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Fri, 30 Oct 2020 06:09:16 +0000 Received: from AM6PR04MB4919.eurprd04.prod.outlook.com ([fe80::f063:76fc:db1a:905b]) by AM6PR04MB4919.eurprd04.prod.outlook.com ([fe80::f063:76fc:db1a:905b%6]) with mapi id 15.20.3477.035; Fri, 30 Oct 2020 06:09:16 +0000 From: Chester Lin To: ardb@kernel.org, zohar@linux.ibm.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com, catalin.marinas@arm.com, will@kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, hpa@zytor.com Subject: [PATCH v3 1/3] efi: generalize efi_get_secureboot Date: Fri, 30 Oct 2020 14:08:38 +0800 Message-ID: <20201030060840.1810-2-clin@suse.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.28.0 In-Reply-To: <20201030060840.1810-1-clin@suse.com> References: <20201030060840.1810-1-clin@suse.com> X-Originating-IP: [36.225.26.227] X-ClientProxiedBy: HK0PR01CA0049.apcprd01.prod.exchangelabs.com (2603:1096:203:a6::13) To AM6PR04MB4919.eurprd04.prod.outlook.com (2603:10a6:20b:c::23) MIME-Version: 1.0 X-MS-Exchange-MessageSentRepresentingType: 1 Received: from localhost.localdomain (36.225.26.227) by HK0PR01CA0049.apcprd01.prod.exchangelabs.com (2603:1096:203:a6::13) with Microsoft SMTP Server (version=TLS1_2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) id 15.20.3499.19 via Frontend Transport; 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Signed-off-by: Chester Lin --- drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile | 2 +- drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub.c | 2 +- drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h | 22 ++++--- drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c | 76 ----------------------- drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c | 2 +- include/linux/efi.h | 41 +++++++++++- 6 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 88 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile index 8a94388e38b3..88e47b0ca09d 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile @@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD := y # Prevents link failures: __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc() is not linked in. KCOV_INSTRUMENT := n -lib-y := efi-stub-helper.o gop.o secureboot.o tpm.o \ +lib-y := efi-stub-helper.o gop.o tpm.o \ file.o mem.o random.o randomalloc.o pci.o \ skip_spaces.o lib-cmdline.o lib-ctype.o \ alignedmem.o relocate.o vsprintf.o diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub.c index 914a343c7785..ad96f1d786a9 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub.c +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub.c @@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ efi_status_t __efiapi efi_pe_entry(efi_handle_t handle, /* Ask the firmware to clear memory on unclean shutdown */ efi_enable_reset_attack_mitigation(); - secure_boot = efi_get_secureboot(); + secure_boot = efi_get_secureboot(get_efi_var); /* * Unauthenticated device tree data is a security hazard, so ignore diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h index 2d7abcd99de9..b1833b51e6d6 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h @@ -91,14 +91,6 @@ efi_status_t __efiapi efi_pe_entry(efi_handle_t handle, fdt_setprop((fdt), (node_offset), (name), &(var), sizeof(var)) #endif -#define get_efi_var(name, vendor, ...) \ - efi_rt_call(get_variable, (efi_char16_t *)(name), \ - (efi_guid_t *)(vendor), __VA_ARGS__) - -#define set_efi_var(name, vendor, ...) \ - efi_rt_call(set_variable, (efi_char16_t *)(name), \ - (efi_guid_t *)(vendor), __VA_ARGS__) - #define efi_get_handle_at(array, idx) \ (efi_is_native() ? (array)[idx] \ : (efi_handle_t)(unsigned long)((u32 *)(array))[idx]) @@ -112,6 +104,20 @@ efi_status_t __efiapi efi_pe_entry(efi_handle_t handle, ((handle = efi_get_handle_at((array), i)) || true); \ i++) +static inline +efi_status_t get_efi_var(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *vendor, u32 *attr, + unsigned long *size, void *data) +{ + return efi_rt_call(get_variable, name, vendor, attr, size, data); +} + +static inline +efi_status_t set_efi_var(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *vendor, u32 attr, + unsigned long size, void *data) +{ + return efi_rt_call(set_variable, name, vendor, attr, size, data); +} + static inline void efi_set_u64_split(u64 data, u32 *lo, u32 *hi) { diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c deleted file mode 100644 index 5efc524b14be..000000000000 --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,76 +0,0 @@ -// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 -/* - * Secure boot handling. - * - * Copyright (C) 2013,2014 Linaro Limited - * Roy Franz - */ -#include -#include - -#include "efistub.h" - -/* BIOS variables */ -static const efi_guid_t efi_variable_guid = EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID; -static const efi_char16_t efi_SecureBoot_name[] = L"SecureBoot"; -static const efi_char16_t efi_SetupMode_name[] = L"SetupMode"; - -/* SHIM variables */ -static const efi_guid_t shim_guid = EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID; -static const efi_char16_t shim_MokSBState_name[] = L"MokSBState"; - -/* - * Determine whether we're in secure boot mode. - * - * Please keep the logic in sync with - * arch/x86/xen/efi.c:xen_efi_get_secureboot(). - */ -enum efi_secureboot_mode efi_get_secureboot(void) -{ - u32 attr; - u8 secboot, setupmode, moksbstate; - unsigned long size; - efi_status_t status; - - size = sizeof(secboot); - status = get_efi_var(efi_SecureBoot_name, &efi_variable_guid, - NULL, &size, &secboot); - if (status == EFI_NOT_FOUND) - return efi_secureboot_mode_disabled; - if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) - goto out_efi_err; - - size = sizeof(setupmode); - status = get_efi_var(efi_SetupMode_name, &efi_variable_guid, - NULL, &size, &setupmode); - if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) - goto out_efi_err; - - if (secboot == 0 || setupmode == 1) - return efi_secureboot_mode_disabled; - - /* - * See if a user has put the shim into insecure mode. If so, and if the - * variable doesn't have the runtime attribute set, we might as well - * honor that. - */ - size = sizeof(moksbstate); - status = get_efi_var(shim_MokSBState_name, &shim_guid, - &attr, &size, &moksbstate); - - /* If it fails, we don't care why. Default to secure */ - if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) - goto secure_boot_enabled; - if (!(attr & EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS) && moksbstate == 1) - return efi_secureboot_mode_disabled; - -secure_boot_enabled: - efi_info("UEFI Secure Boot is enabled.\n"); - return efi_secureboot_mode_enabled; - -out_efi_err: - efi_err("Could not determine UEFI Secure Boot status.\n"); - return efi_secureboot_mode_unknown; -} diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c index 3672539cb96e..3f9b492c566b 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c @@ -781,7 +781,7 @@ unsigned long efi_main(efi_handle_t handle, * otherwise we ask the BIOS. */ if (boot_params->secure_boot == efi_secureboot_mode_unset) - boot_params->secure_boot = efi_get_secureboot(); + boot_params->secure_boot = efi_get_secureboot(get_efi_var); /* Ask the firmware to clear memory on unclean shutdown */ efi_enable_reset_attack_mitigation(); diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h index d7c0e73af2b9..cc2d3de39031 100644 --- a/include/linux/efi.h +++ b/include/linux/efi.h @@ -1089,7 +1089,46 @@ enum efi_secureboot_mode { efi_secureboot_mode_disabled, efi_secureboot_mode_enabled, }; -enum efi_secureboot_mode efi_get_secureboot(void); + +static inline enum efi_secureboot_mode efi_get_secureboot(efi_get_variable_t *get_var) +{ + efi_guid_t var_guid = EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID; + efi_guid_t shim_guid = EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID; + efi_status_t status; + unsigned long size; + u8 secboot, setupmode, moksbstate; + u32 attr; + + size = sizeof(secboot); + status = get_var(L"SecureBoot", &var_guid, NULL, &size, &secboot); + + if (status == EFI_NOT_FOUND) + return efi_secureboot_mode_disabled; + if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) + return efi_secureboot_mode_unknown; + + size = sizeof(setupmode); + status = get_var(L"SetupMode", &var_guid, NULL, &size, &setupmode); + + if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) + return efi_secureboot_mode_unknown; + if (secboot == 0 || setupmode == 1) + return efi_secureboot_mode_disabled; + + /* + * See if a user has put the shim into insecure mode. If so, and if the + * variable doesn't have the runtime attribute set, we might as well + * honor that. + */ + size = sizeof(moksbstate); + status = get_var(L"MokSBState", &shim_guid, &attr, &size, &moksbstate); + /* If it fails, we don't care why. Default to secure */ + if (status == EFI_SUCCESS && moksbstate == 1 + && !(attr & EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS)) + return efi_secureboot_mode_disabled; + + return efi_secureboot_mode_enabled; +} #ifdef CONFIG_RESET_ATTACK_MITIGATION void efi_enable_reset_attack_mitigation(void);