From patchwork Fri Dec 4 05:44:02 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: David Gibson X-Patchwork-Id: 11950621 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-13.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D954EC433FE for ; Fri, 4 Dec 2020 05:45:35 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7F94822581 for ; Fri, 4 Dec 2020 05:45:35 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1728126AbgLDFpB (ORCPT ); Fri, 4 Dec 2020 00:45:01 -0500 Received: from bilbo.ozlabs.org ([203.11.71.1]:37939 "EHLO ozlabs.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1728066AbgLDFpA (ORCPT ); Fri, 4 Dec 2020 00:45:00 -0500 Received: by ozlabs.org (Postfix, from userid 1007) id 4CnM8f5b6bz9sT5; Fri, 4 Dec 2020 16:44:18 +1100 (AEDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=gibson.dropbear.id.au; s=201602; t=1607060658; bh=mxWjWsAC0dVXxgKbwgpPWZDm0iZBSpsgilWWeTLy1wA=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:From; b=VvdNlqruhi8QpiSlhHbtiZmcLN+T/iqxrEaYWyAPqXmFUKeQj43iZdpFnJU378aJq AjsaiHVW2SGmCfXMTOKRxdvm7exQZ1idr85upuRz1XjerQecmgliAPzW6dk5zJeTR/ d/0Gq7iSG0cFDUmkMNUyMSgSdsgWxSXB75PuKVag= From: David Gibson To: pair@us.ibm.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, frankja@linux.ibm.com, brijesh.singh@amd.com, dgilbert@redhat.com, qemu-devel@nongnu.org Cc: Eduardo Habkost , qemu-ppc@nongnu.org, rth@twiddle.net, thuth@redhat.com, berrange@redhat.com, mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com, Marcelo Tosatti , "Michael S. Tsirkin" , Marcel Apfelbaum , david@redhat.com, Richard Henderson , borntraeger@de.ibm.com, David Gibson , cohuck@redhat.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org, qemu-s390x@nongnu.org, pasic@linux.ibm.com Subject: [for-6.0 v5 00/13] Generalize memory encryption models Date: Fri, 4 Dec 2020 16:44:02 +1100 Message-Id: <20201204054415.579042-1-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.28.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: kvm@vger.kernel.org A number of hardware platforms are implementing mechanisms whereby the hypervisor does not have unfettered access to guest memory, in order to mitigate the security impact of a compromised hypervisor. AMD's SEV implements this with in-cpu memory encryption, and Intel has its own memory encryption mechanism. POWER has an upcoming mechanism to accomplish this in a different way, using a new memory protection level plus a small trusted ultravisor. s390 also has a protected execution environment. The current code (committed or draft) for these features has each platform's version configured entirely differently. That doesn't seem ideal for users, or particularly for management layers. AMD SEV introduces a notionally generic machine option "machine-encryption", but it doesn't actually cover any cases other than SEV. This series is a proposal to at least partially unify configuration for these mechanisms, by renaming and generalizing AMD's "memory-encryption" property. It is replaced by a "securable-guest-memory" property pointing to a platform specific object which configures and manages the specific details. Changes since v4: * Renamed from "host trust limitation" to "securable guest memory", which I think is marginally more descriptive * Re-organized initialization, because the previous model called at kvm_init didn't work for s390 * Assorted fixes to the s390 implementation; rudimentary testing (gitlab CI) only Changes since v3: * Rebased * Added first cut at handling of s390 protected virtualization Changes since RFCv2: * Rebased * Removed preliminary SEV cleanups (they've been merged) * Changed name to "host trust limitation" * Added migration blocker to the PEF code (based on SEV's version) Changes since RFCv1: * Rebased * Fixed some errors pointed out by Dave Gilbert David Gibson (12): securable guest memory: Introduce new securable guest memory base class securable guest memory: Handle memory encryption via interface securable guest memory: Move side effect out of machine_set_memory_encryption() securable guest memory: Rework the "memory-encryption" property securable guest memory: Decouple kvm_memcrypt_*() helpers from KVM sev: Add Error ** to sev_kvm_init() securable guest memory: Introduce sgm "ready" flag securable guest memory: Move SEV initialization into arch specific code spapr: Add PEF based securable guest memory spapr: PEF: prevent migration securable guest memory: Alter virtio default properties for protected guests s390: Recognize securable-guest-memory option Greg Kurz (1): qom: Allow optional sugar props accel/kvm/kvm-all.c | 39 +------ accel/kvm/sev-stub.c | 10 +- accel/stubs/kvm-stub.c | 10 -- backends/meson.build | 1 + backends/securable-guest-memory.c | 30 +++++ hw/core/machine.c | 71 ++++++++++-- hw/i386/pc_sysfw.c | 6 +- hw/ppc/meson.build | 1 + hw/ppc/pef.c | 124 +++++++++++++++++++++ hw/ppc/spapr.c | 10 ++ hw/s390x/pv.c | 58 ++++++++++ include/exec/securable-guest-memory.h | 86 +++++++++++++++ include/hw/boards.h | 2 +- include/hw/ppc/pef.h | 26 +++++ include/hw/s390x/pv.h | 1 + include/qemu/typedefs.h | 1 + include/qom/object.h | 3 +- include/sysemu/kvm.h | 17 --- include/sysemu/sev.h | 5 +- qom/object.c | 4 +- softmmu/vl.c | 16 ++- target/i386/kvm.c | 12 ++ target/i386/monitor.c | 1 - target/i386/sev.c | 153 ++++++++++++-------------- target/ppc/kvm.c | 18 --- target/ppc/kvm_ppc.h | 6 - target/s390x/kvm.c | 3 + 27 files changed, 510 insertions(+), 204 deletions(-) create mode 100644 backends/securable-guest-memory.c create mode 100644 hw/ppc/pef.c create mode 100644 include/exec/securable-guest-memory.h create mode 100644 include/hw/ppc/pef.h