diff mbox series

[v4,5/8] KVM: selftests: Add library support for interacting with SNP

Message ID 20241114234104.128532-6-pratikrajesh.sampat@amd.com (mailing list archive)
State New
Headers show
Series Basic SEV-SNP Selftests | expand

Commit Message

Pratik R. Sampat Nov. 14, 2024, 11:41 p.m. UTC
Extend the SEV library to include support for SNP ioctl() wrappers,
which aid in launching and interacting with a SEV-SNP guest.

Signed-off-by: Pratik R. Sampat <pratikrajesh.sampat@amd.com>
---
 .../selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/sev.h        | 49 ++++++++++-
 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev.c  | 81 ++++++++++++++++++-
 2 files changed, 125 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/sev.h b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/sev.h
index faed91435963..19454b0e10a6 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/sev.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/sev.h
@@ -22,9 +22,20 @@  enum sev_guest_state {
 	SEV_GUEST_STATE_RUNNING,
 };
 
+/* Minimum firmware version required for the SEV-SNP support */
+#define SNP_MIN_API_MAJOR	1
+#define SNP_MIN_API_MINOR	51
+
 #define SEV_POLICY_NO_DBG	(1UL << 0)
 #define SEV_POLICY_ES		(1UL << 2)
 
+#define SNP_POLICY_SMT		(1ULL << 16)
+#define SNP_POLICY_RSVD_MBO	(1ULL << 17)
+#define SNP_POLICY_DBG		(1ULL << 19)
+
+#define SNP_FW_VER_MINOR(min)	((uint8_t)(min) << 0)
+#define SNP_FW_VER_MAJOR(maj)	((uint8_t)(maj) << 8)
+
 #define GHCB_MSR_TERM_REQ	0x100
 
 #define VMGEXIT()		{ __asm__ __volatile__("rep; vmmcall"); }
@@ -36,13 +47,35 @@  bool is_sev_snp_vm(struct kvm_vm *vm);
 void sev_vm_launch(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint32_t policy);
 void sev_vm_launch_measure(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint8_t *measurement);
 void sev_vm_launch_finish(struct kvm_vm *vm);
+void snp_vm_launch_start(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint64_t policy);
+void snp_vm_launch_update(struct kvm_vm *vm);
+void snp_vm_launch_finish(struct kvm_vm *vm);
 
 struct kvm_vm *vm_sev_create_with_one_vcpu(uint32_t type, void *guest_code,
 					   struct kvm_vcpu **cpu);
-void vm_sev_launch(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint32_t policy, uint8_t *measurement);
+void vm_sev_launch(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint64_t policy, uint8_t *measurement);
 
 kvm_static_assert(SEV_RET_SUCCESS == 0);
 
+/*
+ * A SEV-SNP VM requires the policy default bit to always be set.
+ * The SMT policy bit is also required to be set based on SMT being
+ * available and active on the system.
+ */
+static inline u64 snp_default_policy(void)
+{
+	bool smt_active = false;
+	FILE *f;
+
+	f = fopen("/sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/active", "r");
+	if (f) {
+		smt_active = fgetc(f) - '0';
+		fclose(f);
+	}
+
+	return SNP_POLICY_RSVD_MBO | (smt_active ? SNP_POLICY_SMT : 0);
+}
+
 /*
  * The KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP uAPI is utter garbage and takes an "unsigned long"
  * instead of a proper struct.  The size of the parameter is embedded in the
@@ -76,6 +109,7 @@  kvm_static_assert(SEV_RET_SUCCESS == 0);
 
 void sev_vm_init(struct kvm_vm *vm);
 void sev_es_vm_init(struct kvm_vm *vm);
+void snp_vm_init(struct kvm_vm *vm);
 
 static inline void sev_register_encrypted_memory(struct kvm_vm *vm,
 						 struct userspace_mem_region *region)
@@ -99,4 +133,17 @@  static inline void sev_launch_update_data(struct kvm_vm *vm, vm_paddr_t gpa,
 	vm_sev_ioctl(vm, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA, &update_data);
 }
 
+static inline void snp_launch_update_data(struct kvm_vm *vm, vm_paddr_t gpa,
+					  uint64_t hva, uint64_t size, uint8_t type)
+{
+	struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_update update_data = {
+		.uaddr = hva,
+		.gfn_start = gpa >> PAGE_SHIFT,
+		.len = size,
+		.type = type,
+	};
+
+	vm_sev_ioctl(vm, KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE, &update_data);
+}
+
 #endif /* SELFTEST_KVM_SEV_H */
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev.c
index d6e7a422b69d..40b90d3a5769 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev.c
@@ -31,7 +31,8 @@  bool is_sev_vm(struct kvm_vm *vm)
  * and find the first range, but that's correct because the condition
  * expression would cause us to quit the loop.
  */
-static void encrypt_region(struct kvm_vm *vm, struct userspace_mem_region *region)
+static void encrypt_region(struct kvm_vm *vm, struct userspace_mem_region *region,
+			   uint8_t page_type)
 {
 	const struct sparsebit *protected_phy_pages = region->protected_phy_pages;
 	const vm_paddr_t gpa_base = region->region.guest_phys_addr;
@@ -41,16 +42,39 @@  static void encrypt_region(struct kvm_vm *vm, struct userspace_mem_region *regio
 	if (!sparsebit_any_set(protected_phy_pages))
 		return;
 
-	sev_register_encrypted_memory(vm, region);
+	if (!is_sev_snp_vm(vm))
+		sev_register_encrypted_memory(vm, region);
 
 	sparsebit_for_each_set_range(protected_phy_pages, i, j) {
 		const uint64_t size = (j - i + 1) * vm->page_size;
 		const uint64_t offset = (i - lowest_page_in_region) * vm->page_size;
 
+		if (is_sev_snp_vm(vm)) {
+			snp_launch_update_data(vm, gpa_base + offset,
+					       (uint64_t)addr_gpa2hva(vm, gpa_base + offset),
+					       size, page_type);
+			continue;
+		}
+
 		sev_launch_update_data(vm, gpa_base + offset, size);
 	}
 }
 
+static void privatize_region(struct kvm_vm *vm, struct userspace_mem_region *region)
+{
+	const struct sparsebit *protected_phy_pages = region->protected_phy_pages;
+	const vm_paddr_t gpa_base = region->region.guest_phys_addr;
+	const sparsebit_idx_t lowest_page_in_region = gpa_base >> vm->page_shift;
+	sparsebit_idx_t i, j;
+
+	sparsebit_for_each_set_range(protected_phy_pages, i, j) {
+		const uint64_t size = (j - i + 1) * vm->page_size;
+		const uint64_t offset = (i - lowest_page_in_region) * vm->page_size;
+
+		vm_mem_set_private(vm, gpa_base + offset, size);
+	}
+}
+
 void sev_vm_init(struct kvm_vm *vm)
 {
 	if (vm->type == KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM) {
@@ -77,6 +101,14 @@  void sev_es_vm_init(struct kvm_vm *vm)
 	}
 }
 
+void snp_vm_init(struct kvm_vm *vm)
+{
+	struct kvm_sev_init init = { 0 };
+
+	assert(vm->type == KVM_X86_SNP_VM);
+	vm_sev_ioctl(vm, KVM_SEV_INIT2, &init);
+}
+
 void sev_vm_launch(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint32_t policy)
 {
 	struct kvm_sev_launch_start launch_start = {
@@ -93,7 +125,7 @@  void sev_vm_launch(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint32_t policy)
 	TEST_ASSERT_EQ(status.state, SEV_GUEST_STATE_LAUNCH_UPDATE);
 
 	hash_for_each(vm->regions.slot_hash, ctr, region, slot_node)
-		encrypt_region(vm, region);
+		encrypt_region(vm, region, 0);
 
 	if (policy & SEV_POLICY_ES)
 		vm_sev_ioctl(vm, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA, NULL);
@@ -129,6 +161,35 @@  void sev_vm_launch_finish(struct kvm_vm *vm)
 	TEST_ASSERT_EQ(status.state, SEV_GUEST_STATE_RUNNING);
 }
 
+void snp_vm_launch_start(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint64_t policy)
+{
+	struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_start launch_start = {
+		.policy = policy,
+	};
+
+	vm_sev_ioctl(vm, KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_START, &launch_start);
+}
+
+void snp_vm_launch_update(struct kvm_vm *vm)
+{
+	struct userspace_mem_region *region;
+	int ctr;
+
+	hash_for_each(vm->regions.slot_hash, ctr, region, slot_node) {
+		privatize_region(vm, region);
+		encrypt_region(vm, region, KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_NORMAL);
+	}
+
+	vm->arch.is_pt_protected = true;
+}
+
+void snp_vm_launch_finish(struct kvm_vm *vm)
+{
+	struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_finish launch_finish = { 0 };
+
+	vm_sev_ioctl(vm, KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH, &launch_finish);
+}
+
 struct kvm_vm *vm_sev_create_with_one_vcpu(uint32_t type, void *guest_code,
 					   struct kvm_vcpu **cpu)
 {
@@ -145,8 +206,20 @@  struct kvm_vm *vm_sev_create_with_one_vcpu(uint32_t type, void *guest_code,
 	return vm;
 }
 
-void vm_sev_launch(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint32_t policy, uint8_t *measurement)
+void vm_sev_launch(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint64_t policy, uint8_t *measurement)
 {
+	if (is_sev_snp_vm(vm)) {
+		vm_enable_cap(vm, KVM_CAP_EXIT_HYPERCALL, (1 << KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE));
+
+		snp_vm_launch_start(vm, policy);
+
+		snp_vm_launch_update(vm);
+
+		snp_vm_launch_finish(vm);
+
+		return;
+	}
+
 	sev_vm_launch(vm, policy);
 
 	if (!measurement)