diff mbox

[5/7] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #3]

Message ID 147990565051.7576.9673287945782426886.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk (mailing list archive)
State New, archived
Headers show

Commit Message

David Howells Nov. 23, 2016, 12:54 p.m. UTC
Get the firmware's secure-boot status in the kernel boot wrapper and stash
it somewhere that the main kernel image can find.

The efi_get_secureboot() function is extracted from the arm stub and (a)
generalised so that it can be called from x86 and (b) made to use
efi_call_runtime() so that it can be run in mixed-mode.

Suggested-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---

 Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt           |    2 +
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c          |    2 +
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h     |    3 +
 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile     |    2 -
 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/arm-stub.c   |   46 -------------------
 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c |   71 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/linux/efi.h                       |    2 +
 7 files changed, 80 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c

Comments

James Bottomley Nov. 24, 2016, 7:41 p.m. UTC | #1
On Wed, 2016-11-23 at 12:54 +0000, David Howells wrote:
> Get the firmware's secure-boot status in the kernel boot wrapper and 
> stash it somewhere that the main kernel image can find.
> 
> The efi_get_secureboot() function is extracted from the arm stub and 
> (a) generalised so that it can be called from x86 and (b) made to use
> efi_call_runtime() so that it can be run in mixed-mode.
> 
> Suggested-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>

Since you seem to be using this to mean "is the platform locked down?",
this looks to be no longer complete in the UEFI 2.6 world.  If
DeployedMode == 0, even if SecureBoot == 1 and SetupMode == 0, you can
remove the platform key by writing 1 to AuditMode and gain control of
the secure variables.  The lock down state becomes DeployedMode == 1,
SecureBoot == 1 and SetupMode == 0

See the diagram on page 1817

http://www.uefi.org/sites/default/files/resources/UEFI%20Spec%202_6.pdf

James
David Howells Nov. 25, 2016, 9:30 a.m. UTC | #2
James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> wrote:

> Since you seem to be using this to mean "is the platform locked down?",
> this looks to be no longer complete in the UEFI 2.6 world.  If
> DeployedMode == 0, even if SecureBoot == 1 and SetupMode == 0, you can
> remove the platform key by writing 1 to AuditMode and gain control of
> the secure variables.  The lock down state becomes DeployedMode == 1,
> SecureBoot == 1 and SetupMode == 0
> 
> See the diagram on page 1817
> 
> http://www.uefi.org/sites/default/files/resources/UEFI%20Spec%202_6.pdf

How many pages?!

Does the DeployedMode variable not exist in older versions of the UEFI spec?

David
Ard Biesheuvel Nov. 25, 2016, 9:52 a.m. UTC | #3
On 25 November 2016 at 09:30, David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> wrote:
> James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> wrote:
>
>> Since you seem to be using this to mean "is the platform locked down?",
>> this looks to be no longer complete in the UEFI 2.6 world.  If
>> DeployedMode == 0, even if SecureBoot == 1 and SetupMode == 0, you can
>> remove the platform key by writing 1 to AuditMode and gain control of
>> the secure variables.  The lock down state becomes DeployedMode == 1,
>> SecureBoot == 1 and SetupMode == 0
>>
>> See the diagram on page 1817
>>
>> http://www.uefi.org/sites/default/files/resources/UEFI%20Spec%202_6.pdf
>
> How many pages?!
>
> Does the DeployedMode variable not exist in older versions of the UEFI spec?
>

No, it was added in 2.6
diff mbox

Patch

diff --git a/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt b/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt
index 95a4d34af3fd..b8527c6b7646 100644
--- a/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt
+++ b/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt
@@ -31,6 +31,8 @@  Offset	Proto	Name		Meaning
 1E9/001	ALL	eddbuf_entries	Number of entries in eddbuf (below)
 1EA/001	ALL	edd_mbr_sig_buf_entries	Number of entries in edd_mbr_sig_buffer
 				(below)
+1EB/001	ALL     kbd_status      Numlock is enabled
+1EC/001	ALL     secure_boot	Secure boot is enabled in the firmware
 1EF/001	ALL	sentinel	Used to detect broken bootloaders
 290/040	ALL	edd_mbr_sig_buffer EDD MBR signatures
 2D0/A00	ALL	e820_map	E820 memory map table
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
index c8c32ebcdfdb..6023b0e6f2af 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
@@ -1158,6 +1158,8 @@  struct boot_params *efi_main(struct efi_config *c,
 	else
 		setup_boot_services32(efi_early);
 
+	boot_params->secure_boot = (efi_get_secureboot(sys_table) == 1);
+
 	setup_graphics(boot_params);
 
 	setup_efi_pci(boot_params);
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h
index b10bf319ed20..5138dacf8bb8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h
@@ -135,7 +135,8 @@  struct boot_params {
 	__u8  eddbuf_entries;				/* 0x1e9 */
 	__u8  edd_mbr_sig_buf_entries;			/* 0x1ea */
 	__u8  kbd_status;				/* 0x1eb */
-	__u8  _pad5[3];					/* 0x1ec */
+	__u8  secure_boot;				/* 0x1ec */
+	__u8  _pad5[2];					/* 0x1ed */
 	/*
 	 * The sentinel is set to a nonzero value (0xff) in header.S.
 	 *
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile
index 6621b13c370f..9af966863612 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@  OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD	:= y
 # Prevents link failures: __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc() is not linked in.
 KCOV_INSTRUMENT			:= n
 
-lib-y				:= efi-stub-helper.o gop.o
+lib-y				:= efi-stub-helper.o gop.o secureboot.o
 
 # include the stub's generic dependencies from lib/ when building for ARM/arm64
 arm-deps := fdt_rw.c fdt_ro.c fdt_wip.c fdt.c fdt_empty_tree.c fdt_sw.c sort.c
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/arm-stub.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/arm-stub.c
index b4f7d78f9e8b..552ee61ddbed 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/arm-stub.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/arm-stub.c
@@ -20,52 +20,6 @@ 
 
 bool __nokaslr;
 
-static int efi_get_secureboot(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg)
-{
-	static efi_char16_t const sb_var_name[] = {
-		'S', 'e', 'c', 'u', 'r', 'e', 'B', 'o', 'o', 't', 0 };
-	static efi_char16_t const sm_var_name[] = {
-		'S', 'e', 't', 'u', 'p', 'M', 'o', 'd', 'e', 0 };
-
-	efi_guid_t var_guid = EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID;
-	efi_get_variable_t *f_getvar = sys_table_arg->runtime->get_variable;
-	u8 val;
-	unsigned long size = sizeof(val);
-	efi_status_t status;
-
-	status = f_getvar((efi_char16_t *)sb_var_name, (efi_guid_t *)&var_guid,
-			  NULL, &size, &val);
-
-	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
-		goto out_efi_err;
-
-	if (val == 0)
-		return 0;
-
-	status = f_getvar((efi_char16_t *)sm_var_name, (efi_guid_t *)&var_guid,
-			  NULL, &size, &val);
-
-	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
-		goto out_efi_err;
-
-	if (val == 1)
-		return 0;
-
-	return 1;
-
-out_efi_err:
-	switch (status) {
-	case EFI_NOT_FOUND:
-		return 0;
-	case EFI_DEVICE_ERROR:
-		return -EIO;
-	case EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION:
-		return -EACCES;
-	default:
-		return -EINVAL;
-	}
-}
-
 efi_status_t efi_open_volume(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg,
 			     void *__image, void **__fh)
 {
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..466fe24f5866
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ 
+/*
+ * Secure boot handling.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2013,2014 Linaro Limited
+ *     Roy Franz <roy.franz@linaro.org
+ * Copyright (C) 2013 Red Hat, Inc.
+ *     Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
+ *
+ * This file is part of the Linux kernel, and is made available under the
+ * terms of the GNU General Public License version 2.
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <linux/efi.h>
+#include <asm/efi.h>
+
+/* BIOS variables */
+static const efi_guid_t efi_variable_guid = EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID;
+static const efi_char16_t const efi_SecureBoot_name[] = {
+	'S', 'e', 'c', 'u', 'r', 'e', 'B', 'o', 'o', 't', 0
+};
+static const efi_char16_t const efi_SetupMode_name[] = {
+	'S', 'e', 't', 'u', 'p', 'M', 'o', 'd', 'e', 0
+};
+
+#define get_efi_var(name, vendor, ...) \
+	efi_call_runtime(get_variable, \
+			 (efi_char16_t *)(name), (efi_guid_t *)(vendor), \
+			 __VA_ARGS__);
+
+/*
+ * Determine whether we're in secure boot mode.
+ */
+int efi_get_secureboot(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg)
+{
+	u8 val;
+	unsigned long size = sizeof(val);
+	efi_status_t status;
+
+	status = get_efi_var(efi_SecureBoot_name, &efi_variable_guid,
+			     NULL, &size, &val);
+
+	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
+		goto out_efi_err;
+
+	if (val == 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	status = get_efi_var(efi_SetupMode_name, &efi_variable_guid,
+			     NULL, &size, &val);
+
+	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
+		goto out_efi_err;
+
+	if (val == 1)
+		return 0;
+
+	return 1;
+
+out_efi_err:
+	switch (status) {
+	case EFI_NOT_FOUND:
+		return 0;
+	case EFI_DEVICE_ERROR:
+		return -EIO;
+	case EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION:
+		return -EACCES;
+	default:
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+}
diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h
index c7904556d7a8..5d6c60a9caf8 100644
--- a/include/linux/efi.h
+++ b/include/linux/efi.h
@@ -1477,6 +1477,8 @@  efi_status_t efi_setup_gop(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg,
 bool efi_runtime_disabled(void);
 extern void efi_call_virt_check_flags(unsigned long flags, const char *call);
 
+int efi_get_secureboot(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg);
+
 /*
  * Arch code can implement the following three template macros, avoiding
  * reptition for the void/non-void return cases of {__,}efi_call_virt():