| Message ID | 20200116062625.32692-3-dja@axtens.net (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
| Series | Fix some incompatibilites between KASAN and FORTIFY_SOURCE | expand |
On Thu, Jan 16, 2020 at 7:26 AM Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> wrote: > > The memcmp KASAN self-test fails on a kernel with both KASAN and > FORTIFY_SOURCE. > > When FORTIFY_SOURCE is on, a number of functions are replaced with > fortified versions, which attempt to check the sizes of the operands. > However, these functions often directly invoke __builtin_foo() once they > have performed the fortify check. Using __builtins may bypass KASAN > checks if the compiler decides to inline it's own implementation as > sequence of instructions, rather than emit a function call that goes out > to a KASAN-instrumented implementation. > > Why is only memcmp affected? > ============================ > > Of the string and string-like functions that kasan_test tests, only memcmp > is replaced by an inline sequence of instructions in my testing on x86 with > gcc version 9.2.1 20191008 (Ubuntu 9.2.1-9ubuntu2). > > I believe this is due to compiler heuristics. For example, if I annotate > kmalloc calls with the alloc_size annotation (and disable some fortify > compile-time checking!), the compiler will replace every memset except the > one in kmalloc_uaf_memset with inline instructions. (I have some WIP > patches to add this annotation.) > > Does this affect other functions in string.h? > ============================================= > > Yes. Anything that uses __builtin_* rather than __real_* could be > affected. This looks like: > > - strncpy > - strcat > - strlen > - strlcpy maybe, under some circumstances? > - strncat under some circumstances > - memset > - memcpy > - memmove > - memcmp (as noted) > - memchr > - strcpy > > Whether a function call is emitted always depends on the compiler. Most > bugs should get caught by FORTIFY_SOURCE, but the missed memcmp test shows > that this is not always the case. > > Isn't FORTIFY_SOURCE disabled with KASAN? > ========================================- > > The string headers on all arches supporting KASAN disable fortify with > kasan, but only when address sanitisation is _also_ disabled. For example > from x86: > > #if defined(CONFIG_KASAN) && !defined(__SANITIZE_ADDRESS__) > /* > * For files that are not instrumented (e.g. mm/slub.c) we > * should use not instrumented version of mem* functions. > */ > #define memcpy(dst, src, len) __memcpy(dst, src, len) > #define memmove(dst, src, len) __memmove(dst, src, len) > #define memset(s, c, n) __memset(s, c, n) > > #ifndef __NO_FORTIFY > #define __NO_FORTIFY /* FORTIFY_SOURCE uses __builtin_memcpy, etc. */ > #endif > > #endif > > This comes from commit 6974f0c4555e ("include/linux/string.h: add the > option of fortified string.h functions"), and doesn't work when KASAN is > enabled and the file is supposed to be sanitised - as with test_kasan.c > > I'm pretty sure this is not wrong, but not as expansive it should be: > > * we shouldn't use __builtin_memcpy etc in files where we don't have > instrumentation - it could devolve into a function call to memcpy, > which will be instrumented. Rather, we should use __memcpy which > by convention is not instrumented. > > * we also shouldn't be using __builtin_memcpy when we have a KASAN > instrumented file, because it could be replaced with inline asm > that will not be instrumented. > > What is correct behaviour? > ========================== > > Firstly, there is some overlap between fortification and KASAN: both > provide some level of _runtime_ checking. Only fortify provides > compile-time checking. > > KASAN and fortify can pick up different things at runtime: > > - Some fortify functions, notably the string functions, could easily be > modified to consider sub-object sizes (e.g. members within a struct), > and I have some WIP patches to do this. KASAN cannot detect these > because it cannot insert poision between members of a struct. > > - KASAN can detect many over-reads/over-writes when the sizes of both > operands are unknown, which fortify cannot. > > So there are a couple of options: > > 1) Flip the test: disable fortify in santised files and enable it in > unsanitised files. This at least stops us missing KASAN checking, but > we lose the fortify checking. > > 2) Make the fortify code always call out to real versions. Do this only > for KASAN, for fear of losing the inlining opportunities we get from > __builtin_*. > > (We can't use kasan_check_{read,write}: because the fortify functions are > _extern inline_, you can't include _static_ inline functions without a > compiler warning. kasan_check_{read,write} are static inline so we can't > use them even when they would otherwise be suitable.) > > Take approach 2 and call out to real versions when KASAN is enabled. > > Use __underlying_foo to distinguish from __real_foo: __real_foo always > refers to the kernel's implementation of foo, __underlying_foo could be > either the kernel implementation or the __builtin_foo implementation. > > This is sometimes enough to make the memcmp test succeed with > FORTIFY_SOURCE enabled. It is at least enough to get the function call > into the module. One more fix is needed to make it reliable: see the next > patch. > > Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> > Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> > Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> > Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> > Fixes: 6974f0c4555e ("include/linux/string.h: add the option of fortified string.h functions") > Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> > --- > > v2: add #undefs, do not drop arch code: Dmitry pointed out that we _do_ want > to disable fortify in non-sanitised files because of how __builtin_memcpy > might end up as a call to regular memcpy rather than __memcpy. > > Dmitry, this might cause a few new syzkaller splats - I first picked it up > building from a syskaller config. Or it might not, it just depends what gets > replaced with an inline sequence of instructions. If you mean new true bugs, I don't think it's changing anything on top of the hundreds of known existing open bugs: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/upstream#open If anything, I would say it's good to surface more true bugs. > checkpatch complains about some over-long lines, happy to change the format > if anyone has better ideas for how to lay it out. > --- > include/linux/string.h | 60 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- > 1 file changed, 48 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/include/linux/string.h b/include/linux/string.h > index 3b8e8b12dd37..18d3f7a4b2b9 100644 > --- a/include/linux/string.h > +++ b/include/linux/string.h > @@ -317,6 +317,31 @@ void __read_overflow3(void) __compiletime_error("detected read beyond size of ob > void __write_overflow(void) __compiletime_error("detected write beyond size of object passed as 1st parameter"); > > #if !defined(__NO_FORTIFY) && defined(__OPTIMIZE__) && defined(CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE) > + > +#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN > +extern void *__underlying_memchr(const void *p, int c, __kernel_size_t size) __RENAME(memchr); > +extern int __underlying_memcmp(const void *p, const void *q, __kernel_size_t size) __RENAME(memcmp); > +extern void *__underlying_memcpy(void *p, const void *q, __kernel_size_t size) __RENAME(memcpy); > +extern void *__underlying_memmove(void *p, const void *q, __kernel_size_t size) __RENAME(memmove); > +extern void *__underlying_memset(void *p, int c, __kernel_size_t size) __RENAME(memset); > +extern char *__underlying_strcat(char *p, const char *q) __RENAME(strcat); > +extern char *__underlying_strcpy(char *p, const char *q) __RENAME(strcpy); > +extern __kernel_size_t __underlying_strlen(const char *p) __RENAME(strlen); > +extern char *__underlying_strncat(char *p, const char *q, __kernel_size_t count) __RENAME(strncat); > +extern char *__underlying_strncpy(char *p, const char *q, __kernel_size_t size) __RENAME(strncpy); > +#else > +#define __underlying_memchr __builtin_memchr > +#define __underlying_memcmp __builtin_memcmp > +#define __underlying_memcpy __builtin_memcpy > +#define __underlying_memmove __builtin_memmove > +#define __underlying_memset __builtin_memset > +#define __underlying_strcat __builtin_strcat > +#define __underlying_strcpy __builtin_strcpy > +#define __underlying_strlen __builtin_strlen > +#define __underlying_strncat __builtin_strncat > +#define __underlying_strncpy __builtin_strncpy > +#endif > + > __FORTIFY_INLINE char *strncpy(char *p, const char *q, __kernel_size_t size) > { > size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0); > @@ -324,14 +349,14 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE char *strncpy(char *p, const char *q, __kernel_size_t size) > __write_overflow(); > if (p_size < size) > fortify_panic(__func__); > - return __builtin_strncpy(p, q, size); > + return __underlying_strncpy(p, q, size); > } > > __FORTIFY_INLINE char *strcat(char *p, const char *q) > { > size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0); > if (p_size == (size_t)-1) > - return __builtin_strcat(p, q); > + return __underlying_strcat(p, q); > if (strlcat(p, q, p_size) >= p_size) > fortify_panic(__func__); > return p; > @@ -345,7 +370,7 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE __kernel_size_t strlen(const char *p) > /* Work around gcc excess stack consumption issue */ > if (p_size == (size_t)-1 || > (__builtin_constant_p(p[p_size - 1]) && p[p_size - 1] == '\0')) > - return __builtin_strlen(p); > + return __underlying_strlen(p); > ret = strnlen(p, p_size); > if (p_size <= ret) > fortify_panic(__func__); > @@ -378,7 +403,7 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE size_t strlcpy(char *p, const char *q, size_t size) > __write_overflow(); > if (len >= p_size) > fortify_panic(__func__); > - __builtin_memcpy(p, q, len); > + __underlying_memcpy(p, q, len); > p[len] = '\0'; > } > return ret; > @@ -391,12 +416,12 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE char *strncat(char *p, const char *q, __kernel_size_t count) > size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0); > size_t q_size = __builtin_object_size(q, 0); > if (p_size == (size_t)-1 && q_size == (size_t)-1) > - return __builtin_strncat(p, q, count); > + return __underlying_strncat(p, q, count); > p_len = strlen(p); > copy_len = strnlen(q, count); > if (p_size < p_len + copy_len + 1) > fortify_panic(__func__); > - __builtin_memcpy(p + p_len, q, copy_len); > + __underlying_memcpy(p + p_len, q, copy_len); > p[p_len + copy_len] = '\0'; > return p; > } > @@ -408,7 +433,7 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE void *memset(void *p, int c, __kernel_size_t size) > __write_overflow(); > if (p_size < size) > fortify_panic(__func__); > - return __builtin_memset(p, c, size); > + return __underlying_memset(p, c, size); > } > > __FORTIFY_INLINE void *memcpy(void *p, const void *q, __kernel_size_t size) > @@ -423,7 +448,7 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE void *memcpy(void *p, const void *q, __kernel_size_t size) > } > if (p_size < size || q_size < size) > fortify_panic(__func__); > - return __builtin_memcpy(p, q, size); > + return __underlying_memcpy(p, q, size); > } > > __FORTIFY_INLINE void *memmove(void *p, const void *q, __kernel_size_t size) > @@ -438,7 +463,7 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE void *memmove(void *p, const void *q, __kernel_size_t size) > } > if (p_size < size || q_size < size) > fortify_panic(__func__); > - return __builtin_memmove(p, q, size); > + return __underlying_memmove(p, q, size); > } > > extern void *__real_memscan(void *, int, __kernel_size_t) __RENAME(memscan); > @@ -464,7 +489,7 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE int memcmp(const void *p, const void *q, __kernel_size_t size) > } > if (p_size < size || q_size < size) > fortify_panic(__func__); > - return __builtin_memcmp(p, q, size); > + return __underlying_memcmp(p, q, size); > } > > __FORTIFY_INLINE void *memchr(const void *p, int c, __kernel_size_t size) > @@ -474,7 +499,7 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE void *memchr(const void *p, int c, __kernel_size_t size) > __read_overflow(); > if (p_size < size) > fortify_panic(__func__); > - return __builtin_memchr(p, c, size); > + return __underlying_memchr(p, c, size); > } > > void *__real_memchr_inv(const void *s, int c, size_t n) __RENAME(memchr_inv); > @@ -505,11 +530,22 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE char *strcpy(char *p, const char *q) > size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0); > size_t q_size = __builtin_object_size(q, 0); > if (p_size == (size_t)-1 && q_size == (size_t)-1) > - return __builtin_strcpy(p, q); > + return __underlying_strcpy(p, q); > memcpy(p, q, strlen(q) + 1); > return p; > } > > +/* Don't use these outside the FORITFY_SOURCE implementation */ > +#undef __underlying_memchr > +#undef __underlying_memcmp > +#undef __underlying_memcpy > +#undef __underlying_memmove > +#undef __underlying_memset > +#undef __underlying_strcat > +#undef __underlying_strcpy > +#undef __underlying_strlen > +#undef __underlying_strncat > +#undef __underlying_strncpy > #endif > > /** > -- > 2.20.1 >
diff --git a/include/linux/string.h b/include/linux/string.h index 3b8e8b12dd37..18d3f7a4b2b9 100644 --- a/include/linux/string.h +++ b/include/linux/string.h @@ -317,6 +317,31 @@ void __read_overflow3(void) __compiletime_error("detected read beyond size of ob void __write_overflow(void) __compiletime_error("detected write beyond size of object passed as 1st parameter"); #if !defined(__NO_FORTIFY) && defined(__OPTIMIZE__) && defined(CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE) + +#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN +extern void *__underlying_memchr(const void *p, int c, __kernel_size_t size) __RENAME(memchr); +extern int __underlying_memcmp(const void *p, const void *q, __kernel_size_t size) __RENAME(memcmp); +extern void *__underlying_memcpy(void *p, const void *q, __kernel_size_t size) __RENAME(memcpy); +extern void *__underlying_memmove(void *p, const void *q, __kernel_size_t size) __RENAME(memmove); +extern void *__underlying_memset(void *p, int c, __kernel_size_t size) __RENAME(memset); +extern char *__underlying_strcat(char *p, const char *q) __RENAME(strcat); +extern char *__underlying_strcpy(char *p, const char *q) __RENAME(strcpy); +extern __kernel_size_t __underlying_strlen(const char *p) __RENAME(strlen); +extern char *__underlying_strncat(char *p, const char *q, __kernel_size_t count) __RENAME(strncat); +extern char *__underlying_strncpy(char *p, const char *q, __kernel_size_t size) __RENAME(strncpy); +#else +#define __underlying_memchr __builtin_memchr +#define __underlying_memcmp __builtin_memcmp +#define __underlying_memcpy __builtin_memcpy +#define __underlying_memmove __builtin_memmove +#define __underlying_memset __builtin_memset +#define __underlying_strcat __builtin_strcat +#define __underlying_strcpy __builtin_strcpy +#define __underlying_strlen __builtin_strlen +#define __underlying_strncat __builtin_strncat +#define __underlying_strncpy __builtin_strncpy +#endif + __FORTIFY_INLINE char *strncpy(char *p, const char *q, __kernel_size_t size) { size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0); @@ -324,14 +349,14 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE char *strncpy(char *p, const char *q, __kernel_size_t size) __write_overflow(); if (p_size < size) fortify_panic(__func__); - return __builtin_strncpy(p, q, size); + return __underlying_strncpy(p, q, size); } __FORTIFY_INLINE char *strcat(char *p, const char *q) { size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0); if (p_size == (size_t)-1) - return __builtin_strcat(p, q); + return __underlying_strcat(p, q); if (strlcat(p, q, p_size) >= p_size) fortify_panic(__func__); return p; @@ -345,7 +370,7 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE __kernel_size_t strlen(const char *p) /* Work around gcc excess stack consumption issue */ if (p_size == (size_t)-1 || (__builtin_constant_p(p[p_size - 1]) && p[p_size - 1] == '\0')) - return __builtin_strlen(p); + return __underlying_strlen(p); ret = strnlen(p, p_size); if (p_size <= ret) fortify_panic(__func__); @@ -378,7 +403,7 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE size_t strlcpy(char *p, const char *q, size_t size) __write_overflow(); if (len >= p_size) fortify_panic(__func__); - __builtin_memcpy(p, q, len); + __underlying_memcpy(p, q, len); p[len] = '\0'; } return ret; @@ -391,12 +416,12 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE char *strncat(char *p, const char *q, __kernel_size_t count) size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0); size_t q_size = __builtin_object_size(q, 0); if (p_size == (size_t)-1 && q_size == (size_t)-1) - return __builtin_strncat(p, q, count); + return __underlying_strncat(p, q, count); p_len = strlen(p); copy_len = strnlen(q, count); if (p_size < p_len + copy_len + 1) fortify_panic(__func__); - __builtin_memcpy(p + p_len, q, copy_len); + __underlying_memcpy(p + p_len, q, copy_len); p[p_len + copy_len] = '\0'; return p; } @@ -408,7 +433,7 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE void *memset(void *p, int c, __kernel_size_t size) __write_overflow(); if (p_size < size) fortify_panic(__func__); - return __builtin_memset(p, c, size); + return __underlying_memset(p, c, size); } __FORTIFY_INLINE void *memcpy(void *p, const void *q, __kernel_size_t size) @@ -423,7 +448,7 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE void *memcpy(void *p, const void *q, __kernel_size_t size) } if (p_size < size || q_size < size) fortify_panic(__func__); - return __builtin_memcpy(p, q, size); + return __underlying_memcpy(p, q, size); } __FORTIFY_INLINE void *memmove(void *p, const void *q, __kernel_size_t size) @@ -438,7 +463,7 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE void *memmove(void *p, const void *q, __kernel_size_t size) } if (p_size < size || q_size < size) fortify_panic(__func__); - return __builtin_memmove(p, q, size); + return __underlying_memmove(p, q, size); } extern void *__real_memscan(void *, int, __kernel_size_t) __RENAME(memscan); @@ -464,7 +489,7 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE int memcmp(const void *p, const void *q, __kernel_size_t size) } if (p_size < size || q_size < size) fortify_panic(__func__); - return __builtin_memcmp(p, q, size); + return __underlying_memcmp(p, q, size); } __FORTIFY_INLINE void *memchr(const void *p, int c, __kernel_size_t size) @@ -474,7 +499,7 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE void *memchr(const void *p, int c, __kernel_size_t size) __read_overflow(); if (p_size < size) fortify_panic(__func__); - return __builtin_memchr(p, c, size); + return __underlying_memchr(p, c, size); } void *__real_memchr_inv(const void *s, int c, size_t n) __RENAME(memchr_inv); @@ -505,11 +530,22 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE char *strcpy(char *p, const char *q) size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0); size_t q_size = __builtin_object_size(q, 0); if (p_size == (size_t)-1 && q_size == (size_t)-1) - return __builtin_strcpy(p, q); + return __underlying_strcpy(p, q); memcpy(p, q, strlen(q) + 1); return p; } +/* Don't use these outside the FORITFY_SOURCE implementation */ +#undef __underlying_memchr +#undef __underlying_memcmp +#undef __underlying_memcpy +#undef __underlying_memmove +#undef __underlying_memset +#undef __underlying_strcat +#undef __underlying_strcpy +#undef __underlying_strlen +#undef __underlying_strncat +#undef __underlying_strncpy #endif /**
The memcmp KASAN self-test fails on a kernel with both KASAN and FORTIFY_SOURCE. When FORTIFY_SOURCE is on, a number of functions are replaced with fortified versions, which attempt to check the sizes of the operands. However, these functions often directly invoke __builtin_foo() once they have performed the fortify check. Using __builtins may bypass KASAN checks if the compiler decides to inline it's own implementation as sequence of instructions, rather than emit a function call that goes out to a KASAN-instrumented implementation. Why is only memcmp affected? ============================ Of the string and string-like functions that kasan_test tests, only memcmp is replaced by an inline sequence of instructions in my testing on x86 with gcc version 9.2.1 20191008 (Ubuntu 9.2.1-9ubuntu2). I believe this is due to compiler heuristics. For example, if I annotate kmalloc calls with the alloc_size annotation (and disable some fortify compile-time checking!), the compiler will replace every memset except the one in kmalloc_uaf_memset with inline instructions. (I have some WIP patches to add this annotation.) Does this affect other functions in string.h? ============================================= Yes. Anything that uses __builtin_* rather than __real_* could be affected. This looks like: - strncpy - strcat - strlen - strlcpy maybe, under some circumstances? - strncat under some circumstances - memset - memcpy - memmove - memcmp (as noted) - memchr - strcpy Whether a function call is emitted always depends on the compiler. Most bugs should get caught by FORTIFY_SOURCE, but the missed memcmp test shows that this is not always the case. Isn't FORTIFY_SOURCE disabled with KASAN? ========================================- The string headers on all arches supporting KASAN disable fortify with kasan, but only when address sanitisation is _also_ disabled. For example from x86: #if defined(CONFIG_KASAN) && !defined(__SANITIZE_ADDRESS__) /* * For files that are not instrumented (e.g. mm/slub.c) we * should use not instrumented version of mem* functions. */ #define memcpy(dst, src, len) __memcpy(dst, src, len) #define memmove(dst, src, len) __memmove(dst, src, len) #define memset(s, c, n) __memset(s, c, n) #ifndef __NO_FORTIFY #define __NO_FORTIFY /* FORTIFY_SOURCE uses __builtin_memcpy, etc. */ #endif #endif This comes from commit 6974f0c4555e ("include/linux/string.h: add the option of fortified string.h functions"), and doesn't work when KASAN is enabled and the file is supposed to be sanitised - as with test_kasan.c I'm pretty sure this is not wrong, but not as expansive it should be: * we shouldn't use __builtin_memcpy etc in files where we don't have instrumentation - it could devolve into a function call to memcpy, which will be instrumented. Rather, we should use __memcpy which by convention is not instrumented. * we also shouldn't be using __builtin_memcpy when we have a KASAN instrumented file, because it could be replaced with inline asm that will not be instrumented. What is correct behaviour? ========================== Firstly, there is some overlap between fortification and KASAN: both provide some level of _runtime_ checking. Only fortify provides compile-time checking. KASAN and fortify can pick up different things at runtime: - Some fortify functions, notably the string functions, could easily be modified to consider sub-object sizes (e.g. members within a struct), and I have some WIP patches to do this. KASAN cannot detect these because it cannot insert poision between members of a struct. - KASAN can detect many over-reads/over-writes when the sizes of both operands are unknown, which fortify cannot. So there are a couple of options: 1) Flip the test: disable fortify in santised files and enable it in unsanitised files. This at least stops us missing KASAN checking, but we lose the fortify checking. 2) Make the fortify code always call out to real versions. Do this only for KASAN, for fear of losing the inlining opportunities we get from __builtin_*. (We can't use kasan_check_{read,write}: because the fortify functions are _extern inline_, you can't include _static_ inline functions without a compiler warning. kasan_check_{read,write} are static inline so we can't use them even when they would otherwise be suitable.) Take approach 2 and call out to real versions when KASAN is enabled. Use __underlying_foo to distinguish from __real_foo: __real_foo always refers to the kernel's implementation of foo, __underlying_foo could be either the kernel implementation or the __builtin_foo implementation. This is sometimes enough to make the memcmp test succeed with FORTIFY_SOURCE enabled. It is at least enough to get the function call into the module. One more fix is needed to make it reliable: see the next patch. Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Fixes: 6974f0c4555e ("include/linux/string.h: add the option of fortified string.h functions") Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> --- v2: add #undefs, do not drop arch code: Dmitry pointed out that we _do_ want to disable fortify in non-sanitised files because of how __builtin_memcpy might end up as a call to regular memcpy rather than __memcpy. Dmitry, this might cause a few new syzkaller splats - I first picked it up building from a syskaller config. Or it might not, it just depends what gets replaced with an inline sequence of instructions. checkpatch complains about some over-long lines, happy to change the format if anyone has better ideas for how to lay it out. --- include/linux/string.h | 60 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 48 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)