Message ID | 20191008153930.15386-1-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org (mailing list archive) |
---|---|
Headers | show |
Series | arm64 spec mitigation backports | expand |
On Tue, Oct 08, 2019 at 05:39:14PM +0200, Ard Biesheuvel wrote: > This is a backport to v4.19 of the arm64 patches that exists in mainline > to support CPUs that implement the SSBS capability, which gives the OS > and user space control over whether Speculative Store Bypass is > permitted in certain contexts. This gives a substantial performance > boost on hardware that implements it. > > At the same time, this series backports arm64 support for reporting > of vulnerabilities via syfs. This is covered by the same series since > it produces a much cleaner backport, where none of the patches required > any changes beyond some manual mangling of the context to make them apply. > > Build tested using a fair number of randconfig builds. Boot tested > under KVM and on ThunderX2. All now queued up, thanks. greg k-h
On Wed, 9 Oct 2019 at 10:04, Greg KH <greg@kroah.com> wrote: > > On Tue, Oct 08, 2019 at 05:39:14PM +0200, Ard Biesheuvel wrote: > > This is a backport to v4.19 of the arm64 patches that exists in mainline > > to support CPUs that implement the SSBS capability, which gives the OS > > and user space control over whether Speculative Store Bypass is > > permitted in certain contexts. This gives a substantial performance > > boost on hardware that implements it. > > > > At the same time, this series backports arm64 support for reporting > > of vulnerabilities via syfs. This is covered by the same series since > > it produces a much cleaner backport, where none of the patches required > > any changes beyond some manual mangling of the context to make them apply. > > > > Build tested using a fair number of randconfig builds. Boot tested > > under KVM and on ThunderX2. > > All now queued up, thanks. > Thanks Greg.