@@ -157,7 +157,13 @@ pmd_populate_kernel(struct mm_struct *mm, pmd_t *pmdp, pte_t *ptep)
static inline void
pmd_populate(struct mm_struct *mm, pmd_t *pmdp, pgtable_t ptep)
{
- __pmd_populate(pmdp, page_to_phys(ptep), _PAGE_USER_TABLE);
+#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_V7
+ if (elf_hwcap & HWCAP_PXN)
+ __pmd_populate(pmdp, page_to_phys(ptep),
+ _PAGE_USER_TABLE | PMD_PXNTABLE);
+ else
+#endif
+ __pmd_populate(pmdp, page_to_phys(ptep), _PAGE_USER_TABLE);
}
#define pmd_pgtable(pmd) pmd_page(pmd)
@@ -20,12 +20,14 @@
#define PMD_TYPE_FAULT (_AT(pmdval_t, 0) << 0)
#define PMD_TYPE_TABLE (_AT(pmdval_t, 1) << 0)
#define PMD_TYPE_SECT (_AT(pmdval_t, 2) << 0)
+#define PMD_PXNTABLE (_AT(pmdval_t, 1) << 2) /* v7 (optional) */
#define PMD_BIT4 (_AT(pmdval_t, 1) << 4)
#define PMD_DOMAIN(x) (_AT(pmdval_t, (x)) << 5)
#define PMD_PROTECTION (_AT(pmdval_t, 1) << 9) /* v5 */
/*
* - section
*/
+#define PMD_SECT_PXN (_AT(pmdval_t, 1) << 0) /* v7 (optional) */
#define PMD_SECT_BUFFERABLE (_AT(pmdval_t, 1) << 2)
#define PMD_SECT_CACHEABLE (_AT(pmdval_t, 1) << 3)
#define PMD_SECT_XN (_AT(pmdval_t, 1) << 4) /* v6 */
- PXN: Privileged execute-never(PXN) is a security feature. PXN bits determines whether the processor can execute software from the region. This is effective solution against ret2usr attack. This patch set PXN bit on user page table for preventing user code execution with privilege mode. Signed-off-by: Jungseung Lee <js07.lee@gmail.com> --- arch/arm/include/asm/pgalloc.h | 8 +++++++- arch/arm/include/asm/pgtable-2level-hwdef.h | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)