > ret = sgx_ioc_enclave_create(encl, (void __user *)arg); > break; > + case SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES: > + ret = sgx_ioc_enclave_add_pages(encl, (void __user *)arg); > + break; > default: > ret = -ENOIOCTLCMD; > break; > -- > 2.25.1
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h index 3787d278e84b..c8f199b3fb6f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h @@ -8,10 +8,21 @@ #include <linux/types.h> #include <linux/ioctl.h> +/** + * enum sgx_epage_flags - page control flags + * %SGX_PAGE_MEASURE: Measure the page contents with a sequence of + * ENCLS[EEXTEND] operations. + */ +enum sgx_page_flags { + SGX_PAGE_MEASURE = 0x01, +}; + #define SGX_MAGIC 0xA4 #define SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_CREATE \ _IOW(SGX_MAGIC, 0x00, struct sgx_enclave_create) +#define SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES \ + _IOWR(SGX_MAGIC, 0x01, struct sgx_enclave_add_pages) /** * struct sgx_enclave_create - parameter structure for the @@ -22,4 +33,23 @@ struct sgx_enclave_create { __u64 src; }; +/** + * struct sgx_enclave_add_pages - parameter structure for the + * %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGE ioctl + * @src: start address for the page data + * @offset: starting page offset + * @length: length of the data (multiple of the page size) + * @secinfo: address for the SECINFO data + * @flags: page control flags + * @count: number of bytes added (multiple of the page size) + */ +struct sgx_enclave_add_pages { + __u64 src; + __u64 offset; + __u64 length; + __u64 secinfo; + __u64 flags; + __u64 count; +}; + #endif /* _UAPI_ASM_X86_SGX_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c index 7981c411b05a..c63a51362d14 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c @@ -197,6 +197,294 @@ static long sgx_ioc_enclave_create(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg) return ret; } +static struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_page_alloc(struct sgx_encl *encl, + unsigned long offset, + u64 secinfo_flags) +{ + struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page; + unsigned long prot; + + encl_page = kzalloc(sizeof(*encl_page), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!encl_page) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + + encl_page->desc = encl->base + offset; + encl_page->encl = encl; + + prot = _calc_vm_trans(secinfo_flags, SGX_SECINFO_R, PROT_READ) | + _calc_vm_trans(secinfo_flags, SGX_SECINFO_W, PROT_WRITE) | + _calc_vm_trans(secinfo_flags, SGX_SECINFO_X, PROT_EXEC); + + /* + * TCS pages must always RW set for CPU access while the SECINFO + * permissions are *always* zero - the CPU ignores the user provided + * values and silently overwrites them with zero permissions. + */ + if ((secinfo_flags & SGX_SECINFO_PAGE_TYPE_MASK) == SGX_SECINFO_TCS) + prot |= PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE; + + /* Calculate maximum of the VM flags for the page. */ + encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits = calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, 0); + + return encl_page; +} + +static int sgx_validate_secinfo(struct sgx_secinfo *secinfo) +{ + u64 perm = secinfo->flags & SGX_SECINFO_PERMISSION_MASK; + u64 pt = secinfo->flags & SGX_SECINFO_PAGE_TYPE_MASK; + + if (pt != SGX_SECINFO_REG && pt != SGX_SECINFO_TCS) + return -EINVAL; + + if ((perm & SGX_SECINFO_W) && !(perm & SGX_SECINFO_R)) + return -EINVAL; + + /* + * CPU will silently overwrite the permissions as zero, which means + * that we need to validate it ourselves. + */ + if (pt == SGX_SECINFO_TCS && perm) + return -EINVAL; + + if (secinfo->flags & SGX_SECINFO_RESERVED_MASK) + return -EINVAL; + + if (memchr_inv(secinfo->reserved, 0, sizeof(secinfo->reserved))) + return -EINVAL; + + return 0; +} + +static int __sgx_encl_add_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, + struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page, + struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page, + struct sgx_secinfo *secinfo, unsigned long src) +{ + struct sgx_pageinfo pginfo; + struct vm_area_struct *vma; + struct page *src_page; + int ret; + + /* Query vma's VM_MAYEXEC as an indirect path_noexec() check. */ + if (encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits & VM_EXEC) { + vma = find_vma(current->mm, src); + if (!vma) + return -EFAULT; + + if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYEXEC)) + return -EACCES; + } + + ret = get_user_pages(src, 1, 0, &src_page, NULL); + if (ret < 1) + return ret; + + pginfo.secs = (unsigned long)sgx_get_epc_addr(encl->secs.epc_page); + pginfo.addr = SGX_ENCL_PAGE_ADDR(encl_page); + pginfo.metadata = (unsigned long)secinfo; + pginfo.contents = (unsigned long)kmap_atomic(src_page); + + ret = __eadd(&pginfo, sgx_get_epc_addr(epc_page)); + + kunmap_atomic((void *)pginfo.contents); + put_page(src_page); + + return ret ? -EIO : 0; +} + +/* + * If the caller requires measurement of the page as a proof for the content, + * use EEXTEND to add a measurement for 256 bytes of the page. Repeat this + * operation until the entire page is measured." + */ +static int __sgx_encl_extend(struct sgx_encl *encl, + struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page) +{ + int ret; + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) { + ret = __eextend(sgx_get_epc_addr(encl->secs.epc_page), + sgx_get_epc_addr(epc_page) + (i * 0x100)); + if (ret) { + if (encls_failed(ret)) + ENCLS_WARN(ret, "EEXTEND"); + return -EIO; + } + } + + return 0; +} + +static int sgx_encl_add_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long src, + unsigned long offset, unsigned long length, + struct sgx_secinfo *secinfo, unsigned long flags) +{ + struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page; + struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page; + int ret; + + encl_page = sgx_encl_page_alloc(encl, offset, secinfo->flags); + if (IS_ERR(encl_page)) + return PTR_ERR(encl_page); + + epc_page = __sgx_alloc_epc_page(); + if (IS_ERR(epc_page)) { + kfree(encl_page); + return PTR_ERR(epc_page); + } + + mmap_read_lock(current->mm); + mutex_lock(&encl->lock); + + /* + * Insert prior to EADD in case of OOM. EADD modifies MRENCLAVE, i.e. + * can't be gracefully unwound, while failure on EADD/EXTEND is limited + * to userspace errors (or kernel/hardware bugs). + */ + ret = xa_insert(&encl->page_array, PFN_DOWN(encl_page->desc), + encl_page, GFP_KERNEL); + if (ret) + goto err_out_unlock; + + ret = __sgx_encl_add_page(encl, encl_page, epc_page, secinfo, + src); + if (ret) + goto err_out; + + /* + * Complete the "add" before doing the "extend" so that the "add" + * isn't in a half-baked state in the extremely unlikely scenario the + * the enclave will be destroyed in response to EEXTEND failure. + */ + encl_page->encl = encl; + encl_page->epc_page = epc_page; + encl->secs_child_cnt++; + + if (flags & SGX_PAGE_MEASURE) { + ret = __sgx_encl_extend(encl, epc_page); + if (ret) + goto err_out; + } + + mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); + mmap_read_unlock(current->mm); + return ret; + +err_out: + xa_erase(&encl->page_array, PFN_DOWN(encl_page->desc)); + +err_out_unlock: + mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); + mmap_read_unlock(current->mm); + + sgx_free_epc_page(epc_page); + kfree(encl_page); + + /* + * Destroy enclave on ENCLS failure as this means that EPC has been + * invalidated. + */ + if (ret == -EIO) { + mutex_lock(&encl->lock); + sgx_encl_destroy(encl); + mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); + } + + return ret; +} + +/** + * sgx_ioc_enclave_add_pages() - The handler for %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES + * @encl: pointer to an enclave instance (via ioctl() file pointer) + * @arg: a user pointer to a struct sgx_enclave_add_pages instance + * + * Add one or more pages to an uninitialized enclave, and optionally extend the + * measurement with the contents of the page. The SECINFO and measurement mask + * are applied to all pages. + * + * A SECINFO for a TCS is required to always contain zero permissions because + * CPU silently zeros them. Allowing anything else would cause a mismatch in + * the measurement. + * + * mmap()'s protection bits are capped by the page permissions. For each page + * address, the maximum protection bits are computed with the following + * heuristics: + * + * 1. A regular page: PROT_R, PROT_W and PROT_X match the SECINFO permissions. + * 2. A TCS page: PROT_R | PROT_W. + * + * mmap() is not allowed to surpass the minimum of the maximum protection bits + * within the given address range. + * + * If ENCLS opcode fails, that effectively means that EPC has been invalidated. + * When this happens the enclave is destroyed and -EIO is returned to the + * caller. + * + * Return: + * 0 on success, + * -EACCES if an executable source page is located in a noexec partition, + * -EIO if either ENCLS[EADD] or ENCLS[EEXTEND] fails + * -errno otherwise + */ +static long sgx_ioc_enclave_add_pages(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg) +{ + struct sgx_enclave_add_pages addp; + struct sgx_secinfo secinfo; + unsigned long c; + int ret; + + if ((atomic_read(&encl->flags) & SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED) || + !(atomic_read(&encl->flags) & SGX_ENCL_CREATED)) + return -EINVAL; + + if (copy_from_user(&addp, arg, sizeof(addp))) + return -EFAULT; + + if (!IS_ALIGNED(addp.offset, PAGE_SIZE) || + !IS_ALIGNED(addp.src, PAGE_SIZE)) + return -EINVAL; + + if (!(access_ok(addp.src, PAGE_SIZE))) + return -EFAULT; + + if (addp.length & (PAGE_SIZE - 1)) + return -EINVAL; + + if (addp.offset + addp.length - PAGE_SIZE >= encl->size) + return -EINVAL; + + if (copy_from_user(&secinfo, (void __user *)addp.secinfo, + sizeof(secinfo))) + return -EFAULT; + + if (sgx_validate_secinfo(&secinfo)) + return -EINVAL; + + for (c = 0 ; c < addp.length; c += PAGE_SIZE) { + if (signal_pending(current)) { + ret = -EINTR; + break; + } + + if (need_resched()) + cond_resched(); + + ret = sgx_encl_add_page(encl, addp.src + c, addp.offset + c, + addp.length - c, &secinfo, addp.flags); + if (ret) + break; + } + + addp.count = c; + + if (copy_to_user(arg, &addp, sizeof(addp))) + return -EFAULT; + + return ret; +} + long sgx_ioctl(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) { struct sgx_encl *encl = filep->private_data; @@ -215,6 +503,9 @@ long sgx_ioctl(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) case SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_CREATE: ret = sgx_ioc_enclave_create(encl, (void __user *)arg); break; + case SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES: + ret = sgx_ioc_enclave_add_pages(encl, (void __user *)arg); + break; default: ret = -ENOIOCTLCMD; break;