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Thu, 29 Aug 2019 04:35:58 -0700 (PDT) From: Viresh Kumar To: stable@vger.kernel.org, Julien Thierry , Mark Rutland Subject: [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 25/44] arm64: Add skeleton to harden the branch predictor against aliasing attacks Date: Thu, 29 Aug 2019 17:04:10 +0530 Message-Id: <4cab9c33e7a8e9959e7cc8b296740be72544d4d0.1567077734.git.viresh.kumar@linaro.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.21.0.rc0.269.g1a574e7a288b In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 X-CRM114-Version: 20100106-BlameMichelson ( TRE 0.8.0 (BSD) ) MR-646709E3 X-CRM114-CacheID: sfid-20190829_043600_655998_F15A3457 X-CRM114-Status: GOOD ( 25.59 ) X-Spam-Score: -0.2 (/) X-Spam-Report: SpamAssassin version 3.4.2 on bombadil.infradead.org summary: Content analysis details: (-0.2 points) pts rule name description ---- ---------------------- -------------------------------------------------- -0.0 RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE RBL: Sender listed at https://www.dnswl.org/, no trust [2607:f8b0:4864:20:0:0:0:641 listed in] [list.dnswl.org] 0.0 SPF_HELO_NONE SPF: HELO does not publish an SPF Record -0.0 SPF_PASS SPF: sender matches SPF record -0.1 DKIM_VALID_AU Message has a valid DKIM or DK signature from author's domain -0.1 DKIM_VALID_EF Message has a valid DKIM or DK signature from envelope-from domain -0.1 DKIM_VALID Message has at least one valid DKIM or DK signature 0.1 DKIM_SIGNED Message has a DKIM or DK signature, not necessarily valid X-BeenThere: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: Marc Zyngier , Viresh Kumar , Will Deacon , mark.brown@arm.com, Catalin Marinas , Russell King , linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Sender: "linux-arm-kernel" Errors-To: linux-arm-kernel-bounces+patchwork-linux-arm=patchwork.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org From: Will Deacon commit 0f15adbb2861ce6f75ccfc5a92b19eae0ef327d0 upstream. Aliasing attacks against CPU branch predictors can allow an attacker to redirect speculative control flow on some CPUs and potentially divulge information from one context to another. This patch adds initial skeleton code behind a new Kconfig option to enable implementation-specific mitigations against these attacks for CPUs that are affected. Co-developed-by: Marc Zyngier Signed-off-by: Will Deacon Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas [ v4.4: Changes made according to 4.4 codebase ] Signed-off-by: Viresh Kumar --- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 17 +++++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 3 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu.h | 39 +++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h | 2 + arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile | 5 ++ arch/arm64/kernel/bpi.S | 55 +++++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c | 74 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 3 +- arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 8 ++-- arch/arm64/mm/context.c | 2 + arch/arm64/mm/fault.c | 16 +++++++ 11 files changed, 219 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/arm64/kernel/bpi.S diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig index f18b8c26a959..5fa01073566b 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig +++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig @@ -624,6 +624,23 @@ config FORCE_MAX_ZONEORDER However for 4K, we choose a higher default value, 11 as opposed to 10, giving us 4M allocations matching the default size used by generic code. +config HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR + bool "Harden the branch predictor against aliasing attacks" if EXPERT + default y + help + Speculation attacks against some high-performance processors rely on + being able to manipulate the branch predictor for a victim context by + executing aliasing branches in the attacker context. Such attacks + can be partially mitigated against by clearing internal branch + predictor state and limiting the prediction logic in some situations. + + This config option will take CPU-specific actions to harden the + branch predictor against aliasing attacks and may rely on specific + instruction sequences or control bits being set by the system + firmware. + + If unsure, say Y. + menuconfig ARMV8_DEPRECATED bool "Emulate deprecated/obsolete ARMv8 instructions" depends on COMPAT diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h index 1bc51f8835e5..93fb24d14d95 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h @@ -32,8 +32,9 @@ #define ARM64_WORKAROUND_834220 7 #define ARM64_WORKAROUND_CAVIUM_27456 8 #define ARM64_HAS_32BIT_EL0 9 +#define ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR 10 -#define ARM64_NCAPS 10 +#define ARM64_NCAPS 11 #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__ diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu.h index 990124a67eeb..8d0129210416 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu.h @@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ #ifndef __ASM_MMU_H #define __ASM_MMU_H +#include + typedef struct { atomic64_t id; void *vdso; @@ -28,6 +30,43 @@ typedef struct { */ #define ASID(mm) ((mm)->context.id.counter & 0xffff) +typedef void (*bp_hardening_cb_t)(void); + +struct bp_hardening_data { + int hyp_vectors_slot; + bp_hardening_cb_t fn; +}; + +#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR +extern char __bp_harden_hyp_vecs_start[], __bp_harden_hyp_vecs_end[]; + +DECLARE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(struct bp_hardening_data, bp_hardening_data); + +static inline struct bp_hardening_data *arm64_get_bp_hardening_data(void) +{ + return this_cpu_ptr(&bp_hardening_data); +} + +static inline void arm64_apply_bp_hardening(void) +{ + struct bp_hardening_data *d; + + if (!cpus_have_cap(ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR)) + return; + + d = arm64_get_bp_hardening_data(); + if (d->fn) + d->fn(); +} +#else +static inline struct bp_hardening_data *arm64_get_bp_hardening_data(void) +{ + return NULL; +} + +static inline void arm64_apply_bp_hardening(void) { } +#endif /* CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR */ + extern void paging_init(void); extern void __iomem *early_io_map(phys_addr_t phys, unsigned long virt); extern void init_mem_pgprot(void); diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h index 50150320f80d..523b089fb408 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h @@ -95,6 +95,8 @@ #define ID_AA64ISAR0_AES_SHIFT 4 /* id_aa64pfr0 */ +#define ID_AA64PFR0_CSV2_SHIFT 56 +#define ID_AA64PFR0_SVE_SHIFT 32 #define ID_AA64PFR0_GIC_SHIFT 24 #define ID_AA64PFR0_ASIMD_SHIFT 20 #define ID_AA64PFR0_FP_SHIFT 16 diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile b/arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile index 474691f8b13a..aa8f28210219 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile @@ -42,7 +42,12 @@ arm64-obj-$(CONFIG_PCI) += pci.o arm64-obj-$(CONFIG_ARMV8_DEPRECATED) += armv8_deprecated.o arm64-obj-$(CONFIG_ACPI) += acpi.o +ifeq ($(CONFIG_KVM),y) +arm64-obj-$(CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR) += bpi.o +endif + obj-y += $(arm64-obj-y) vdso/ + obj-m += $(arm64-obj-m) head-y := head.o extra-y += $(head-y) vmlinux.lds diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/bpi.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/bpi.S new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..06a931eb2673 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/bpi.S @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +/* + * Contains CPU specific branch predictor invalidation sequences + * + * Copyright (C) 2018 ARM Ltd. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as + * published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program. If not, see . + */ + +#include + +.macro ventry target + .rept 31 + nop + .endr + b \target +.endm + +.macro vectors target + ventry \target + 0x000 + ventry \target + 0x080 + ventry \target + 0x100 + ventry \target + 0x180 + + ventry \target + 0x200 + ventry \target + 0x280 + ventry \target + 0x300 + ventry \target + 0x380 + + ventry \target + 0x400 + ventry \target + 0x480 + ventry \target + 0x500 + ventry \target + 0x580 + + ventry \target + 0x600 + ventry \target + 0x680 + ventry \target + 0x700 + ventry \target + 0x780 +.endm + + .align 11 +ENTRY(__bp_harden_hyp_vecs_start) + .rept 4 + vectors __kvm_hyp_vector + .endr +ENTRY(__bp_harden_hyp_vecs_end) diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c index 047f1da59cb1..19c51d1cd302 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c @@ -43,6 +43,80 @@ is_affected_midr_range(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope) return (midr >= entry->midr_range_min && midr <= entry->midr_range_max); } +#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR +#include +#include + +DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(struct bp_hardening_data, bp_hardening_data); + +#ifdef CONFIG_KVM +static void __copy_hyp_vect_bpi(int slot, const char *hyp_vecs_start, + const char *hyp_vecs_end) +{ + void *dst = __bp_harden_hyp_vecs_start + slot * SZ_2K; + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < SZ_2K; i += 0x80) + memcpy(dst + i, hyp_vecs_start, hyp_vecs_end - hyp_vecs_start); + + flush_icache_range((uintptr_t)dst, (uintptr_t)dst + SZ_2K); +} + +static void __install_bp_hardening_cb(bp_hardening_cb_t fn, + const char *hyp_vecs_start, + const char *hyp_vecs_end) +{ + static int last_slot = -1; + static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(bp_lock); + int cpu, slot = -1; + + spin_lock(&bp_lock); + for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) { + if (per_cpu(bp_hardening_data.fn, cpu) == fn) { + slot = per_cpu(bp_hardening_data.hyp_vectors_slot, cpu); + break; + } + } + + if (slot == -1) { + last_slot++; + BUG_ON(((__bp_harden_hyp_vecs_end - __bp_harden_hyp_vecs_start) + / SZ_2K) <= last_slot); + slot = last_slot; + __copy_hyp_vect_bpi(slot, hyp_vecs_start, hyp_vecs_end); + } + + __this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.hyp_vectors_slot, slot); + __this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.fn, fn); + spin_unlock(&bp_lock); +} +#else +static void __install_bp_hardening_cb(bp_hardening_cb_t fn, + const char *hyp_vecs_start, + const char *hyp_vecs_end) +{ + __this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.fn, fn); +} +#endif /* CONFIG_KVM */ + +static void install_bp_hardening_cb(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, + bp_hardening_cb_t fn, + const char *hyp_vecs_start, + const char *hyp_vecs_end) +{ + u64 pfr0; + + if (!entry->matches(entry, SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU)) + return; + + pfr0 = read_cpuid(ID_AA64PFR0_EL1); + if (cpuid_feature_extract_unsigned_field(pfr0, ID_AA64PFR0_CSV2_SHIFT)) + return; + + __install_bp_hardening_cb(fn, hyp_vecs_start, hyp_vecs_end); +} +#endif /* CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR */ + #define MIDR_RANGE(model, min, max) \ .def_scope = SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU, \ .matches = is_affected_midr_range, \ diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c index 474b34243521..07c39d1f4479 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c @@ -83,7 +83,8 @@ static struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64isar0[] = { }; static struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64pfr0[] = { - ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, 32, 32, 0), + ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_NONSTRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64PFR0_CSV2_SHIFT, 4, 0), + ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, 32, 24, 0), ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, 28, 4, 0), ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, ID_AA64PFR0_GIC_SHIFT, 4, 0), ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64PFR0_ASIMD_SHIFT, 4, ID_AA64PFR0_ASIMD_NI), diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S index e6aec982dea9..05bfc71639fc 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S @@ -495,13 +495,15 @@ ENDPROC(el1_irq) * Instruction abort handling */ mrs x26, far_el1 - // enable interrupts before calling the main handler - enable_dbg_and_irq + msr daifclr, #(8 | 4 | 1) +#ifdef CONFIG_TRACE_IRQFLAGS + bl trace_hardirqs_off +#endif ct_user_exit mov x0, x26 orr x1, x25, #1 << 24 // use reserved ISS bit for instruction aborts mov x2, sp - bl do_mem_abort + bl do_el0_ia_bp_hardening b ret_to_user el0_fpsimd_acc: /* diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/context.c b/arch/arm64/mm/context.c index 492d2968fa8f..be42bd3dca5c 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/mm/context.c +++ b/arch/arm64/mm/context.c @@ -193,6 +193,8 @@ asmlinkage void post_ttbr_update_workaround(void) "ic iallu; dsb nsh; isb", ARM64_WORKAROUND_CAVIUM_27456, CONFIG_CAVIUM_ERRATUM_27456)); + + arm64_apply_bp_hardening(); } static int asids_init(void) diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c b/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c index 89abdf9af4e6..1878c881a247 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c +++ b/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c @@ -535,6 +535,22 @@ asmlinkage void __exception do_mem_abort(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr, arm64_notify_die("", regs, &info, esr); } +asmlinkage void __exception do_el0_ia_bp_hardening(unsigned long addr, + unsigned int esr, + struct pt_regs *regs) +{ + /* + * We've taken an instruction abort from userspace and not yet + * re-enabled IRQs. If the address is a kernel address, apply + * BP hardening prior to enabling IRQs and pre-emption. + */ + if (addr > TASK_SIZE) + arm64_apply_bp_hardening(); + + local_irq_enable(); + do_mem_abort(addr, esr, regs); +} + /* * Handle stack alignment exceptions. */