| Message ID | 871a1e89a4dff59f50d9c264c6d9a4cfd0eab50f.1585548051.git.ashish.kalra@amd.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
| Series | Add AMD SEV guest live migration support | expand |
On 3/29/20 11:21 PM, Ashish Kalra wrote: > From: Brijesh Singh <Brijesh.Singh@amd.com> > > The command is used for copying the incoming buffer into the > SEV guest memory space. > > Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> > Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> > Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> > Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> > Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com> > Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org> > Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> > Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> > Cc: x86@kernel.org > Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org > Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org > Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> > Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com> > --- > .../virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst | 24 ++++++ > arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 79 +++++++++++++++++++ > include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 9 +++ > 3 files changed, 112 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst > index ef1f1f3a5b40..554aa33a99cc 100644 > --- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst > +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst > @@ -351,6 +351,30 @@ On success, the 'handle' field contains a new handle and on error, a negative va > > For more details, see SEV spec Section 6.12. > > +14. KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA > +---------------------------- > + > +The KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA command can be used by the hypervisor to copy > +the incoming buffers into the guest memory region with encryption context > +created during the KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_START. > + > +Parameters (in): struct kvm_sev_receive_update_data > + > +Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error > + > +:: > + > + struct kvm_sev_launch_receive_update_data { > + __u64 hdr_uaddr; /* userspace address containing the packet header */ > + __u32 hdr_len; > + > + __u64 guest_uaddr; /* the destination guest memory region */ > + __u32 guest_len; > + > + __u64 trans_uaddr; /* the incoming buffer memory region */ > + __u32 trans_len; > + }; > + > References > ========== > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c > index 038b47685733..5fc5355536d7 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c > @@ -7497,6 +7497,82 @@ static int sev_receive_start(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) > return ret; > } > > +static int sev_receive_update_data(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) > +{ > + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; > + struct kvm_sev_receive_update_data params; > + struct sev_data_receive_update_data *data; > + void *hdr = NULL, *trans = NULL; > + struct page **guest_page; > + unsigned long n; > + int ret, offset; > + > + if (!sev_guest(kvm)) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + if (copy_from_user(¶ms, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, > + sizeof(struct kvm_sev_receive_update_data))) > + return -EFAULT; > + > + if (!params.hdr_uaddr || !params.hdr_len || > + !params.guest_uaddr || !params.guest_len || > + !params.trans_uaddr || !params.trans_len) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + /* Check if we are crossing the page boundary */ > + offset = params.guest_uaddr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1); > + if ((params.guest_len + offset > PAGE_SIZE)) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + hdr = psp_copy_user_blob(params.hdr_uaddr, params.hdr_len); > + if (IS_ERR(hdr)) > + return PTR_ERR(hdr); > + > + trans = psp_copy_user_blob(params.trans_uaddr, params.trans_len); > + if (IS_ERR(trans)) { > + ret = PTR_ERR(trans); > + goto e_free_hdr; > + } > + > + ret = -ENOMEM; > + data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL); > + if (!data) > + goto e_free_trans; > + > + data->hdr_address = __psp_pa(hdr); > + data->hdr_len = params.hdr_len; > + data->trans_address = __psp_pa(trans); > + data->trans_len = params.trans_len; > + > + /* Pin guest memory */ > + ret = -EFAULT; > + guest_page = sev_pin_memory(kvm, params.guest_uaddr & PAGE_MASK, > + PAGE_SIZE, &n, 0); > + if (!guest_page) > + goto e_free; > + > + /* The RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA command requires C-bit to be always set. */ > + data->guest_address = (page_to_pfn(guest_page[0]) << PAGE_SHIFT) + > + offset; > + data->guest_address |= sev_me_mask; > + data->guest_len = params.guest_len; > + data->handle = sev->handle; > + > + ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA, data, > + &argp->error); > + > + sev_unpin_memory(kvm, guest_page, n); > + > +e_free: > + kfree(data); > +e_free_trans: > + kfree(trans); > +e_free_hdr: > + kfree(hdr); > + > + return ret; > +} > + > static int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) > { > struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd; > @@ -7553,6 +7629,9 @@ static int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) > case KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_START: > r = sev_receive_start(kvm, &sev_cmd); > break; > + case KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA: > + r = sev_receive_update_data(kvm, &sev_cmd); > + break; > default: > r = -EINVAL; > goto out; > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h > index 74764b9db5fa..4e80c57a3182 100644 > --- a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h > @@ -1588,6 +1588,15 @@ struct kvm_sev_receive_start { > __u32 session_len; > }; > > +struct kvm_sev_receive_update_data { > + __u64 hdr_uaddr; > + __u32 hdr_len; > + __u64 guest_uaddr; > + __u32 guest_len; > + __u64 trans_uaddr; > + __u32 trans_len; > +}; > + > #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_ENABLE_IOMMU (1 << 0) > #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_PCI_2_3 (1 << 1) > #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_MASK_INTX (1 << 2) Reviewed-by: Krish Sadhukhan <krish.sadhukhan@oracle.com>
On 2020-03-30 06:21:20 +0000, Ashish Kalra wrote: > From: Brijesh Singh <Brijesh.Singh@amd.com> > > The command is used for copying the incoming buffer into the > SEV guest memory space. > > Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> > Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> > Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> > Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> > Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com> > Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org> > Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> > Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> > Cc: x86@kernel.org > Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org > Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org > Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> > Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Venu Busireddy <venu.busireddy@oracle.com> > --- > .../virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst | 24 ++++++ > arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 79 +++++++++++++++++++ > include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 9 +++ > 3 files changed, 112 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst > index ef1f1f3a5b40..554aa33a99cc 100644 > --- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst > +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst > @@ -351,6 +351,30 @@ On success, the 'handle' field contains a new handle and on error, a negative va > > For more details, see SEV spec Section 6.12. > > +14. KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA > +---------------------------- > + > +The KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA command can be used by the hypervisor to copy > +the incoming buffers into the guest memory region with encryption context > +created during the KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_START. > + > +Parameters (in): struct kvm_sev_receive_update_data > + > +Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error > + > +:: > + > + struct kvm_sev_launch_receive_update_data { > + __u64 hdr_uaddr; /* userspace address containing the packet header */ > + __u32 hdr_len; > + > + __u64 guest_uaddr; /* the destination guest memory region */ > + __u32 guest_len; > + > + __u64 trans_uaddr; /* the incoming buffer memory region */ > + __u32 trans_len; > + }; > + > References > ========== > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c > index 038b47685733..5fc5355536d7 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c > @@ -7497,6 +7497,82 @@ static int sev_receive_start(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) > return ret; > } > > +static int sev_receive_update_data(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) > +{ > + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; > + struct kvm_sev_receive_update_data params; > + struct sev_data_receive_update_data *data; > + void *hdr = NULL, *trans = NULL; > + struct page **guest_page; > + unsigned long n; > + int ret, offset; > + > + if (!sev_guest(kvm)) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + if (copy_from_user(¶ms, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, > + sizeof(struct kvm_sev_receive_update_data))) > + return -EFAULT; > + > + if (!params.hdr_uaddr || !params.hdr_len || > + !params.guest_uaddr || !params.guest_len || > + !params.trans_uaddr || !params.trans_len) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + /* Check if we are crossing the page boundary */ > + offset = params.guest_uaddr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1); > + if ((params.guest_len + offset > PAGE_SIZE)) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + hdr = psp_copy_user_blob(params.hdr_uaddr, params.hdr_len); > + if (IS_ERR(hdr)) > + return PTR_ERR(hdr); > + > + trans = psp_copy_user_blob(params.trans_uaddr, params.trans_len); > + if (IS_ERR(trans)) { > + ret = PTR_ERR(trans); > + goto e_free_hdr; > + } > + > + ret = -ENOMEM; > + data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL); > + if (!data) > + goto e_free_trans; > + > + data->hdr_address = __psp_pa(hdr); > + data->hdr_len = params.hdr_len; > + data->trans_address = __psp_pa(trans); > + data->trans_len = params.trans_len; > + > + /* Pin guest memory */ > + ret = -EFAULT; > + guest_page = sev_pin_memory(kvm, params.guest_uaddr & PAGE_MASK, > + PAGE_SIZE, &n, 0); > + if (!guest_page) > + goto e_free; > + > + /* The RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA command requires C-bit to be always set. */ > + data->guest_address = (page_to_pfn(guest_page[0]) << PAGE_SHIFT) + > + offset; > + data->guest_address |= sev_me_mask; > + data->guest_len = params.guest_len; > + data->handle = sev->handle; > + > + ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA, data, > + &argp->error); > + > + sev_unpin_memory(kvm, guest_page, n); > + > +e_free: > + kfree(data); > +e_free_trans: > + kfree(trans); > +e_free_hdr: > + kfree(hdr); > + > + return ret; > +} > + > static int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) > { > struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd; > @@ -7553,6 +7629,9 @@ static int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) > case KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_START: > r = sev_receive_start(kvm, &sev_cmd); > break; > + case KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA: > + r = sev_receive_update_data(kvm, &sev_cmd); > + break; > default: > r = -EINVAL; > goto out; > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h > index 74764b9db5fa..4e80c57a3182 100644 > --- a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h > @@ -1588,6 +1588,15 @@ struct kvm_sev_receive_start { > __u32 session_len; > }; > > +struct kvm_sev_receive_update_data { > + __u64 hdr_uaddr; > + __u32 hdr_len; > + __u64 guest_uaddr; > + __u32 guest_len; > + __u64 trans_uaddr; > + __u32 trans_len; > +}; > + > #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_ENABLE_IOMMU (1 << 0) > #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_PCI_2_3 (1 << 1) > #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_MASK_INTX (1 << 2) > -- > 2.17.1 >
On Thu, Apr 2, 2020 at 3:31 PM Venu Busireddy <venu.busireddy@oracle.com> wrote: > > On 2020-03-30 06:21:20 +0000, Ashish Kalra wrote: > > From: Brijesh Singh <Brijesh.Singh@amd.com> > > > > The command is used for copying the incoming buffer into the > > SEV guest memory space. > > > > Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> > > Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> > > Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> > > Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> > > Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com> > > Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org> > > Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> > > Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> > > Cc: x86@kernel.org > > Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org > > Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org > > Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> > > Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com> > > Reviewed-by: Venu Busireddy <venu.busireddy@oracle.com> > > > --- > > .../virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst | 24 ++++++ > > arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 79 +++++++++++++++++++ > > include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 9 +++ > > 3 files changed, 112 insertions(+) > > > > diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst > > index ef1f1f3a5b40..554aa33a99cc 100644 > > --- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst > > +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst > > @@ -351,6 +351,30 @@ On success, the 'handle' field contains a new handle and on error, a negative va > > > > For more details, see SEV spec Section 6.12. > > > > +14. KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA > > +---------------------------- > > + > > +The KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA command can be used by the hypervisor to copy > > +the incoming buffers into the guest memory region with encryption context > > +created during the KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_START. > > + > > +Parameters (in): struct kvm_sev_receive_update_data > > + > > +Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error > > + > > +:: > > + > > + struct kvm_sev_launch_receive_update_data { > > + __u64 hdr_uaddr; /* userspace address containing the packet header */ > > + __u32 hdr_len; > > + > > + __u64 guest_uaddr; /* the destination guest memory region */ > > + __u32 guest_len; > > + > > + __u64 trans_uaddr; /* the incoming buffer memory region */ > > + __u32 trans_len; > > + }; > > + > > References > > ========== > > > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c > > index 038b47685733..5fc5355536d7 100644 > > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c > > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c > > @@ -7497,6 +7497,82 @@ static int sev_receive_start(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) > > return ret; > > } > > > > +static int sev_receive_update_data(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) > > +{ > > + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; > > + struct kvm_sev_receive_update_data params; > > + struct sev_data_receive_update_data *data; > > + void *hdr = NULL, *trans = NULL; > > + struct page **guest_page; > > + unsigned long n; > > + int ret, offset; > > + > > + if (!sev_guest(kvm)) > > + return -EINVAL; > > + > > + if (copy_from_user(¶ms, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, > > + sizeof(struct kvm_sev_receive_update_data))) > > + return -EFAULT; > > + > > + if (!params.hdr_uaddr || !params.hdr_len || > > + !params.guest_uaddr || !params.guest_len || > > + !params.trans_uaddr || !params.trans_len) > > + return -EINVAL; > > + > > + /* Check if we are crossing the page boundary */ > > + offset = params.guest_uaddr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1); > > + if ((params.guest_len + offset > PAGE_SIZE)) > > + return -EINVAL; Check for overflow. > > > + > > + hdr = psp_copy_user_blob(params.hdr_uaddr, params.hdr_len); > > + if (IS_ERR(hdr)) > > + return PTR_ERR(hdr); > > + > > + trans = psp_copy_user_blob(params.trans_uaddr, params.trans_len); > > + if (IS_ERR(trans)) { > > + ret = PTR_ERR(trans); > > + goto e_free_hdr; > > + } > > + > > + ret = -ENOMEM; > > + data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL); > > + if (!data) > > + goto e_free_trans; > > + > > + data->hdr_address = __psp_pa(hdr); > > + data->hdr_len = params.hdr_len; > > + data->trans_address = __psp_pa(trans); > > + data->trans_len = params.trans_len; > > + > > + /* Pin guest memory */ > > + ret = -EFAULT; > > + guest_page = sev_pin_memory(kvm, params.guest_uaddr & PAGE_MASK, > > + PAGE_SIZE, &n, 0); > > + if (!guest_page) > > + goto e_free; > > + > > + /* The RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA command requires C-bit to be always set. */ > > + data->guest_address = (page_to_pfn(guest_page[0]) << PAGE_SHIFT) + > > + offset; > > + data->guest_address |= sev_me_mask; > > + data->guest_len = params.guest_len; > > + data->handle = sev->handle; > > + > > + ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA, data, > > + &argp->error); > > + > > + sev_unpin_memory(kvm, guest_page, n); > > + > > +e_free: > > + kfree(data); > > +e_free_trans: > > + kfree(trans); > > +e_free_hdr: > > + kfree(hdr); > > + > > + return ret; > > +} > > + > > static int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) > > { > > struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd; > > @@ -7553,6 +7629,9 @@ static int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) > > case KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_START: > > r = sev_receive_start(kvm, &sev_cmd); > > break; > > + case KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA: > > + r = sev_receive_update_data(kvm, &sev_cmd); > > + break; > > default: > > r = -EINVAL; > > goto out; > > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h > > index 74764b9db5fa..4e80c57a3182 100644 > > --- a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h > > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h > > @@ -1588,6 +1588,15 @@ struct kvm_sev_receive_start { > > __u32 session_len; > > }; > > > > +struct kvm_sev_receive_update_data { > > + __u64 hdr_uaddr; > > + __u32 hdr_len; > > + __u64 guest_uaddr; > > + __u32 guest_len; > > + __u64 trans_uaddr; > > + __u32 trans_len; > > +}; > > + > > #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_ENABLE_IOMMU (1 << 0) > > #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_PCI_2_3 (1 << 1) > > #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_MASK_INTX (1 << 2) > > -- > > 2.17.1 > > Otherwise looks fine to my eye. Reviewed-by: Steve Rutherford <srutherford@google.com>
diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst index ef1f1f3a5b40..554aa33a99cc 100644 --- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst @@ -351,6 +351,30 @@ On success, the 'handle' field contains a new handle and on error, a negative va For more details, see SEV spec Section 6.12. +14. KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA +---------------------------- + +The KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA command can be used by the hypervisor to copy +the incoming buffers into the guest memory region with encryption context +created during the KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_START. + +Parameters (in): struct kvm_sev_receive_update_data + +Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error + +:: + + struct kvm_sev_launch_receive_update_data { + __u64 hdr_uaddr; /* userspace address containing the packet header */ + __u32 hdr_len; + + __u64 guest_uaddr; /* the destination guest memory region */ + __u32 guest_len; + + __u64 trans_uaddr; /* the incoming buffer memory region */ + __u32 trans_len; + }; + References ========== diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c index 038b47685733..5fc5355536d7 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c @@ -7497,6 +7497,82 @@ static int sev_receive_start(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) return ret; } +static int sev_receive_update_data(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) +{ + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; + struct kvm_sev_receive_update_data params; + struct sev_data_receive_update_data *data; + void *hdr = NULL, *trans = NULL; + struct page **guest_page; + unsigned long n; + int ret, offset; + + if (!sev_guest(kvm)) + return -EINVAL; + + if (copy_from_user(¶ms, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, + sizeof(struct kvm_sev_receive_update_data))) + return -EFAULT; + + if (!params.hdr_uaddr || !params.hdr_len || + !params.guest_uaddr || !params.guest_len || + !params.trans_uaddr || !params.trans_len) + return -EINVAL; + + /* Check if we are crossing the page boundary */ + offset = params.guest_uaddr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1); + if ((params.guest_len + offset > PAGE_SIZE)) + return -EINVAL; + + hdr = psp_copy_user_blob(params.hdr_uaddr, params.hdr_len); + if (IS_ERR(hdr)) + return PTR_ERR(hdr); + + trans = psp_copy_user_blob(params.trans_uaddr, params.trans_len); + if (IS_ERR(trans)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(trans); + goto e_free_hdr; + } + + ret = -ENOMEM; + data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!data) + goto e_free_trans; + + data->hdr_address = __psp_pa(hdr); + data->hdr_len = params.hdr_len; + data->trans_address = __psp_pa(trans); + data->trans_len = params.trans_len; + + /* Pin guest memory */ + ret = -EFAULT; + guest_page = sev_pin_memory(kvm, params.guest_uaddr & PAGE_MASK, + PAGE_SIZE, &n, 0); + if (!guest_page) + goto e_free; + + /* The RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA command requires C-bit to be always set. */ + data->guest_address = (page_to_pfn(guest_page[0]) << PAGE_SHIFT) + + offset; + data->guest_address |= sev_me_mask; + data->guest_len = params.guest_len; + data->handle = sev->handle; + + ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA, data, + &argp->error); + + sev_unpin_memory(kvm, guest_page, n); + +e_free: + kfree(data); +e_free_trans: + kfree(trans); +e_free_hdr: + kfree(hdr); + + return ret; +} + static int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) { struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd; @@ -7553,6 +7629,9 @@ static int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) case KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_START: r = sev_receive_start(kvm, &sev_cmd); break; + case KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA: + r = sev_receive_update_data(kvm, &sev_cmd); + break; default: r = -EINVAL; goto out; diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h index 74764b9db5fa..4e80c57a3182 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h @@ -1588,6 +1588,15 @@ struct kvm_sev_receive_start { __u32 session_len; }; +struct kvm_sev_receive_update_data { + __u64 hdr_uaddr; + __u32 hdr_len; + __u64 guest_uaddr; + __u32 guest_len; + __u64 trans_uaddr; + __u32 trans_len; +}; + #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_ENABLE_IOMMU (1 << 0) #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_PCI_2_3 (1 << 1) #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_MASK_INTX (1 << 2)