From patchwork Sun Mar 6 05:32:06 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Jarkko Sakkinen X-Patchwork-Id: 12770562 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 77908C433EF for ; Sun, 6 Mar 2022 05:33:25 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S232979AbiCFFeN (ORCPT ); Sun, 6 Mar 2022 00:34:13 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:36604 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S232954AbiCFFeK (ORCPT ); Sun, 6 Mar 2022 00:34:10 -0500 Received: from ams.source.kernel.org (ams.source.kernel.org [145.40.68.75]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 080B03EB94; Sat, 5 Mar 2022 21:33:13 -0800 (PST) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ams.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 3DD16B80DF2; Sun, 6 Mar 2022 05:33:12 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 76AD2C340F6; Sun, 6 Mar 2022 05:33:10 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1646544791; bh=fYelMDSbRkCmySORRYGtRxueIY8qkKKul1PQnCLAH7Q=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=YZAMFDdzpbgA0U5lhYWfExCEKBLwd01PyByv18S/fV3M4av7Un4kAWupgJzcsihqj 4HLqWF0AJdq76fyFRzZEBkUwPlq30bAbVAL3F/DVPx4lnWRIkK2SfXQo+CMUpVJbTn F/A2FHthGckJ0uCUdM0WlHn2Qi6tZ2eO/Ay2xPiVqAcLtM2wC5D9hh07K6atOgKBqY /g07YZOkIW9nXsbaEyJM0BYJvphPV1/7/xVz8calOm2tTVs/JZWkoyDVCRTmXTT3jg FCfbcZtTpQq/z61In+09wsMv+M/dJLdActsoEDlFKc4bQ0wmedMX5Gr9Z0dk5BYL9s f2Yz11oTiqj6Q== From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: Dave Hansen , Nathaniel McCallum , Reinette Chatre , Andrew Morton , linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Jarkko Sakkinen , "H. Peter Anvin" , Thomas Bogendoerfer , Florian Fainelli , Matthew Auld , =?utf-8?q?Thomas_Hellstr=C3=B6m?= , Daniel Vetter , Jason Ekstrand , Chris Wilson , Maarten Lankhorst , Greg Kroah-Hartman , Tvrtko Ursulin , Vasily Averin , Shakeel Butt , Mike Kravetz , Alexey Gladkov , zhangyiru , Alexander Mikhalitsyn , linux-mips@vger.kernel.org, intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org, dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org, codalist@coda.cs.cmu.edu, linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH RFC 2/3] x86/sgx: Export sgx_encl_page_alloc() Date: Sun, 6 Mar 2022 07:32:06 +0200 Message-Id: <20220306053211.135762-3-jarkko@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.35.1 In-Reply-To: <20220306053211.135762-1-jarkko@kernel.org> References: <20220306053211.135762-1-jarkko@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org Move sgx_encl_page_alloc() to encl.c and export it so that it can be used in the implementation for MAP_POPULATE, which requires to allocate new enclave pages. Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h | 3 +++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c | 38 --------------------------------- 3 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c index 89aeed798ffb..79e39bd99c09 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c @@ -914,6 +914,44 @@ int sgx_encl_test_and_clear_young(struct mm_struct *mm, return ret; } +struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_page_alloc(struct sgx_encl *encl, + unsigned long offset, + u64 secinfo_flags) +{ + struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page; + unsigned long prot; + + encl_page = kzalloc(sizeof(*encl_page), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!encl_page) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + + encl_page->desc = encl->base + offset; + encl_page->encl = encl; + + prot = _calc_vm_trans(secinfo_flags, SGX_SECINFO_R, PROT_READ) | + _calc_vm_trans(secinfo_flags, SGX_SECINFO_W, PROT_WRITE) | + _calc_vm_trans(secinfo_flags, SGX_SECINFO_X, PROT_EXEC); + + /* + * TCS pages must always RW set for CPU access while the SECINFO + * permissions are *always* zero - the CPU ignores the user provided + * values and silently overwrites them with zero permissions. + */ + if ((secinfo_flags & SGX_SECINFO_PAGE_TYPE_MASK) == SGX_SECINFO_TCS) + prot |= PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE; + + /* Calculate maximum of the VM flags for the page. */ + encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits = calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, 0); + + /* + * At time of allocation, the runtime protection bits are the same + * as the maximum protection bits. + */ + encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits = encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits; + + return encl_page; +} + /** * sgx_zap_enclave_ptes() - remove PTEs mapping the address from enclave * @encl: the enclave diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h index 1b6ce1da7c92..3df0d3faf3a1 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h @@ -113,6 +113,9 @@ int sgx_encl_get_backing(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long page_index, void sgx_encl_put_backing(struct sgx_backing *backing, bool do_write); int sgx_encl_test_and_clear_young(struct mm_struct *mm, struct sgx_encl_page *page); +struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_page_alloc(struct sgx_encl *encl, + unsigned long offset, + u64 secinfo_flags); void sgx_zap_enclave_ptes(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long addr); struct sgx_epc_page *sgx_alloc_va_page(void); unsigned int sgx_alloc_va_slot(struct sgx_va_page *va_page); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c index d8c3c07badb3..3e3ca27a6f72 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c @@ -169,44 +169,6 @@ static long sgx_ioc_enclave_create(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg) return ret; } -static struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_page_alloc(struct sgx_encl *encl, - unsigned long offset, - u64 secinfo_flags) -{ - struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page; - unsigned long prot; - - encl_page = kzalloc(sizeof(*encl_page), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!encl_page) - return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); - - encl_page->desc = encl->base + offset; - encl_page->encl = encl; - - prot = _calc_vm_trans(secinfo_flags, SGX_SECINFO_R, PROT_READ) | - _calc_vm_trans(secinfo_flags, SGX_SECINFO_W, PROT_WRITE) | - _calc_vm_trans(secinfo_flags, SGX_SECINFO_X, PROT_EXEC); - - /* - * TCS pages must always RW set for CPU access while the SECINFO - * permissions are *always* zero - the CPU ignores the user provided - * values and silently overwrites them with zero permissions. - */ - if ((secinfo_flags & SGX_SECINFO_PAGE_TYPE_MASK) == SGX_SECINFO_TCS) - prot |= PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE; - - /* Calculate maximum of the VM flags for the page. */ - encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits = calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, 0); - - /* - * At time of allocation, the runtime protection bits are the same - * as the maximum protection bits. - */ - encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits = encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits; - - return encl_page; -} - static int sgx_validate_secinfo(struct sgx_secinfo *secinfo) { u64 perm = secinfo->flags & SGX_SECINFO_PERMISSION_MASK;