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Registered in England and Wales under Company Registration No. 3798903 Subject: [PATCH 4/7] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #7] From: David Howells To: matt@codeblueprint.co.uk, ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org Date: Tue, 31 Jan 2017 15:13:49 +0000 Message-ID: <148587562967.4026.18171897997650345605.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> In-Reply-To: <148587558696.4026.16034622623568539004.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> References: <148587558696.4026.16034622623568539004.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> User-Agent: StGit/0.17.1-dirty MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.68 on 10.5.11.24 X-Greylist: Sender IP whitelisted, not delayed by milter-greylist-4.5.16 (mx1.redhat.com [10.5.110.32]); Tue, 31 Jan 2017 15:13:55 +0000 (UTC) X-CRM114-Version: 20100106-BlameMichelson ( TRE 0.8.0 (BSD) ) MR-646709E3 X-CRM114-CacheID: sfid-20170131_071414_328214_29142EF2 X-CRM114-Status: GOOD ( 30.14 ) X-BeenThere: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.21 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dhowells@redhat.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Sender: "linux-arm-kernel" Errors-To: linux-arm-kernel-bounces+patchwork-linux-arm=patchwork.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP Get the firmware's secure-boot status in the kernel boot wrapper and stash it somewhere that the main kernel image can find. The efi_get_secureboot() function is extracted from the arm stub and (a) generalised so that it can be called from x86 and (b) made to use efi_call_runtime() so that it can be run in mixed-mode. For x86, it is stored in boot_params and can be overridden by the boot loader or kexec. This allows secure-boot mode to be passed on to a new kernel. Suggested-by: Lukas Wunner Signed-off-by: David Howells --- Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt | 2 + arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c | 6 +++ arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h | 3 + arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c | 1 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile | 2 - drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/arm-stub.c | 63 +++-------------------------- drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c | 63 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/efi.h | 8 ++++ 8 files changed, 89 insertions(+), 59 deletions(-) create mode 100644 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c diff --git a/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt b/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt index 95a4d34af3fd..b8527c6b7646 100644 --- a/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt +++ b/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt @@ -31,6 +31,8 @@ Offset Proto Name Meaning 1E9/001 ALL eddbuf_entries Number of entries in eddbuf (below) 1EA/001 ALL edd_mbr_sig_buf_entries Number of entries in edd_mbr_sig_buffer (below) +1EB/001 ALL kbd_status Numlock is enabled +1EC/001 ALL secure_boot Secure boot is enabled in the firmware 1EF/001 ALL sentinel Used to detect broken bootloaders 290/040 ALL edd_mbr_sig_buffer EDD MBR signatures 2D0/A00 ALL e820_map E820 memory map table diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c index f99978db6b6f..57c2c9c71e53 100644 --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c @@ -988,6 +988,12 @@ struct boot_params *efi_main(struct efi_config *c, else setup_boot_services32(efi_early); + /* If the boot loader gave us a value for secure_boot then we use that, + * otherwise we ask the BIOS. + */ + if (boot_params->secure_boot == efi_secureboot_mode_unset) + boot_params->secure_boot = efi_get_secureboot(sys_table); + setup_graphics(boot_params); setup_efi_pci(boot_params); diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h index b10bf319ed20..5138dacf8bb8 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h @@ -135,7 +135,8 @@ struct boot_params { __u8 eddbuf_entries; /* 0x1e9 */ __u8 edd_mbr_sig_buf_entries; /* 0x1ea */ __u8 kbd_status; /* 0x1eb */ - __u8 _pad5[3]; /* 0x1ec */ + __u8 secure_boot; /* 0x1ec */ + __u8 _pad5[2]; /* 0x1ed */ /* * The sentinel is set to a nonzero value (0xff) in header.S. * diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c b/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c index c62e015b126c..de827d6ac8c2 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c @@ -81,6 +81,7 @@ void common(void) { BLANK(); OFFSET(BP_scratch, boot_params, scratch); + OFFSET(BP_secure_boot, boot_params, secure_boot); OFFSET(BP_loadflags, boot_params, hdr.loadflags); OFFSET(BP_hardware_subarch, boot_params, hdr.hardware_subarch); OFFSET(BP_version, boot_params, hdr.version); diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile index 33e0e2f1a730..f7425960f6a5 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD := y # Prevents link failures: __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc() is not linked in. KCOV_INSTRUMENT := n -lib-y := efi-stub-helper.o gop.o +lib-y := efi-stub-helper.o gop.o secureboot.o # include the stub's generic dependencies from lib/ when building for ARM/arm64 arm-deps := fdt_rw.c fdt_ro.c fdt_wip.c fdt.c fdt_empty_tree.c fdt_sw.c sort.c diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/arm-stub.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/arm-stub.c index 6fca48c9e054..d4056c6be1ec 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/arm-stub.c +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/arm-stub.c @@ -20,52 +20,6 @@ bool __nokaslr; -static int efi_get_secureboot(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg) -{ - static efi_char16_t const sb_var_name[] = { - 'S', 'e', 'c', 'u', 'r', 'e', 'B', 'o', 'o', 't', 0 }; - static efi_char16_t const sm_var_name[] = { - 'S', 'e', 't', 'u', 'p', 'M', 'o', 'd', 'e', 0 }; - - efi_guid_t var_guid = EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID; - efi_get_variable_t *f_getvar = sys_table_arg->runtime->get_variable; - u8 val; - unsigned long size = sizeof(val); - efi_status_t status; - - status = f_getvar((efi_char16_t *)sb_var_name, (efi_guid_t *)&var_guid, - NULL, &size, &val); - - if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) - goto out_efi_err; - - if (val == 0) - return 0; - - status = f_getvar((efi_char16_t *)sm_var_name, (efi_guid_t *)&var_guid, - NULL, &size, &val); - - if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) - goto out_efi_err; - - if (val == 1) - return 0; - - return 1; - -out_efi_err: - switch (status) { - case EFI_NOT_FOUND: - return 0; - case EFI_DEVICE_ERROR: - return -EIO; - case EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION: - return -EACCES; - default: - return -EINVAL; - } -} - efi_status_t efi_open_volume(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg, void *__image, void **__fh) { @@ -157,7 +111,7 @@ unsigned long efi_entry(void *handle, efi_system_table_t *sys_table, efi_guid_t loaded_image_proto = LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL_GUID; unsigned long reserve_addr = 0; unsigned long reserve_size = 0; - int secure_boot = 0; + enum efi_secureboot_mode secure_boot; struct screen_info *si; /* Check if we were booted by the EFI firmware */ @@ -227,19 +181,14 @@ unsigned long efi_entry(void *handle, efi_system_table_t *sys_table, pr_efi_err(sys_table, "Failed to parse EFI cmdline options\n"); secure_boot = efi_get_secureboot(sys_table); - if (secure_boot > 0) - pr_efi(sys_table, "UEFI Secure Boot is enabled.\n"); - - if (secure_boot < 0) { - pr_efi_err(sys_table, - "could not determine UEFI Secure Boot status.\n"); - } /* - * Unauthenticated device tree data is a security hazard, so - * ignore 'dtb=' unless UEFI Secure Boot is disabled. + * Unauthenticated device tree data is a security hazard, so ignore + * 'dtb=' unless UEFI Secure Boot is disabled. We assume that secure + * boot is enabled if we can't determine its state. */ - if (secure_boot != 0 && strstr(cmdline_ptr, "dtb=")) { + if (secure_boot != efi_secureboot_mode_disabled && + strstr(cmdline_ptr, "dtb=")) { pr_efi(sys_table, "Ignoring DTB from command line.\n"); } else { status = handle_cmdline_files(sys_table, image, cmdline_ptr, diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..62d6904da800 --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c @@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ +/* + * Secure boot handling. + * + * Copyright (C) 2013,2014 Linaro Limited + * Roy Franz + * + * This file is part of the Linux kernel, and is made available under the + * terms of the GNU General Public License version 2. + * + */ + +#include +#include + +/* BIOS variables */ +static const efi_guid_t efi_variable_guid = EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID; +static const efi_char16_t const efi_SecureBoot_name[] = { + 'S', 'e', 'c', 'u', 'r', 'e', 'B', 'o', 'o', 't', 0 +}; +static const efi_char16_t const efi_SetupMode_name[] = { + 'S', 'e', 't', 'u', 'p', 'M', 'o', 'd', 'e', 0 +}; + +#define get_efi_var(name, vendor, ...) \ + efi_call_runtime(get_variable, \ + (efi_char16_t *)(name), (efi_guid_t *)(vendor), \ + __VA_ARGS__); + +/* + * Determine whether we're in secure boot mode. + */ +enum efi_secureboot_mode efi_get_secureboot(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg) +{ + u8 secboot, setupmode; + unsigned long size; + efi_status_t status; + + size = sizeof(secboot); + status = get_efi_var(efi_SecureBoot_name, &efi_variable_guid, + NULL, &size, &secboot); + if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) + goto out_efi_err; + + size = sizeof(setupmode); + status = get_efi_var(efi_SetupMode_name, &efi_variable_guid, + NULL, &size, &setupmode); + if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) + goto out_efi_err; + + if (secboot == 0 || setupmode == 1) + return efi_secureboot_mode_disabled; + + pr_efi(sys_table_arg, "UEFI Secure Boot is enabled.\n"); + return efi_secureboot_mode_enabled; + +out_efi_err: + pr_efi_err(sys_table_arg, "Could not determine UEFI Secure Boot status.\n"); + if (status == EFI_NOT_FOUND) + return efi_secureboot_mode_disabled; + return efi_secureboot_mode_unknown; +} diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h index 58c9dd48f42a..1c200cdbdc05 100644 --- a/include/linux/efi.h +++ b/include/linux/efi.h @@ -1480,6 +1480,14 @@ efi_status_t efi_setup_gop(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg, bool efi_runtime_disabled(void); extern void efi_call_virt_check_flags(unsigned long flags, const char *call); +enum efi_secureboot_mode { + efi_secureboot_mode_unset, + efi_secureboot_mode_unknown, + efi_secureboot_mode_disabled, + efi_secureboot_mode_enabled, +}; +enum efi_secureboot_mode efi_get_secureboot(efi_system_table_t *sys_table); + /* * Arch code can implement the following three template macros, avoiding * reptition for the void/non-void return cases of {__,}efi_call_virt():