[v12,04/19] virt: sev-guest: Consolidate SNP guest messaging parameters to a struct

Message ID	20241009092850.197575-5-nikunj@amd.com (mailing list archive)
State	New, archived
Headers	show Received: from NAM10-BN7-obe.outbound.protection.outlook.com (mail-bn7nam10on2063.outbound.protection.outlook.com [40.107.92.63]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id E44D518E75F; Wed, 9 Oct 2024 09:29:28 +0000 (UTC) Received-SPF: Pass (protection.outlook.com: domain of amd.com designates 165.204.84.17 as permitted sender) receiver=protection.outlook.com; client-ip=165.204.84.17; helo=SATLEXMB04.amd.com; pr=C From: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com> To: <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>, <bp@alien8.de>, <x86@kernel.org>, <kvm@vger.kernel.org> CC: <mingo@redhat.com>, <tglx@linutronix.de>, <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, <pgonda@google.com>, <seanjc@google.com>, <pbonzini@redhat.com>, <nikunj@amd.com> Subject: [PATCH v12 04/19] virt: sev-guest: Consolidate SNP guest messaging parameters to a struct Date: Wed, 9 Oct 2024 14:58:35 +0530 Message-ID: <20241009092850.197575-5-nikunj@amd.com> In-Reply-To: <20241009092850.197575-1-nikunj@amd.com> References: <20241009092850.197575-1-nikunj@amd.com> Precedence: bulk MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Content-Type: text/plain
Series	Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests \| expand [v12,00/19] Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests [v12,01/19] virt: sev-guest: Use AES GCM crypto library [v12,02/19] x86/sev: Handle failures from snp_init() [v12,03/19] x86/sev: Cache the secrets page address [v12,04/19] virt: sev-guest: Consolidate SNP guest messaging parameters to a struct [v12,05/19] virt: sev-guest: Reduce the scope of SNP command mutex [v12,06/19] virt: sev-guest: Carve out SNP message context structure [v12,07/19] x86/sev: Carve out and export SNP guest messaging init routines [v12,08/19] x86/sev: Relocate SNP guest messaging routines to common code [v12,09/19] x86/cc: Add CC_ATTR_GUEST_SNP_SECURE_TSC [v12,10/19] x86/sev: Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests [v12,11/19] x86/sev: Change TSC MSR behavior for Secure TSC enabled guests [v12,12/19] x86/sev: Prevent RDTSC/RDTSCP interception for Secure TSC enabled guests [v12,13/19] x86/sev: Mark Secure TSC as reliable clocksource [v12,14/19] tsc: Use the GUEST_TSC_FREQ MSR for discovering TSC frequency [v12,15/19] tsc: Upgrade TSC clocksource rating [v12,16/19] x86/kvmclock: Use clock source callback to update kvm sched clock [v12,17/19] x86/kvmclock: Abort SecureTSC enabled guest when kvmclock is selected [v12,18/19] x86/cpu/amd: Do not print FW_BUG for Secure TSC [v12,19/19] x86/sev: Allow Secure TSC feature for SNP guests

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h index e7977f76d77e..27fa1c9c3465 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h @@ -174,6 +174,19 @@ struct sev_guest_platform_data { u64 secrets_gpa; }; +struct snp_guest_req { + void *req_buf; + size_t req_sz; + + void *resp_buf; + size_t resp_sz; + + u64 exit_code; + unsigned int vmpck_id; + u8 msg_version; + u8 msg_type; +}; + /* * The secrets page contains 96-bytes of reserved field that can be used by * the guest OS. The guest OS uses the area to save the message sequence @@ -395,7 +408,8 @@ void snp_set_wakeup_secondary_cpu(void); bool snp_init(struct boot_params *bp); void __noreturn snp_abort(void); void snp_dmi_setup(void); -int snp_issue_guest_request(u64 exit_code, struct snp_req_data *input, struct snp_guest_request_ioctl *rio); +int snp_issue_guest_request(struct snp_guest_req *req, struct snp_req_data *input, + struct snp_guest_request_ioctl *rio); int snp_issue_svsm_attest_req(u64 call_id, struct svsm_call *call, struct svsm_attest_call *input); void snp_accept_memory(phys_addr_t start, phys_addr_t end); u64 snp_get_unsupported_features(u64 status); @@ -425,7 +439,8 @@ static inline void snp_set_wakeup_secondary_cpu(void) { } static inline bool snp_init(struct boot_params *bp) { return false; } static inline void snp_abort(void) { } static inline void snp_dmi_setup(void) { } -static inline int snp_issue_guest_request(u64 exit_code, struct snp_req_data *input, struct snp_guest_request_ioctl *rio) +static inline int snp_issue_guest_request(struct snp_guest_req *req, struct snp_req_data *input, + struct snp_guest_request_ioctl *rio) { return -ENOTTY; } diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c b/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c index 1b0facfe658b..f40a2df38a84 100644 --- a/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c +++ b/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c @@ -2417,7 +2417,8 @@ int snp_issue_svsm_attest_req(u64 call_id, struct svsm_call *call, } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(snp_issue_svsm_attest_req); -int snp_issue_guest_request(u64 exit_code, struct snp_req_data *input, struct snp_guest_request_ioctl *rio) +int snp_issue_guest_request(struct snp_guest_req *req, struct snp_req_data *input, + struct snp_guest_request_ioctl *rio) { struct ghcb_state state; struct es_em_ctxt ctxt; @@ -2441,12 +2442,12 @@ int snp_issue_guest_request(u64 exit_code, struct snp_req_data *input, struct sn vc_ghcb_invalidate(ghcb); - if (exit_code == SVM_VMGEXIT_EXT_GUEST_REQUEST) { + if (req->exit_code == SVM_VMGEXIT_EXT_GUEST_REQUEST) { ghcb_set_rax(ghcb, input->data_gpa); ghcb_set_rbx(ghcb, input->data_npages); } - ret = sev_es_ghcb_hv_call(ghcb, &ctxt, exit_code, input->req_gpa, input->resp_gpa); + ret = sev_es_ghcb_hv_call(ghcb, &ctxt, req->exit_code, input->req_gpa, input->resp_gpa); if (ret) goto e_put; @@ -2461,7 +2462,7 @@ int snp_issue_guest_request(u64 exit_code, struct snp_req_data *input, struct sn case SNP_GUEST_VMM_ERR(SNP_GUEST_VMM_ERR_INVALID_LEN): /* Number of expected pages are returned in RBX */ - if (exit_code == SVM_VMGEXIT_EXT_GUEST_REQUEST) { + if (req->exit_code == SVM_VMGEXIT_EXT_GUEST_REQUEST) { input->data_npages = ghcb_get_rbx(ghcb); ret = -ENOSPC; break; diff --git a/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c b/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c index a33daff516ed..2a1b542168b1 100644 --- a/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c +++ b/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c @@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ static struct aesgcm_ctx *snp_init_crypto(u8 *key, size_t keylen) return ctx; } -static int verify_and_dec_payload(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, void *payload, u32 sz) +static int verify_and_dec_payload(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, struct snp_guest_req *req) { struct snp_guest_msg *resp_msg = &snp_dev->secret_response; struct snp_guest_msg *req_msg = &snp_dev->secret_request; @@ -206,20 +206,19 @@ static int verify_and_dec_payload(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, void *payload, * If the message size is greater than our buffer length then return * an error. */ - if (unlikely((resp_msg_hdr->msg_sz + ctx->authsize) > sz)) + if (unlikely((resp_msg_hdr->msg_sz + ctx->authsize) > req->resp_sz)) return -EBADMSG; /* Decrypt the payload */ memcpy(iv, &resp_msg_hdr->msg_seqno, min(sizeof(iv), sizeof(resp_msg_hdr->msg_seqno))); - if (!aesgcm_decrypt(ctx, payload, resp_msg->payload, resp_msg_hdr->msg_sz, + if (!aesgcm_decrypt(ctx, req->resp_buf, resp_msg->payload, resp_msg_hdr->msg_sz, &resp_msg_hdr->algo, AAD_LEN, iv, resp_msg_hdr->authtag)) return -EBADMSG; return 0; } -static int enc_payload(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, u64 seqno, int version, u8 type, - void *payload, size_t sz) +static int enc_payload(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, u64 seqno, struct snp_guest_req *req) { struct snp_guest_msg *msg = &snp_dev->secret_request; struct snp_guest_msg_hdr *hdr = &msg->hdr; @@ -231,11 +230,11 @@ static int enc_payload(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, u64 seqno, int version, u8 hdr->algo = SNP_AEAD_AES_256_GCM; hdr->hdr_version = MSG_HDR_VER; hdr->hdr_sz = sizeof(*hdr); - hdr->msg_type = type; - hdr->msg_version = version; + hdr->msg_type = req->msg_type; + hdr->msg_version = req->msg_version; hdr->msg_seqno = seqno; - hdr->msg_vmpck = vmpck_id; - hdr->msg_sz = sz; + hdr->msg_vmpck = req->vmpck_id; + hdr->msg_sz = req->req_sz; /* Verify the sequence number is non-zero */ if (!hdr->msg_seqno) @@ -244,17 +243,17 @@ static int enc_payload(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, u64 seqno, int version, u8 pr_debug("request [seqno %lld type %d version %d sz %d]\n", hdr->msg_seqno, hdr->msg_type, hdr->msg_version, hdr->msg_sz); - if (WARN_ON((sz + ctx->authsize) > sizeof(msg->payload))) + if (WARN_ON((req->req_sz + ctx->authsize) > sizeof(msg->payload))) return -EBADMSG; memcpy(iv, &hdr->msg_seqno, min(sizeof(iv), sizeof(hdr->msg_seqno))); - aesgcm_encrypt(ctx, msg->payload, payload, sz, &hdr->algo, AAD_LEN, - iv, hdr->authtag); + aesgcm_encrypt(ctx, msg->payload, req->req_buf, req->req_sz, &hdr->algo, + AAD_LEN, iv, hdr->authtag); return 0; } -static int __handle_guest_request(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, u64 exit_code, +static int __handle_guest_request(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, struct snp_guest_req *req, struct snp_guest_request_ioctl *rio) { unsigned long req_start = jiffies; @@ -269,7 +268,7 @@ static int __handle_guest_request(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, u64 exit_code, * sequence number must be incremented or the VMPCK must be deleted to * prevent reuse of the IV. */ - rc = snp_issue_guest_request(exit_code, &snp_dev->input, rio); + rc = snp_issue_guest_request(req, &snp_dev->input, rio); switch (rc) { case -ENOSPC: /* @@ -280,7 +279,7 @@ static int __handle_guest_request(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, u64 exit_code, * IV reuse. */ override_npages = snp_dev->input.data_npages; - exit_code = SVM_VMGEXIT_GUEST_REQUEST; + req->exit_code = SVM_VMGEXIT_GUEST_REQUEST; /* * Override the error to inform callers the given extended @@ -340,10 +339,8 @@ static int __handle_guest_request(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, u64 exit_code, return rc; } -static int handle_guest_request(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, u64 exit_code, - struct snp_guest_request_ioctl *rio, u8 type, - void *req_buf, size_t req_sz, void *resp_buf, - u32 resp_sz) +static int snp_send_guest_request(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, struct snp_guest_req *req, + struct snp_guest_request_ioctl *rio) { u64 seqno; int rc; @@ -357,7 +354,7 @@ static int handle_guest_request(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, u64 exit_code, memset(snp_dev->response, 0, sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg)); /* Encrypt the userspace provided payload in snp_dev->secret_request. */ - rc = enc_payload(snp_dev, seqno, rio->msg_version, type, req_buf, req_sz); + rc = enc_payload(snp_dev, seqno, req); if (rc) return rc; @@ -368,7 +365,7 @@ static int handle_guest_request(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, u64 exit_code, memcpy(snp_dev->request, &snp_dev->secret_request, sizeof(snp_dev->secret_request)); - rc = __handle_guest_request(snp_dev, exit_code, rio); + rc = __handle_guest_request(snp_dev, req, rio); if (rc) { if (rc == -EIO && rio->exitinfo2 == SNP_GUEST_VMM_ERR(SNP_GUEST_VMM_ERR_INVALID_LEN)) @@ -382,7 +379,7 @@ static int handle_guest_request(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, u64 exit_code, return rc; } - rc = verify_and_dec_payload(snp_dev, resp_buf, resp_sz); + rc = verify_and_dec_payload(snp_dev, req); if (rc) { dev_alert(snp_dev->dev, "Detected unexpected decode failure from ASP. rc: %d\n", rc); snp_disable_vmpck(snp_dev); @@ -401,6 +398,7 @@ static int get_report(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, struct snp_guest_request_io { struct snp_report_req *report_req = &snp_dev->req.report; struct snp_report_resp *report_resp; + struct snp_guest_req req = {}; int rc, resp_len; lockdep_assert_held(&snp_cmd_mutex); @@ -421,8 +419,16 @@ static int get_report(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, struct snp_guest_request_io if (!report_resp) return -ENOMEM; - rc = handle_guest_request(snp_dev, SVM_VMGEXIT_GUEST_REQUEST, arg, SNP_MSG_REPORT_REQ, - report_req, sizeof(*report_req), report_resp->data, resp_len); + req.msg_version = arg->msg_version; + req.msg_type = SNP_MSG_REPORT_REQ; + req.vmpck_id = vmpck_id; + req.req_buf = report_req; + req.req_sz = sizeof(*report_req); + req.resp_buf = report_resp->data; + req.resp_sz = resp_len; + req.exit_code = SVM_VMGEXIT_GUEST_REQUEST; + + rc = snp_send_guest_request(snp_dev, &req, arg); if (rc) goto e_free; @@ -438,6 +444,7 @@ static int get_derived_key(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, struct snp_guest_reque { struct snp_derived_key_req *derived_key_req = &snp_dev->req.derived_key; struct snp_derived_key_resp derived_key_resp = {0}; + struct snp_guest_req req = {}; int rc, resp_len; /* Response data is 64 bytes and max authsize for GCM is 16 bytes. */ u8 buf[64 + 16]; @@ -460,8 +467,16 @@ static int get_derived_key(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, struct snp_guest_reque sizeof(*derived_key_req))) return -EFAULT; - rc = handle_guest_request(snp_dev, SVM_VMGEXIT_GUEST_REQUEST, arg, SNP_MSG_KEY_REQ, - derived_key_req, sizeof(*derived_key_req), buf, resp_len); + req.msg_version = arg->msg_version; + req.msg_type = SNP_MSG_KEY_REQ; + req.vmpck_id = vmpck_id; + req.req_buf = derived_key_req; + req.req_sz = sizeof(*derived_key_req); + req.resp_buf = buf; + req.resp_sz = resp_len; + req.exit_code = SVM_VMGEXIT_GUEST_REQUEST; + + rc = snp_send_guest_request(snp_dev, &req, arg); if (rc) return rc; @@ -482,6 +497,7 @@ static int get_ext_report(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, struct snp_guest_reques { struct snp_ext_report_req *report_req = &snp_dev->req.ext_report; struct snp_report_resp *report_resp; + struct snp_guest_req req = {}; int ret, npages = 0, resp_len; sockptr_t certs_address; @@ -529,9 +545,17 @@ static int get_ext_report(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, struct snp_guest_reques return -ENOMEM; snp_dev->input.data_npages = npages; - ret = handle_guest_request(snp_dev, SVM_VMGEXIT_EXT_GUEST_REQUEST, arg, SNP_MSG_REPORT_REQ, - &report_req->data, sizeof(report_req->data), - report_resp->data, resp_len); + + req.msg_version = arg->msg_version; + req.msg_type = SNP_MSG_REPORT_REQ; + req.vmpck_id = vmpck_id; + req.req_buf = &report_req->data; + req.req_sz = sizeof(report_req->data); + req.resp_buf = report_resp->data; + req.resp_sz = resp_len; + req.exit_code = SVM_VMGEXIT_EXT_GUEST_REQUEST; + + ret = snp_send_guest_request(snp_dev, &req, arg); /* If certs length is invalid then copy the returned length */ if (arg->vmm_error == SNP_GUEST_VMM_ERR_INVALID_LEN) { @@ -1057,7 +1081,7 @@ static int __init sev_guest_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) misc->name = DEVICE_NAME; misc->fops = &snp_guest_fops; - /* initial the input address for guest request */ + /* Initialize the input addresses for guest request */ snp_dev->input.req_gpa = __pa(snp_dev->request); snp_dev->input.resp_gpa = __pa(snp_dev->response); snp_dev->input.data_gpa = __pa(snp_dev->certs_data);

[v12,04/19] virt: sev-guest: Consolidate SNP guest messaging parameters to a struct

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