Message ID | 20220119005436.119072-4-ebiggers@kernel.org (mailing list archive) |
---|---|
State | New |
Headers | show |
Series | KEYS: x509: various cleanups | expand |
On Tue, Jan 18, 2022 at 04:54:35PM -0800, Eric Biggers wrote: > From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> > > The X.509 parser always sets cert->pub->pkey_algo on success, since > x509_extract_key_data() is a mandatory action in the X.509 ASN.1 > grammar, and it returns an error if the algorithm is unknown. Thus, > remove the dead code which handled this field being NULL. This results > in the ->unsupported_key flag never being set, so remove that too. > > Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> > --- > crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c | 7 ++----- > crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h | 1 - > crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c | 9 --------- > 3 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c > index 0b4d07aa88111..d37b187faf9ae 100644 > --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c > +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c > @@ -226,9 +226,6 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, > return 0; > } > > - if (x509->unsupported_key) > - goto unsupported_crypto_in_x509; > - > pr_debug("- issuer %s\n", x509->issuer); > sig = x509->sig; > if (sig->auth_ids[0]) > @@ -245,7 +242,7 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, > * authority. > */ > if (x509->unsupported_sig) > - goto unsupported_crypto_in_x509; > + goto unsupported_sig_in_x509; > x509->signer = x509; > pr_debug("- self-signed\n"); > return 0; > @@ -309,7 +306,7 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, > might_sleep(); > } > > -unsupported_crypto_in_x509: > +unsupported_sig_in_x509: > /* Just prune the certificate chain at this point if we lack some > * crypto module to go further. Note, however, we don't want to set > * sinfo->unsupported_crypto as the signed info block may still be > diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h > index c233f136fb354..da854c94f1115 100644 > --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h > +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h > @@ -36,7 +36,6 @@ struct x509_certificate { > bool seen; /* Infinite recursion prevention */ > bool verified; > bool self_signed; /* T if self-signed (check unsupported_sig too) */ > - bool unsupported_key; /* T if key uses unsupported crypto */ > bool unsupported_sig; /* T if signature uses unsupported crypto */ > bool blacklisted; > }; > diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c > index fe14cae115b51..b03d04d78eb9d 100644 > --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c > +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c > @@ -33,9 +33,6 @@ int x509_get_sig_params(struct x509_certificate *cert) > sig->data = cert->tbs; > sig->data_size = cert->tbs_size; > > - if (!cert->pub->pkey_algo) > - cert->unsupported_key = true; > - > if (!sig->pkey_algo) > cert->unsupported_sig = true; > > @@ -173,12 +170,6 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) > > pr_devel("Cert Issuer: %s\n", cert->issuer); > pr_devel("Cert Subject: %s\n", cert->subject); > - > - if (cert->unsupported_key) { > - ret = -ENOPKG; > - goto error_free_cert; > - } > - > pr_devel("Cert Key Algo: %s\n", cert->pub->pkey_algo); > pr_devel("Cert Valid period: %lld-%lld\n", cert->valid_from, cert->valid_to); > > -- > 2.34.1 > Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> BR, Jarkko
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c index 0b4d07aa88111..d37b187faf9ae 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c @@ -226,9 +226,6 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, return 0; } - if (x509->unsupported_key) - goto unsupported_crypto_in_x509; - pr_debug("- issuer %s\n", x509->issuer); sig = x509->sig; if (sig->auth_ids[0]) @@ -245,7 +242,7 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, * authority. */ if (x509->unsupported_sig) - goto unsupported_crypto_in_x509; + goto unsupported_sig_in_x509; x509->signer = x509; pr_debug("- self-signed\n"); return 0; @@ -309,7 +306,7 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, might_sleep(); } -unsupported_crypto_in_x509: +unsupported_sig_in_x509: /* Just prune the certificate chain at this point if we lack some * crypto module to go further. Note, however, we don't want to set * sinfo->unsupported_crypto as the signed info block may still be diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h index c233f136fb354..da854c94f1115 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h @@ -36,7 +36,6 @@ struct x509_certificate { bool seen; /* Infinite recursion prevention */ bool verified; bool self_signed; /* T if self-signed (check unsupported_sig too) */ - bool unsupported_key; /* T if key uses unsupported crypto */ bool unsupported_sig; /* T if signature uses unsupported crypto */ bool blacklisted; }; diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c index fe14cae115b51..b03d04d78eb9d 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c @@ -33,9 +33,6 @@ int x509_get_sig_params(struct x509_certificate *cert) sig->data = cert->tbs; sig->data_size = cert->tbs_size; - if (!cert->pub->pkey_algo) - cert->unsupported_key = true; - if (!sig->pkey_algo) cert->unsupported_sig = true; @@ -173,12 +170,6 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) pr_devel("Cert Issuer: %s\n", cert->issuer); pr_devel("Cert Subject: %s\n", cert->subject); - - if (cert->unsupported_key) { - ret = -ENOPKG; - goto error_free_cert; - } - pr_devel("Cert Key Algo: %s\n", cert->pub->pkey_algo); pr_devel("Cert Valid period: %lld-%lld\n", cert->valid_from, cert->valid_to);