From patchwork Thu Nov 9 11:55:40 2023 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: "Huang, Kai" X-Patchwork-Id: 13450966 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (lindbergh.monkeyblade.net [23.128.96.19]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D3FAA1DA41 for ; Thu, 9 Nov 2023 11:56:35 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=intel.com header.i=@intel.com header.b="dtGaOoL0" Received: from mgamail.intel.com (mgamail.intel.com [192.198.163.8]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 512B72D78; Thu, 9 Nov 2023 03:56:35 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=intel.com; i=@intel.com; q=dns/txt; s=Intel; t=1699530995; x=1731066995; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to: references:mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=oSJ+WCISblOmP/KSjvUJCPXd3quC4qZ4W+Luwy1KEDQ=; b=dtGaOoL0K+EwJmJiZRgFVIqfzRJDgDGYVAD/lR7HlL2awyk/SV9p0blb LeDrL4BtT9UgI/Ad15g5o863jMxu8HPHYWlyqzhqaYye05UPqH4akh3BG G1trDvUwxqE9eEDWmdZxLZj+6dWaaWZk7OF3Jc28pKFnK5YP+7x8Q5RhG pHEEtS32K+4oANkjWEp7/VKvv+lz1wIO2wPqSLKx+wcIFALJjvYKIgA8y kQvSOfKoEJzNasTD0Myfc28GetFWsct6lQuh2vABIyLPHqQmTJGw2cgtn C1G/b2WhflDMmu7A8kWjKHzC8r80eLUPTeTHMOEbVhh9jJj66/7lgOmrb g==; X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6600,9927,10888"; a="2936312" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="6.03,289,1694761200"; d="scan'208";a="2936312" Received: from fmsmga007.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.52]) by fmvoesa102.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 09 Nov 2023 03:56:35 -0800 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6600,9927,10888"; a="766976617" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="6.03,289,1694761200"; d="scan'208";a="766976617" Received: from shadphix-mobl.amr.corp.intel.com (HELO khuang2-desk.gar.corp.intel.com) ([10.209.83.35]) by fmsmga007-auth.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 09 Nov 2023 03:56:28 -0800 From: Kai Huang To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: x86@kernel.org, dave.hansen@intel.com, kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com, peterz@infradead.org, tony.luck@intel.com, tglx@linutronix.de, bp@alien8.de, mingo@redhat.com, hpa@zytor.com, seanjc@google.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, rafael@kernel.org, david@redhat.com, dan.j.williams@intel.com, len.brown@intel.com, ak@linux.intel.com, isaku.yamahata@intel.com, ying.huang@intel.com, chao.gao@intel.com, sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com, nik.borisov@suse.com, bagasdotme@gmail.com, sagis@google.com, imammedo@redhat.com, kai.huang@intel.com Subject: [PATCH v15 03/23] x86/virt/tdx: Make INTEL_TDX_HOST depend on X86_X2APIC Date: Fri, 10 Nov 2023 00:55:40 +1300 Message-ID: X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.41.0 In-Reply-To: References: Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: kvm@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 TDX capable platforms are locked to X2APIC mode and cannot fall back to the legacy xAPIC mode when TDX is enabled by the BIOS. TDX host support requires x2APIC. Make INTEL_TDX_HOST depend on X86_X2APIC. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/ba80b303-31bf-d44a-b05d-5c0f83038798@intel.com/ Signed-off-by: Kai Huang Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand Reviewed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov --- arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig index 3762f41bb092..eb6e63956d51 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig @@ -1970,6 +1970,7 @@ config INTEL_TDX_HOST depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL depends on X86_64 depends on KVM_INTEL + depends on X86_X2APIC help Intel Trust Domain Extensions (TDX) protects guest VMs from malicious host and certain physical attacks. This option enables necessary TDX