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[182.249.80.206]) by mx.google.com with ESMTPSA id uj2sm152027160pab.14.2014.07.04.00.32.32 for (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA bits=128/128); Fri, 04 Jul 2014 00:32:35 -0700 (PDT) From: AKASHI Takahiro To: wad@chromium.org, catalin.marinas@arm.com, will.deacon@arm.com Subject: [RESEND PATCH v4 2/2] arm64: Add seccomp support Date: Fri, 4 Jul 2014 16:31:55 +0900 Message-Id: <1404459115-8292-3-git-send-email-takahiro.akashi@linaro.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.9.1 In-Reply-To: <1404459115-8292-1-git-send-email-takahiro.akashi@linaro.org> References: <1404459115-8292-1-git-send-email-takahiro.akashi@linaro.org> X-CRM114-Version: 20100106-BlameMichelson ( TRE 0.8.0 (BSD) ) MR-646709E3 X-CRM114-CacheID: sfid-20140704_003258_185576_A43AA75E X-CRM114-Status: GOOD ( 15.98 ) X-Spam-Score: -2.3 (--) Cc: AKASHI Takahiro , dsaxena@linaro.org, linaro-kernel@lists.linaro.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org X-BeenThere: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.18-1 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: "linux-arm-kernel" Errors-To: linux-arm-kernel-bounces+patchwork-linux-arm=patchwork.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.9 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00, T_RP_MATCHES_RCVD, UNPARSEABLE_RELAY autolearn=unavailable version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on mail.kernel.org X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP secure_computing() should always be called first in syscall_trace_enter(). If it returns non-zero, we should stop further handling. Then that system call may eventually fail, be trapped or the process itself be killed depending on loaded rules. In this case, syscall_trace_enter() returns a dedicated value in order to skip a normal syscall table lookup because a seccomp rule may have already overridden errno. Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro --- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 14 ++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/seccomp.h | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd.h | 3 +++ arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 4 ++++ arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c | 6 ++++++ 5 files changed, 52 insertions(+) create mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/asm/seccomp.h diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig index 3a18571..eeac003 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig +++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig @@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ config ARM64 select HAVE_ARCH_AUDITSYSCALL select HAVE_ARCH_JUMP_LABEL select HAVE_ARCH_KGDB + select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER select HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK select HAVE_C_RECORDMCOUNT select HAVE_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE @@ -259,6 +260,19 @@ config ARCH_HAS_CACHE_LINE_SIZE source "mm/Kconfig" +config SECCOMP + bool "Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode" + ---help--- + This kernel feature is useful for number crunching applications + that may need to compute untrusted bytecode during their + execution. By using pipes or other transports made available to + the process as file descriptors supporting the read/write + syscalls, it's possible to isolate those applications in + their own address space using seccomp. Once seccomp is + enabled via prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP), it cannot be disabled + and the task is only allowed to execute a few safe syscalls + defined by each seccomp mode. + config XEN_DOM0 def_bool y depends on XEN diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/seccomp.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/seccomp.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c76fac9 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/seccomp.h @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +/* + * arch/arm64/include/asm/seccomp.h + * + * Copyright (C) 2014 Linaro Limited + * Author: AKASHI Takahiro + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as + * published by the Free Software Foundation. + */ +#ifndef _ASM_SECCOMP_H +#define _ASM_SECCOMP_H + +#include + +#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT +#define __NR_seccomp_read_32 __NR_compat_read +#define __NR_seccomp_write_32 __NR_compat_write +#define __NR_seccomp_exit_32 __NR_compat_exit +#define __NR_seccomp_sigreturn_32 __NR_compat_rt_sigreturn +#endif /* CONFIG_COMPAT */ + +#include + +#endif /* _ASM_SECCOMP_H */ diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd.h index c980ab7..729c155 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd.h @@ -31,6 +31,9 @@ * Compat syscall numbers used by the AArch64 kernel. */ #define __NR_compat_restart_syscall 0 +#define __NR_compat_exit 1 +#define __NR_compat_read 3 +#define __NR_compat_write 4 #define __NR_compat_sigreturn 119 #define __NR_compat_rt_sigreturn 173 diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S index 5141e79..fe55b4c 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S @@ -628,6 +628,10 @@ ENDPROC(el0_svc) __sys_trace: mov x0, sp bl syscall_trace_enter +#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP + cmp w0, #-EPERM // check seccomp result + b.eq ret_to_user // -EPERM means 'rejected' +#endif adr lr, __sys_trace_return // return address uxtw scno, w0 // syscall number (possibly new) mov x1, sp // pointer to regs diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c index 70526cf..baab5fc 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c @@ -21,12 +21,14 @@ #include #include +#include #include #include #include #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -1109,6 +1111,10 @@ static void tracehook_report_syscall(struct pt_regs *regs, asmlinkage int syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs) { + if (secure_computing(regs->syscallno) == -1) + /* seccomp failures shouldn't expose any additional code. */ + return -EPERM; + if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE)) tracehook_report_syscall(regs, PTRACE_SYSCALL_ENTER);