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Tue, 27 Jul 2021 22:27:30 +0000 From: Tom Lendacky To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org, linux-graphics-maintainer@vmware.com, amd-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org, dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Borislav Petkov , Brijesh Singh , Joerg Roedel , Andi Kleen , Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy , Tianyu Lan , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Dave Hansen , Andy Lutomirski , Peter Zijlstra , Ard Biesheuvel Subject: [PATCH 05/11] x86/sev: Replace occurrences of sev_active() with prot_guest_has() Date: Tue, 27 Jul 2021 17:26:08 -0500 Message-Id: X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.32.0 In-Reply-To: References: X-ClientProxiedBy: SA9PR13CA0122.namprd13.prod.outlook.com (2603:10b6:806:27::7) To DM4PR12MB5229.namprd12.prod.outlook.com (2603:10b6:5:398::12) MIME-Version: 1.0 X-MS-Exchange-MessageSentRepresentingType: 1 Received: from tlendack-t1.amd.com (165.204.77.1) by SA9PR13CA0122.namprd13.prod.outlook.com (2603:10b6:806:27::7) with Microsoft SMTP Server (version=TLS1_2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) id 15.20.4373.7 via Frontend Transport; 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If future support is added for other memory encryption technologies, the use of PATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT can be updated, as required, to use PATTR_SEV. Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Ard Biesheuvel Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky Reviewed-by: Joerg Roedel --- arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 2 -- arch/x86/kernel/crash_dump_64.c | 4 +++- arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c | 3 ++- arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c | 4 ++-- arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c | 16 ++++++++-------- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 3 ++- arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c | 6 +++--- arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 15 +++++++-------- arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c | 9 +++++---- 9 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h index 956338406cec..7e25de37c148 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h @@ -50,7 +50,6 @@ void __init mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem(void); void __init mem_encrypt_init(void); void __init sev_es_init_vc_handling(void); -bool sev_active(void); bool sev_es_active(void); bool amd_prot_guest_has(unsigned int attr); @@ -75,7 +74,6 @@ static inline void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(struct boot_params *bp) { } static inline void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp) { } static inline void sev_es_init_vc_handling(void) { } -static inline bool sev_active(void) { return false; } static inline bool sev_es_active(void) { return false; } static inline bool amd_prot_guest_has(unsigned int attr) { return false; } diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/crash_dump_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/crash_dump_64.c index 045e82e8945b..0cfe35f03e67 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/crash_dump_64.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/crash_dump_64.c @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include static ssize_t __copy_oldmem_page(unsigned long pfn, char *buf, size_t csize, unsigned long offset, int userbuf, @@ -73,5 +74,6 @@ ssize_t copy_oldmem_page_encrypted(unsigned long pfn, char *buf, size_t csize, ssize_t elfcorehdr_read(char *buf, size_t count, u64 *ppos) { - return read_from_oldmem(buf, count, ppos, 0, sev_active()); + return read_from_oldmem(buf, count, ppos, 0, + prot_guest_has(PATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT)); } diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c index a26643dc6bd6..9d08ad2f3faa 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -418,7 +419,7 @@ static void __init sev_map_percpu_data(void) { int cpu; - if (!sev_active()) + if (!prot_guest_has(PATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) return; for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) { diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c index ad273e5861c1..f7ba78a23dcd 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c @@ -16,9 +16,9 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include -#include #include #include @@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ static void __init kvmclock_init_mem(void) * hvclock is shared between the guest and the hypervisor, must * be mapped decrypted. */ - if (sev_active()) { + if (prot_guest_has(PATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) { r = set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long) hvclock_mem, 1UL << order); if (r) { diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c index 8e7b517ad738..66ff788b79c9 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c @@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ static int init_transition_pgtable(struct kimage *image, pgd_t *pgd) } pte = pte_offset_kernel(pmd, vaddr); - if (sev_active()) + if (prot_guest_has(PATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) prot = PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC; set_pte(pte, pfn_pte(paddr >> PAGE_SHIFT, prot)); @@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ static int init_pgtable(struct kimage *image, unsigned long start_pgtable) level4p = (pgd_t *)__va(start_pgtable); clear_page(level4p); - if (sev_active()) { + if (prot_guest_has(PATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) { info.page_flag |= _PAGE_ENC; info.kernpg_flag |= _PAGE_ENC; } @@ -570,12 +570,12 @@ void arch_kexec_unprotect_crashkres(void) */ int arch_kexec_post_alloc_pages(void *vaddr, unsigned int pages, gfp_t gfp) { - if (sev_active()) + if (!prot_guest_has(PATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) return 0; /* - * If SME is active we need to be sure that kexec pages are - * not encrypted because when we boot to the new kernel the + * If host memory encryption is active we need to be sure that kexec + * pages are not encrypted because when we boot to the new kernel the * pages won't be accessed encrypted (initially). */ return set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long)vaddr, pages); @@ -583,12 +583,12 @@ int arch_kexec_post_alloc_pages(void *vaddr, unsigned int pages, gfp_t gfp) void arch_kexec_pre_free_pages(void *vaddr, unsigned int pages) { - if (sev_active()) + if (!prot_guest_has(PATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) return; /* - * If SME is active we need to reset the pages back to being - * an encrypted mapping before freeing them. + * If host memory encryption is active we need to reset the pages back + * to being an encrypted mapping before freeing them. */ set_memory_encrypted((unsigned long)vaddr, pages); } diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c index 664d20f0689c..48c906f6593a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -457,7 +458,7 @@ static int has_svm(void) return 0; } - if (sev_active()) { + if (prot_guest_has(PATTR_SEV)) { pr_info("KVM is unsupported when running as an SEV guest\n"); return 0; } diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c index f899f02c0241..0f2d5ace5986 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c @@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ static unsigned int __ioremap_check_ram(struct resource *res) */ static unsigned int __ioremap_check_encrypted(struct resource *res) { - if (!sev_active()) + if (!prot_guest_has(PATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) return 0; switch (res->desc) { @@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ static unsigned int __ioremap_check_encrypted(struct resource *res) */ static void __ioremap_check_other(resource_size_t addr, struct ioremap_desc *desc) { - if (!sev_active()) + if (!prot_guest_has(PATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) return; if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI)) @@ -555,7 +555,7 @@ static bool memremap_should_map_decrypted(resource_size_t phys_addr, case E820_TYPE_NVS: case E820_TYPE_UNUSABLE: /* For SEV, these areas are encrypted */ - if (sev_active()) + if (prot_guest_has(PATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) break; fallthrough; diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c index d246a630feb9..eb5cae93b238 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c @@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ void __init sme_early_init(void) for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(protection_map); i++) protection_map[i] = pgprot_encrypted(protection_map[i]); - if (sev_active()) + if (amd_prot_guest_has(PATTR_SEV)) swiotlb_force = SWIOTLB_FORCE; } @@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ void __init sev_setup_arch(void) phys_addr_t total_mem = memblock_phys_mem_size(); unsigned long size; - if (!sev_active()) + if (!amd_prot_guest_has(PATTR_SEV)) return; /* @@ -373,7 +373,7 @@ int __init early_set_memory_encrypted(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size) * up under SME the trampoline area cannot be encrypted, whereas under SEV * the trampoline area must be encrypted. */ -bool sev_active(void) +static bool sev_active(void) { return sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED; } @@ -382,7 +382,6 @@ static bool sme_active(void) { return sme_me_mask && !sev_active(); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sev_active); /* Needs to be called from non-instrumentable code */ bool noinstr sev_es_active(void) @@ -420,7 +419,7 @@ bool force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev) /* * For SEV, all DMA must be to unencrypted addresses. */ - if (sev_active()) + if (amd_prot_guest_has(PATTR_SEV)) return true; /* @@ -479,7 +478,7 @@ static void print_mem_encrypt_feature_info(void) } /* Secure Encrypted Virtualization */ - if (sev_active()) + if (amd_prot_guest_has(PATTR_SEV)) pr_cont(" SEV"); /* Encrypted Register State */ @@ -502,7 +501,7 @@ void __init mem_encrypt_init(void) * With SEV, we need to unroll the rep string I/O instructions, * but SEV-ES supports them through the #VC handler. */ - if (sev_active() && !sev_es_active()) + if (amd_prot_guest_has(PATTR_SEV) && !sev_es_active()) static_branch_enable(&sev_enable_key); print_mem_encrypt_feature_info(); @@ -510,6 +509,6 @@ void __init mem_encrypt_init(void) int arch_has_restricted_virtio_memory_access(void) { - return sev_active(); + return amd_prot_guest_has(PATTR_SEV); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(arch_has_restricted_virtio_memory_access); diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c index 7515e78ef898..94737fcc1e21 100644 --- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c +++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ #include #include #include -#include +#include #include #include @@ -284,7 +284,8 @@ static void __init __map_region(efi_memory_desc_t *md, u64 va) if (!(md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_WB)) flags |= _PAGE_PCD; - if (sev_active() && md->type != EFI_MEMORY_MAPPED_IO) + if (prot_guest_has(PATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT) && + md->type != EFI_MEMORY_MAPPED_IO) flags |= _PAGE_ENC; pfn = md->phys_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT; @@ -390,7 +391,7 @@ static int __init efi_update_mem_attr(struct mm_struct *mm, efi_memory_desc_t *m if (!(md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_RO)) pf |= _PAGE_RW; - if (sev_active()) + if (prot_guest_has(PATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) pf |= _PAGE_ENC; return efi_update_mappings(md, pf); @@ -438,7 +439,7 @@ void __init efi_runtime_update_mappings(void) (md->type != EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE)) pf |= _PAGE_RW; - if (sev_active()) + if (prot_guest_has(PATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) pf |= _PAGE_ENC; efi_update_mappings(md, pf);