From patchwork Wed Jul 3 18:24:50 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Jarkko Sakkinen X-Patchwork-Id: 13722695 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id E38EB187556; Wed, 3 Jul 2024 18:25:16 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1720031117; cv=none; b=q6UFCLHnO6LmO9TSbMNFKNH/MVGqNbNR65cHS3PPqxCnXPkigxT3jNYbtmFWxWeE3ROW0H2qi8wIGwZ3XPqKZUtP9f5RwkHq32f3lnQOJJvsCKR9wRBB6WPVzDJTn0BbTHBfmRU6pukfvrhOQsq4tgmsFnlWawoCqhUqseyW6UM= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1720031117; c=relaxed/simple; bh=vGuO+9bbdYk7rQq5wisNYXsobZUocrZsZ3QmZB07RL8=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=VIpfYi0SwHP3x2oV1rS9CUPUjHCflTsrDF8PM7iiWyb9gaUqDAz6Uz40ycrmcpwRfXPU/7fegRMOswiE629HdmZm8ZV3IX+Enh6AlR8JtXY19TQs+cIbhPz9cw+T6+HCKhjk/x34mhDYpQmczFQBOkqMZ+z2TApLOMXzhZd1AK0= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=tx6D6B1I; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="tx6D6B1I" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 668B3C2BD10; Wed, 3 Jul 2024 18:25:16 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1720031116; bh=vGuO+9bbdYk7rQq5wisNYXsobZUocrZsZ3QmZB07RL8=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=tx6D6B1Ifxq0LFfdki24k6AQfsBvRxiRxOu+e+XAvR0rWvSJzg/4LiFD/odyUWsW5 pe1iwQBK6KYv+sc+xflC0qd65VvSH+e/KdeS09WKTVQY+3zTXX2PYk5tX3LQ4gzJhd eAWWqCy5VLQCoCnI7jbr1zVv8iwJBvZrE9U3tYkcXTfkBUHpsb7SDBAF48z6vqTmyi cscor6E9RxxedWHT5JduMRG+2eYeirkpmCSREJAH7rJrAnvJxd5bZpuSntdCCZ3kAU lnRJE+aaVUTGASAF+0yIHNfnQ1gJNSLFN02HRDqf9v9DRdldk3q9DWrwQckyKKCF6t N49B++EbqXnXw== From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: Thorsten Leemhuis , Linus Torvalds , Jarkko Sakkinen , stable@vger.kernel.org, Stefan Berger , Peter Huewe , Jason Gunthorpe , James Bottomley , Mimi Zohar , David Howells , Paul Moore , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Ard Biesheuvel , Mario Limonciello , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v2 3/3] tpm: Address !chip->auth in tpm_buf_append_hmac_session*() Date: Wed, 3 Jul 2024 21:24:50 +0300 Message-ID: <20240703182453.1580888-4-jarkko@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.45.2 In-Reply-To: <20240703182453.1580888-1-jarkko@kernel.org> References: <20240703182453.1580888-1-jarkko@kernel.org> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: keyrings@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Unless tpm_chip_bootstrap() was called by the driver, !chip->auth can cause a null derefence in tpm_buf_hmac_session*(). Thus, address !chip->auth in tpm_buf_hmac_session*() and remove the fallback implementation for !TCG_TPM2_HMAC. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.9+ Reported-by: Stefan Berger Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/20240617193408.1234365-1-stefanb@linux.ibm.com/ Fixes: 1085b8276bb4 ("tpm: Add the rest of the session HMAC API") Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- v2: - Use auth in place of chip->auth. --- drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 181 ++++++++++++++++++------------- include/linux/tpm.h | 67 ++++-------- 2 files changed, 124 insertions(+), 124 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c index 06d0f10a2301..304247090b56 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c @@ -268,6 +268,105 @@ void tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_append_name); +/** + * tpm_buf_append_hmac_session() - Append a TPM session element + * @chip: the TPM chip structure + * @buf: The buffer to be appended + * @attributes: The session attributes + * @passphrase: The session authority (NULL if none) + * @passphrase_len: The length of the session authority (0 if none) + * + * This fills in a session structure in the TPM command buffer, except + * for the HMAC which cannot be computed until the command buffer is + * complete. The type of session is controlled by the @attributes, + * the main ones of which are TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION which means the + * session won't terminate after tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(), + * TPM2_SA_DECRYPT which means this buffers first parameter should be + * encrypted with a session key and TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT, which means the + * response buffer's first parameter needs to be decrypted (confusing, + * but the defines are written from the point of view of the TPM). + * + * Any session appended by this command must be finalized by calling + * tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session() otherwise the HMAC will be incorrect + * and the TPM will reject the command. + * + * As with most tpm_buf operations, success is assumed because failure + * will be caused by an incorrect programming model and indicated by a + * kernel message. + */ +void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, + u8 attributes, u8 *passphrase, + int passphrase_len) +{ + struct tpm2_auth *auth = chip->auth; + u8 nonce[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]; + u32 len; + + if (!auth) { + /* offset tells us where the sessions area begins */ + int offset = buf->handles * 4 + TPM_HEADER_SIZE; + u32 len = 9 + passphrase_len; + + if (tpm_buf_length(buf) != offset) { + /* not the first session so update the existing length */ + len += get_unaligned_be32(&buf->data[offset]); + put_unaligned_be32(len, &buf->data[offset]); + } else { + tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, len); + } + /* auth handle */ + tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, TPM2_RS_PW); + /* nonce */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, 0); + /* attributes */ + tpm_buf_append_u8(buf, 0); + /* passphrase */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, passphrase_len); + tpm_buf_append(buf, passphrase, passphrase_len); + return; + } + + /* + * The Architecture Guide requires us to strip trailing zeros + * before computing the HMAC + */ + while (passphrase && passphrase_len > 0 && passphrase[passphrase_len - 1] == '\0') + passphrase_len--; + + auth->attrs = attributes; + auth->passphrase_len = passphrase_len; + if (passphrase_len) + memcpy(auth->passphrase, passphrase, passphrase_len); + + if (auth->session != tpm_buf_length(buf)) { + /* we're not the first session */ + len = get_unaligned_be32(&buf->data[auth->session]); + if (4 + len + auth->session != tpm_buf_length(buf)) { + WARN(1, "session length mismatch, cannot append"); + return; + } + + /* add our new session */ + len += 9 + 2 * SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE; + put_unaligned_be32(len, &buf->data[auth->session]); + } else { + tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, 9 + 2 * SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); + } + + /* random number for our nonce */ + get_random_bytes(nonce, sizeof(nonce)); + memcpy(auth->our_nonce, nonce, sizeof(nonce)); + tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, auth->handle); + /* our new nonce */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); + tpm_buf_append(buf, nonce, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); + tpm_buf_append_u8(buf, auth->attrs); + /* and put a placeholder for the hmac */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); + tpm_buf_append(buf, nonce, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_append_hmac_session); + #ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC /* * It turns out the crypto hmac(sha256) is hard for us to consume @@ -449,82 +548,6 @@ static void tpm_buf_append_salt(struct tpm_buf *buf, struct tpm_chip *chip) crypto_free_kpp(kpp); } -/** - * tpm_buf_append_hmac_session() - Append a TPM session element - * @chip: the TPM chip structure - * @buf: The buffer to be appended - * @attributes: The session attributes - * @passphrase: The session authority (NULL if none) - * @passphrase_len: The length of the session authority (0 if none) - * - * This fills in a session structure in the TPM command buffer, except - * for the HMAC which cannot be computed until the command buffer is - * complete. The type of session is controlled by the @attributes, - * the main ones of which are TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION which means the - * session won't terminate after tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(), - * TPM2_SA_DECRYPT which means this buffers first parameter should be - * encrypted with a session key and TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT, which means the - * response buffer's first parameter needs to be decrypted (confusing, - * but the defines are written from the point of view of the TPM). - * - * Any session appended by this command must be finalized by calling - * tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session() otherwise the HMAC will be incorrect - * and the TPM will reject the command. - * - * As with most tpm_buf operations, success is assumed because failure - * will be caused by an incorrect programming model and indicated by a - * kernel message. - */ -void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, - u8 attributes, u8 *passphrase, - int passphrase_len) -{ - u8 nonce[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]; - u32 len; - struct tpm2_auth *auth = chip->auth; - - /* - * The Architecture Guide requires us to strip trailing zeros - * before computing the HMAC - */ - while (passphrase && passphrase_len > 0 - && passphrase[passphrase_len - 1] == '\0') - passphrase_len--; - - auth->attrs = attributes; - auth->passphrase_len = passphrase_len; - if (passphrase_len) - memcpy(auth->passphrase, passphrase, passphrase_len); - - if (auth->session != tpm_buf_length(buf)) { - /* we're not the first session */ - len = get_unaligned_be32(&buf->data[auth->session]); - if (4 + len + auth->session != tpm_buf_length(buf)) { - WARN(1, "session length mismatch, cannot append"); - return; - } - - /* add our new session */ - len += 9 + 2 * SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE; - put_unaligned_be32(len, &buf->data[auth->session]); - } else { - tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, 9 + 2 * SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); - } - - /* random number for our nonce */ - get_random_bytes(nonce, sizeof(nonce)); - memcpy(auth->our_nonce, nonce, sizeof(nonce)); - tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, auth->handle); - /* our new nonce */ - tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); - tpm_buf_append(buf, nonce, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); - tpm_buf_append_u8(buf, auth->attrs); - /* and put a placeholder for the hmac */ - tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); - tpm_buf_append(buf, nonce, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm_buf_append_hmac_session); - /** * tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session() - finalize the session HMAC * @chip: the TPM chip structure @@ -555,6 +578,9 @@ void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) u8 cphash[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]; struct sha256_state sctx; + if (!auth) + return; + /* save the command code in BE format */ auth->ordinal = head->ordinal; @@ -713,6 +739,9 @@ int tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, u32 cc = be32_to_cpu(auth->ordinal); int parm_len, len, i, handles; + if (!auth) + return rc; + if (auth->session >= TPM_HEADER_SIZE) { WARN(1, "tpm session not filled correctly\n"); goto out; diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h index 2844fea4a12a..912fd0d2646d 100644 --- a/include/linux/tpm.h +++ b/include/linux/tpm.h @@ -493,22 +493,35 @@ static inline void tpm_buf_append_empty_auth(struct tpm_buf *buf, u32 handle) void tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, u32 handle, u8 *name); - -#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC - -int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip); void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, u8 attributes, u8 *passphrase, int passphraselen); + static inline void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session_opt(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, u8 attributes, u8 *passphrase, int passphraselen) { - tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf, attributes, passphrase, - passphraselen); + struct tpm_header *head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data; + int offset = buf->handles * 4 + TPM_HEADER_SIZE; + + if (chip->auth) { + tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf, attributes, passphrase, + passphraselen); + } else { + /* + * If the only sessions are optional, the command tag must change to + * TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS. + */ + if (tpm_buf_length(buf) == offset) + head->tag = cpu_to_be16(TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS); + } } + +#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC + +int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip); void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf); int tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, int rc); @@ -523,48 +536,6 @@ static inline int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip) static inline void tpm2_end_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip) { } -static inline void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, - struct tpm_buf *buf, - u8 attributes, u8 *passphrase, - int passphraselen) -{ - /* offset tells us where the sessions area begins */ - int offset = buf->handles * 4 + TPM_HEADER_SIZE; - u32 len = 9 + passphraselen; - - if (tpm_buf_length(buf) != offset) { - /* not the first session so update the existing length */ - len += get_unaligned_be32(&buf->data[offset]); - put_unaligned_be32(len, &buf->data[offset]); - } else { - tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, len); - } - /* auth handle */ - tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, TPM2_RS_PW); - /* nonce */ - tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, 0); - /* attributes */ - tpm_buf_append_u8(buf, 0); - /* passphrase */ - tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, passphraselen); - tpm_buf_append(buf, passphrase, passphraselen); -} -static inline void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session_opt(struct tpm_chip *chip, - struct tpm_buf *buf, - u8 attributes, - u8 *passphrase, - int passphraselen) -{ - int offset = buf->handles * 4 + TPM_HEADER_SIZE; - struct tpm_header *head = (struct tpm_header *) buf->data; - - /* - * if the only sessions are optional, the command tag - * must change to TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS - */ - if (tpm_buf_length(buf) == offset) - head->tag = cpu_to_be16(TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS); -} static inline void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) {