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Tue, 10 Nov 2020 14:20:52 -0800 (PST) Date: Tue, 10 Nov 2020 23:20:14 +0100 In-Reply-To: Message-Id: <0a9b63bff116734ab63d99ebd09c244332d71958.1605046662.git.andreyknvl@google.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 References: X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.29.2.222.g5d2a92d10f8-goog Subject: [PATCH v2 10/20] kasan: inline and rename kasan_unpoison_memory From: Andrey Konovalov To: Dmitry Vyukov , Alexander Potapenko , Marco Elver X-CRM114-Version: 20100106-BlameMichelson ( TRE 0.8.0 (BSD) ) MR-646709E3 X-CRM114-CacheID: sfid-20201110_172100_600239_1ED966F4 X-CRM114-Status: GOOD ( 17.89 ) X-BeenThere: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: Branislav Rankov , Catalin Marinas , Kevin Brodsky , Will Deacon , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, Andrey Konovalov , Andrey Ryabinin , Andrew Morton , Vincenzo Frascino , Evgenii Stepanov Sender: "linux-arm-kernel" Errors-To: linux-arm-kernel-bounces+linux-arm-kernel=archiver.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org Currently kasan_unpoison_memory() is used as both an external annotation and as an internal memory poisoning helper. Rename external annotation to kasan_unpoison_data() and inline the internal helper for hardware tag-based mode to avoid undeeded function calls. There's the external annotation kasan_unpoison_slab() that is currently defined as static inline and uses kasan_unpoison_memory(). With this change it's turned into a function call. Overall, this results in the same number of calls for hardware tag-based mode as kasan_unpoison_memory() is now inlined. Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/Ia7c8b659f79209935cbaab3913bf7f082cc43a0e --- include/linux/kasan.h | 16 ++++++---------- kernel/fork.c | 2 +- mm/kasan/common.c | 10 ++++++++++ mm/kasan/hw_tags.c | 6 ------ mm/kasan/kasan.h | 7 +++++++ mm/slab_common.c | 2 +- 6 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/kasan.h b/include/linux/kasan.h index 53c8e8b12fbc..f1a5042ae4fc 100644 --- a/include/linux/kasan.h +++ b/include/linux/kasan.h @@ -74,14 +74,15 @@ static inline void kasan_disable_current(void) {} #ifdef CONFIG_KASAN -void kasan_unpoison_memory(const void *address, size_t size); - void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order); void kasan_free_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order); void kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache, unsigned int *size, slab_flags_t *flags); +void kasan_unpoison_data(const void *address, size_t size); +void kasan_unpoison_slab(const void *ptr); + void kasan_poison_slab(struct page *page); void kasan_unpoison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object); void kasan_poison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object); @@ -106,11 +107,6 @@ struct kasan_cache { int free_meta_offset; }; -size_t __ksize(const void *); -static inline void kasan_unpoison_slab(const void *ptr) -{ - kasan_unpoison_memory(ptr, __ksize(ptr)); -} size_t kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache); bool kasan_save_enable_multi_shot(void); @@ -118,8 +114,6 @@ void kasan_restore_multi_shot(bool enabled); #else /* CONFIG_KASAN */ -static inline void kasan_unpoison_memory(const void *address, size_t size) {} - static inline void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order) {} static inline void kasan_free_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order) {} @@ -127,6 +121,9 @@ static inline void kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache, unsigned int *size, slab_flags_t *flags) {} +static inline void kasan_unpoison_data(const void *address, size_t size) { } +static inline void kasan_unpoison_slab(const void *ptr) { } + static inline void kasan_poison_slab(struct page *page) {} static inline void kasan_unpoison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object) {} @@ -166,7 +163,6 @@ static inline bool kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object, return false; } -static inline void kasan_unpoison_slab(const void *ptr) { } static inline size_t kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache) { return 0; } #endif /* CONFIG_KASAN */ diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c index 1c905e4290ab..883898487b3f 100644 --- a/kernel/fork.c +++ b/kernel/fork.c @@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ static unsigned long *alloc_thread_stack_node(struct task_struct *tsk, int node) continue; /* Mark stack accessible for KASAN. */ - kasan_unpoison_memory(s->addr, THREAD_SIZE); + kasan_unpoison_data(s->addr, THREAD_SIZE); /* Clear stale pointers from reused stack. */ memset(s->addr, 0, THREAD_SIZE); diff --git a/mm/kasan/common.c b/mm/kasan/common.c index a266b90636a1..4598c1364f19 100644 --- a/mm/kasan/common.c +++ b/mm/kasan/common.c @@ -184,6 +184,16 @@ struct kasan_free_meta *kasan_get_free_meta(struct kmem_cache *cache, return kasan_reset_tag(object) + cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset; } +void kasan_unpoison_data(const void *address, size_t size) +{ + kasan_unpoison_memory(address, size); +} + +void kasan_unpoison_slab(const void *ptr) +{ + kasan_unpoison_memory(ptr, __ksize(ptr)); +} + void kasan_poison_slab(struct page *page) { unsigned long i; diff --git a/mm/kasan/hw_tags.c b/mm/kasan/hw_tags.c index 0303e49904b4..838b29e44e32 100644 --- a/mm/kasan/hw_tags.c +++ b/mm/kasan/hw_tags.c @@ -30,12 +30,6 @@ void kasan_init_hw_tags(void) pr_info("KernelAddressSanitizer initialized\n"); } -void kasan_unpoison_memory(const void *address, size_t size) -{ - hw_set_mem_tag_range(kasan_reset_tag(address), - round_up(size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE), get_tag(address)); -} - void kasan_set_free_info(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object, u8 tag) { diff --git a/mm/kasan/kasan.h b/mm/kasan/kasan.h index ab7314418604..2d3c99125996 100644 --- a/mm/kasan/kasan.h +++ b/mm/kasan/kasan.h @@ -283,6 +283,12 @@ static inline void kasan_poison_memory(const void *address, size_t size, u8 valu round_up(size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE), value); } +static inline void kasan_unpoison_memory(const void *address, size_t size) +{ + hw_set_mem_tag_range(kasan_reset_tag(address), + round_up(size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE), get_tag(address)); +} + static inline bool check_invalid_free(void *addr) { u8 ptr_tag = get_tag(addr); @@ -295,6 +301,7 @@ static inline bool check_invalid_free(void *addr) #else /* CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS */ void kasan_poison_memory(const void *address, size_t size, u8 value); +void kasan_unpoison_memory(const void *address, size_t size); bool check_invalid_free(void *addr); #endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS */ diff --git a/mm/slab_common.c b/mm/slab_common.c index 53d0f8bb57ea..f1b0c4a22f08 100644 --- a/mm/slab_common.c +++ b/mm/slab_common.c @@ -1176,7 +1176,7 @@ size_t ksize(const void *objp) * We assume that ksize callers could use whole allocated area, * so we need to unpoison this area. */ - kasan_unpoison_memory(objp, size); + kasan_unpoison_data(objp, size); return size; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(ksize);