From patchwork Wed Dec 22 12:40:31 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Jing Liu X-Patchwork-Id: 12691525 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 10CDDC433FE for ; Wed, 22 Dec 2021 12:40:57 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S244936AbhLVMkz (ORCPT ); Wed, 22 Dec 2021 07:40:55 -0500 Received: from mga14.intel.com ([192.55.52.115]:11431 "EHLO mga14.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S244921AbhLVMky (ORCPT ); Wed, 22 Dec 2021 07:40:54 -0500 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=intel.com; i=@intel.com; q=dns/txt; s=Intel; t=1640176854; x=1671712854; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to: references:mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=Z5RSfKMnkkaLro1yBDNL6KUk/annZZwjWyYEhvP3jZE=; b=aKDUGm79JLZacwLV0KueGYCzH8YyyDFK3OsV7v4/GVPRsnGTrqNLhexf rbtW+vXOR11b/Z7jJlkm2CU9u8yQURN432wcB3GPcNcFgYInJaIXucq67 O2Ax6IKfy/ieD2NdOAOqmXZi/7AW7hup4G63lfqs8JnOd2S1pFg9A1My9 g5npQgIknKin/0XbmoIrXcRdRGHbsKqATQ+BBEKTXP5eCzD0HgSPfBh2h 9BJusbVvlqJVfOZEgqV+b/vS2bTWF1Tcw3/ET3N2bn7xvqkYFz+ZPUwg7 jyXNOk+gpenuMzNwFlWMUXZ28TdMq6lCG+KZg5F5zRjRbm8riP/LukXn2 A==; X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6200,9189,10205"; a="240833403" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.88,226,1635231600"; d="scan'208";a="240833403" Received: from fmsmga004.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.48]) by fmsmga103.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 22 Dec 2021 04:40:54 -0800 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.88,226,1635231600"; d="scan'208";a="587002693" Received: from 984fee00a228.jf.intel.com ([10.165.56.59]) by fmsmga004.fm.intel.com with ESMTP; 22 Dec 2021 04:40:53 -0800 From: Jing Liu To: x86@kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, corbet@lwn.net, shuah@kernel.org Cc: seanjc@google.com, jun.nakajima@intel.com, kevin.tian@intel.com, jing2.liu@linux.intel.com, jing2.liu@intel.com, guang.zeng@intel.com, wei.w.wang@intel.com, yang.zhong@intel.com Subject: [PATCH v3 01/22] x86/fpu: Extend fpu_xstate_prctl() with guest permissions Date: Wed, 22 Dec 2021 04:40:31 -0800 Message-Id: <20211222124052.644626-2-jing2.liu@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.27.0 In-Reply-To: <20211222124052.644626-1-jing2.liu@intel.com> References: <20211222124052.644626-1-jing2.liu@intel.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: kvm@vger.kernel.org From: Thomas Gleixner KVM requires a clear separation of host user space and guest permissions for dynamic XSTATE components. Add a guest permissions member to struct fpu and a separate set of prctl() arguments: ARCH_GET_XCOMP_GUEST_PERM and ARCH_REQ_XCOMP_GUEST_PERM. The semantics are equivalent to the host user space permission control except for the following constraints: 1) Permissions have to be requested before the first vCPU is created 2) Permissions are frozen when the first vCPU is created to ensure consistency. Any attempt to expand permissions via the prctl() after that point is rejected. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Signed-off-by: Jing Liu --- arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/api.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h | 9 ++++++ arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h | 26 ++++++++------- arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c | 3 ++ arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------- arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.h | 13 ++++++-- arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 2 ++ 7 files changed, 80 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/api.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/api.h index c2767a6a387e..d8c222290e68 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/api.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/api.h @@ -132,6 +132,8 @@ static inline void fpstate_free(struct fpu *fpu) { } /* fpstate-related functions which are exported to KVM */ extern void fpstate_clear_xstate_component(struct fpstate *fps, unsigned int xfeature); +extern inline u64 xstate_get_guest_group_perm(void); + /* KVM specific functions */ extern bool fpu_alloc_guest_fpstate(struct fpu_guest *gfpu); extern void fpu_free_guest_fpstate(struct fpu_guest *gfpu); diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h index 3c06c82ab355..6ddf80637697 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h @@ -387,6 +387,8 @@ struct fpstate { /* @regs is dynamically sized! Don't add anything after @regs! */ } __aligned(64); +#define FPU_GUEST_PERM_LOCKED BIT_ULL(63) + struct fpu_state_perm { /* * @__state_perm: @@ -476,6 +478,13 @@ struct fpu { */ struct fpu_state_perm perm; + /* + * @guest_perm: + * + * Permission related information for guest pseudo FPUs + */ + struct fpu_state_perm guest_perm; + /* * @__fpstate: * diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h index 754a07856817..500b96e71f18 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h @@ -2,20 +2,22 @@ #ifndef _ASM_X86_PRCTL_H #define _ASM_X86_PRCTL_H -#define ARCH_SET_GS 0x1001 -#define ARCH_SET_FS 0x1002 -#define ARCH_GET_FS 0x1003 -#define ARCH_GET_GS 0x1004 +#define ARCH_SET_GS 0x1001 +#define ARCH_SET_FS 0x1002 +#define ARCH_GET_FS 0x1003 +#define ARCH_GET_GS 0x1004 -#define ARCH_GET_CPUID 0x1011 -#define ARCH_SET_CPUID 0x1012 +#define ARCH_GET_CPUID 0x1011 +#define ARCH_SET_CPUID 0x1012 -#define ARCH_GET_XCOMP_SUPP 0x1021 -#define ARCH_GET_XCOMP_PERM 0x1022 -#define ARCH_REQ_XCOMP_PERM 0x1023 +#define ARCH_GET_XCOMP_SUPP 0x1021 +#define ARCH_GET_XCOMP_PERM 0x1022 +#define ARCH_REQ_XCOMP_PERM 0x1023 +#define ARCH_GET_XCOMP_GUEST_PERM 0x1024 +#define ARCH_REQ_XCOMP_GUEST_PERM 0x1025 -#define ARCH_MAP_VDSO_X32 0x2001 -#define ARCH_MAP_VDSO_32 0x2002 -#define ARCH_MAP_VDSO_64 0x2003 +#define ARCH_MAP_VDSO_X32 0x2001 +#define ARCH_MAP_VDSO_32 0x2002 +#define ARCH_MAP_VDSO_64 0x2003 #endif /* _ASM_X86_PRCTL_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c index 8ea306b1bf8e..ab19b3d8b2f7 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c @@ -450,6 +450,8 @@ void fpstate_reset(struct fpu *fpu) fpu->perm.__state_perm = fpu_kernel_cfg.default_features; fpu->perm.__state_size = fpu_kernel_cfg.default_size; fpu->perm.__user_state_size = fpu_user_cfg.default_size; + /* Same defaults for guests */ + fpu->guest_perm = fpu->perm; } static inline void fpu_inherit_perms(struct fpu *dst_fpu) @@ -460,6 +462,7 @@ static inline void fpu_inherit_perms(struct fpu *dst_fpu) spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock); /* Fork also inherits the permissions of the parent */ dst_fpu->perm = src_fpu->perm; + dst_fpu->guest_perm = src_fpu->guest_perm; spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock); } } diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c index d28829403ed0..5f01d463859d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c @@ -1595,7 +1595,7 @@ static int validate_sigaltstack(unsigned int usize) return 0; } -static int __xstate_request_perm(u64 permitted, u64 requested) +static int __xstate_request_perm(u64 permitted, u64 requested, bool guest) { /* * This deliberately does not exclude !XSAVES as we still might @@ -1605,9 +1605,10 @@ static int __xstate_request_perm(u64 permitted, u64 requested) */ bool compacted = cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_XSAVES); struct fpu *fpu = ¤t->group_leader->thread.fpu; + struct fpu_state_perm *perm; unsigned int ksize, usize; u64 mask; - int ret; + int ret = 0; /* Check whether fully enabled */ if ((permitted & requested) == requested) @@ -1621,15 +1622,18 @@ static int __xstate_request_perm(u64 permitted, u64 requested) mask &= XFEATURE_MASK_USER_SUPPORTED; usize = xstate_calculate_size(mask, false); - ret = validate_sigaltstack(usize); - if (ret) - return ret; + if (!guest) { + ret = validate_sigaltstack(usize); + if (ret) + return ret; + } + perm = guest ? &fpu->guest_perm : &fpu->perm; /* Pairs with the READ_ONCE() in xstate_get_group_perm() */ - WRITE_ONCE(fpu->perm.__state_perm, requested); + WRITE_ONCE(perm->__state_perm, requested); /* Protected by sighand lock */ - fpu->perm.__state_size = ksize; - fpu->perm.__user_state_size = usize; + perm->__state_size = ksize; + perm->__user_state_size = usize; return ret; } @@ -1640,7 +1644,7 @@ static const u64 xstate_prctl_req[XFEATURE_MAX] = { [XFEATURE_XTILE_DATA] = XFEATURE_MASK_XTILE_DATA, }; -static int xstate_request_perm(unsigned long idx) +static int xstate_request_perm(unsigned long idx, bool guest) { u64 permitted, requested; int ret; @@ -1661,14 +1665,19 @@ static int xstate_request_perm(unsigned long idx) return -EOPNOTSUPP; /* Lockless quick check */ - permitted = xstate_get_host_group_perm(); + permitted = xstate_get_group_perm(guest); if ((permitted & requested) == requested) return 0; /* Protect against concurrent modifications */ spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock); - permitted = xstate_get_host_group_perm(); - ret = __xstate_request_perm(permitted, requested); + permitted = xstate_get_group_perm(guest); + + /* First vCPU allocation locks the permissions. */ + if (guest && (permitted & FPU_GUEST_PERM_LOCKED)) + ret = -EBUSY; + else + ret = __xstate_request_perm(permitted, requested, guest); spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock); return ret; } @@ -1713,12 +1722,18 @@ int xfd_enable_feature(u64 xfd_err) return 0; } #else /* CONFIG_X86_64 */ -static inline int xstate_request_perm(unsigned long idx) +static inline int xstate_request_perm(unsigned long idx, bool guest) { return -EPERM; } #endif /* !CONFIG_X86_64 */ +inline u64 xstate_get_guest_group_perm(void) +{ + return xstate_get_group_perm(true); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xstate_get_guest_group_perm); + /** * fpu_xstate_prctl - xstate permission operations * @tsk: Redundant pointer to current @@ -1742,6 +1757,7 @@ long fpu_xstate_prctl(struct task_struct *tsk, int option, unsigned long arg2) u64 __user *uptr = (u64 __user *)arg2; u64 permitted, supported; unsigned long idx = arg2; + bool guest = false; if (tsk != current) return -EPERM; @@ -1760,11 +1776,20 @@ long fpu_xstate_prctl(struct task_struct *tsk, int option, unsigned long arg2) permitted &= XFEATURE_MASK_USER_SUPPORTED; return put_user(permitted, uptr); + case ARCH_GET_XCOMP_GUEST_PERM: + permitted = xstate_get_guest_group_perm(); + permitted &= XFEATURE_MASK_USER_SUPPORTED; + return put_user(permitted, uptr); + + case ARCH_REQ_XCOMP_GUEST_PERM: + guest = true; + fallthrough; + case ARCH_REQ_XCOMP_PERM: if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64)) return -EOPNOTSUPP; - return xstate_request_perm(idx); + return xstate_request_perm(idx, guest); default: return -EINVAL; diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.h b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.h index 86ea7c0fa2f6..98a472775c97 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.h +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.h @@ -20,10 +20,19 @@ static inline void xstate_init_xcomp_bv(struct xregs_state *xsave, u64 mask) xsave->header.xcomp_bv = mask | XCOMP_BV_COMPACTED_FORMAT; } -static inline u64 xstate_get_host_group_perm(void) +static inline u64 xstate_get_group_perm(bool guest) { + struct fpu *fpu = ¤t->group_leader->thread.fpu; + struct fpu_state_perm *perm; + /* Pairs with WRITE_ONCE() in xstate_request_perm() */ - return READ_ONCE(current->group_leader->thread.fpu.perm.__state_perm); + perm = guest ? &fpu->guest_perm : &fpu->perm; + return READ_ONCE(perm->__state_perm); +} + +static inline u64 xstate_get_host_group_perm(void) +{ + return xstate_get_group_perm(false); } enum xstate_copy_mode { diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c index 04143a653a8a..d7bc23589062 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c @@ -993,6 +993,8 @@ long do_arch_prctl_common(struct task_struct *task, int option, case ARCH_GET_XCOMP_SUPP: case ARCH_GET_XCOMP_PERM: case ARCH_REQ_XCOMP_PERM: + case ARCH_GET_XCOMP_GUEST_PERM: + case ARCH_REQ_XCOMP_GUEST_PERM: return fpu_xstate_prctl(task, option, arg2); }