[RFC,02/27] KVM: x86: Introduce address_space_isolation module parameter

Commit Message

Alexandre Chartre May 13, 2019, 2:38 p.m. UTC

From: Liran Alon <[e-mail]>

Add the address_space_isolation parameter to the kvm module.

When set to true, KVM #VMExit handlers run in isolated address space
which maps only KVM required code and per-VM information instead of
entire kernel address space.

This mechanism is meant to mitigate memory-leak side-channels CPU
vulnerabilities (e.g. Spectre, L1TF and etc.) but can also be viewed
as security in-depth as it also helps generically against info-leaks
vulnerabilities in KVM #VMExit handlers and reduce the available
gadgets for ROP attacks.

This is set to false by default because it incurs a performance hit
which some users will not want to take for security gain.

Signed-off-by: Liran Alon <[e-mail]>
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Chartre <[e-mail]>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/Makefile    |    2 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/isolation.c |   26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/isolation.c

Comments

Andy Lutomirski May 13, 2019, 3:46 p.m. UTC | #1

On Mon, May 13, 2019 at 7:39 AM Alexandre Chartre
<[e-mail]> wrote:
>
> From: Liran Alon <[e-mail]>
>
> Add the address_space_isolation parameter to the kvm module.
>
> When set to true, KVM #VMExit handlers run in isolated address space
> which maps only KVM required code and per-VM information instead of
> entire kernel address space.

Does the *entry* also get isolated?  If not, it seems less useful for
side-channel mitigation.

Alexandre Chartre May 13, 2019, 3:55 p.m. UTC | #2

On 5/13/19 5:46 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Mon, May 13, 2019 at 7:39 AM Alexandre Chartre
> <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>
>> From: Liran Alon <[e-mail]>
>>
>> Add the address_space_isolation parameter to the kvm module.
>>
>> When set to true, KVM #VMExit handlers run in isolated address space
>> which maps only KVM required code and per-VM information instead of
>> entire kernel address space.
> 
> Does the *entry* also get isolated?  If not, it seems less useful for
> side-channel mitigation.
> 

Yes, context is switched before VM entry. We switch back to kernel address
space if VM-exit handler needs it or when exiting the KVM_RUN ioctl.

alex.

Patch

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/Makefile b/arch/x86/kvm/Makefile
index 31ecf7a..9f404e9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/Makefile
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@  kvm-$(CONFIG_KVM_ASYNC_PF)	+= $(KVM)/async_pf.o
 
 kvm-y			+= x86.o mmu.o emulate.o i8259.o irq.o lapic.o \
 			   i8254.o ioapic.o irq_comm.o cpuid.o pmu.o mtrr.o \
-			   hyperv.o page_track.o debugfs.o
+			   hyperv.o page_track.o debugfs.o isolation.o
 
 kvm-intel-y		+= vmx/vmx.o vmx/vmenter.o vmx/pmu_intel.o vmx/vmcs12.o vmx/evmcs.o vmx/nested.o
 kvm-amd-y		+= svm.o pmu_amd.o
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/isolation.c b/arch/x86/kvm/isolation.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e25f663
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/isolation.c
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ 
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2019, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * KVM Address Space Isolation
+ */
+
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/moduleparam.h>
+
+/*
+ * When set to true, KVM #VMExit handlers run in isolated address space
+ * which maps only KVM required code and per-VM information instead of
+ * entire kernel address space.
+ *
+ * This mechanism is meant to mitigate memory-leak side-channels CPU
+ * vulnerabilities (e.g. Spectre, L1TF and etc.) but can also be viewed
+ * as security in-depth as it also helps generically against info-leaks
+ * vulnerabilities in KVM #VMExit handlers and reduce the available
+ * gadgets for ROP attacks.
+ *
+ * This is set to false by default because it incurs a performance hit
+ * which some users will not want to take for security gain.
+ */
+static bool __read_mostly address_space_isolation;
+module_param(address_space_isolation, bool, 0444);