[5.4,15/37] x86/bugs: Split spectre_v2_select_mitigation() and spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation()

Commit Message

Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo Oct. 3, 2022, 1:10 p.m. UTC

From: Peter Zijlstra <[e-mail]>

commit 166115c08a9b0b846b783088808a27d739be6e8d upstream.

retbleed will depend on spectre_v2, while spectre_v2_user depends on
retbleed. Break this cycle.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[e-mail]>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[e-mail]>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <[e-mail]>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[e-mail]>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <[e-mail]>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

Patch

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 497562e78876..74f81db13585 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -36,8 +36,9 @@ 
 #include "cpu.h"
 
 static void __init spectre_v1_select_mitigation(void);
-static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void);
 static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void);
+static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void);
+static void __init spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(void);
 static void __init ssb_select_mitigation(void);
 static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void);
 static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void);
@@ -136,13 +137,19 @@  void __init check_bugs(void)
 
 	/* Select the proper CPU mitigations before patching alternatives: */
 	spectre_v1_select_mitigation();
+	spectre_v2_select_mitigation();
+	/*
+	 * retbleed_select_mitigation() relies on the state set by
+	 * spectre_v2_select_mitigation(); specifically it wants to know about
+	 * spectre_v2=ibrs.
+	 */
 	retbleed_select_mitigation();
 	/*
-	 * spectre_v2_select_mitigation() relies on the state set by
+	 * spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation() relies on the state set by
 	 * retbleed_select_mitigation(); specifically the STIBP selection is
 	 * forced for UNRET.
 	 */
-	spectre_v2_select_mitigation();
+	spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation();
 	ssb_select_mitigation();
 	l1tf_select_mitigation();
 	md_clear_select_mitigation();
@@ -918,13 +925,15 @@  static void __init spec_v2_user_print_cond(const char *reason, bool secure)
 		pr_info("spectre_v2_user=%s forced on command line.\n", reason);
 }
 
+static __ro_after_init enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd spectre_v2_cmd;
+
 static enum spectre_v2_user_cmd __init
-spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd)
+spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(void)
 {
 	char arg[20];
 	int ret, i;
 
-	switch (v2_cmd) {
+	switch (spectre_v2_cmd) {
 	case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE:
 		return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_NONE;
 	case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE:
@@ -959,7 +968,7 @@  static inline bool spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode)
 }
 
 static void __init
-spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd)
+spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(void)
 {
 	enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE;
 	bool smt_possible = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP);
@@ -972,7 +981,7 @@  spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd)
 	    cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_NOT_SUPPORTED)
 		smt_possible = false;
 
-	cmd = spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(v2_cmd);
+	cmd = spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline();
 	switch (cmd) {
 	case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_NONE:
 		goto set_mode;
@@ -1289,7 +1298,7 @@  static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
 	}
 
 	/* Set up IBPB and STIBP depending on the general spectre V2 command */
-	spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(cmd);
+	spectre_v2_cmd = cmd;
 }
 
 static void update_stibp_msr(void * __unused)