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Peter Anvin" , Ingo Molnar , Joao Martins , Jonathan Corbet , Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk , "Paolo Bonzini" , Sean Christopherson , Thomas Gleixner , David Woodhouse , Greg Kroah-Hartman , Juergen Gross , Peter Zijlstra , Tony Luck , Tom Lendacky , "Alexey Kardashevskiy" , , , Subject: [PATCH v8 7/8] x86/cpu: Support AMD Automatic IBRS Date: Mon, 23 Jan 2023 16:56:59 -0600 Message-ID: <20230123225700.2224063-8-kim.phillips@amd.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.34.1 In-Reply-To: <20230123225700.2224063-1-kim.phillips@amd.com> References: <20230123225700.2224063-1-kim.phillips@amd.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Originating-IP: [10.180.168.240] X-ClientProxiedBy: SATLEXMB04.amd.com (10.181.40.145) To SATLEXMB04.amd.com (10.181.40.145) X-EOPAttributedMessage: 0 X-MS-PublicTrafficType: Email X-MS-TrafficTypeDiagnostic: BN8NAM11FT030:EE_|SN7PR12MB6765:EE_ X-MS-Office365-Filtering-Correlation-Id: 63fd96f7-065c-4500-3bd8-08dafd955db1 X-MS-Exchange-SenderADCheck: 1 X-MS-Exchange-AntiSpam-Relay: 0 X-Microsoft-Antispam: BCL:0; X-Microsoft-Antispam-Message-Info: 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 X-Forefront-Antispam-Report: CIP:165.204.84.17;CTRY:US;LANG:en;SCL:1;SRV:;IPV:CAL;SFV:NSPM;H:SATLEXMB04.amd.com;PTR:InfoDomainNonexistent;CAT:NONE;SFS:(13230022)(4636009)(346002)(396003)(39860400002)(136003)(376002)(451199015)(46966006)(40470700004)(36840700001)(36860700001)(83380400001)(82310400005)(81166007)(82740400003)(7416002)(41300700001)(86362001)(356005)(44832011)(2906002)(8936002)(5660300002)(4326008)(40460700003)(40480700001)(16526019)(8676002)(6916009)(26005)(186003)(6666004)(47076005)(336012)(426003)(70206006)(316002)(70586007)(2616005)(54906003)(1076003)(478600001)(7696005)(36756003)(36900700001);DIR:OUT;SFP:1101; X-OriginatorOrg: amd.com X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-OriginalArrivalTime: 23 Jan 2023 22:58:38.9728 (UTC) X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-Network-Message-Id: 63fd96f7-065c-4500-3bd8-08dafd955db1 X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-Id: 3dd8961f-e488-4e60-8e11-a82d994e183d X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-OriginalAttributedTenantConnectingIp: TenantId=3dd8961f-e488-4e60-8e11-a82d994e183d;Ip=[165.204.84.17];Helo=[SATLEXMB04.amd.com] X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-AuthSource: BN8NAM11FT030.eop-nam11.prod.protection.outlook.com X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-AuthAs: Anonymous X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-FromEntityHeader: HybridOnPrem X-MS-Exchange-Transport-CrossTenantHeadersStamped: SN7PR12MB6765 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: kvm@vger.kernel.org The AMD Zen4 core supports a new feature called Automatic IBRS. It is a "set-and-forget" feature that means that, like Intel's Enhanced IBRS, h/w manages its IBRS mitigation resources automatically across CPL transitions. The feature is advertised by CPUID_Fn80000021_EAX bit 8 and is enabled by setting MSR C000_0080 (EFER) bit 21. Enable Automatic IBRS by default if the CPU feature is present. It typically provides greater performance over the incumbent generic retpolines mitigation. Reuse the SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS spectre_v2_mitigation enum. AMD Automatic IBRS and Intel Enhanced IBRS have similar enablement. Add NO_EIBRS_PBRSB to cpu_vuln_whitelist, since AMD Automatic IBRS isn't affected by PBRSB-eIBRS. The kernel command line option spectre_v2=eibrs is used to select AMD Automatic IBRS, if available. Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips Acked-by: Dave Hansen --- Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst | 6 +++--- .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 6 +++--- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 20 +++++++++++-------- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 19 ++++++++++-------- 6 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst index c4dcdb3d0d45..3fe6511c5405 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst @@ -610,9 +610,9 @@ kernel command line. retpoline,generic Retpolines retpoline,lfence LFENCE; indirect branch retpoline,amd alias for retpoline,lfence - eibrs enhanced IBRS - eibrs,retpoline enhanced IBRS + Retpolines - eibrs,lfence enhanced IBRS + LFENCE + eibrs Enhanced/Auto IBRS + eibrs,retpoline Enhanced/Auto IBRS + Retpolines + eibrs,lfence Enhanced/Auto IBRS + LFENCE ibrs use IBRS to protect kernel Not specifying this option is equivalent to diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt index 6cfa6e3996cf..839fa0fefb58 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -5729,9 +5729,9 @@ retpoline,generic - Retpolines retpoline,lfence - LFENCE; indirect branch retpoline,amd - alias for retpoline,lfence - eibrs - enhanced IBRS - eibrs,retpoline - enhanced IBRS + Retpolines - eibrs,lfence - enhanced IBRS + LFENCE + eibrs - Enhanced/Auto IBRS + eibrs,retpoline - Enhanced/Auto IBRS + Retpolines + eibrs,lfence - Enhanced/Auto IBRS + LFENCE ibrs - use IBRS to protect kernel Not specifying this option is equivalent to diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h index 6dcc3c3d0c8d..7b319acda31a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -432,6 +432,7 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_NO_NESTED_DATA_BP (20*32+ 0) /* "" No Nested Data Breakpoints */ #define X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC (20*32+ 2) /* "" LFENCE always serializing / synchronizes RDTSC */ #define X86_FEATURE_NULL_SEL_CLR_BASE (20*32+ 6) /* "" Null Selector Clears Base */ +#define X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS (20*32+ 8) /* "" Automatic IBRS */ #define X86_FEATURE_NO_SMM_CTL_MSR (20*32+ 9) /* "" SMM_CTL MSR is not present */ /* diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h index 47878f048aa6..b78336599247 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ #define _EFER_SVME 12 /* Enable virtualization */ #define _EFER_LMSLE 13 /* Long Mode Segment Limit Enable */ #define _EFER_FFXSR 14 /* Enable Fast FXSAVE/FXRSTOR */ +#define _EFER_AUTOIBRS 21 /* Enable Automatic IBRS */ #define EFER_SCE (1<<_EFER_SCE) #define EFER_LME (1<<_EFER_LME) @@ -33,6 +34,7 @@ #define EFER_SVME (1<<_EFER_SVME) #define EFER_LMSLE (1<<_EFER_LMSLE) #define EFER_FFXSR (1<<_EFER_FFXSR) +#define EFER_AUTOIBRS (1<<_EFER_AUTOIBRS) /* Intel MSRs. Some also available on other CPUs */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 4a0add86c182..cf81848b72f4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -1238,9 +1238,9 @@ static const char * const spectre_v2_strings[] = { [SPECTRE_V2_NONE] = "Vulnerable", [SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE] = "Mitigation: Retpolines", [SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE] = "Mitigation: LFENCE", - [SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS] = "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS", - [SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE] = "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS + LFENCE", - [SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE] = "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS + Retpolines", + [SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS] = "Mitigation: Enhanced / Automatic IBRS", + [SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE] = "Mitigation: Enhanced / Automatic IBRS + LFENCE", + [SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE] = "Mitigation: Enhanced / Automatic IBRS + Retpolines", [SPECTRE_V2_IBRS] = "Mitigation: IBRS", }; @@ -1309,7 +1309,7 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void) cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE || cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_RETPOLINE) && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED)) { - pr_err("%s selected but CPU doesn't have eIBRS. Switching to AUTO select\n", + pr_err("%s selected but CPU doesn't have Enhanced or Automatic IBRS. Switching to AUTO select\n", mitigation_options[i].option); return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO; } @@ -1495,8 +1495,12 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) pr_err(SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_EBPF_MSG); if (spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(mode)) { - x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_IBRS; - update_spec_ctrl(x86_spec_ctrl_base); + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS)) { + msr_set_bit(MSR_EFER, _EFER_AUTOIBRS); + } else { + x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_IBRS; + update_spec_ctrl(x86_spec_ctrl_base); + } } switch (mode) { @@ -1580,8 +1584,8 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) /* * Retpoline protects the kernel, but doesn't protect firmware. IBRS * and Enhanced IBRS protect firmware too, so enable IBRS around - * firmware calls only when IBRS / Enhanced IBRS aren't otherwise - * enabled. + * firmware calls only when IBRS / Enhanced / Automatic IBRS aren't + * otherwise enabled. * * Use "mode" to check Enhanced IBRS instead of boot_cpu_has(), because * the user might select retpoline on the kernel command line and if diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c index 162352d42ce0..8ce67a8a61a6 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -1229,8 +1229,8 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = { VULNWL_AMD(0x12, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO), /* FAMILY_ANY must be last, otherwise 0x0f - 0x12 matches won't work */ - VULNWL_AMD(X86_FAMILY_ANY, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO), - VULNWL_HYGON(X86_FAMILY_ANY, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO), + VULNWL_AMD(X86_FAMILY_ANY, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO | NO_EIBRS_PBRSB), + VULNWL_HYGON(X86_FAMILY_ANY, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO | NO_EIBRS_PBRSB), /* Zhaoxin Family 7 */ VULNWL(CENTAUR, 7, X86_MODEL_ANY, NO_SPECTRE_V2 | NO_SWAPGS | NO_MMIO), @@ -1341,8 +1341,16 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSB_NO)) setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS); - if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL) + /* + * AMD's AutoIBRS is equivalent to Intel's eIBRS - use the Intel feature + * flag and protect from vendor-specific bugs via the whitelist. + */ + if ((ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL) || cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS)) { setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED); + if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_EIBRS_PBRSB) && + !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO)) + setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB); + } if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MDS) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO)) { @@ -1404,11 +1412,6 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED); } - if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED) && - !cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_EIBRS_PBRSB) && - !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO)) - setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB); - if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN)) return;