From patchwork Fri Sep 11 18:22:30 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Eric Snowberg X-Patchwork-Id: 11771357 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 404CF13B1 for ; Fri, 11 Sep 2020 18:23:23 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 11C80208E4 for ; Fri, 11 Sep 2020 18:23:23 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=oracle.com header.i=@oracle.com header.b="CYiWmeOG" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1725794AbgIKSXW (ORCPT ); Fri, 11 Sep 2020 14:23:22 -0400 Received: from aserp2120.oracle.com ([141.146.126.78]:50448 "EHLO aserp2120.oracle.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1725786AbgIKSXS (ORCPT ); Fri, 11 Sep 2020 14:23:18 -0400 Received: from pps.filterd (aserp2120.oracle.com [127.0.0.1]) by aserp2120.oracle.com (8.16.0.42/8.16.0.42) with SMTP id 08BIEiAM045415; Fri, 11 Sep 2020 18:22:55 GMT DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=oracle.com; h=from : to : cc : subject : date : message-id; s=corp-2020-01-29; bh=3S1LDGLJaTqbdvySV2cTAYdJo5YXwcqyQi6kW67a7DE=; b=CYiWmeOGdV8dH6jV4AMQJ3SdmOSa/0rNJ+6dkScfiBAn5j7F+zqZ32EQANA7xNWY0L4u nLxoE9DQMhhbGxcknHFCvz5JvWb2lM7a5jXC4M1kfIBH6aSptmUPUfiGKdMuEN7SsBds a0Xvk0alG6RhRwgkUfk10Rhfm0V5OkWehrxoJ7guG//hyvmra0+ebevPkOm3FcuIM/jJ MZI7/2R+h95oJu/j435UpbUTxOJdr7CzHslHCgRqmms+hRWXk5m9zqLXWOp7oeNzmFWj cE9z9kmW3IMG4qCYsL7h0hd4GDkbFW5AtAixovebr4t1++Ez/bQCCQPntfBImc6X8mlL Lg== Received: from aserp3020.oracle.com (aserp3020.oracle.com [141.146.126.70]) by aserp2120.oracle.com with ESMTP id 33c2mmfsj1-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=FAIL); Fri, 11 Sep 2020 18:22:55 +0000 Received: from pps.filterd (aserp3020.oracle.com [127.0.0.1]) by aserp3020.oracle.com (8.16.0.42/8.16.0.42) with SMTP id 08BIFCAI191067; Fri, 11 Sep 2020 18:22:54 GMT Received: from aserv0122.oracle.com (aserv0122.oracle.com [141.146.126.236]) by aserp3020.oracle.com with ESMTP id 33cmkdpkf4-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Fri, 11 Sep 2020 18:22:54 +0000 Received: from abhmp0005.oracle.com (abhmp0005.oracle.com [141.146.116.11]) by aserv0122.oracle.com (8.14.4/8.14.4) with ESMTP id 08BIMjor025328; Fri, 11 Sep 2020 18:22:45 GMT Received: from localhost.us.oracle.com (/10.147.27.2) by default (Oracle Beehive Gateway v4.0) with ESMTP ; Fri, 11 Sep 2020 11:22:45 -0700 From: Eric Snowberg To: dhowells@redhat.com, dwmw2@infradead.org, jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com Cc: jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, nayna@linux.ibm.com, erichte@linux.ibm.com, mpe@ellerman.id.au, zohar@linux.ibm.com, eric.snowberg@oracle.com, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, rdunlap@infradead.org Subject: [PATCH v3] certs: Add EFI_CERT_X509_GUID support for dbx entries Date: Fri, 11 Sep 2020 14:22:30 -0400 Message-Id: <20200911182230.62266-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.18.1 X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=nai engine=6000 definitions=9741 signatures=668679 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=notspam policy=default score=0 spamscore=0 malwarescore=0 phishscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 bulkscore=0 adultscore=0 mlxscore=0 suspectscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.12.0-2006250000 definitions=main-2009110147 X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=nai engine=6000 definitions=9741 signatures=668679 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=notspam policy=default score=0 mlxscore=0 priorityscore=1501 phishscore=0 adultscore=0 bulkscore=0 clxscore=1015 mlxlogscore=999 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=0 lowpriorityscore=0 spamscore=0 impostorscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.12.0-2006250000 definitions=main-2009110147 Sender: keyrings-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: keyrings@vger.kernel.org The Secure Boot Forbidden Signature Database, dbx, contains a list of now revoked signatures and keys previously approved to boot with UEFI Secure Boot enabled. The dbx is capable of containing any number of EFI_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID, EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID, and EFI_CERT_X509_GUID entries. Currently when EFI_CERT_X509_GUID are contained in the dbx, the entries are skipped. Add support for EFI_CERT_X509_GUID dbx entries. When a EFI_CERT_X509_GUID is found, it is added as an asymmetrical key to the .blacklist keyring. Anytime the .platform keyring is used, the keys in the .blacklist keyring are referenced, if a matching key is found, the key will be rejected. Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg --- v3: Fixed an issue when CONFIG_PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER is not builtin and defined as a module instead, pointed out by Randy Dunlap v2: Fixed build issue reported by kernel test robot Commit message update (suggested by Jarkko Sakkinen) --- certs/blacklist.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++ certs/blacklist.h | 12 +++++++ certs/system_keyring.c | 6 ++++ include/keys/system_keyring.h | 11 +++++++ .../platform_certs/keyring_handler.c | 11 +++++++ 5 files changed, 73 insertions(+) diff --git a/certs/blacklist.c b/certs/blacklist.c index 6514f9ebc943..3d1514ba5d47 100644 --- a/certs/blacklist.c +++ b/certs/blacklist.c @@ -100,6 +100,39 @@ int mark_hash_blacklisted(const char *hash) return 0; } +int mark_key_revocationlisted(const char *data, size_t size) +{ + key_ref_t key; + + key = key_create_or_update(make_key_ref(blacklist_keyring, true), + "asymmetric", + NULL, + data, + size, + ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | KEY_USR_VIEW), + KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA | KEY_ALLOC_BUILT_IN); + + if (IS_ERR(key)) { + pr_err("Problem with revocation key (%ld)\n", PTR_ERR(key)); + return PTR_ERR(key); + } + + return 0; +} + +int is_key_revocationlisted(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7) +{ + int ret; + + ret = validate_trust(pkcs7, blacklist_keyring); + + if (ret == 0) + return -EKEYREJECTED; + + return -ENOKEY; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(is_key_revocationlisted); + /** * is_hash_blacklisted - Determine if a hash is blacklisted * @hash: The hash to be checked as a binary blob diff --git a/certs/blacklist.h b/certs/blacklist.h index 1efd6fa0dc60..420bb7c86e07 100644 --- a/certs/blacklist.h +++ b/certs/blacklist.h @@ -1,3 +1,15 @@ #include +#include +#include extern const char __initconst *const blacklist_hashes[]; + +#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING +#define validate_trust pkcs7_validate_trust +#else +static inline int validate_trust(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, + struct key *trust_keyring) +{ + return -ENOKEY; +} +#endif diff --git a/certs/system_keyring.c b/certs/system_keyring.c index 798291177186..f8ea96219155 100644 --- a/certs/system_keyring.c +++ b/certs/system_keyring.c @@ -241,6 +241,12 @@ int verify_pkcs7_message_sig(const void *data, size_t len, pr_devel("PKCS#7 platform keyring is not available\n"); goto error; } + + ret = is_key_revocationlisted(pkcs7); + if (ret != -ENOKEY) { + pr_devel("PKCS#7 platform key revocationlisted\n"); + goto error; + } } ret = pkcs7_validate_trust(pkcs7, trusted_keys); if (ret < 0) { diff --git a/include/keys/system_keyring.h b/include/keys/system_keyring.h index fb8b07daa9d1..b6991cfe1b6d 100644 --- a/include/keys/system_keyring.h +++ b/include/keys/system_keyring.h @@ -31,11 +31,14 @@ extern int restrict_link_by_builtin_and_secondary_trusted( #define restrict_link_by_builtin_and_secondary_trusted restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted #endif +extern struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7; #ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING extern int mark_hash_blacklisted(const char *hash); +extern int mark_key_revocationlisted(const char *data, size_t size); extern int is_hash_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len, const char *type); extern int is_binary_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len); +extern int is_key_revocationlisted(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7); #else static inline int is_hash_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len, const char *type) @@ -47,6 +50,14 @@ static inline int is_binary_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len) { return 0; } +static inline int mark_key_revocationlisted(const char *data, size_t size) +{ + return 0; +} +static inline int is_key_revocationlisted(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7) +{ + return -ENOKEY; +} #endif #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_BLACKLIST_KEYRING diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c b/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c index c5ba695c10e3..cc5a43804bc4 100644 --- a/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c +++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c @@ -55,6 +55,15 @@ static __init void uefi_blacklist_binary(const char *source, uefi_blacklist_hash(source, data, len, "bin:", 4); } +/* + * Revocationlist the X509 cert + */ +static __init void uefi_revocationlist_x509(const char *source, + const void *data, size_t len) +{ + mark_key_revocationlisted(data, len); +} + /* * Return the appropriate handler for particular signature list types found in * the UEFI db and MokListRT tables. @@ -76,5 +85,7 @@ __init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_dbx(const efi_guid_t *sig_type) return uefi_blacklist_x509_tbs; if (efi_guidcmp(*sig_type, efi_cert_sha256_guid) == 0) return uefi_blacklist_binary; + if (efi_guidcmp(*sig_type, efi_cert_x509_guid) == 0) + return uefi_revocationlist_x509; return 0; }