| Message ID | 01ba3a317e54756593e54b7029e7df846c33d3e4.1588234824.git.ashish.kalra@amd.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
| Series | Add AMD SEV guest live migration support | expand |
On 2020-04-30 08:42:37 +0000, Ashish Kalra wrote: > From: Brijesh Singh <Brijesh.Singh@amd.com> > > The command finalize the guest receiving process and make the SEV guest > ready for the execution. > > Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> > Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> > Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> > Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> > Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com> > Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org> > Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> > Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> > Cc: x86@kernel.org > Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org > Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org > Reviewed-by: Steve Rutherford <srutherford@google.com> > Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> > Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com> > --- > .../virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst | 8 +++++++ > arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++ > 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst > index 554aa33a99cc..93cd95d9a6c0 100644 > --- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst > +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst > @@ -375,6 +375,14 @@ Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error > __u32 trans_len; > }; > > +15. KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_FINISH > +------------------------ > + > +After completion of the migration flow, the KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_FINISH command can be > +issued by the hypervisor to make the guest ready for execution. > + > +Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error > + > References > ========== > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c > index d5dfd0da53b9..1f9181e37ef0 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c > @@ -1327,6 +1327,26 @@ static int sev_receive_update_data(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) > return ret; > } > > +static int sev_receive_finish(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) > +{ > + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; > + struct sev_data_receive_finish *data; > + int ret; > + > + if (!sev_guest(kvm)) > + return -ENOTTY; What is the rationale for using -ENOTTY? Is it the best return value? Aren't one of -ENXIO, or -ENODEV, or -EINVAL a better choice? > + > + data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL); > + if (!data) > + return -ENOMEM; > + > + data->handle = sev->handle; > + ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_FINISH, data, &argp->error); > + > + kfree(data); > + return ret; > +} > + > int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) > { > struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd; > @@ -1386,6 +1406,9 @@ int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) > case KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA: > r = sev_receive_update_data(kvm, &sev_cmd); > break; > + case KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_FINISH: > + r = sev_receive_finish(kvm, &sev_cmd); > + break; > default: > r = -EINVAL; > goto out; > -- > 2.17.1 >
diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst index 554aa33a99cc..93cd95d9a6c0 100644 --- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst @@ -375,6 +375,14 @@ Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error __u32 trans_len; }; +15. KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_FINISH +------------------------ + +After completion of the migration flow, the KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_FINISH command can be +issued by the hypervisor to make the guest ready for execution. + +Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error + References ========== diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c index d5dfd0da53b9..1f9181e37ef0 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c @@ -1327,6 +1327,26 @@ static int sev_receive_update_data(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) return ret; } +static int sev_receive_finish(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) +{ + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; + struct sev_data_receive_finish *data; + int ret; + + if (!sev_guest(kvm)) + return -ENOTTY; + + data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!data) + return -ENOMEM; + + data->handle = sev->handle; + ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_FINISH, data, &argp->error); + + kfree(data); + return ret; +} + int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) { struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd; @@ -1386,6 +1406,9 @@ int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) case KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA: r = sev_receive_update_data(kvm, &sev_cmd); break; + case KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_FINISH: + r = sev_receive_finish(kvm, &sev_cmd); + break; default: r = -EINVAL; goto out;