diff mbox series

[v3,15/27] KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED event_data

Message ID 20241001050110.3643764-16-xin@zytor.com (mailing list archive)
State New, archived
Headers show
Series Enable FRED with KVM VMX | expand

Commit Message

Xin Li Oct. 1, 2024, 5 a.m. UTC 
From: Xin Li <xin3.li@intel.com>

Set injected-event data when injecting a #PF, #DB, or #NM caused
by extended feature disable using FRED event delivery, and save
original-event data for being used as injected-event data.

Unlike IDT using some extra CPU register as part of an event
context, e.g., %cr2 for #PF, FRED saves a complete event context
in its stack frame, e.g., FRED saves the faulting linear address
of a #PF into the event data field defined in its stack frame.

Thus a new VMX control field called injected-event data is added
to provide the event data that will be pushed into a FRED stack
frame for VM entries that inject an event using FRED event delivery.
In addition, a new VM exit information field called original-event
data is added to store the event data that would have saved into a
FRED stack frame for VM exits that occur during FRED event delivery.
After such a VM exit is handled to allow the original-event to be
delivered, the data in the original-event data VMCS field needs to
be set into the injected-event data VMCS field for the injection of
the original event.

Signed-off-by: Xin Li <xin3.li@intel.com>
[ Sean: reworked event data injection for nested ]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Li (Intel) <xin@zytor.com>
Tested-by: Shan Kang <shan.kang@intel.com>
---

Changes since v2:
* Rework event data injection for nested (Chao Gao & Sean Christopherson).

Changes since v1:
* Document event data should be equal to CR2/DR6/IA32_XFD_ERR instead
  of using WARN_ON() (Chao Gao).
* Zero event data if a #NM was not caused by extended feature disable
  (Chao Gao).
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h |  3 ++-
 arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h      |  4 ++++
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c          |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c          | 22 ++++++++++++++++++----
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c              | 16 +++++++++++++++-
 5 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index 43b08d12cb32..b9b82aaea9a3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -736,6 +736,7 @@  struct kvm_queued_exception {
 	u32 error_code;
 	unsigned long payload;
 	bool has_payload;
+	u64 event_data;
 };
 
 struct kvm_vcpu_arch {
@@ -2113,7 +2114,7 @@  void kvm_queue_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned nr);
 void kvm_queue_exception_e(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned nr, u32 error_code);
 void kvm_queue_exception_p(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned nr, unsigned long payload);
 void kvm_requeue_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned int nr,
-			   bool has_error_code, u32 error_code);
+			   bool has_error_code, u32 error_code, u64 event_data);
 void kvm_inject_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct x86_exception *fault);
 void kvm_inject_emulated_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 				    struct x86_exception *fault);
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
index 5184e03945dd..3696e763c231 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
@@ -265,8 +265,12 @@  enum vmcs_field {
 	PID_POINTER_TABLE_HIGH		= 0x00002043,
 	SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_CONTROLS	= 0x00002044,
 	SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_CONTROLS_HIGH	= 0x00002045,
+	INJECTED_EVENT_DATA		= 0x00002052,
+	INJECTED_EVENT_DATA_HIGH	= 0x00002053,
 	GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS          = 0x00002400,
 	GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS_HIGH     = 0x00002401,
+	ORIGINAL_EVENT_DATA		= 0x00002404,
+	ORIGINAL_EVENT_DATA_HIGH	= 0x00002405,
 	VMCS_LINK_POINTER               = 0x00002800,
 	VMCS_LINK_POINTER_HIGH          = 0x00002801,
 	GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL             = 0x00002802,
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index d9e2568bcd54..7fa8f842f116 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -4126,7 +4126,7 @@  static void svm_complete_interrupts(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 
 		kvm_requeue_exception(vcpu, vector,
 				      exitintinfo & SVM_EXITINTINFO_VALID_ERR,
-				      error_code);
+				      error_code, 0);
 		break;
 	}
 	case SVM_EXITINTINFO_TYPE_INTR:
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 686006fe6d45..d81144bd648f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -1915,6 +1915,9 @@  void vmx_inject_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 
 	vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD, intr_info);
 
+	if (is_fred_enabled(vcpu))
+		vmcs_write64(INJECTED_EVENT_DATA, ex->event_data);
+
 	vmx_clear_hlt(vcpu);
 }
 
@@ -7241,7 +7244,8 @@  static void vmx_recover_nmi_blocking(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
 static void __vmx_complete_interrupts(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 				      u32 idt_vectoring_info,
 				      int instr_len_field,
-				      int error_code_field)
+				      int error_code_field,
+				      int event_data_field)
 {
 	u8 vector;
 	int type;
@@ -7276,13 +7280,17 @@  static void __vmx_complete_interrupts(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 		fallthrough;
 	case INTR_TYPE_HARD_EXCEPTION: {
 		u32 error_code = 0;
+		u64 event_data = 0;
 
 		if (idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK)
 			error_code = vmcs_read32(error_code_field);
+		if (is_fred_enabled(vcpu))
+			event_data = vmcs_read64(event_data_field);
 
 		kvm_requeue_exception(vcpu, vector,
 				      idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK,
-				      error_code);
+				      error_code,
+				      event_data);
 		break;
 	}
 	case INTR_TYPE_SOFT_INTR:
@@ -7300,7 +7308,8 @@  static void vmx_complete_interrupts(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
 {
 	__vmx_complete_interrupts(&vmx->vcpu, vmx->idt_vectoring_info,
 				  VM_EXIT_INSTRUCTION_LEN,
-				  IDT_VECTORING_ERROR_CODE);
+				  IDT_VECTORING_ERROR_CODE,
+				  ORIGINAL_EVENT_DATA);
 }
 
 void vmx_cancel_injection(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
@@ -7308,7 +7317,8 @@  void vmx_cancel_injection(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	__vmx_complete_interrupts(vcpu,
 				  vmcs_read32(VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD),
 				  VM_ENTRY_INSTRUCTION_LEN,
-				  VM_ENTRY_EXCEPTION_ERROR_CODE);
+				  VM_ENTRY_EXCEPTION_ERROR_CODE,
+				  INJECTED_EVENT_DATA);
 
 	vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD, 0);
 }
@@ -7439,6 +7449,10 @@  static noinstr void vmx_vcpu_enter_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 
 	vmx_disable_fb_clear(vmx);
 
+	/*
+	 * Note, even though FRED delivers the faulting linear address via the
+	 * event data field on the stack, CR2 is still updated.
+	 */
 	if (vcpu->arch.cr2 != native_read_cr2())
 		native_write_cr2(vcpu->arch.cr2);
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index b31ebafbe0bc..7a55c1eb5297 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -810,9 +810,22 @@  void kvm_deliver_exception_payload(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 		 * breakpoint), it is reserved and must be zero in DR6.
 		 */
 		vcpu->arch.dr6 &= ~BIT(12);
+
+		/*
+		 * FRED #DB event data matches DR6, but follows the polarity of
+		 * VMX's pending debug exceptions, not DR6.
+		 */
+		ex->event_data = ex->payload & ~BIT(12);
+		break;
+	case NM_VECTOR:
+		ex->event_data = ex->payload;
 		break;
 	case PF_VECTOR:
 		vcpu->arch.cr2 = ex->payload;
+		ex->event_data = ex->payload;
+		break;
+	default:
+		ex->event_data = 0;
 		break;
 	}
 
@@ -920,7 +933,7 @@  static void kvm_queue_exception_e_p(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned nr,
 }
 
 void kvm_requeue_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned int nr,
-			   bool has_error_code, u32 error_code)
+			   bool has_error_code, u32 error_code, u64 event_data)
 {
 
 	/*
@@ -945,6 +958,7 @@  void kvm_requeue_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned int nr,
 	vcpu->arch.exception.error_code = error_code;
 	vcpu->arch.exception.has_payload = false;
 	vcpu->arch.exception.payload = 0;
+	vcpu->arch.exception.event_data = event_data;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_requeue_exception);