From patchwork Tue Feb 2 04:13:10 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: David Gibson X-Patchwork-Id: 12060577 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-18.7 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER, INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED, USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id CD91BC433E6 for ; Tue, 2 Feb 2021 04:15:05 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A979264ED7 for ; Tue, 2 Feb 2021 04:15:05 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S231630AbhBBEO6 (ORCPT ); Mon, 1 Feb 2021 23:14:58 -0500 Received: from ozlabs.org ([203.11.71.1]:41063 "EHLO ozlabs.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S231603AbhBBEOp (ORCPT ); Mon, 1 Feb 2021 23:14:45 -0500 Received: by ozlabs.org (Postfix, from userid 1007) id 4DVBHz39fwz9tkx; Tue, 2 Feb 2021 15:13:19 +1100 (AEDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=gibson.dropbear.id.au; s=201602; t=1612239199; bh=EC9nTg+Uv3v+VvRKFWEjtF2Rk7pUODae9A3gtMZRc6Q=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=isurvp9Wqau9433wIFzYsTRwZtbwsrI/T8WfCTTV7juwUTbyw+YM3VrWT7kv6WBkG 7XspQYrSVJ2YnyAJsd65nx8PGfDUnQ+/o5qa7U2aq/x+R2Bri2Ypy68Eqf69EQ07yD R3kCDXWlmIsCagH/GsvJqGOg2ZSMkhBcPSS0Ftlc= From: David Gibson To: dgilbert@redhat.com, pair@us.ibm.com, qemu-devel@nongnu.org, brijesh.singh@amd.com, pasic@linux.ibm.com Cc: pragyansri.pathi@intel.com, Greg Kurz , richard.henderson@linaro.org, berrange@redhat.com, David Hildenbrand , mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org, Marcel Apfelbaum , pbonzini@redhat.com, mtosatti@redhat.com, borntraeger@de.ibm.com, Cornelia Huck , qemu-ppc@nongnu.org, David Gibson , qemu-s390x@nongnu.org, thuth@redhat.com, mst@redhat.com, frankja@linux.ibm.com, jun.nakajima@intel.com, andi.kleen@intel.com, Eduardo Habkost Subject: [PATCH v8 08/13] confidential guest support: Move SEV initialization into arch specific code Date: Tue, 2 Feb 2021 15:13:10 +1100 Message-Id: <20210202041315.196530-9-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.29.2 In-Reply-To: <20210202041315.196530-1-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> References: <20210202041315.196530-1-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: kvm@vger.kernel.org While we've abstracted some (potential) differences between mechanisms for securing guest memory, the initialization is still specific to SEV. Given that, move it into x86's kvm_arch_init() code, rather than the generic kvm_init() code. Signed-off-by: David Gibson Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz --- accel/kvm/kvm-all.c | 14 -------------- accel/kvm/sev-stub.c | 4 ++-- target/i386/kvm/kvm.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ target/i386/sev.c | 7 ++++++- 4 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) diff --git a/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c b/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c index 3d820d0c7d..7150acdbcc 100644 --- a/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c +++ b/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c @@ -2180,20 +2180,6 @@ static int kvm_init(MachineState *ms) kvm_state = s; - /* - * if memory encryption object is specified then initialize the memory - * encryption context. - */ - if (ms->cgs) { - Error *local_err = NULL; - /* FIXME handle mechanisms other than SEV */ - ret = sev_kvm_init(ms->cgs, &local_err); - if (ret < 0) { - error_report_err(local_err); - goto err; - } - } - ret = kvm_arch_init(ms, s); if (ret < 0) { goto err; diff --git a/accel/kvm/sev-stub.c b/accel/kvm/sev-stub.c index 512e205f7f..9587d1b2a3 100644 --- a/accel/kvm/sev-stub.c +++ b/accel/kvm/sev-stub.c @@ -17,6 +17,6 @@ int sev_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp) { - /* SEV can't be selected if it's not compiled */ - g_assert_not_reached(); + /* If we get here, cgs must be some non-SEV thing */ + return 0; } diff --git a/target/i386/kvm/kvm.c b/target/i386/kvm/kvm.c index 6dc1ee052d..4788139128 100644 --- a/target/i386/kvm/kvm.c +++ b/target/i386/kvm/kvm.c @@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ #include "hw/i386/intel_iommu.h" #include "hw/i386/x86-iommu.h" #include "hw/i386/e820_memory_layout.h" +#include "sysemu/sev.h" #include "hw/pci/pci.h" #include "hw/pci/msi.h" @@ -2135,6 +2136,25 @@ int kvm_arch_init(MachineState *ms, KVMState *s) uint64_t shadow_mem; int ret; struct utsname utsname; + Error *local_err = NULL; + + /* + * Initialize SEV context, if required + * + * If no memory encryption is requested (ms->cgs == NULL) this is + * a no-op. + * + * It's also a no-op if a non-SEV confidential guest support + * mechanism is selected. SEV is the only mechanism available to + * select on x86 at present, so this doesn't arise, but if new + * mechanisms are supported in future (e.g. TDX), they'll need + * their own initialization either here or elsewhere. + */ + ret = sev_kvm_init(ms->cgs, &local_err); + if (ret < 0) { + error_report_err(local_err); + return ret; + } if (!kvm_check_extension(s, KVM_CAP_IRQ_ROUTING)) { error_report("kvm: KVM_CAP_IRQ_ROUTING not supported by KVM"); diff --git a/target/i386/sev.c b/target/i386/sev.c index f9e9b5d8ae..11c9a3cc21 100644 --- a/target/i386/sev.c +++ b/target/i386/sev.c @@ -664,13 +664,18 @@ sev_vm_state_change(void *opaque, int running, RunState state) int sev_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp) { - SevGuestState *sev = SEV_GUEST(cgs); + SevGuestState *sev + = (SevGuestState *)object_dynamic_cast(OBJECT(cgs), TYPE_SEV_GUEST); char *devname; int ret, fw_error; uint32_t ebx; uint32_t host_cbitpos; struct sev_user_data_status status = {}; + if (!sev) { + return 0; + } + ret = ram_block_discard_disable(true); if (ret) { error_report("%s: cannot disable RAM discard", __func__);