From patchwork Wed May 8 14:44:06 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: "Kirill A . Shutemov" X-Patchwork-Id: 10935959 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5AE851515 for ; Wed, 8 May 2019 14:48:15 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 488AD276D6 for ; Wed, 8 May 2019 14:48:15 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id 3B21928485; Wed, 8 May 2019 14:48:15 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-7.9 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI autolearn=unavailable version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9DA55276D6 for ; Wed, 8 May 2019 14:48:14 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727690AbfEHOrt (ORCPT ); Wed, 8 May 2019 10:47:49 -0400 Received: from mga03.intel.com ([134.134.136.65]:59540 "EHLO mga03.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1728435AbfEHOov (ORCPT ); Wed, 8 May 2019 10:44:51 -0400 X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from fmsmga005.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.32]) by orsmga103.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 08 May 2019 07:44:49 -0700 X-ExtLoop1: 1 Received: from black.fi.intel.com ([10.237.72.28]) by fmsmga005.fm.intel.com with ESMTP; 08 May 2019 07:44:45 -0700 Received: by black.fi.intel.com (Postfix, from userid 1000) id 0BEE5F6B; Wed, 8 May 2019 17:44:31 +0300 (EEST) From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" To: Andrew Morton , x86@kernel.org, Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , "H. Peter Anvin" , Borislav Petkov , Peter Zijlstra , Andy Lutomirski , David Howells Cc: Kees Cook , Dave Hansen , Kai Huang , Jacob Pan , Alison Schofield , linux-mm@kvack.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, "Kirill A . Shutemov" Subject: [PATCH, RFC 46/62] x86/mm: Keep reference counts on encrypted VMAs for MKTME Date: Wed, 8 May 2019 17:44:06 +0300 Message-Id: <20190508144422.13171-47-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.20.1 In-Reply-To: <20190508144422.13171-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> References: <20190508144422.13171-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: kvm-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: kvm@vger.kernel.org X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP From: Alison Schofield The MKTME (Multi-Key Total Memory Encryption) Key Service needs a reference count on encrypted VMAs. This reference count is used to determine when a hardware encryption KeyID is no longer in use and can be freed and reassigned to another Userspace Key. The MKTME Key service does the percpu_ref_init and _kill, so these gets/puts on encrypted VMA's can be considered the intermediaries in the lifetime of the key. Increment/decrement the reference count during encrypt_mprotect() system call for initial or updated encryption on a VMA. Piggy back on the vm_area_dup/free() helpers. If the VMAs being duplicated, or freed are encrypted, adjust the reference count. Signed-off-by: Alison Schofield Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov --- arch/x86/include/asm/mktme.h | 5 +++++ arch/x86/mm/mktme.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- include/linux/mm.h | 2 ++ kernel/fork.c | 2 ++ 4 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mktme.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mktme.h index 0e6df07f1921..14da002d2e85 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mktme.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mktme.h @@ -16,6 +16,11 @@ extern int mktme_keyid_shift; extern void mprotect_set_encrypt(struct vm_area_struct *vma, int newkeyid, unsigned long start, unsigned long end); +/* MTKME encrypt_count for VMAs */ +extern struct percpu_ref *encrypt_count; +extern void vma_get_encrypt_ref(struct vm_area_struct *vma); +extern void vma_put_encrypt_ref(struct vm_area_struct *vma); + DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mktme_enabled_key); static inline bool mktme_enabled(void) { diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mktme.c b/arch/x86/mm/mktme.c index 91b49e88ca3f..df70651816a1 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/mktme.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mktme.c @@ -66,11 +66,12 @@ void mprotect_set_encrypt(struct vm_area_struct *vma, int newkeyid, if (oldkeyid == newkeyid) return; - + vma_put_encrypt_ref(vma); newprot = pgprot_val(vma->vm_page_prot); newprot &= ~mktme_keyid_mask; newprot |= (unsigned long)newkeyid << mktme_keyid_shift; vma->vm_page_prot = __pgprot(newprot); + vma_get_encrypt_ref(vma); /* * The VMA doesn't have any inherited pages. @@ -79,6 +80,18 @@ void mprotect_set_encrypt(struct vm_area_struct *vma, int newkeyid, unlink_anon_vmas(vma); } +void vma_get_encrypt_ref(struct vm_area_struct *vma) +{ + if (vma_keyid(vma)) + percpu_ref_get(&encrypt_count[vma_keyid(vma)]); +} + +void vma_put_encrypt_ref(struct vm_area_struct *vma) +{ + if (vma_keyid(vma)) + percpu_ref_put(&encrypt_count[vma_keyid(vma)]); +} + /* Prepare page to be used for encryption. Called from page allocator. */ void __prep_encrypted_page(struct page *page, int order, int keyid, bool zero) { @@ -102,6 +115,22 @@ void __prep_encrypted_page(struct page *page, int order, int keyid, bool zero) page++; } + + /* + * Make sure the KeyID cannot be freed until the last page that + * uses the KeyID is gone. + * + * This is required because the page may live longer than VMA it + * is mapped into (i.e. in get_user_pages() case) and having + * refcounting per-VMA is not enough. + * + * Taking a reference per-4K helps in case if the page will be + * split after the allocation. free_encrypted_page() will balance + * out the refcount even if the page was split and freed as bunch + * of 4K pages. + */ + + percpu_ref_get_many(&encrypt_count[keyid], 1 << order); } /* @@ -110,7 +139,9 @@ void __prep_encrypted_page(struct page *page, int order, int keyid, bool zero) */ void free_encrypted_page(struct page *page, int order) { - int i; + int i, keyid; + + keyid = page_keyid(page); /* * The hardware/CPU does not enforce coherency between mappings @@ -125,6 +156,8 @@ void free_encrypted_page(struct page *page, int order) lookup_page_ext(page)->keyid = 0; page++; } + + percpu_ref_put_many(&encrypt_count[keyid], 1 << order); } static int sync_direct_mapping_pte(unsigned long keyid, diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h index a7f52d053826..00c0fd70816b 100644 --- a/include/linux/mm.h +++ b/include/linux/mm.h @@ -2831,6 +2831,8 @@ static inline void mprotect_set_encrypt(struct vm_area_struct *vma, int newkeyid, unsigned long start, unsigned long end) {} +static inline void vma_get_encrypt_ref(struct vm_area_struct *vma) {} +static inline void vma_put_encrypt_ref(struct vm_area_struct *vma) {} #endif /* CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MKTME */ #endif /* __KERNEL__ */ #endif /* _LINUX_MM_H */ diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c index 9dcd18aa210b..f0e35ed76f5a 100644 --- a/kernel/fork.c +++ b/kernel/fork.c @@ -342,12 +342,14 @@ struct vm_area_struct *vm_area_dup(struct vm_area_struct *orig) if (new) { *new = *orig; INIT_LIST_HEAD(&new->anon_vma_chain); + vma_get_encrypt_ref(new); } return new; } void vm_area_free(struct vm_area_struct *vma) { + vma_put_encrypt_ref(vma); kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma); }