From patchwork Thu May 13 18:47:26 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Mike Rapoport X-Patchwork-Id: 12256235 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-17.7 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,MENTIONS_GIT_HOSTING, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9E5DBC433B4 for ; Thu, 13 May 2021 18:50:44 +0000 (UTC) Received: from desiato.infradead.org (desiato.infradead.org [90.155.92.199]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 1F9E661206 for ; Thu, 13 May 2021 18:50:44 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 1F9E661206 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=kernel.org Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=linux-arm-kernel-bounces+linux-arm-kernel=archiver.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=lists.infradead.org; s=desiato.20200630; h=Sender:Content-Transfer-Encoding :Content-Type:List-Subscribe:List-Help:List-Post:List-Archive: List-Unsubscribe:List-Id:MIME-Version:Message-Id:Date:Subject:Cc:To:From: Reply-To:Content-ID:Content-Description:Resent-Date:Resent-From:Resent-Sender :Resent-To:Resent-Cc:Resent-Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References:List-Owner; bh=sc+T6ukX8aicD1dfYn8+g+J3KWE1RPbiUD71LWvmn9M=; b=acBZftgepspUqnSrfFvMnaOls8 NJL9BsD9JqQ4C9qGCM0JiFQ+ZEeDEKxUfatU+eOQv+Tsezl2Tpqei3A+S3ACKJGDQ94aZAWF4+z3X VLtQY+vV9BOD+e/6oQ34j3roUgzGw0WfSEX4s/+kQQCnQM5GEQWSA92avFqNrOBRuToKOBJZnSLNE VtjzrFl6Rbpm9kzGsHcBWGIxogvdNAHjZhhAXZH5Pp+mymc4hb4NeotV1VdURluwfIhIOI/WX/E7N kPqTlQWzYAr6dvOVPxHPwVMCJkdpeh69+OngZMt0OIiXcS7dcDN6PxKNbku/PkmNlPoD2x4Bcawp5 9H3npA9g==; Received: from localhost ([::1] helo=desiato.infradead.org) by desiato.infradead.org with esmtp (Exim 4.94 #2 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1lhGNI-006ArL-Ez; Thu, 13 May 2021 18:47:58 +0000 Received: from bombadil.infradead.org ([2607:7c80:54:e::133]) by desiato.infradead.org with esmtps (Exim 4.94 #2 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1lhGNF-006ArD-Ng; Thu, 13 May 2021 18:47:54 +0000 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=infradead.org; s=bombadil.20210309; h=Content-Transfer-Encoding: MIME-Version:Message-Id:Date:Subject:Cc:To:From:Sender:Reply-To:Content-Type: Content-ID:Content-Description:In-Reply-To:References; bh=CvHWO5U05YWqch/Zro2lw3U8WAzHeufKLckJG/jNdtE=; b=G4jKTPNpQJTEPfAdQ1gRVBnSHF Si623gEd0lnhRrY6O9H6Ij2KoicWg7FuaNqy1fbQFkypSsjCpdnW/PgzxpccWfU8QqTvD+JDOPL9l kYpg5XURtjLHTiIzqYx34sObzzZb0n30IG/bTMiAP/TmaF18ESaoQiGQofnxJVjEjWrCmIE+KBpkI GWeZEerhy3k03AdoH1TrO+GB4O40NCe01W7phUTQZ6l2+dESVg2HlTZeLo+r965EQaOkcFQ+xSmfv k2jXDZ9VB0w39Ca93B6vmxAv+FDYvPImbW9EYBUsk+9fNnDMGzlkgicaJxEEJvJRjM4nUEAU7w01B 41W7bo5A==; Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]) by bombadil.infradead.org with esmtps (Exim 4.94 #2 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1lhGNC-00BRqw-BI; Thu, 13 May 2021 18:47:52 +0000 Received: by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id CABA461206; Thu, 13 May 2021 18:47:38 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1620931669; bh=Cfcf66dAT5oHYZ++4JL8ICwLlZYZVIzX9QBdBYAWTu4=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:From; b=RLxVm0DTNPyghpQQFedtgrzEDyOHkygG7h953ZsIYgnOWHmh3xnUWuwL6wXNRtn3Z DYXOeEDgrjQmmXsB+oMMvR4/MLd++UX6CyN5Cf62gTxAwsbxh/MB9n5VgcZm6poCR1 RyXl9bmdvf3qYiDihYXFaMUHIAVoMPKWTZehiqhoNZ1OkeIud++RPEJzfalw2c4FU7 fMmD4URLdbynlwuOeVU51TUclViV4vzguzK2K14l4+bnf0MYd7v5UrKGxeIW6OKtgE tATI2TAEuNWiYRYmMcUWl0KKu5S3OjdkUEkyV9nPiYjwmbKQuN80v8a9ZNsSermQjZ oQrk5UEOvmmBw== From: Mike Rapoport To: Andrew Morton Cc: Alexander Viro , Andy Lutomirski , Arnd Bergmann , Borislav Petkov , Catalin Marinas , Christopher Lameter , Dan Williams , Dave Hansen , David Hildenbrand , Elena Reshetova , "H. Peter Anvin" , Hagen Paul Pfeifer , Ingo Molnar , James Bottomley , Kees Cook , "Kirill A. Shutemov" , Matthew Wilcox , Matthew Garrett , Mark Rutland , Michal Hocko , Mike Rapoport , Mike Rapoport , Michael Kerrisk , Palmer Dabbelt , Palmer Dabbelt , Paul Walmsley , Peter Zijlstra , "Rafael J. Wysocki" , Rick Edgecombe , Roman Gushchin , Shakeel Butt , Shuah Khan , Thomas Gleixner , Tycho Andersen , Will Deacon , Yury Norov , linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, x86@kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v19 0/8] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas Date: Thu, 13 May 2021 21:47:26 +0300 Message-Id: <20210513184734.29317-1-rppt@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.28.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-CRM114-Version: 20100106-BlameMichelson ( TRE 0.8.0 (BSD) ) MR-646709E3 X-CRM114-CacheID: sfid-20210513_114750_470245_4785486F X-CRM114-Status: GOOD ( 30.04 ) X-BeenThere: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.34 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Sender: "linux-arm-kernel" Errors-To: linux-arm-kernel-bounces+linux-arm-kernel=archiver.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org From: Mike Rapoport Hi, @Andrew, this is based on v5.13-rc1, I can rebase whatever way you prefer. This is an implementation of "secret" mappings backed by a file descriptor. The file descriptor backing secret memory mappings is created using a dedicated memfd_secret system call The desired protection mode for the memory is configured using flags parameter of the system call. The mmap() of the file descriptor created with memfd_secret() will create a "secret" memory mapping. The pages in that mapping will be marked as not present in the direct map and will be present only in the page table of the owning mm. Although normally Linux userspace mappings are protected from other users, such secret mappings are useful for environments where a hostile tenant is trying to trick the kernel into giving them access to other tenants mappings. It's designed to provide the following protections: * Enhanced protection (in conjunction with all the other in-kernel attack prevention systems) against ROP attacks. Seceretmem makes "simple" ROP insufficient to perform exfiltration, which increases the required complexity of the attack. Along with other protections like the kernel stack size limit and address space layout randomization which make finding gadgets is really hard, absence of any in-kernel primitive for accessing secret memory means the one gadget ROP attack can't work. Since the only way to access secret memory is to reconstruct the missing mapping entry, the attacker has to recover the physical page and insert a PTE pointing to it in the kernel and then retrieve the contents. That takes at least three gadgets which is a level of difficulty beyond most standard attacks. * Prevent cross-process secret userspace memory exposures. Once the secret memory is allocated, the user can't accidentally pass it into the kernel to be transmitted somewhere. The secreremem pages cannot be accessed via the direct map and they are disallowed in GUP. * Harden against exploited kernel flaws. In order to access secretmem, a kernel-side attack would need to either walk the page tables and create new ones, or spawn a new privileged uiserspace process to perform secrets exfiltration using ptrace. In the future the secret mappings may be used as a mean to protect guest memory in a virtual machine host. For demonstration of secret memory usage we've created a userspace library https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jejb/secret-memory-preloader.git that does two things: the first is act as a preloader for openssl to redirect all the OPENSSL_malloc calls to secret memory meaning any secret keys get automatically protected this way and the other thing it does is expose the API to the user who needs it. We anticipate that a lot of the use cases would be like the openssl one: many toolkits that deal with secret keys already have special handling for the memory to try to give them greater protection, so this would simply be pluggable into the toolkits without any need for user application modification. Hiding secret memory mappings behind an anonymous file allows usage of the page cache for tracking pages allocated for the "secret" mappings as well as using address_space_operations for e.g. page migration callbacks. The anonymous file may be also used implicitly, like hugetlb files, to implement mmap(MAP_SECRET) and use the secret memory areas with "native" mm ABIs in the future. Removing of the pages from the direct map may cause its fragmentation on architectures that use large pages to map the physical memory which affects the system performance. However, the original Kconfig text for CONFIG_DIRECT_GBPAGES said that gigabyte pages in the direct map "... can improve the kernel's performance a tiny bit ..." (commit 00d1c5e05736 ("x86: add gbpages switches")) and the recent report [1] showed that "... although 1G mappings are a good default choice, there is no compelling evidence that it must be the only choice". Hence, it is sufficient to have secretmem disabled by default with the ability of a system administrator to enable it at boot time. In addition, there is also a long term goal to improve management of the direct map. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/213b4567-46ce-f116-9cdf-bbd0c884eb3c@linux.intel.com/ v19: * block /dev/mem mmap access, per David * disallow mmap/mprotect with PROT_EXEC, per Kees * simplify return in page_is_secretmem(), per Matthew * use unsigned int for syscall falgs, per Yury v18: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210303162209.8609-1-rppt@kernel.org * rebase on v5.12-rc1 * merge kfence fix into the original patch * massage commit message of the patch introducing the memfd_secret syscall v17: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210208084920.2884-1-rppt@kernel.org * Remove pool of large pages backing secretmem allocations, per Michal Hocko * Add secretmem pages to unevictable LRU, per Michal Hocko * Use GFP_HIGHUSER as secretmem mapping mask, per Michal Hocko * Make secretmem an opt-in feature that is disabled by default v16: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210121122723.3446-1-rppt@kernel.org * Fix memory leak intorduced in v15 * Clean the data left from previous page user before handing the page to the userspace v15: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210120180612.1058-1-rppt@kernel.org * Add riscv/Kconfig update to disable set_memory operations for nommu builds (patch 3) * Update the code around add_to_page_cache() per Matthew's comments (patches 6,7) * Add fixups for build/checkpatch errors discovered by CI systems Older history: v14: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20201203062949.5484-1-rppt@kernel.org v13: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20201201074559.27742-1-rppt@kernel.org v12: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20201125092208.12544-1-rppt@kernel.org v11: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20201124092556.12009-1-rppt@kernel.org v10: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20201123095432.5860-1-rppt@kernel.org v9: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20201117162932.13649-1-rppt@kernel.org v8: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20201110151444.20662-1-rppt@kernel.org v7: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20201026083752.13267-1-rppt@kernel.org v6: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200924132904.1391-1-rppt@kernel.org v5: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200916073539.3552-1-rppt@kernel.org v4: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200818141554.13945-1-rppt@kernel.org v3: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200804095035.18778-1-rppt@kernel.org v2: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200727162935.31714-1-rppt@kernel.org v1: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200720092435.17469-1-rppt@kernel.org rfc-v2: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200706172051.19465-1-rppt@kernel.org/ rfc-v1: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200130162340.GA14232@rapoport-lnx/ rfc-v0: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/1572171452-7958-1-git-send-email-rppt@kernel.org/ Mike Rapoport (8): mmap: make mlock_future_check() global riscv/Kconfig: make direct map manipulation options depend on MMU set_memory: allow set_direct_map_*_noflush() for multiple pages set_memory: allow querying whether set_direct_map_*() is actually enabled mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas PM: hibernate: disable when there are active secretmem users arch, mm: wire up memfd_secret system call where relevant secretmem: test: add basic selftest for memfd_secret(2) arch/arm64/include/asm/Kbuild | 1 - arch/arm64/include/asm/cacheflush.h | 6 - arch/arm64/include/asm/kfence.h | 2 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/set_memory.h | 17 ++ arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h | 1 + arch/arm64/kernel/machine_kexec.c | 1 + arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c | 6 +- arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c | 23 +- arch/riscv/Kconfig | 4 +- arch/riscv/include/asm/set_memory.h | 4 +- arch/riscv/include/asm/unistd.h | 1 + arch/riscv/mm/pageattr.c | 8 +- arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 1 + arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h | 4 +- arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c | 8 +- drivers/char/mem.c | 4 + include/linux/secretmem.h | 54 ++++ include/linux/set_memory.h | 16 +- include/linux/syscalls.h | 1 + include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h | 7 +- include/uapi/linux/magic.h | 1 + kernel/power/hibernate.c | 5 +- kernel/power/snapshot.c | 4 +- kernel/sys_ni.c | 2 + mm/Kconfig | 4 + mm/Makefile | 1 + mm/gup.c | 12 + mm/internal.h | 3 + mm/mlock.c | 3 +- mm/mmap.c | 5 +- mm/secretmem.c | 254 +++++++++++++++++++ mm/vmalloc.c | 5 +- scripts/checksyscalls.sh | 4 + tools/testing/selftests/vm/.gitignore | 1 + tools/testing/selftests/vm/Makefile | 3 +- tools/testing/selftests/vm/memfd_secret.c | 296 ++++++++++++++++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/vm/run_vmtests.sh | 17 ++ 38 files changed, 744 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/asm/set_memory.h create mode 100644 include/linux/secretmem.h create mode 100644 mm/secretmem.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/vm/memfd_secret.c base-commit: 6efb943b8616ec53a5e444193dccf1af9ad627b5 Acked-by: James Bottomley