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[198.145.64.163]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id b11-20020a170903228b00b0015eaa9797e8sm193186plh.172.2022.05.10.16.58.26 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Tue, 10 May 2022 16:58:26 -0700 (PDT) From: Kees Cook To: David Howells Cc: Kees Cook , Eric Biggers , Christoph Hellwig , Jarkko Sakkinen , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v2] big_keys: Use struct for internal payload Date: Tue, 10 May 2022 16:58:17 -0700 Message-Id: <20220510235817.3627784-1-keescook@chromium.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.32.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Developer-Signature: v=1; a=openpgp-sha256; l=7729; h=from:subject; bh=c98cT0wFABSs1ubFVptJpzmYSiaWgubsH31Bhn/VSsk=; b=owEBbQKS/ZANAwAKAYly9N/cbcAmAcsmYgBievwYyfrJEiabIkxaAe4GlYzMSukYR3j833rJK6yS 0vpWRaSJAjMEAAEKAB0WIQSlw/aPIp3WD3I+bhOJcvTf3G3AJgUCYnr8GAAKCRCJcvTf3G3AJj6rD/ sH9pngx8uqZGZAIkhCKZ1oYdiRN/w5vub6ZWNer+ao/PFNTQlDvAUQ/wwD+xov1BK73KYrDVOF2MKv olHAOsqIc66bPPrXaotH4ztQ1YLA+0Iqe3eFElniqMBVK7pzmvU0jllQTb5RfxbCl9V9y+iGUXjbVk i5bKu1pSOEWrn9scyHjiVaBH35KKLgv3MedjkNzYzMHvIAKQ5EvO0+8kZ1FEOIvYAypZntZoXog6jR WejfW2HhA3HoGc7tlAtSdgilJNYMMwgE+hU1AvI5H5erySu45fOFIHMVEoSQlWzj4dnFWVZMZ7znai vknf3IYBsNKHHVdmppmbf9zNtv6Ovmp/ifZEpHT9g3lxcJXxz3SCpLLnCe3T8ejG7ls/ZC2ant0iH/ 6lawRNIj09BUs2MRC+B5jzMXZvF8Gs68lK8uTmXRoeqPzFoO37UxgSLWGKikLkpnXG4jtvG62jcekE 3NmJsiGnFexhjcmBxe07Xa9W0ztZoj+vtI7Es4IpeDZnhR4e9UEhx8MTQRXwIStk1qytyHPOYUgQI0 Duy2q7HdnazsXjJ7OVVCaM3YXghNg8d29rVA7nGHIWZaaeizNhGkuf0D1aGEnc7+k5/9g7GcANoP/m L3gZYdtQRzAqWVygPWTM/Z9TiPAwlHYt53n+WsDMtsxy9eJVUZHSHb/2T4Gw== X-Developer-Key: i=keescook@chromium.org; a=openpgp; fpr=A5C3F68F229DD60F723E6E138972F4DFDC6DC026 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: keyrings@vger.kernel.org The randstruct GCC plugin gets upset when it sees struct path (which is randomized) being assigned from a "void *" (which it cannot type-check). There's no need for these casts, as the entire internal payload use is following a normal struct layout. Convert the enum-based void * offset dereferencing to the new big_key_payload struct. No meaningful machine code changes result after this change, and source readability is improved. Drop the randstruct exception now that there is no "confusing" cross-type assignment. Cc: David Howells Cc: Eric Biggers Cc: Christoph Hellwig Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen Cc: James Morris Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" Cc: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook --- scripts/gcc-plugins/randomize_layout_plugin.c | 2 - security/keys/big_key.c | 73 +++++++++---------- 2 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-) diff --git a/scripts/gcc-plugins/randomize_layout_plugin.c b/scripts/gcc-plugins/randomize_layout_plugin.c index 19214e573137..5836a7fc7532 100644 --- a/scripts/gcc-plugins/randomize_layout_plugin.c +++ b/scripts/gcc-plugins/randomize_layout_plugin.c @@ -50,8 +50,6 @@ static const struct whitelist_entry whitelist[] = { { "drivers/net/ethernet/sun/niu.c", "page", "address_space" }, /* unix_skb_parms via UNIXCB() buffer */ { "net/unix/af_unix.c", "unix_skb_parms", "char" }, - /* big_key payload.data struct splashing */ - { "security/keys/big_key.c", "path", "void *" }, { } }; diff --git a/security/keys/big_key.c b/security/keys/big_key.c index d17e5f09eeb8..c3367622c683 100644 --- a/security/keys/big_key.c +++ b/security/keys/big_key.c @@ -20,12 +20,13 @@ /* * Layout of key payload words. */ -enum { - big_key_data, - big_key_path, - big_key_path_2nd_part, - big_key_len, +struct big_key_payload { + u8 *data; + struct path path; + size_t length; }; +#define to_big_key_payload(payload) \ + (struct big_key_payload *)((payload).data) /* * If the data is under this limit, there's no point creating a shm file to @@ -55,7 +56,7 @@ struct key_type key_type_big_key = { */ int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) { - struct path *path = (struct path *)&prep->payload.data[big_key_path]; + struct big_key_payload *payload = to_big_key_payload(prep->payload); struct file *file; u8 *buf, *enckey; ssize_t written; @@ -63,13 +64,15 @@ int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) size_t enclen = datalen + CHACHA20POLY1305_AUTHTAG_SIZE; int ret; + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(*payload) != sizeof(prep->payload.data)); + if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 1024 * 1024 || !prep->data) return -EINVAL; /* Set an arbitrary quota */ prep->quotalen = 16; - prep->payload.data[big_key_len] = (void *)(unsigned long)datalen; + payload->length = datalen; if (datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) { /* Create a shmem file to store the data in. This will permit the data @@ -117,9 +120,9 @@ int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) /* Pin the mount and dentry to the key so that we can open it again * later */ - prep->payload.data[big_key_data] = enckey; - *path = file->f_path; - path_get(path); + payload->data = enckey; + payload->path = file->f_path; + path_get(&payload->path); fput(file); kvfree_sensitive(buf, enclen); } else { @@ -129,7 +132,7 @@ int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) if (!data) return -ENOMEM; - prep->payload.data[big_key_data] = data; + payload->data = data; memcpy(data, prep->data, prep->datalen); } return 0; @@ -148,12 +151,11 @@ int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) */ void big_key_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) { - if (prep->datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) { - struct path *path = (struct path *)&prep->payload.data[big_key_path]; + struct big_key_payload *payload = to_big_key_payload(prep->payload); - path_put(path); - } - kfree_sensitive(prep->payload.data[big_key_data]); + if (prep->datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) + path_put(&payload->path); + kfree_sensitive(payload->data); } /* @@ -162,13 +164,12 @@ void big_key_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) */ void big_key_revoke(struct key *key) { - struct path *path = (struct path *)&key->payload.data[big_key_path]; + struct big_key_payload *payload = to_big_key_payload(key->payload); /* clear the quota */ key_payload_reserve(key, 0); - if (key_is_positive(key) && - (size_t)key->payload.data[big_key_len] > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) - vfs_truncate(path, 0); + if (key_is_positive(key) && payload->length > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) + vfs_truncate(&payload->path, 0); } /* @@ -176,17 +177,15 @@ void big_key_revoke(struct key *key) */ void big_key_destroy(struct key *key) { - size_t datalen = (size_t)key->payload.data[big_key_len]; - - if (datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) { - struct path *path = (struct path *)&key->payload.data[big_key_path]; + struct big_key_payload *payload = to_big_key_payload(key->payload); - path_put(path); - path->mnt = NULL; - path->dentry = NULL; + if (payload->length > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) { + path_put(&payload->path); + payload->path.mnt = NULL; + payload->path.dentry = NULL; } - kfree_sensitive(key->payload.data[big_key_data]); - key->payload.data[big_key_data] = NULL; + kfree_sensitive(payload->data); + payload->data = NULL; } /* @@ -211,14 +210,14 @@ int big_key_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) */ void big_key_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m) { - size_t datalen = (size_t)key->payload.data[big_key_len]; + struct big_key_payload *payload = to_big_key_payload(key->payload); seq_puts(m, key->description); if (key_is_positive(key)) seq_printf(m, ": %zu [%s]", - datalen, - datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD ? "file" : "buff"); + payload->length, + payload->length > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD ? "file" : "buff"); } /* @@ -227,16 +226,16 @@ void big_key_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m) */ long big_key_read(const struct key *key, char *buffer, size_t buflen) { - size_t datalen = (size_t)key->payload.data[big_key_len]; + struct big_key_payload *payload = to_big_key_payload(key->payload); + size_t datalen = payload->length; long ret; if (!buffer || buflen < datalen) return datalen; if (datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) { - struct path *path = (struct path *)&key->payload.data[big_key_path]; struct file *file; - u8 *buf, *enckey = (u8 *)key->payload.data[big_key_data]; + u8 *buf, *enckey = payload->data; size_t enclen = datalen + CHACHA20POLY1305_AUTHTAG_SIZE; loff_t pos = 0; @@ -244,7 +243,7 @@ long big_key_read(const struct key *key, char *buffer, size_t buflen) if (!buf) return -ENOMEM; - file = dentry_open(path, O_RDONLY, current_cred()); + file = dentry_open(&payload->path, O_RDONLY, current_cred()); if (IS_ERR(file)) { ret = PTR_ERR(file); goto error; @@ -274,7 +273,7 @@ long big_key_read(const struct key *key, char *buffer, size_t buflen) kvfree_sensitive(buf, enclen); } else { ret = datalen; - memcpy(buffer, key->payload.data[big_key_data], datalen); + memcpy(buffer, payload->data, datalen); } return ret;