From patchwork Wed Jan 13 23:58:05 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: David Gibson X-Patchwork-Id: 12018201 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-18.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER, INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 11F32C072AD for ; Thu, 14 Jan 2021 01:53:49 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E45A72074A for ; Thu, 14 Jan 2021 01:53:48 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1728253AbhANBxo (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Jan 2021 20:53:44 -0500 Received: from bilbo.ozlabs.org ([203.11.71.1]:35947 "EHLO ozlabs.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1729680AbhAMX7J (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Jan 2021 18:59:09 -0500 Received: by ozlabs.org (Postfix, from userid 1007) id 4DGPXQ6v7Cz9sWk; Thu, 14 Jan 2021 10:58:14 +1100 (AEDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=gibson.dropbear.id.au; s=201602; t=1610582294; bh=idJr0chYvjooRoA3aqKnU601BZd17+94MhdcU47V62A=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=ZL+y3MKlNgB5V+HRIddau2xZRc6ivsKrn3t/xFPR8WxiViIiH2Xk6XkGU+p50nzp3 9PiQflWHy4l7o9AMlYI6cuxI6Ra0IMEMQUAlves2Zjz6icBTX85QlI1njCPu4/yEZ+ 0oS6eZN8sQ8K+HEg3dVIKHxSHipa8jKx9IAI+y9E= From: David Gibson To: brijesh.singh@amd.com, pair@us.ibm.com, dgilbert@redhat.com, pasic@linux.ibm.com, qemu-devel@nongnu.org Cc: cohuck@redhat.com, Richard Henderson , Marcelo Tosatti , David Hildenbrand , borntraeger@de.ibm.com, Marcel Apfelbaum , Paolo Bonzini , mst@redhat.com, jun.nakajima@intel.com, thuth@redhat.com, pragyansri.pathi@intel.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org, Eduardo Habkost , qemu-s390x@nongnu.org, qemu-ppc@nongnu.org, frankja@linux.ibm.com, Greg Kurz , mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com, David Gibson , berrange@redhat.com, andi.kleen@intel.com Subject: [PATCH v7 07/13] confidential guest support: Introduce cgs "ready" flag Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2021 10:58:05 +1100 Message-Id: <20210113235811.1909610-8-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.29.2 In-Reply-To: <20210113235811.1909610-1-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> References: <20210113235811.1909610-1-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: kvm@vger.kernel.org The platform specific details of mechanisms for implementing confidential guest support may require setup at various points during initialization. Thus, it's not really feasible to have a single cgs initialization hook, but instead each mechanism needs its own initialization calls in arch or machine specific code. However, to make it harder to have a bug where a mechanism isn't properly initialized under some circumstances, we want to have a common place, relatively late in boot, where we verify that cgs has been initialized if it was requested. This patch introduces a ready flag to the ConfidentialGuestSupport base type to accomplish this, which we verify just before the machine specific initialization function. Signed-off-by: David Gibson Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck --- hw/core/machine.c | 8 ++++++++ include/exec/confidential-guest-support.h | 2 ++ target/i386/sev.c | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+) diff --git a/hw/core/machine.c b/hw/core/machine.c index 94194ab82d..5a7433332b 100644 --- a/hw/core/machine.c +++ b/hw/core/machine.c @@ -1190,6 +1190,14 @@ void machine_run_board_init(MachineState *machine) } if (machine->cgs) { + /* + * Where confidential guest support is initialized depends on + * the specific mechanism in use. But, we need to make sure + * it's ready by now. If it isn't, that's a bug in the + * implementation of that cgs mechanism. + */ + assert(machine->cgs->ready); + /* * With confidential guests, the host can't see the real * contents of RAM, so there's no point in it trying to merge diff --git a/include/exec/confidential-guest-support.h b/include/exec/confidential-guest-support.h index 5f131023ba..bcaf6c9f49 100644 --- a/include/exec/confidential-guest-support.h +++ b/include/exec/confidential-guest-support.h @@ -27,6 +27,8 @@ OBJECT_DECLARE_SIMPLE_TYPE(ConfidentialGuestSupport, CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT) struct ConfidentialGuestSupport { Object parent; + + bool ready; }; typedef struct ConfidentialGuestSupportClass { diff --git a/target/i386/sev.c b/target/i386/sev.c index e2b41ef342..3d94635397 100644 --- a/target/i386/sev.c +++ b/target/i386/sev.c @@ -737,6 +737,8 @@ int sev_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp) qemu_add_machine_init_done_notifier(&sev_machine_done_notify); qemu_add_vm_change_state_handler(sev_vm_state_change, sev); + cgs->ready = true; + return 0; err: sev_guest = NULL;