| Message ID | 20210301131127.793707-3-sumit.garg@linaro.org (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New |
| Headers | show |
| Series | Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys support | expand |
On Mon, Mar 01, 2021 at 06:41:25PM +0530, Sumit Garg wrote: > Add support for TEE based trusted keys where TEE provides the functionality > to seal and unseal trusted keys using hardware unique key. > > Refer to Documentation/staging/tee.rst for detailed information about TEE. > > Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org> > Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> /Jarkko > --- > include/keys/trusted_tee.h | 16 ++ > security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile | 1 + > security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c | 4 + > security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tee.c | 317 ++++++++++++++++++++++ > 4 files changed, 338 insertions(+) > create mode 100644 include/keys/trusted_tee.h > create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tee.c > > diff --git a/include/keys/trusted_tee.h b/include/keys/trusted_tee.h > new file mode 100644 > index 000000000000..151be25a979e > --- /dev/null > +++ b/include/keys/trusted_tee.h > @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ > +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ > +/* > + * Copyright (C) 2019-2021 Linaro Ltd. > + * > + * Author: > + * Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org> > + */ > + > +#ifndef __TEE_TRUSTED_KEY_H > +#define __TEE_TRUSTED_KEY_H > + > +#include <keys/trusted-type.h> > + > +extern struct trusted_key_ops trusted_key_tee_ops; > + > +#endif > diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile > index 49e3bcfe704f..347021d5d1f9 100644 > --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile > +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile > @@ -7,3 +7,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS) += trusted.o > trusted-y += trusted_core.o > trusted-y += trusted_tpm1.o > trusted-y += trusted_tpm2.o > +trusted-$(CONFIG_TEE) += trusted_tee.o > diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c > index 0db86b44605d..ec3a066a4b42 100644 > --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c > +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c > @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ > > #include <keys/user-type.h> > #include <keys/trusted-type.h> > +#include <keys/trusted_tee.h> > #include <keys/trusted_tpm.h> > #include <linux/capability.h> > #include <linux/err.h> > @@ -29,6 +30,9 @@ static const struct trusted_key_source trusted_key_sources[] = { > #if defined(CONFIG_TCG_TPM) > { "tpm", &trusted_key_tpm_ops }, > #endif > +#if defined(CONFIG_TEE) > + { "tee", &trusted_key_tee_ops }, > +#endif > }; > > DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL(trusted_key_init, *trusted_key_sources[0].ops->init); > diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tee.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tee.c > new file mode 100644 > index 000000000000..62983d98a252 > --- /dev/null > +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tee.c > @@ -0,0 +1,317 @@ > +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 > +/* > + * Copyright (C) 2019-2021 Linaro Ltd. > + * > + * Author: > + * Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org> > + */ > + > +#include <linux/err.h> > +#include <linux/key-type.h> > +#include <linux/slab.h> > +#include <linux/string.h> > +#include <linux/tee_drv.h> > +#include <linux/uuid.h> > + > +#include <keys/trusted_tee.h> > + > +#define DRIVER_NAME "trusted-key-tee" > + > +/* > + * Get random data for symmetric key > + * > + * [out] memref[0] Random data > + */ > +#define TA_CMD_GET_RANDOM 0x0 > + > +/* > + * Seal trusted key using hardware unique key > + * > + * [in] memref[0] Plain key > + * [out] memref[1] Sealed key datablob > + */ > +#define TA_CMD_SEAL 0x1 > + > +/* > + * Unseal trusted key using hardware unique key > + * > + * [in] memref[0] Sealed key datablob > + * [out] memref[1] Plain key > + */ > +#define TA_CMD_UNSEAL 0x2 > + > +/** > + * struct trusted_key_tee_private - TEE Trusted key private data > + * @dev: TEE based Trusted key device. > + * @ctx: TEE context handler. > + * @session_id: Trusted key TA session identifier. > + * @shm_pool: Memory pool shared with TEE device. > + */ > +struct trusted_key_tee_private { > + struct device *dev; > + struct tee_context *ctx; > + u32 session_id; > + struct tee_shm *shm_pool; > +}; > + > +static struct trusted_key_tee_private pvt_data; > + > +/* > + * Have the TEE seal(encrypt) the symmetric key > + */ > +static int trusted_tee_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) > +{ > + int ret; > + struct tee_ioctl_invoke_arg inv_arg; > + struct tee_param param[4]; > + struct tee_shm *reg_shm_in = NULL, *reg_shm_out = NULL; > + > + memset(&inv_arg, 0, sizeof(inv_arg)); > + memset(¶m, 0, sizeof(param)); > + > + reg_shm_in = tee_shm_register(pvt_data.ctx, (unsigned long)p->key, > + p->key_len, TEE_SHM_DMA_BUF | > + TEE_SHM_KERNEL_MAPPED); > + if (IS_ERR(reg_shm_in)) { > + dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "key shm register failed\n"); > + return PTR_ERR(reg_shm_in); > + } > + > + reg_shm_out = tee_shm_register(pvt_data.ctx, (unsigned long)p->blob, > + sizeof(p->blob), TEE_SHM_DMA_BUF | > + TEE_SHM_KERNEL_MAPPED); > + if (IS_ERR(reg_shm_out)) { > + dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "blob shm register failed\n"); > + ret = PTR_ERR(reg_shm_out); > + goto out; > + } > + > + inv_arg.func = TA_CMD_SEAL; > + inv_arg.session = pvt_data.session_id; > + inv_arg.num_params = 4; > + > + param[0].attr = TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_ATTR_TYPE_MEMREF_INPUT; > + param[0].u.memref.shm = reg_shm_in; > + param[0].u.memref.size = p->key_len; > + param[0].u.memref.shm_offs = 0; > + param[1].attr = TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_ATTR_TYPE_MEMREF_OUTPUT; > + param[1].u.memref.shm = reg_shm_out; > + param[1].u.memref.size = sizeof(p->blob); > + param[1].u.memref.shm_offs = 0; > + > + ret = tee_client_invoke_func(pvt_data.ctx, &inv_arg, param); > + if ((ret < 0) || (inv_arg.ret != 0)) { > + dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "TA_CMD_SEAL invoke err: %x\n", > + inv_arg.ret); > + ret = -EFAULT; > + } else { > + p->blob_len = param[1].u.memref.size; > + } > + > +out: > + if (reg_shm_out) > + tee_shm_free(reg_shm_out); > + if (reg_shm_in) > + tee_shm_free(reg_shm_in); > + > + return ret; > +} > + > +/* > + * Have the TEE unseal(decrypt) the symmetric key > + */ > +static int trusted_tee_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) > +{ > + int ret; > + struct tee_ioctl_invoke_arg inv_arg; > + struct tee_param param[4]; > + struct tee_shm *reg_shm_in = NULL, *reg_shm_out = NULL; > + > + memset(&inv_arg, 0, sizeof(inv_arg)); > + memset(¶m, 0, sizeof(param)); > + > + reg_shm_in = tee_shm_register(pvt_data.ctx, (unsigned long)p->blob, > + p->blob_len, TEE_SHM_DMA_BUF | > + TEE_SHM_KERNEL_MAPPED); > + if (IS_ERR(reg_shm_in)) { > + dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "blob shm register failed\n"); > + return PTR_ERR(reg_shm_in); > + } > + > + reg_shm_out = tee_shm_register(pvt_data.ctx, (unsigned long)p->key, > + sizeof(p->key), TEE_SHM_DMA_BUF | > + TEE_SHM_KERNEL_MAPPED); > + if (IS_ERR(reg_shm_out)) { > + dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "key shm register failed\n"); > + ret = PTR_ERR(reg_shm_out); > + goto out; > + } > + > + inv_arg.func = TA_CMD_UNSEAL; > + inv_arg.session = pvt_data.session_id; > + inv_arg.num_params = 4; > + > + param[0].attr = TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_ATTR_TYPE_MEMREF_INPUT; > + param[0].u.memref.shm = reg_shm_in; > + param[0].u.memref.size = p->blob_len; > + param[0].u.memref.shm_offs = 0; > + param[1].attr = TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_ATTR_TYPE_MEMREF_OUTPUT; > + param[1].u.memref.shm = reg_shm_out; > + param[1].u.memref.size = sizeof(p->key); > + param[1].u.memref.shm_offs = 0; > + > + ret = tee_client_invoke_func(pvt_data.ctx, &inv_arg, param); > + if ((ret < 0) || (inv_arg.ret != 0)) { > + dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "TA_CMD_UNSEAL invoke err: %x\n", > + inv_arg.ret); > + ret = -EFAULT; > + } else { > + p->key_len = param[1].u.memref.size; > + } > + > +out: > + if (reg_shm_out) > + tee_shm_free(reg_shm_out); > + if (reg_shm_in) > + tee_shm_free(reg_shm_in); > + > + return ret; > +} > + > +/* > + * Have the TEE generate random symmetric key > + */ > +static int trusted_tee_get_random(unsigned char *key, size_t key_len) > +{ > + int ret; > + struct tee_ioctl_invoke_arg inv_arg; > + struct tee_param param[4]; > + struct tee_shm *reg_shm = NULL; > + > + memset(&inv_arg, 0, sizeof(inv_arg)); > + memset(¶m, 0, sizeof(param)); > + > + reg_shm = tee_shm_register(pvt_data.ctx, (unsigned long)key, key_len, > + TEE_SHM_DMA_BUF | TEE_SHM_KERNEL_MAPPED); > + if (IS_ERR(reg_shm)) { > + dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "key shm register failed\n"); > + return PTR_ERR(reg_shm); > + } > + > + inv_arg.func = TA_CMD_GET_RANDOM; > + inv_arg.session = pvt_data.session_id; > + inv_arg.num_params = 4; > + > + param[0].attr = TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_ATTR_TYPE_MEMREF_OUTPUT; > + param[0].u.memref.shm = reg_shm; > + param[0].u.memref.size = key_len; > + param[0].u.memref.shm_offs = 0; > + > + ret = tee_client_invoke_func(pvt_data.ctx, &inv_arg, param); > + if ((ret < 0) || (inv_arg.ret != 0)) { > + dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "TA_CMD_GET_RANDOM invoke err: %x\n", > + inv_arg.ret); > + ret = -EFAULT; > + } else { > + ret = param[0].u.memref.size; > + } > + > + tee_shm_free(reg_shm); > + > + return ret; > +} > + > +static int optee_ctx_match(struct tee_ioctl_version_data *ver, const void *data) > +{ > + if (ver->impl_id == TEE_IMPL_ID_OPTEE) > + return 1; > + else > + return 0; > +} > + > +static int trusted_key_probe(struct device *dev) > +{ > + struct tee_client_device *rng_device = to_tee_client_device(dev); > + int ret; > + struct tee_ioctl_open_session_arg sess_arg; > + > + memset(&sess_arg, 0, sizeof(sess_arg)); > + > + pvt_data.ctx = tee_client_open_context(NULL, optee_ctx_match, NULL, > + NULL); > + if (IS_ERR(pvt_data.ctx)) > + return -ENODEV; > + > + memcpy(sess_arg.uuid, rng_device->id.uuid.b, TEE_IOCTL_UUID_LEN); > + sess_arg.clnt_login = TEE_IOCTL_LOGIN_REE_KERNEL; > + sess_arg.num_params = 0; > + > + ret = tee_client_open_session(pvt_data.ctx, &sess_arg, NULL); > + if ((ret < 0) || (sess_arg.ret != 0)) { > + dev_err(dev, "tee_client_open_session failed, err: %x\n", > + sess_arg.ret); > + ret = -EINVAL; > + goto out_ctx; > + } > + pvt_data.session_id = sess_arg.session; > + > + ret = register_key_type(&key_type_trusted); > + if (ret < 0) > + goto out_sess; > + > + pvt_data.dev = dev; > + > + return 0; > + > +out_sess: > + tee_client_close_session(pvt_data.ctx, pvt_data.session_id); > +out_ctx: > + tee_client_close_context(pvt_data.ctx); > + > + return ret; > +} > + > +static int trusted_key_remove(struct device *dev) > +{ > + unregister_key_type(&key_type_trusted); > + tee_client_close_session(pvt_data.ctx, pvt_data.session_id); > + tee_client_close_context(pvt_data.ctx); > + > + return 0; > +} > + > +static const struct tee_client_device_id trusted_key_id_table[] = { > + {UUID_INIT(0xf04a0fe7, 0x1f5d, 0x4b9b, > + 0xab, 0xf7, 0x61, 0x9b, 0x85, 0xb4, 0xce, 0x8c)}, > + {} > +}; > +MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(tee, trusted_key_id_table); > + > +static struct tee_client_driver trusted_key_driver = { > + .id_table = trusted_key_id_table, > + .driver = { > + .name = DRIVER_NAME, > + .bus = &tee_bus_type, > + .probe = trusted_key_probe, > + .remove = trusted_key_remove, > + }, > +}; > + > +static int trusted_tee_init(void) > +{ > + return driver_register(&trusted_key_driver.driver); > +} > + > +static void trusted_tee_exit(void) > +{ > + driver_unregister(&trusted_key_driver.driver); > +} > + > +struct trusted_key_ops trusted_key_tee_ops = { > + .migratable = 0, /* non-migratable */ > + .init = trusted_tee_init, > + .seal = trusted_tee_seal, > + .unseal = trusted_tee_unseal, > + .get_random = trusted_tee_get_random, > + .exit = trusted_tee_exit, > +}; > -- > 2.25.1 > >
diff --git a/include/keys/trusted_tee.h b/include/keys/trusted_tee.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..151be25a979e --- /dev/null +++ b/include/keys/trusted_tee.h @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2019-2021 Linaro Ltd. + * + * Author: + * Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org> + */ + +#ifndef __TEE_TRUSTED_KEY_H +#define __TEE_TRUSTED_KEY_H + +#include <keys/trusted-type.h> + +extern struct trusted_key_ops trusted_key_tee_ops; + +#endif diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile index 49e3bcfe704f..347021d5d1f9 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile @@ -7,3 +7,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS) += trusted.o trusted-y += trusted_core.o trusted-y += trusted_tpm1.o trusted-y += trusted_tpm2.o +trusted-$(CONFIG_TEE) += trusted_tee.o diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c index 0db86b44605d..ec3a066a4b42 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ #include <keys/user-type.h> #include <keys/trusted-type.h> +#include <keys/trusted_tee.h> #include <keys/trusted_tpm.h> #include <linux/capability.h> #include <linux/err.h> @@ -29,6 +30,9 @@ static const struct trusted_key_source trusted_key_sources[] = { #if defined(CONFIG_TCG_TPM) { "tpm", &trusted_key_tpm_ops }, #endif +#if defined(CONFIG_TEE) + { "tee", &trusted_key_tee_ops }, +#endif }; DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL(trusted_key_init, *trusted_key_sources[0].ops->init); diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tee.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tee.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..62983d98a252 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tee.c @@ -0,0 +1,317 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Copyright (C) 2019-2021 Linaro Ltd. + * + * Author: + * Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org> + */ + +#include <linux/err.h> +#include <linux/key-type.h> +#include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/string.h> +#include <linux/tee_drv.h> +#include <linux/uuid.h> + +#include <keys/trusted_tee.h> + +#define DRIVER_NAME "trusted-key-tee" + +/* + * Get random data for symmetric key + * + * [out] memref[0] Random data + */ +#define TA_CMD_GET_RANDOM 0x0 + +/* + * Seal trusted key using hardware unique key + * + * [in] memref[0] Plain key + * [out] memref[1] Sealed key datablob + */ +#define TA_CMD_SEAL 0x1 + +/* + * Unseal trusted key using hardware unique key + * + * [in] memref[0] Sealed key datablob + * [out] memref[1] Plain key + */ +#define TA_CMD_UNSEAL 0x2 + +/** + * struct trusted_key_tee_private - TEE Trusted key private data + * @dev: TEE based Trusted key device. + * @ctx: TEE context handler. + * @session_id: Trusted key TA session identifier. + * @shm_pool: Memory pool shared with TEE device. + */ +struct trusted_key_tee_private { + struct device *dev; + struct tee_context *ctx; + u32 session_id; + struct tee_shm *shm_pool; +}; + +static struct trusted_key_tee_private pvt_data; + +/* + * Have the TEE seal(encrypt) the symmetric key + */ +static int trusted_tee_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) +{ + int ret; + struct tee_ioctl_invoke_arg inv_arg; + struct tee_param param[4]; + struct tee_shm *reg_shm_in = NULL, *reg_shm_out = NULL; + + memset(&inv_arg, 0, sizeof(inv_arg)); + memset(¶m, 0, sizeof(param)); + + reg_shm_in = tee_shm_register(pvt_data.ctx, (unsigned long)p->key, + p->key_len, TEE_SHM_DMA_BUF | + TEE_SHM_KERNEL_MAPPED); + if (IS_ERR(reg_shm_in)) { + dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "key shm register failed\n"); + return PTR_ERR(reg_shm_in); + } + + reg_shm_out = tee_shm_register(pvt_data.ctx, (unsigned long)p->blob, + sizeof(p->blob), TEE_SHM_DMA_BUF | + TEE_SHM_KERNEL_MAPPED); + if (IS_ERR(reg_shm_out)) { + dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "blob shm register failed\n"); + ret = PTR_ERR(reg_shm_out); + goto out; + } + + inv_arg.func = TA_CMD_SEAL; + inv_arg.session = pvt_data.session_id; + inv_arg.num_params = 4; + + param[0].attr = TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_ATTR_TYPE_MEMREF_INPUT; + param[0].u.memref.shm = reg_shm_in; + param[0].u.memref.size = p->key_len; + param[0].u.memref.shm_offs = 0; + param[1].attr = TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_ATTR_TYPE_MEMREF_OUTPUT; + param[1].u.memref.shm = reg_shm_out; + param[1].u.memref.size = sizeof(p->blob); + param[1].u.memref.shm_offs = 0; + + ret = tee_client_invoke_func(pvt_data.ctx, &inv_arg, param); + if ((ret < 0) || (inv_arg.ret != 0)) { + dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "TA_CMD_SEAL invoke err: %x\n", + inv_arg.ret); + ret = -EFAULT; + } else { + p->blob_len = param[1].u.memref.size; + } + +out: + if (reg_shm_out) + tee_shm_free(reg_shm_out); + if (reg_shm_in) + tee_shm_free(reg_shm_in); + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Have the TEE unseal(decrypt) the symmetric key + */ +static int trusted_tee_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) +{ + int ret; + struct tee_ioctl_invoke_arg inv_arg; + struct tee_param param[4]; + struct tee_shm *reg_shm_in = NULL, *reg_shm_out = NULL; + + memset(&inv_arg, 0, sizeof(inv_arg)); + memset(¶m, 0, sizeof(param)); + + reg_shm_in = tee_shm_register(pvt_data.ctx, (unsigned long)p->blob, + p->blob_len, TEE_SHM_DMA_BUF | + TEE_SHM_KERNEL_MAPPED); + if (IS_ERR(reg_shm_in)) { + dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "blob shm register failed\n"); + return PTR_ERR(reg_shm_in); + } + + reg_shm_out = tee_shm_register(pvt_data.ctx, (unsigned long)p->key, + sizeof(p->key), TEE_SHM_DMA_BUF | + TEE_SHM_KERNEL_MAPPED); + if (IS_ERR(reg_shm_out)) { + dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "key shm register failed\n"); + ret = PTR_ERR(reg_shm_out); + goto out; + } + + inv_arg.func = TA_CMD_UNSEAL; + inv_arg.session = pvt_data.session_id; + inv_arg.num_params = 4; + + param[0].attr = TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_ATTR_TYPE_MEMREF_INPUT; + param[0].u.memref.shm = reg_shm_in; + param[0].u.memref.size = p->blob_len; + param[0].u.memref.shm_offs = 0; + param[1].attr = TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_ATTR_TYPE_MEMREF_OUTPUT; + param[1].u.memref.shm = reg_shm_out; + param[1].u.memref.size = sizeof(p->key); + param[1].u.memref.shm_offs = 0; + + ret = tee_client_invoke_func(pvt_data.ctx, &inv_arg, param); + if ((ret < 0) || (inv_arg.ret != 0)) { + dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "TA_CMD_UNSEAL invoke err: %x\n", + inv_arg.ret); + ret = -EFAULT; + } else { + p->key_len = param[1].u.memref.size; + } + +out: + if (reg_shm_out) + tee_shm_free(reg_shm_out); + if (reg_shm_in) + tee_shm_free(reg_shm_in); + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Have the TEE generate random symmetric key + */ +static int trusted_tee_get_random(unsigned char *key, size_t key_len) +{ + int ret; + struct tee_ioctl_invoke_arg inv_arg; + struct tee_param param[4]; + struct tee_shm *reg_shm = NULL; + + memset(&inv_arg, 0, sizeof(inv_arg)); + memset(¶m, 0, sizeof(param)); + + reg_shm = tee_shm_register(pvt_data.ctx, (unsigned long)key, key_len, + TEE_SHM_DMA_BUF | TEE_SHM_KERNEL_MAPPED); + if (IS_ERR(reg_shm)) { + dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "key shm register failed\n"); + return PTR_ERR(reg_shm); + } + + inv_arg.func = TA_CMD_GET_RANDOM; + inv_arg.session = pvt_data.session_id; + inv_arg.num_params = 4; + + param[0].attr = TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_ATTR_TYPE_MEMREF_OUTPUT; + param[0].u.memref.shm = reg_shm; + param[0].u.memref.size = key_len; + param[0].u.memref.shm_offs = 0; + + ret = tee_client_invoke_func(pvt_data.ctx, &inv_arg, param); + if ((ret < 0) || (inv_arg.ret != 0)) { + dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "TA_CMD_GET_RANDOM invoke err: %x\n", + inv_arg.ret); + ret = -EFAULT; + } else { + ret = param[0].u.memref.size; + } + + tee_shm_free(reg_shm); + + return ret; +} + +static int optee_ctx_match(struct tee_ioctl_version_data *ver, const void *data) +{ + if (ver->impl_id == TEE_IMPL_ID_OPTEE) + return 1; + else + return 0; +} + +static int trusted_key_probe(struct device *dev) +{ + struct tee_client_device *rng_device = to_tee_client_device(dev); + int ret; + struct tee_ioctl_open_session_arg sess_arg; + + memset(&sess_arg, 0, sizeof(sess_arg)); + + pvt_data.ctx = tee_client_open_context(NULL, optee_ctx_match, NULL, + NULL); + if (IS_ERR(pvt_data.ctx)) + return -ENODEV; + + memcpy(sess_arg.uuid, rng_device->id.uuid.b, TEE_IOCTL_UUID_LEN); + sess_arg.clnt_login = TEE_IOCTL_LOGIN_REE_KERNEL; + sess_arg.num_params = 0; + + ret = tee_client_open_session(pvt_data.ctx, &sess_arg, NULL); + if ((ret < 0) || (sess_arg.ret != 0)) { + dev_err(dev, "tee_client_open_session failed, err: %x\n", + sess_arg.ret); + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out_ctx; + } + pvt_data.session_id = sess_arg.session; + + ret = register_key_type(&key_type_trusted); + if (ret < 0) + goto out_sess; + + pvt_data.dev = dev; + + return 0; + +out_sess: + tee_client_close_session(pvt_data.ctx, pvt_data.session_id); +out_ctx: + tee_client_close_context(pvt_data.ctx); + + return ret; +} + +static int trusted_key_remove(struct device *dev) +{ + unregister_key_type(&key_type_trusted); + tee_client_close_session(pvt_data.ctx, pvt_data.session_id); + tee_client_close_context(pvt_data.ctx); + + return 0; +} + +static const struct tee_client_device_id trusted_key_id_table[] = { + {UUID_INIT(0xf04a0fe7, 0x1f5d, 0x4b9b, + 0xab, 0xf7, 0x61, 0x9b, 0x85, 0xb4, 0xce, 0x8c)}, + {} +}; +MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(tee, trusted_key_id_table); + +static struct tee_client_driver trusted_key_driver = { + .id_table = trusted_key_id_table, + .driver = { + .name = DRIVER_NAME, + .bus = &tee_bus_type, + .probe = trusted_key_probe, + .remove = trusted_key_remove, + }, +}; + +static int trusted_tee_init(void) +{ + return driver_register(&trusted_key_driver.driver); +} + +static void trusted_tee_exit(void) +{ + driver_unregister(&trusted_key_driver.driver); +} + +struct trusted_key_ops trusted_key_tee_ops = { + .migratable = 0, /* non-migratable */ + .init = trusted_tee_init, + .seal = trusted_tee_seal, + .unseal = trusted_tee_unseal, + .get_random = trusted_tee_get_random, + .exit = trusted_tee_exit, +};