From patchwork Fri Oct 28 23:40:25 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: "Jason A. Donenfeld" X-Patchwork-Id: 13024411 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from bombadil.infradead.org (bombadil.infradead.org [198.137.202.133]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 22B35FA3741 for ; Fri, 28 Oct 2022 23:41:46 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=lists.infradead.org; s=bombadil.20210309; h=Sender: Content-Transfer-Encoding:Content-Type:List-Subscribe:List-Help:List-Post: List-Archive:List-Unsubscribe:List-Id:MIME-Version:Message-Id:Date:Subject:Cc :To:From:Reply-To:Content-ID:Content-Description:Resent-Date:Resent-From: Resent-Sender:Resent-To:Resent-Cc:Resent-Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: List-Owner; bh=3+UrXyVPK1g0APQiM+6yJBvoyiR+5ipLNv4KLjn/doM=; b=wTh0h3dWhBvmVb OsXW54nAeKVoPo0yYeO+8s65eeCM01HkibcHT3uKQhW+8u/IytbhWEXjkkkrQSmtzqwC6ep3Kaj4G WVjI3fh24O9KglkulhFun/NznG+DJr9+Z1kRifZJZE6bIdvB7L3zSq+0CL2YcoV0z2Qx/WtcUbzTU 1kl1NjsIIy90QK/D4ZytJDfVumtAWQIYUeP8bIyCQPZ1pEyEiNkayhWv0N4GvO32fC4EmPiyfjQPj ZIL1Ox4NUbQ8M/yMIyvRgzhByfH0G2261tTfpTTepgH17dbiaqPFSuMeB0oKjv1f1xAEUCf67+fal V7tq2n+y8ot9O9fjV+3A==; Received: from localhost ([::1] helo=bombadil.infradead.org) by bombadil.infradead.org with esmtp (Exim 4.94.2 #2 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1ooYxx-003HMA-R7; Fri, 28 Oct 2022 23:40:45 +0000 Received: from ams.source.kernel.org ([2604:1380:4601:e00::1]) by bombadil.infradead.org with esmtps (Exim 4.94.2 #2 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1ooYxu-003HLR-VF for linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org; Fri, 28 Oct 2022 23:40:45 +0000 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ams.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 6FDA4B82D9A; Fri, 28 Oct 2022 23:40:41 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 5141EC433D6; Fri, 28 Oct 2022 23:40:39 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=zx2c4.com header.i=@zx2c4.com header.b="PB+weiRE" DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=zx2c4.com; s=20210105; t=1667000437; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding; bh=cp1Xr1b0al/fXFCbuvHhFS7yT6OAQVKZYDYFdLMcyIc=; b=PB+weiREJSJgZVfkz58SPQiIAV1W8QU2tt8R107aoTX7yo+d9d/uWKMtINVzQoODHODEna U5yRE23sBGGxWaYcWfeqfOftRpMkOEeEMrEjsjf+yKvWMyidVak8fO4av6UM8Sd3KXr0l9 vc89vsRwN9ctWa2tSkoKQj2Nm+DoXHo= Received: by mail.zx2c4.com (ZX2C4 Mail Server) with ESMTPSA id 2b502cb8 (TLSv1.3:TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256:NO); Fri, 28 Oct 2022 23:40:36 +0000 (UTC) From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" To: catalin.marinas@arm.com, will@kernel.org, jean-philippe@linaro.org, ardb@kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Subject: [PATCH] random: remove early archrandom abstraction Date: Sat, 29 Oct 2022 01:40:25 +0200 Message-Id: <20221028234025.82222-1-Jason@zx2c4.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-CRM114-Version: 20100106-BlameMichelson ( TRE 0.8.0 (BSD) ) MR-646709E3 X-CRM114-CacheID: sfid-20221028_164043_529308_6B9CC859 X-CRM114-Status: GOOD ( 20.91 ) X-BeenThere: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.34 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Sender: "linux-arm-kernel" Errors-To: linux-arm-kernel-bounces+linux-arm-kernel=archiver.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org The arch_get_random*_early() abstraction is not completely useful and adds complexity, because it's not a given that there will be no calls to arch_get_random*() between random_init_early(), which uses arch_get_random*_early(), and init_cpu_features(). During that gap, crng_reseed() might be called, which uses arch_get_random*(), since it's mostly not init code. Instead we can test whether we're in the early phase in arch_get_random*() itself, and in doing so avoid all ambiguity about where we are. Fortunately, the only architecture that currently implements arch_get_random*_early() also has an alternatives-based cpu feature system, one flag of which determines whether the other flags have been initialized. This makes it possible to do the early check with zero cost once the system is initialized. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld --- Catalin - Though this touches arm64's archrandom.h, I intend to take this through the random.git tree, if that's okay. I have other patches that will build off of this one. -Jason arch/arm64/include/asm/archrandom.h | 57 ++++++----------------------- drivers/char/random.c | 4 +- include/linux/random.h | 20 ---------- 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 67 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/archrandom.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/archrandom.h index 109e2a4454be..8a059a9033af 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/archrandom.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/archrandom.h @@ -58,6 +58,16 @@ static inline bool __arm64_rndrrs(unsigned long *v) return ok; } +static __always_inline bool __cpu_has_rng(void) +{ + if (!system_capabilities_finalized()) { + /* Open code as we run prior to the first call to cpufeature. */ + unsigned long ftr = read_sysreg_s(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1); + return (ftr >> ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1_RNDR_SHIFT) & 0xf; + } + return cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_HAS_RNG); +} + static inline size_t __must_check arch_get_random_longs(unsigned long *v, size_t max_longs) { /* @@ -66,7 +76,7 @@ static inline size_t __must_check arch_get_random_longs(unsigned long *v, size_t * cpufeature code and with potential scheduling between CPUs * with and without the feature. */ - if (max_longs && cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_HAS_RNG) && __arm64_rndr(v)) + if (max_longs && __cpu_has_rng() && __arm64_rndr(v)) return 1; return 0; } @@ -108,53 +118,10 @@ static inline size_t __must_check arch_get_random_seed_longs(unsigned long *v, s * reseeded after each invocation. This is not a 100% fit but good * enough to implement this API if no other entropy source exists. */ - if (cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_HAS_RNG) && __arm64_rndrrs(v)) + if (__cpu_has_rng() && __arm64_rndrrs(v)) return 1; return 0; } -static inline bool __init __early_cpu_has_rndr(void) -{ - /* Open code as we run prior to the first call to cpufeature. */ - unsigned long ftr = read_sysreg_s(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1); - return (ftr >> ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1_RNDR_SHIFT) & 0xf; -} - -static inline size_t __init __must_check -arch_get_random_seed_longs_early(unsigned long *v, size_t max_longs) -{ - WARN_ON(system_state != SYSTEM_BOOTING); - - if (!max_longs) - return 0; - - if (smccc_trng_available) { - struct arm_smccc_res res; - - max_longs = min_t(size_t, 3, max_longs); - arm_smccc_1_1_invoke(ARM_SMCCC_TRNG_RND64, max_longs * 64, &res); - if ((int)res.a0 >= 0) { - switch (max_longs) { - case 3: - *v++ = res.a1; - fallthrough; - case 2: - *v++ = res.a2; - fallthrough; - case 1: - *v++ = res.a3; - break; - } - return max_longs; - } - } - - if (__early_cpu_has_rndr() && __arm64_rndr(v)) - return 1; - - return 0; -} -#define arch_get_random_seed_longs_early arch_get_random_seed_longs_early - #endif /* _ASM_ARCHRANDOM_H */ diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 6f323344d0b9..e3cf4f51ed58 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -813,13 +813,13 @@ void __init random_init_early(const char *command_line) #endif for (i = 0, arch_bits = sizeof(entropy) * 8; i < ARRAY_SIZE(entropy);) { - longs = arch_get_random_seed_longs_early(entropy, ARRAY_SIZE(entropy) - i); + longs = arch_get_random_seed_longs(entropy, ARRAY_SIZE(entropy) - i); if (longs) { _mix_pool_bytes(entropy, sizeof(*entropy) * longs); i += longs; continue; } - longs = arch_get_random_longs_early(entropy, ARRAY_SIZE(entropy) - i); + longs = arch_get_random_longs(entropy, ARRAY_SIZE(entropy) - i); if (longs) { _mix_pool_bytes(entropy, sizeof(*entropy) * longs); i += longs; diff --git a/include/linux/random.h b/include/linux/random.h index 182780cafd45..2bdd3add3400 100644 --- a/include/linux/random.h +++ b/include/linux/random.h @@ -153,26 +153,6 @@ declare_get_random_var_wait(long, unsigned long) #include -/* - * Called from the boot CPU during startup; not valid to call once - * secondary CPUs are up and preemption is possible. - */ -#ifndef arch_get_random_seed_longs_early -static inline size_t __init arch_get_random_seed_longs_early(unsigned long *v, size_t max_longs) -{ - WARN_ON(system_state != SYSTEM_BOOTING); - return arch_get_random_seed_longs(v, max_longs); -} -#endif - -#ifndef arch_get_random_longs_early -static inline bool __init arch_get_random_longs_early(unsigned long *v, size_t max_longs) -{ - WARN_ON(system_state != SYSTEM_BOOTING); - return arch_get_random_longs(v, max_longs); -} -#endif - #ifdef CONFIG_SMP int random_prepare_cpu(unsigned int cpu); int random_online_cpu(unsigned int cpu);